NOBLE v DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION and ANOR [1997] NSWCA 225
NSW Caselaw
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NOBLE v DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION and
ANOR
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
GLEESON CJ, HANDLEY and SHELLER JJA
19 February 1997, 19 February 1997
[1997] NSWCA 225
LICENCE — Application under Water Act 1912 — Requirement to provide
particulars with application held to be directory only — substantial compliance with
requirement — McRae v Coulton (1986) 7 NSWLR 644 followed — "particulars of
application" — Water Act s10(3), s11(1).
WATER ACT — LICENSING
On an appeal to the Land and Environment Court, from a Local Land Board, under
s11 of the Water Act 1912, following a favourable report by the Board concerning an
application for a licence under s12, it was argued that the applicants for the licence
had failed to give, in their application, all the particulars required by the Act. The
Court held that the requirements of the Act were directory only, and that there had
been substantial compliance — HELD — The Court's decision was correct.
Mr Rae v Coulton (1986) 7 NSWLR 644 followed.
Gleeson CJ This is an appeal from a decision of Bannon J in the Land and
Environment Court given in February of last year.
The first respondent, the Department of Land and Water Conservation, has
taken the point that no appeal lies to this Court from the decision of Bannon J.
In that respect the respondent points to the provisions of s11(6) of the Water Act
1912 and in particular the stipulation that the decision of the Land and
Environment Court in a case such as the present "shall be final". Reliance is also
placed upon Farrant v Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (1959) SR
(NSW) 283. The point has not been fully argued, and in the view that I take of
the manner in which the court should dispose of the grounds of appeal it is not
necessary for us to decide it. It suffices to say that I should not be taken to have
determined the existence of the right of appeal contended for by the appellant.
The background to this appeal may be summarised as follows. Yandyguinula
Creek, which is a tributary of the Monongolo River, and which extends to the
Great Dividing Range, flows in a manner which is described in part of the
evidence as being generally quite reliable. Nevertheless, it is said, on occasions
low flows occur. Low flows became of concern to local landholders in 1994
because of the number of people reliant on the creek catchment for stock and
domestic purposes. A public meeting was held on 12 February 1994 to advise
landholders of their rights and of the requirements of the Water Act 1912.
Mr and Mrs Eldridge, the second respondents to this appeal, occupy land at
some distance from the Yandyguinula Creek. They graze cattle and sheep, there
is a sawmill on the property and also a dwelling house. Apparently some years
before March 1994 Mr and Mrs Eldridge had installed a diversion pipeline by
means of which they drew water from the Yandyguinula Creek to their property.
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Not being riparian owners, they needed a licence under the Water Act in order
to enable them to do this lawfully. They did not obtain such a licence at the time
the line was installed. However it appears that, at or about the time of the meeting
in 1994 to which I have referred, they were advised by the authorities of the
necessity to obtain a licence under s12 of the Water Act, and accordingly they
applied for one. So far as appears from the evidence Mr and Mrs Eldridge have
never been advised or represented by lawyers in relation to this matter. The
application for a licence was filled in in the handwriting of one of them.
The scheme of the relevant provisions of Div 3 of PtII of the Water Act 1912
may be summarised as follows. S10 of the Act provides that an occupier of land
whereon any work is constructed or used or is proposed to be constructed or used
for the purpose of, amongst other things, water supply, may apply to the
Ministerial Corporation for a licence to construct and use the work.
Subs(3) of s10 provides that an application for such a licence is to be
accompanied by particulars as to certain matters. I will return to that subject a
little later.
S11 provides that when an application is made under s10 the Ministerial
Corporation shall cause to be advertised a notice containing particulars of the
application. The section goes on to provide that a local occupier or a statutory
authority whose interests may be affected by the granting of the application may
within a certain time lodge with the Ministerial Corporation an objection to the
application.
Subs(5) of s11 provides that where the Ministerial Corporation decides that an
application should be granted but an objection has been lodged, the Ministerial
Corporation shall direct the local Land Board or a Magistrate to hold a public
inquiry as to the desirability of granting the application or as to the period, terms,
limitations and conditions proposed to be applied to the licence as the case may
be. At such an inquiry the applicant and objectors sometimes are entitled to be
heard. The local Land Board or Magistrate as the case may be is required
following the inquiry to report in writing upon the inquiry to the Ministerial
Corporation. Where the inquiry is as to the desirability of granting the application
and the report of the local Land Board or Magistrate is in favour of granting the
application, the report is to embody the period, terms, limitations and conditions
to apply to the licence. Subs(6) of s11 provides:
"6. Where an inquiry is held under subs(5) the Ministerial Corporation or the
applicant or any person or authority so interested as aforesaid may within 28 days
from the announcement of the decision as provided for in the said subsection
appeal to the Land and Environment Court against the decision of the local Land
Board or Magistrate, the decision of the court shall be final."
