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READ v CARMODY
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
MEAGHER; POWELL and STEIN JJA
21 November 1997, 23 July 1998
[1998] NSWCA 182
Wills Probate and Administration — Wills — Testamentary capacity — Soundness
of mind memory and understanding — Elderly testator — Disinherited niece
previously provided for in earlier Wills — Allegedly because affected by "non insane
delusions" — Or because of diminished cognition or memory.
Meagher JA I agree with Powell JA.
Powell JA This is an appeal from a Judgment delivered, and orders made, by
Brownie J on 18 August 1995, on which day his Honour dismissed the
proceedings which had been brought by the Appellant, in which proceedings the
Appellant had sought (sub silentio) to have revoked a grant of Probate in
Common Form of a Will made by one John Wilson ("the deceased") on 5
February 1993, which grant had been made by the Registrar in Probate on 13 July
1993, and sought instead, (again sub silentio) a grant of Probate in Solemn Form
of one or other of three earlier Wills made, or said to have been made, by the
deceased, those earlier Wills having been made on 3 February 1993, 11
December 1992 and 14 July 1988.
Although, in the Amended Statement of Claim which was filed on behalf of the
Appellant in the proceedings, the attack upon the Will made on 5 February 1993
was based upon the deceased's alleged lack of testamentary capacity - said to be
due to (inter alia) a combination of cognitive defects and overwhelming
emotional distress - and the fact that, so it was alleged, the deceased's execution
of the Will was procured by the undue influence of the Second Respondent - a
concept of which the draftsman of the Amended Statement of Claim, in common
with many members of the legal profession, clearly has little, if any,
comprehension (see, for example, Winter v Crichron!) - and although, on the
hearing of the appeal, counsel for the Appellant seemed determined to assert that
the deceased's alleged lack of testamentary capacity was due to two material -
"non insane - delusions" - on the part of the deceased - the phrase "non insane
delusions" as I have on at least one prior occasion (Shaw v Crichron2) had
occasion to point out, is an oxymoron, while the phrase "insane delusions" is a
tautology - since delusions are pathognomonic of psychosis - in the end, the
question which Brownie J was called upon to determine was whether, by reason
of certain facts which the Appellant sought to establish, and upon which he
sought to rely, it appeared that the deceased at 5 February 1993 no longer retained
testamentary capacity. Bearing in mind that, although seeking to persuade
Brownie J to the view that the deceased no longer had testamentary capacity on
5 February 1993, the Appellant nonetheless sought to propound, and to have a
1. (1991) 23 NSWLR 116
2. Court of Appeal 23 August 1995 (unreported)
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
grant of Probate made in respect of, the Wills made by the Deceased on 3
February 1993 and 11 December 1992 it is, in my view, hardly surprising that
Brownie J concluded (AB 1286):
"T accept the view of Dr Phillips that the testator had testamentary capacity, as
at 5 February 1993. He was frightened of and anxious about the pending surgery,
and he was 91 years old, but he was an unusually fit, alert and aware 91 year old,
and in particular, he understood that he was making his will, he understood the
claims upon his bounty, and he understood what property he had. It may be the
case, as Dr Phillips postulated, that the act of executing his will of 3 February,
coupled with his anxiety, led him to reconsider the terms of that will; for what it
is worth, this is consistent with the notion that his visit to Dr Pead on 10
December 1992 triggered his decision to alter his copy of his 1988 will, on 11
December 1992. However, I do not accept that there was any significant
impairment of his cognitive functioning.
The sharp differences between the two wills of 3 February and 5 February raise
what most people would regard as a presumption that there was something amiss
with the testator, and his statements indicating what seems to have been a state
of forgetfulness reinforce that view. If there is a legal presumption to this effect,
the evidence displaces it."
Lest the fact that I have referred to the Appellant's attempt to persuade
Brownie J to the view that, as at 5 February 1993, the deceased lacked
testamentary capacity leads to some misapprehension as to the basis upon which
the proceedings at first instance were conducted, I record that, despite that the
fact that the Respondents did not, as it was open to them to do, file a Cross-Claim
seeking a grant of Probate in Solemn Form of the Will of 5 February 1993,
Brownie J, at the commencement of his Judgment (AB 1265), wrote (inter alia)
as follows:
"The testator, John Wilson, died on 9 March 1993, aged 91. The defendants,
the executors appointed by his will of 5 February 1993, obtained a grant of
probate of that will in common form. The plaintiff is one of the executors named
in another will made by the testator, on 3 February 1993, and he seeks probate
of that will, in solemn form, saying that the testator lacked testamentary capacity
as at 5 February. The defendants' concede that the plaintiff is entitled to proceed
in this way, and that they bear the onus of proving that the testator had
testamentary capacity, at the time of the execution of his will of 5 February."
