INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT GROUP OF AMERICA PTY LTD v JOHN FAIRFAX GROUP PTY LTD [1997] NSWCA 161
NSW Caselaw
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INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT GROUP OF AMERICA PTY LTD v
JOHN FAIRFAX GROUP PTY LTD
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
GLEESON CJ, BEAZLEY and STEIN JJA
24 October 1997
[1997] NSWCA 161
Gleeson CJ, Beazley and Stein JJA We have before us applications by both
the plaintiff and the defendant in proceedings in the Defamation List for leave to
appeal against a judgment of Levine J, given on 8 August 1997, in relation to a
number of issues of particulars. What I am about to announce are the joint
reasons of the Court for refusing leave in both applications.
The particulars in question are particulars of a reply by the plaintiff to a
defence of the defendant, the defence being to the effect that the matter
complained of was a fair protected report of proceedings in public of a court.
In considering the applications for leave we have borne in mind that what was
before Levine J was a strike out application. That affected the approach his
Honour was required to take to what might be described as the availability of
arguments as distinct from their ultimate merit.
We have also taken into account considerations of the practical significance
which the decisions that his Honour made in relation to these questions of
particulars may have for the ultimate conduct of the proceedings.
Senior counsel on both sides in their oral and written submissions have not
only advanced arguments going to the merits of the individual decisions made by
Levine J but also have made points as to the practical significance for the conduct
of the litigation of the decisions his Honour made. Against that background we
have considered the lengthy reasons which his Honour gave for his decisions.
We are unable to find what we regard as substantial fault in the reasons
advanced by Levine J for his decisions. We do not consider that there is sufficient
prospect of success of either an appeal or a cross appeal to warrant the grant of
leave that is sought. For that reason both applications for leave to appeal will be
dismissed with costs.
Both applications for leave to appeal are dismissed with costs.