The licence, if any, is granted by the Ministerial Corporation (s12).
The Ministerial Corporation advertised the application made by Mr and Mrs
Eldridge and a number of objections were received. They included an objection
by Mrs Noble, the present appellant. Mrs Noble is the owner of some land
downstream of the point in Yandyguinula Creek from which Mr and Mrs
Eldridge draw water. All of the other objections were withdrawn but Mrs Noble
pursued her objection and a hearing was conducted by the local Land Board. The
local Land Board made its decision on 16 March 1995. The concluding paragraph
of the Board's decision is expressed in the following terms:
WROBLE v DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION and ANOR (Gleeso&
CJ)
"Accordingly the Board is in favour of granting the application for a five (5)
year period on the terms, limitations and conditions contained in the Schedule of
Works (exhibit 3) and the Condition Statement (exhibit 4) as amended to include
the provisions of both. "
Dealing with the central issue of the desirability of the grant of the licence the
Board said:
"No persuasive evidence was produced to the Board to support the contention
that Mrs Noble's interests will be adversely affected if the application is granted.
However the Board accepted that the grant of the licence should be subject to
amended conditions. In particular the Board accepts that a single control point at
Begby's Crossing may not be sufficient to adequately protect the interests of the
other water users, therefore the Board agrees that an additional control point
should be located (at a certain place)."
The reasons for decision of the Board show that at the hearing of the inquiry
the agent who appeared to represent Mrs Noble raised certain issues concerning
deficiencies in the form of the application signed by Mr and Mrs Eldridge and
other related points concerning the competency of the application.
Referring to the decision of Sugerman J in Hobart v Mobbs reported in the
Law Book Company Land Law Service Monthly Notes vol 5, July 1959, p3, the
Board expressed serious reservations as to whether or not these were issues
which were proper to be raised for its consideration. Those reservations were
based upon the consideration that, under s11(5) of the Water Act 1912, what the
Board was doing, pursuant to a direction of the Ministerial Council, was
conducting an inquiry as to the desirability of granting the application and as to
the period, terms, limitations and conditions proposed to be applied to the
licence.
It is the Ministerial Corporation under s12 of the Act which has the ultimate
function of issuing the licence in the event of a favourable report from the Land
Board. Nevertheless, the points having been raised, the Land Board dealt with
them on their merits.
Since to some extent the points have been raised again in the present appeal
and were argued before Bannon J it is appropriate to refer to those which are
presently material. Mention was earlier made of the fact that when Mr and Mrs
Eldridge applied for a licence they filled the form of application out themselves.
$10(3) of the Act requires that certain particulars are required to be given in or
with the application for a licence. They include, in para(b) and para(c),
particulars of the maximum rate at which water may be taken from the river or
lake, and particulars of the estimated quantities of water proposed to be taken
annually.
The form of application as filled out by Mr and Mrs Eldridge did not contain
particulars of the kind referred to in para(b) and para(c). In effect, the relevant
portions of the form of application were left blank.
In relation both to the complaint that the application did not contain to the
extent mentioned above the necessarily particulars and, also, to a complaint about
the advertisement inserted by the Ministerial Corporation under s11 the Land
Board made the following observations. This was a case in which the application
was for the licensing of a use which had been in operation for several years. The
pipe in question had been installed a number of years previously and any local
occupier who wanted to understand the effect of the pipe on the flow of water in
the creek could go and look at it.
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Furthermore, in the course of the hearing before the Land Board evidence was
given about the maximum rate at which water may be taken from the river or lake
and the estimated quantity of water proposed to be taken annually pursuant to the
use in respect of which Mr and Mrs Eldridge were seeking a licence.
The Board said:
"Whilst the Board accepts that the information contained in the application
form is an essential ingredient in assessing the impact that the granting of a
particular application may have on objectors or local occupiers, the
circumstances of this case, that is an application to license an existing 40
millimetres poly pipeline to take water from a creek by way of a gravity flow
through that pipeline for domestic purposes are such that no downstream water
user would or could be misled or unaware of the impact that the application will
have on their interests in this matter. The Department of Water Resources made
all the necessary information available to occupiers in the form of a schedule of
works of the proposed conditions that will attach to the licence."
In other words, whilst expressing misgivings as to whether these really were
matters for the Board's consideration, the Board decided, giving reasons for that
decision, that no unfairness resulted from the deficiencies in the application and
from the form of the Ministerial Corporation's advertisement.
When the appeal from the Board's decision came before Bannon J both the
present appellant, Mrs Noble and Mr and Mrs Eldridge appeared in person before
his Honour. The Department was represented by counsel.
No attempt was made in the appeal to this Court to challenge the decision of
the Board or the decision of Bannon J on the merits of the matter, that is to say,
the question of the desirability of granting the application. The points that are
sought to be argued in this court relate to technical issues as I shall explain them.