(see also Re Hodges, Shorter v Hodges?) It is clear from the first of the
passages in Brownie J's Judgment which I have set out above that his Honour
was aware of the various matters which he was required to consider in
determining whether or not at the relevant time the deceased had testamentary
capacity. Those matters have, over the years, been expressed in varying forms
and in differing language, but all formulations seem agreed that "testamentary
capacity" encompasses the following concepts:
1. that the testator - or testatrix - is aware, and appreciates the significance, of
the act in the law which he - or she - is about to embark upon;
2. that the testator - or testatrix - is aware, at least in general terms, of the
nature, and extent, and value, of the estate over which he - or she - has a
disposing power;
3. (1988) 14 NSWLR 698
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 3
3. that the testator - or testatrix - is aware of those or may reasonably be
thought to have a claim upon his - or her - testamentary bounty, and the basis for,
and nature of, the claims of such persons;
4. that the testator - or testatrix - has the ability to evaluate, and to discriminate
between, the respective strengths of the claims of such persons.
The necessary corollary of this is that, if, at the relevant time the testator - or
testatrix - is found to suffer from a condition - whether "mental illness" (or
psychosis) in the strict sense or any other form of "mental disorder" (including,
but not limited to, deterioration in higher intellectual function or dementia) -
which detrimentally affects his - or her - consciousness or sense of orientation, or
has brought about disturbances to his - or her - intelligence, cognition, thought
content and thought processes, judgment and the like, then, even though that
condition may be transient, or, if appropriately treated, reversible, the testator -
or testatrix - will, more probably than not, be held to lack testamentary capacity.
This being the question which Brownie J was called upon to determine, and the
basic principles which he was called upon to apply when determining that
question, it is necessary now to consider the facts as he found them and upon
which he based the conclusion which I have earlier set out.
The deceased who was born in Scotland was the eldest, and one of the seven,
children - one daughter and six sons - of William and Jane Wilson. The family
is said to have migrated to Australia in three groups in the period 1929 to 1931.
Of the deceased's siblings, only four, his sister Elizabeth - seemingly known as
Lily - and his brothers, William, George and Stanley - need be noticed.
The deceased married only once, his wife being Violet - whom he called Vi.
There were no children of the marriage.
For a time the deceased and his wife conducted a café called "The Green Mill"
at Parramatta. One of those who worked for the deceased and his wife at the café
was the mother of one who gave evidence on the hearing before Brownie J, Mrs
McCauley. Mrs McCauley's mother, who appears to have worked at the café for
some 15-20 years, and her husband lived nearby. Mrs McCauley said that the
deceased and his wife treated her like a daughter and that, even after the deceased
and his wife moved to the Wollongong area where the deceased - or they -
together with the deceased's brother Stanley later built, or had built, the block of
flats in which they went to live about thirty years ago she (Mrs McCauley) and
the deceased and his wife - and after the death of the deceased's wife, the
deceased - kept in touched and remained on affectionate terms.
The deceased's sister Lily, who seems now to be well into her eighties, married
one Thomas Carmody in December 1944. Mr and Mrs Carmody had one child,
a son, Ian, who is the First Respondent. At the time of the deceased's death and
at the time of the hearing before Brownie J, Mr and Mrs Carmody lived at
Fairfield while the First Respondent lived at Northmead.
The deceased's brother William, who died in 1988, and his wife had a
daughter, Robyn, who, in 1969, married the Appellant, Frank Read. Mr and Mrs
Read have had a son of their marriage, Anthony, who appears to have been born
in 1974. Mrs Read claims that, throughout her life, she maintained a close and
affectionate relationship with the deceased who, on many occasions, spoke of the
provisions which he had made, or which he intended to make, for her after his
death.
The deceased's brother George had two sons, Grahame and Kenneth. The
deceased's brother George lived in the Katoomba area until 1990, when he went
to live with the testator in his flat at Wollongong and where he continued to live
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
up until some time in 1991 when, because of failing health, he was admitted to
hospital. At the time of the hearing before Brownie J, the deceased's brother
George was living in a nursing home, his son Grahame lived at Katoomba and his
son Kenneth lived in the United States, where he had lived since 1976.
The deceased's brother Stanley did not marry but, as it seems, lived with his
parents until the death of his mother, and thereafter with his father, in what had
been his parent's home at Jessie Street, Westmead. Ultimately, after the death of
his father, the deceased's brother Stanley became registered as the proprietor of
the Westmead property.
