CARSON v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER and ANOR (NO 3) [1997] NSWCA 60
NSW Caselaw
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CARSON v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER (NO 3)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
SHELLER and STEIN JJA, and GILES AJA
16 December 1997
[1997] NSWCA 60
Sheller, Stein JJA and Giles AJA
Summons
By a summons filed on 28 November 1997, Nicholas Roderick Carson seeks
leave to appeal from a decision of Barr J given on 24 November 1997 and asks
that, if leave is granted, the appeal be heard instanter and allowed.
Mr Carson is the claimant in a summons originally filed in this Court seeking
relief against the Legal Services Commissioner. The summons was listed for
hearing before this Court, as presently constituted, on 26 August 1997. On 29
August 1997 the Court remitted the proceedings to the Common Law Division
for determination. On 15 September 1997 a directions hearing took place before
Simpson J. Her Honour was not prepared to expedite the matter but listed it at the
end of other matters expedited in the call-over to be held towards the end of the
year. On 24 October 1997 a call-over took place before Barr J. His Honour fixed
the matter for hearing on 2 February 1998.
On 14 November 1997 the Commissioner's solicitors filed and served a notice
of motion and an affidavit of Ian David Hill, a solicitor having the carriage of the
matter for the Commissioner, to have the hearing date of 2 February 1998
vacated. On 24 November 1997 Barr J vacated the hearing date and set the matter
down for hearing for 25 May 1998. Mr Carson seeks leave to appeal from that
decision.
Before Barr J no part of the affidavit of Mr Hill was objected to, nor was he
cross examined. However, Mr Brereton, counsel for Mr Carson, called for the
production of documents pursuant to a notice to produce addressed to the
Commissioner and served the previous Friday. Mr Haylen QC, who appeared for
the Commissioner, said the notice asked for memos of fees. While he wished to
be heard on the relevance of the documents sought, he was prepared to provide
a summary of time spent by counsel briefed by the Commissioner which was
noted on a piece of paper handed to Mr Brereton at the bar table. Mr Brereton
said the notice to produce went to paral! of Mr Hill's affidavit and the claim by
the Commissioner that the briefing of new senior counsel to appear on 2 February
1998 would result in substantial fees already paid to senior counsel being thrown
away. He said the notice sought documents which detailed not only time spent
but also quantum of fees. He again called on the notice to produce. Barr J said:
"What is produced is produced". Mr Brereton then tendered the document which
had been handed to him and was headed "Summary of quantum of work done by
counsel" in the matter.
At the directions hearing before Simpson J, Mr Haylen appeared for the
Commissioner. Mr Hill said that he had been informed and believed that Mr
Haylen informed her Honour that the hearing of the case would take
approximately fifteen days, and that the matter had been complicated by the
departure from the case of his junior counsel, Mr Blackmore, who had been
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
appointed Acting Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and had been
intimately involved in the detailed preparation of the case. Mr Haylen also
informed her Honour that a lead time would be required because of this but that
the Commissioner would not have difficulty if the matter were not listed for
hearing before March/April 1988. When Simpson J asked Mr Brereton if there
was any urgency concerning the hearing of the matter, Mr Brereton stated that the
only urgency was that there were serious professional allegations hanging over
Mr Carson's head. Mr Carson sought a special fixture for the matter but her
Honour directed that the matter be listed at the end of other matters expedited in
the long matters call up to be conducted later in the year.
On 24 October 1997 Mr Marien, junior counsel briefed by the Commissioner,
informed Barr J that Mr Haylen had been briefed for the Commissioner since the
beginning of the case but was not available in February 1998 and that a hearing
after February 1998 was therefore sought. Barr J invited no submission from Mr
Marien as to what was involved in the preparation of the case for the
Commissioner. Ms Chang, Mr Carson's solicitor, informed the Judge that he
sought the first available hearing date. In fixing the proceedings to be heard on
2 February 1998, Barr J stated he would not list the matter to suit the convenience
of senior counsel.
Mr Hill's affidavit continued as follows:
"8. These proceedings relate to a complaint by way of information made by
[the Commissioner] under the Legal Profession Act 1987 against [Mr Carson].
The complaint arises from very complex litigation in this Court. [Mr Carson] will
be cross-examined at considerable length at the hearing. The hearing of oral
evidence could take some ten (10) days: see Decision of the Court of Appeal on
29 August 1997 at p3 and p9. Cross-examination of [Mr Carson] will involve a
great volume of documentary material and will require lengthy preparation on the
part of [the Commissioner].
9. The information filed against [Mr Carson] concerns serious allegations
against him and seeks a finding by the Second Defendant that [Mr Carson], a
solicitor of this Court, is guilty of professional misconduct or alternatively
unsatisfactory professional conduct. [The Commissioner] has filed the
information against [Mr Carson] in accordance with a statutory duty and it is in
the public interest that [the Commissioner] be afforded proper opportunity to be
represented at the hearing of these proceedings.