The first point raised on behalf of the appellant in this Court concerns what is
said to be a deficiency in the decision of Bannon J. It is argued that nowhere in
his Honour's decision did he specify the term of the licence.
The statute provides that the maximum term of the licence may be ten years.
In a passage in the concluding part of the decision of the Board which I have
already quoted the Board reported to the Ministerial Corporation that it was in
favour of granting the application for a five year period upon certain terms and
conditions.
Bannon J at the conclusion of his reasons for judgment said:
"T accept Mr Webb's evidence and uphold the view of the Land Board and
grant the licence on the conditions set out in Ex 12 and permit the schedule of
works authorised as set out in Ex 13."
In my view, it is perfectly clear that his Honour intended the effect of his
decision to be that he upheld the decision of the Land Board in relation to the
term of the proposed licence, that is to say a period of five years. This was
mentioned earlier. It was neither for the Land Board nor for the Land and
Environment Court actually to grant the licence. That is the function of the
Ministerial Corporation pursuant to s2. His Honour's reference to his granting the
licence was a slip.
I think there can be no possible room for uncertainty on the part of the
Ministerial Corporation as to the term of the licence that Bannon J contemplated
it was to grant. That term was to be for five years. This ground of appeal has not
been made out.
WROBLE v DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION and ANOR (Gleesoi
CJ)
The second point taken on behalf of the appellant relates to a matter that was
considered in some detail by Bannon J. It concerns the insufficiency of the
particulars given in the application filled out by Mr and Mrs Eldridge. I have
already mentioned the basis upon which the Land Board considered that
question.
It has been common ground between counsel for the appellant and counsel for
the first respondent on this appeal that it lay within the jurisdiction of the Land
and Environment Court to consider issues of law concerning the validity of the
application on an appeal under s11 of the Act. That being common ground it is
unnecessary for this Court to examine of its own motion that question. I am
content to proceed with the consideration of the appeal on the assumption that
what is agreed between counsel in that regard is correct, without making any
independent decision on the matter myself.
A question arose before Bannon J as to whether the provisions of s10(3) of the
Act were mandatory or directory. In dealing with that issue his Honour rightly
held that the decision of this court in McRae v Coulton (1986) 7 NSWLR 644,
a decision relating to cognate provisions of the Water Act, was directly in point,
and bound him to decide that the relevant provisions were directory. It is accepted
on this appeal that the principles applicable to the making of such a decision are
those set out in the judgment of Hope JA at p661.
I agree with Bannon J that on the true construction of s10 of the Water Act
strict compliance with the provisions of s10(3) is not a condition precedent to the
validity of an application. In that respect, as was pointed out by Hope JA in
McRae, it is to be remembered that applications for licences under this Act are
typically prepared by people who are acting without the benefit of legal advice
and commonly relate to installations of a relatively minor nature. As a matter of
practical common sense a conclusion that the requirements of s10(3) need to be
strictly complied with for an application to be valid would produce unacceptable
consequences. Bannon J also concluded that in the facts and circumstances of the
present case there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of s10.
I also agree with his Honour's conclusion in that regard. In particular, the
circumstance that this was an application for the licence of a use and in respect
of an installation that had been in existence and in operation for a substantial
number of years and that was readily available to be physically inspected by any
local occupier who might be minded to object is a material consideration.
The third point that was argued on this appeal is not a point that was argued
before Bannon J and is, therefore, not referred to in his Honour's reasons for
judgment. It concerns the form of notice of the application advertised by the
Ministerial Corporation. The argument proceeds upon an assumption as to the
meaning of s11(1) of the Water Act which I do not accept. That assumption is that
the words "a notice containing particulars of the application" means "a notice
containing the particulars of the application required to be given by s10(3)".
The argument is that the notice advertised by the Ministerial Corporation did
not attempt to repeat the particulars required by s10(3), even to the extent to
which those particulars were given by Mr and Mrs Eldridge. In my view, when
sl1(1) refers to "particulars of the application" it means such information
concerning the application as is necessary to enable potential objectors to decide
whether they should give consideration to objecting. This is consistent with the
decision in McRae to which reference has already been made. It is also consistent
with the meaning which similar words have in cognate provisions of the Water
Act, such as s20A. It would be a curious reading of the corresponding words in
6 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
s20A to take them to require that the advertisement or notice there referred to
should repeat in detail all of the particulars required to be given by s20(2).
For those reasons, I consider that the third ground relied upon in this appeal by
the appellant should not succeed. I am content to deal with this appeal upon the
assumption that this is a point that may be relied upon by the appellant
notwithstanding that it was not taken before Bannon J.
In my view, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Handley JA I agree.
Sheller JA I also agree.
GLEESON CJ: The order of the Court will be as I have proposed.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the appellant: T Robertson
Solicitors for the appellant: Woolf Associates
Counsel for the respondent: B Green
Solicitors for the respondent: Director Legal Services, Department of Land and
Water Conservation
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