Although the materials which are before the Court are less than clear, it would
appear that, following the death of the deceased's mother, housekeepers were,
from time to time, engaged to care for the deceased's father and the deceased's
brother Stanley. One of those housekeepers appears to have been the
grandmother, while another appears to have been the mother, of Fiona and Gary
Evans who appear to have been the, or at least among the, beneficiaries of the
estate which the deceased's brother Stanley left when he died in 1989. For the last
four years of the life of the deceased's brother Stanley, Fiona Evans appears to
have acted as his housekeeper.
At least during the last four years of the life of his brother Stanley, the
deceased saw him regularly. The deceased, who, as it would seem, followed the
Parramatta Rugby League football team would often visit his brother on
week-ends, particularly during the football season when the Parramatta team
played "home matches" at Parramatta. On such occasions he often stayed with
his sister and brother-in-law Mr and Mrs Carmody at their home at Fairfield.
Because of her position, Fiona Evans came to regard the deceased and his
brother Stanley as the two major male figures in her life. Following the death of
the deceased's brother Stanley, Fiona Evans, in particular, and her brother Gary
Evans, continued their relationship with the deceased, who continued to manage
the flats and who kept them, as the beneficiaries of Stanley's interest in the flats,
informed of his management of the flats and accounted to them from time to time
for their share in the proceeds of lettings.
Although it would appear that, after the death of the deceased's father in about
1954, there was a falling out between Mrs Carmody and her brother William,
following which Mrs Carmody had little if any contact with her brother William
or his daughter Mrs Read or any of her family, it would seem that the deceased
attempted to maintain contact with both the Carmodys and the Reads although,
in his Judgment, Brownie J expressed the view that that contact was not
particularly frequent.
In addition to members of the deceased's immediate family there were others
who played a part in the deceased's life in his later years, and some of whom gave
evidence at the hearing before Brownie J. Those others included:
. Mr and Mrs Baker;
. Mr Bell;
Mr Simonato;
Mr Dignan;
Mr Dollin;
. the Second Respondent;
7. Mrs Grozde and her de facto husband Mr Graham.
Mrs Baker was the deceased's wife's sister. She and her husband for some
fifteen years lived in the flats at Wollongong which were owned by the deceased
and his brother Stanley before they moved out to a unit which was but a short
AWRYNE
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 5
distance away from the flats. Mr Baker's evidence was, if I may say so, a little
odd. In the Affidavit which he swore in support of the Appellant's case, Mr Baker
gave the impression that he and his wife saw the deceased regularly over the
years. In the same Affidavit, Mr Baker deposed to what he claimed was the
deterioration in the deceased over the eighteen months prior to his death, that
deterioration, so he said, being reflected (inter alia) in the deceased's ill -kempt
appearance and the deterioration in his speech. However, in his oral evidence, Mr
Baker said that, although he and the deceased had been on good terms for about
fifteen years prior to 1978 when, so he said, the deceased had struck Mrs Baker,
thereafter, and until the day when the deceased died, he regarded the deceased as
an enemy. In the same evidence, Mr Baker seemed to suggest that the
deterioration in the deceased's appearance and speech may have commenced at
about the time - in 1980 - when he and Mrs Baker left the flats at Wollongong.
Mr Bell, who met the deceased some seven or eight years prior to the
deceased's death, lived with his wife a short distance away from the flats at
Wollongong. Mr Bell was interested in rugby league football and it was because
of that interest that he came to meet the deceased and it was through that interest
that the relationship between the deceased and Mr and Mrs Bell developed. They
often travelled with the deceased to football matches particularly when the
Parramatta team was playing "home games" at Parramatta and it was more
probably than not on such occasions that Mr and Mrs Bell came to meet Mr and
Mrs Carmody. Although Mr Bell gave evidence of the fact that the deceased
appeared to be slightly deaf and wore a hearing aid, his impression was that the
deceased's general health was good, that he appeared to be mentally alert and that
he was able properly to carry on conversations and discuss general affairs.