10. I am informed by Mr Haylen that he is not available to appear in these
proceedings in 1998 until the beginning of March. I am further informed by Mr
Haylen that proper preparation for the hearing of these proceedings by Senior
Counsel not yet familiar with the case and without having the assistance of junior
counsel involved in the case since its inception will require not less than 10 to 12
weeks preparation. In my opinion, should the matter proceed to hearing on 2
February 1998 without [the Commissioner] represented by Mr Haylen and in the
circumstances where Mr Blackmore has recently departed the case then [the
Commissioner] will be seriously prejudiced in the proper preparation and
presentation of his case. Because of his prior commitments, Mr Marien was not
able to commence detailed preparation of the case before early November 1997.
11. The briefing of new Senior Counsel to appear at the hearing on 2 February
1998 will result in substantial fees already paid to Senior Counsel being thrown
away by [the Commissioner] and will involve the incurring of further substantial
fees to brief new Senior Counsel to prepare for the hearing and will still not
overcome the difficulties referred to in paral0 above. All funds available to [the
WRRSON v LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER (NO 3) (Sheller, Stein JJA and Gile8
AJA)
Commissioner] for the payment of legal fees incurred by him are derived from
public funds. [The Commissioner] has already had to bear the burden of
considerable additional costs by having to brief new Senior Counsel in the
proceedings in the Court of Appeal in August 1997."
The transcript of the hearing before Barr J is not available. However, according
to the notes of the hearing taken by Ms Chang, which were annexed to her
affidavit on this application, Barr J, after hearing submissions, said he was
inclined to move the date but he wished to make inquiries about Judges'
availability. He adjourned for approximately twenty minutes. When his Honour
returned to the bench he said: "It is appropriate for the reasons given and the
submissions made by Mr Haylen supported by the Hill affidavit that justice
required that the hearing date be vacated. The Court is in a position to offer
another date to the parties which is 25 May 1998." Counsel responded by saying
that the date proposed was convenient and his Honour then made his orders.
Mr Brereton, in making his submissions in support of the application for leave
to appeal, acknowledged that an appellate court ought to be very slow indeed to
interfere with the discretion of a Judge in adjourning a trial; Maxwell v Keun
[1928] 1 KB 645 at 653 per Atkin LJ. In Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390 at
395, Wilson J, with whose judgment three other members of the Court agreed,
said that in Maxwell v Keun Atkin LJ stated the rule in terms which have won
general acceptance. This rule acknowledged that if it appeared that the result of
the order made was to defeat the rights of the parties altogether and to do what
the appellate Court was satisfied would be an injustice to one or other of the
parties, then the appellate Court had power to review such an order and it was its
duty to do so.
Mr Brereton submitted that Barr J had exercised his discretion arbitrarily,
injudiciously and irrationally. In our opinion, this contention is without any
substance. Mr Brereton submitted that the present was an exceptional case and
said, amongst other things, that a hearing had already been appointed and vacated
by reason of the remitter from the Court of Appeal to the Common Law Division,
that an application to adjourn the hearing in the Court of Appeal "to suit the
convenience of Mr Haylen" had been refused by Stein JA, that on 24 October
1997 the Court was aware of all the matters upon which the Commissioner
subsequently relied to vacate the hearing date, that on 24 October a period of
fourteen weeks remained for preparation before trial and that, according to
material produced, Mr Haylen had spent only one day and fifty-five hours on the
matter, much less than other counsel substantially briefed by the Commissioner
in the matter, and that Barr J had stated that he would not list the matter to suit
the convenience of senior counsel. The adjournment was said to do great injustice
to Mr Carson. Mr Brereton referred to what was said to be a history of delay since
Mr Rajski's complaint was made to the Commissioner on 5 July 1994. Mr
Brereton questioned Mr Hill's statement that proper preparation for the hearing
of the proceedings by senior counsel not yet familiar with the case and without
having the assistance of junior counsel involved in the case since its inception
would require not less than ten to twelve weeks preparation. He questioned Mr
Hill's opinion that if the matter proceeded to hearing on 2 February 1998, the
Commissioner would be seriously prejudiced in the proper preparation and
presentation of the case. He questioned the claim that the briefing of new senior
counsel to appear on 2 February 1998 would result in substantial fees already
paid to senior counsel being thrown away by the Commissioner. Mr Brereton also
relied upon Barr J's failure to require the Commissioner to produce documents in
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
accordance with the notice to produce Pt36 rl6 of the Supreme Court Rules.
However Mr Brereton acknowledged that when his Honour said "What is
produced is produced" he took the view the decision was not one to cavil with.
As we have said, Mr Brereton did not challenge Mr Hill's evidence when he
had the opportunity to do so, and there is no reason at all why Barr J should not
have acted upon it, as he said he did. To suggest that in doing so he was acting
arbitrarily, injudiciously or irrationally is unfair to his Honour and wrong. It is
unfortunate that no date earlier than 25 May 1998 could be found for the hearing.
In our judgment of 29 August 1997 we recognised that the case was a serious and
important one where any further delay was undesirable. But it must be realised
that the Court has limited resources, that this is a case that is likely to go for some
time and that there are many other litigants whose cases are urgent and have to
be dealt with in an extremely busy list. In our opinion, no ground at all has been
shown for disturbing the order that Barr J made and accordingly, the application
for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.