Mr Simonato was a retired mechanical engineer who owned the block of flats
adjacent to that owned by the deceased and his brother Stanley and who, for
about ten years, had lived in one of the flats. Despite the fact that, some ten years
or a little more prior to the deceased's death, he (Mr Simonato) had moved from
the block of flats which he owned, he regularly attended the flats on several days
a week. On such occasions, so Mr Simonato said, the deceased would often come
to his (Mr Simonato's) block of flats for a chat. They were both interested in sport
and they regularly spoke about the Parramatta football team. Mr Simonato's
observations were to the effect that the deceased appeared to be healthy, that he
did not appear to be subject to any mental disorder and that he regularly drove
himself in his car even doing so in the week prior to his being hospitalised,
Mr Dignan, a retired bank manager, who lived near the deceased had known
him for about thirty years prior to his death. Both Mr Dignan and the deceased
were keen swimmers and played bowls at the Wollongong City Bowling Club
which seemed to have ceased to operate but a short time before the deceased's
death. Mr Dignan observed that the deceased was a very active man. Mr Dignan,
who, as a retired bank manager, was a Justice of the Peace, was accustomed from
time to time to witness documents for the deceased at his request. Mr Dignan's
observations of the deceased were that he was clear minded, that he did not talk
inappropriately, that he appeared well fed and healthy and that his clothing was
appropriate at all times.
Mr Dollin, who had died by the time the matter came on for hearing before had
known the deceased for about twenty years prior to his (the deceased's) death. It
would seem that, for much of that time, Mr Dollin lived in a home unit not far
from the deceased's flats, but that, some years prior to the deceased's death, he
moved to another home unit a further distance away. Mr Dollin appears to have
6 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
been accustomed to visit the deceased every second night. Mr Dollin and the
deceased appear to have played bowls together over the period of seven years or
so prior to the Wollongong City Bowling Club ceasing to operate. In addition,
they shared a common interest in rugby league football and regularly attended
matches in Sydney together.
In the Affidavit which he swore on behalf of the Appellant prior to his death,
Mr Dollin, who appears clearly to have been very frail at the time, deposed to his
being involved in a motor accident when a passenger in a car driven by the
deceased in December 1992 - the correct date appears to have been March 1990.
Although each of Mr Dollin and the deceased was admitted to hospital following
the accident, Mr Dollin did not observe any changes in the deceased's conduct or
behaviour following the accident.
In his Affidavit Mr Dollin further deposed to having observed the relationship
between the deceased and Mrs Read and her family and, as well, deposed to
statements indicating that the deceased intended to make provision for Mrs Read
after his death.
In the same Affidavit Mr Dollin deposed to having met the Second
Respondent, whom he described as "a good bloke", and who, so he said, assisted
the deceased around the flats as a general handyman and attended to many items
requiring repair or maintenance. In the Affidavit Mr Dollin described the
relationship between the deceased and the Second Respondent as a friendly one.
The Second Respondent, who was born in Korea, and who, at the time of the
hearing before Brownie J, was 38 years of age, immigrated to this country in
1984. At first he lived in Melbourne where for a time he worked for
Westinghouse System Ltd as a technician. The Second Respondent appears in
1987 to have moved to New South Wales where, in March 1988, he commenced
a full-time course at Wollongong University, graduating in May 1991 with a
Diploma of Computer Application.
The Second Respondent met the deceased in August 1988 apparently as the
result of his carrying out some work on a washing machine in a flat at the
deceased's block of flats which was being rented by a friend of the Second
Respondent. From time to time thereafter the deceased engaged the Second
Respondent to carry out maintenance or repairs which were needed around the
flats.
About a year later the deceased offered the Second Respondent an opportunity
of living in one of the flats upon the basis that he (the Second Respondent) would
help the deceased with the general maintenance of the various flats. The flat
which was offered was that which was located next to the deceased's flat and
needed first to be renovated with the materials which the deceased had bought
and which materials the Second Respondent then used for that purpose. When the
renovations had been completed, the Second Respondent and his wife moved to
occupy the flat and continued to do so until mid-1990 when they were offered
Housing Commission accommodation to which they then moved, with the
approval of the deceased. At some time - which is not clear - after the Second
Respondent and his wife had moved into the Housing Commission
accommodation, the deceased gave the Second Respondent the use of the flat
which he and his wife had previously occupied and encouraged him to let it, for
his own benefit, at a normal commercial rent.
Despite the fact that the Second Respondent and his wife had moved to the
Housing Commissioner accommodation, the relationship between the deceased
and the Second Respondent appears to have become progressively more close,
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 7
the Second Respondent not only continuing to carry out repairs and maintenance
for the deceased but also being given the task of collecting the rent of the flats
when the deceased was on vacation; as well, the Second Respondent began to
assist the deceased with keeping his accounts, preparing an accounting
programme for the deceased to use on a computer which he had bought and
teaching the deceased how to use the computer.
Mrs Grozde and Mr Graham - neither of whom gave evidence at the hearing
before Brownie J - were tenants in the deceased's flats. At one time when the
Second Respondent returned to Korea for a short time, the deceased engaged Mrs
Grozde and Mr Graham to carry out cleaning and maintenance work in the flats.
It is convenient that, before I turn to record the events of the last few months
of the deceased's life, I record some information as to the four formal Wills
which were known to have been made by the deceased prior to the two Wills
which were the main focus of the proceedings.
The first of such Wills was made in November 1966, prior to the death of the
deceased's wife. It provided, as one might have expected, for the appointment of
the deceased's wife as his executrix and, in the event that she survived him by
three months, constituted her his universal legatee. The Will further provided
that, in the event that the deceased's wife did not survive him or did not survive
him by three months, Mr P J McGrath, who appears as if he were then the
deceased's solicitor, be appointed the executor of the Will, and, after providing
for some small legacies and bequests, directed that the income from the flats be
divided between Mrs Baker and a Mrs Harrison - who was a cousin of the
deceased - during their joint lives and thereafter be paid to the survivor of them
during her life, and that thereafter the income to be paid to the First Respondent
and a Mr Northey, a nephew of the deceased's wife, who were also constituted
the deceased's residuary beneficiaries.
The second Will which appears to have been prepared by Mr K W Ewart, a
solicitor at Parramatta, who appears, by then, to have become the deceased's
solicitor, was made in June 1977. It provided for the appointment of Mr Read and
the First Respondent as executors and, after providing for some small legacies in
favour of Mrs Harrison, Mrs Carmody, Mr Northey and Mrs Baker, provided for
the residuary estate to be divided into six equal shares, two of which were
devised to each of Mrs Read and the First Respondent and one of which was
devised to each of Grahame Wilson and Kenneth Wilson.
The third Will, which again appears to have been prepared by Mr Ewart, was
made in November 1982. As with the second Will it provided for the appointment
of Mr Read and the First Respondent as executors. After providing for small
legacies in favour of Mrs Harrison and Mr Northey, the Will provided for the
residue of the estate to be divided into six equal parts, three of such parts to be
bequeathed to each of Mrs Read and the First Respondent. The Will also
provided for the postponement of the sale of the Wollongong flats for a period of
ten years "to permit the same to be retained for the use of (his) brother Stanley
Wilson during that period of time".
The fourth such Will, which appears also to have been prepared by Mr Ewart,
was executed in July 1988. As with the second and third Wills, this Will provided
for the appointment of Mr Read and the First Respondent as executors. It
provided for legacies of $5,000.00 to each of Grahame Wilson and Kenneth
Wilson and to Patricia McCauley and directed that the rest and residue of the
estate be divided into six equal shares, three of such shares to be devised to each
of Mrs Read and the First Respondent. On this occasion the Will provided for the
8 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
postponement of the sale of the flats at Wollongong for a period of up to six years
after the deceased's death, but subject to the proviso that, if Stanley Wilson, Mrs
Read and the First Respondent were to agree, the property might be sold earlier.
Subsequent events would seem to suggest that Mr Ewart provided an unsigned
copy of this Will to the deceased who still had it in his possession in December
1992.
In light of the case which the Appellant sought to make out in the proceedings,
it is proper that, before recording the events of the last few months of the
deceased's life, I note that in his Judgment (AB 1272), Brownie J found that "on
any view of the matter, (the deceased) was unusually fit, active, alert, and aware,
for a person of his age, 91 in late 1992".
It would appear that, in the latter part of 1992, there was a proposal before the
Wollongong City Council for the erection of a motel near the deceased's flats, a
development to which the deceased was opposed and which led him to incur
expenses in endeavouring to prevent it. According to Mrs Read the deceased told
her that the solicitor for the Council was Mr Brodie and that he hated Mr Brodie
- subsequent events would seem to cast more than a shadow of doubt over that
part of Mrs Read's evidence. Be that as it may, it would appear that the proposed
development was very much in the forefront of the deceased's mind and
prominent in his conversation during the latter months of 1992.
On 11 November 1992, the deceased saw his general practitioner, Dr Pead,
who, so it seems, he had consulted from time to time over the preceding years.
It should be noted that in the Affidavit which he swore in support of the
Appellant's case, Dr Pead recorded (AB 159) that "the deceased was a
remarkable man who enjoyed good health". In the course of a routine physical
examination conducted by Dr Pead on that day, he found what he thought was an
aortic aneurism, to confirm which diagnosis he referred the deceased to the South
Coast Vascular Laboratory.
Dr Pead saw the deceased again on 23 November 1992 when he referred him
to Dr Huber, a vascular surgeon.
In early December 1992, so Mrs Read said (AB 55), she spoke to the deceased
who said that George Wilson had suggested to him that it was unfair for Mrs
Read and the First Respondent to inherit the whole of the deceased's estate, and
that the deceased said that he thought he would leave a little extra to Grahame
Wilson and Kenneth Wilson.
It was part of the Appellant's case at trial that, at about this time, it was
proposed that the Reads should go to live in Wollongong near the testator, a
proposal which had been mentioned over the years, despite which it had not
suited the Reads to move earlier.
On 10 December 1992, Dr Pead saw the deceased once more. On that occasion
he recorded the result of a report which he had received from the South Coast
Vascular Laboratory and referred the deceased to Dr Novotny, a general
physician, with a view to obtaining an opinion as to whether or not the deceased
was fit to undergo the general anaesthetic which would be needed if the aneurism
were to be surgically repaired.
Since it was dated by the deceased in his own hand "11 December 1992", it
would appear that it was on that day when the deceased took the unsigned copy
of his 1988 Will to which I have earlier referred and made a number of alterations
to it, which alterations he then initialled. The principal alterations, clearly
enough, indicated that the deceased intended to increase the legacies to Grahame
Wilson and Kenneth Wilson from $5,000.00 to $10,000.00 but to make no
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 9
provision whatsoever for a legacy to be paid to Patricia McCauley. The other
alteration involved the deletion from the provision for postponement of the sale
of the Wollongong flats of the words:
"As the property comprises a block of units jointly owned by with my brother
STANLEY WILSON who is registered as owner of one quarter share, it is my
wish that the property be retained during his lifetime subject, however, that if all
parties agree to the sale of the property then my trustees know and empower to
do so (sic)."
the latter part of that provisions having become otiose as the result of the
earlier death of the deceased's brother Stanley. Despite having made those
alterations, the deceased did not communicate that fact to anyone until later in the
month.
On 18 December 1992, the deceased saw Dr Huber who, on conducting a
physical examination, confirmed Dr Pead's diagnosis. In the letter which he
wrote to Dr Pead on that day (AB 965), Dr Huber wrote:
"T agree that one should consider this gentleman for repair. I understand that
he quite elderly, but has now been well demonstrated that aneurism repair in the
elderly does indeed prolong life and therefore should be seriously considered. His
aneurism is (greater than) 5.0cms and I would therefore consider him for repair.
Ihave taken the liberty of arranging for him to be seen by Dr Etheredge for work
up and I have sent off some blood investigations. I have arranged a C T scan to
confirm the diagnosis and to assess the relationship to the renal arteries. I will
review him in the rooms in one month's time."
In his oral evidence, Dr Huber indicated that he did not contemplate carrying
out any required surgery in January as the hospital was closed to elective surgery
in January 1993.
According to Mrs Read, she telephoned the deceased on 19 December 1992
and that he appeared to be vague and she had to tell him three times who she was.
Later during the course of the conversation, however, he told her that he had seen
Dr Huber the day before and that he had to have an operation. She, for her part,
expressed concern and told me that her husband might have cancer. At that stage,
her mother was terminally ill and the deceased expressed his concern and
inquired if she needed financial help. He then spoke again of the development
proposal and again invited the Reads to live with him. She, for her part, invited
him to go to her house for Christmas but he said that he was going to the
Carmodys.
In the late evening of 20 December 1992, the deceased telephoned the Second
Respondent and told him that he had seen "some funny lighting on the wall when
he got to sleep in the bed". The Second Respondent then drove to the deceased's
home and took him to the Casualty Department of the hospital. The hospital
records (AB 971) recorded the presenting symptoms as:
"91 y o (man) noticed ground colour is the same as the wall when it is dark
Some bright red colour blood on paper toilet." and (AB 970):
"Feeling dizzy slight headache? Bleeding PR
Old slightly deaf old man 90 above + and the fact he sees cobwebs when
the room is dark. Seeing Dr Huber with aneurism
T36.3 P60 BP 130170"
The deceased appears to have been discharged at about midnight having said
that he felt better (AB 972) and was instructed to see his general practitioner on
the following day. On discharge the deceased was provided with a letter
addressed "Dear Dr G P" which recorded (AB 969):
"resenting problem - seeing things on wall
10 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Clinical findings: neurologically stable, no signs, orientation etc all
good BP 130/70 PR 80 no abdominal tenderness BS = (N) AAA is felt-
CVS - (N) Resp - (N)
Provisional diagnosis: AAA excluded leaking
Instructions: continue to follow up before elective surgery"
The deceased saw Dr Pead on 21 December. Dr Pead's notes record (AB 912):
"Aneurism more definite O/E
Referred physician opinion (Etheredge)
Reports minor visual symptoms
BP satis
Generally well but shaking
Prob for aneurism repair in early 93"
Between 24 and 28 December 1992, the deceased stayed with the First
Respondent at his home at Northmead. On Christmas Day, after lunch, the
deceased told the First Respondent that he was to go into hospital and wished to
discuss some personal matters with him. By arrangement, that discussion (AB
252-256) took place the following day while the deceased and the First
Respondent were at Mr and Mrs Carmody's home.
During the course of the discussion the deceased spoke of the flats and told the
First Respondent of his wishes for his funeral telling him that he (the First
Respondent) was a co-trustee of his Will. He then produced the copy of the 1988
Will (AB 945-946) which bore the alterations to which I have earlier referred and
asked the First Respondent to take the document to Mr Ewart so that a new Will
could be drawn up and executed. At the same time he gave instructions as to a
provision he wanted inserted concerning the co-ownership of the flats by Fiona
Evans and her brother. The First Respondent wrote out a summary of those
instructions (AB 953) and the testator approved of it. The deceased then had Mr
Carmody sign the copy will and the instructions for the purpose of identification.
The deceased saw Dr Pead again on 29 December 1992, on which occasion Dr
Pead found that the deceased had an enlarged prostate for which he appears to
have prescribed some form of medication. An operation for the deceased's
prostate condition was proposed, but not until after the operation for the repair of
the aneurism.
On 31 December 1992 the deceased went for his usual early morning swim. In
some way which is anything but clear he injured his head. When he returned
home, he telephoned the Second Respondent at about 6.00am telling him that he
was not well and asking him to go to the deceased's flat. The Second Respondent,
while there, noticed a mark on the testator's head "like a scratch". The Second
Respondent asked the deceased to go to hospital, but the deceased said that he
would make an appointment to see a doctor himself. The deceased then gave the
Second Respondent instructions as to his banking.
It would seem that Mrs Grozde and Mr Graham took the deceased to the
hospital shortly afterwards. The hospital notes (AB 973) record:
"Superficial lac frontal scalp sl venous ooze
For-clean
(2) sterilising
tetanus toxoid
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 11
F/U LMO"
The deceased saw Dr Pead again on 8 January 1993, on which day Dr Pead
referred him to Dr Skyring for a pre-operative report in respect of the prostate
condition (AB 912).
On 12 January 1993, Dr Etheredge saw the deceased and, after examination,
reassured him that he was fit for an anaesthetic if necessary. At the time Dr
Etheredge noted that the deceased "was certainly quite deaf" (AB 966).
On the same day, and presumably after the deceased had seen Dr Etheredge,
Mr and Mrs Carmody travelled to Wollongong to stay in the deceased's flat while
he was in hospital and to look after him whilst he recuperated. This, so it seems,
may well have been due to some misunderstanding by the deceased of what he
had been told by Dr Huber or some misunderstanding on the part of Mr and Mrs
Carmody as to what the deceased had told them - it being the fact that the
deceased had an appointment to see Dr Huber on 15 January 1993.
On 12 January 1993 the First Respondent saw Mr Ewart and passed on to him
the deceased's instructions for his new Will.
On the following day, Mr Ewart wrote to the deceased commenting on the
instructions which he had been given as to the proposed new Will and, in
particular, on the proposal that the flats be retained until six years after his death.
At the same time, Mr Ewart advised that he had arranged for the First Respondent
to collect the Will when engrossed and advised that it would be inappropriate for
the Will to be witnessed by the First Respondent (AB 950-951).
On the following day, the deceased told Mr and Mrs Carmody that there was
no bed available in the hospital at the time and they returned home.
On the same day Mr Read called to see the testator, whom he described as
being uncharacteristically badly dressed and who, so he claimed, exhibited other
uncharacteristic behaviour. Although mentioning his prostate problem to Mr
Read, the deceased did not inform him that he was to see Dr Huber on 15 January
1993.
On 15 January 1993 the deceased was seen by Dr Huber who, on the same day,
wrote to Dr Pead a letter (AB 964) which was as follows:
Re: John Wilson
I have reviewed this gentleman in the rooms today following the CT scan.
This has confirmed the presence of a moderately large abdominal aortic
aneurism. I have discussed surgery with Mr Wilson, especially following Dr
Etheredge's consult. It appears he is perfectly fit for surgery.
I would still advise resection of the abdominal aortic aneurism as it has been
clearly demonstrated that aneurism surgery in the elderly does prolong life. I
have explained the risks and benefits, and Mr Wilson is happy to go ahead.
I have arranged for the resection to be done on 15.2.93. I will let you know
how he gets on."
In the course of his cross-examination on the hearing before Brownie J, Dr
Huber gave the following (inter alia) evidence (AB 442):
"Q. Those considerations of course would mean that when you were
discussing the matter with the patient you would have been extremely careful to
ensure that he was comprehending what you were saying about the operation and
its risks? A. Yes.
Q. And you were so satisfied? A. I was satisfied that he understood what the
operation was about, why it was being done and the potential for complications.
Q. You indicated that he appeared to you to be a remarkably fit, aware 91 year
old? A. Yes, that is correct.
12 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Q. What did you mean to convey by the expression 'aware 91 year old'?
A. Well, I see a number of 91 year olds who are unaware, who are mentally
fairly hazy and he appeared remarkably aware. I would not have contemplated
surgery on someone who was not aware of what was going on and for the average
91 year old I would not advise surgery.
Q. He appeared so far as his awareness and cognition was concerned to be
above average for his age? A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. And considerably above average? I don't want to put words in your mouth?
A. Yes. There is no doubt that he was a very aware 91 year old. I only see sick
91 year olds so don't know if the average 91 year old is as good as he was.
On 3 February 1993 the First Respondent travelled to Wollongong by prior
arrangement with the deceased, to have the latter execute the Will which had
been prepared by Mr Ewart. When he arrived he found that the Second
Respondent, who, so it seems (AB 334), had been requested by the deceased to
be there, in the flat. After the deceased and the First Respondent discussed the
Will, the deceased went out and returned with Mrs Grozde. When he did so, he
executed the Will which he had then witnessed by Mrs Grozde and the Second
Respondent.
On the following day, the deceased saw Dr Pead for the last time. When he did
so he complained of constipation for which the doctor appears to have prescribed
an enema. The doctor's notes (AB 911) record that he "passed (the deceased)
okay for surgery".
Late that afternoon, in accordance with arrangements which they had earlier
made, the Second Respondent drove to the deceased's home to pick him up in
order that they might go out for an evening meal. As they were driving to the
restaurant, the deceased, so the Second Respondent - whom Brownie J accepted
as a truthful and reliable witness (AB 1265) - said, told him that he (the deceased)
had been thinking of giving his property to the Second Respondent. When he did
so, the Second Respondent protested and said that the deceased's family would
hate him (the Second Respondent), a sentiment which he repeated during dinner.
On the following day, at the deceased's request, the Second Respondent went
to the deceased's flat. When he did so he, at the request of the deceased, using the
deceased's computer, typed and printed out a document (AB 129) which was in
the following form:
"People involved
Executives:
1. Ian Carmody
add: 110 Capresa Rd N mid 2142
2. In Deok Jun
add: 7/6 Macquarie St, Wollongong 2500
Others
1. Robyn Read
add: 26 Harcourt St, Killara 2071
2. Grahame Wilson
add: PO 145 Glebe NSW 2037
3. Ken Wilson
add: Same as above
These people can have $10, 000 Each."
After he had done so, the deceased then consulted the telephone directory and
appeared to make a telephone call.
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 13
Later that morning, the deceased called at the office of Mr Brodie, apparently
without an appointment. As Mr Brodie was then engaged, an appointment was
made for the deceased to see him at 2.00pm that day.
When the deceased returned that afternoon, he told Mr Brodie that he was
shortly to enter hospital for surgery and that he wanted to make a Will. At the
time, the deceased said to Mr Brodie - who had previously acted for the deceased
in relation to a matter involving the Wollongong Bowling Club - "Do you
remember me". After some general discussion, Mr Brodie commenced to make
notes of his instructions. Those notes, when completed took the following form
(AB 128):
5-2-1993
Instructions for WILL
T'tor JOHN WILSON
Flat 7/10 Harbour St
WOLLONGONG
RETIRED BUSINESS PROPTR
EXERS: Tan Carmody and In Deok Jun (see attached sheet
for address ect)
LEGAC Y $10,000 each to: Robyn Read
: Graheme Wilson &
: Ken Wilson
(see attached sheet)
RESIDUE: The residue of my estate to my nephew Ian
Carmody & my friend IN DEOK JUN in = shares
[illegible]
ASSETS: Real Estate: 3/4 share as T & C in Flat @ 10
Hartow St W°GONG
Personal Estate: Moneys on Deposit in Bank ETC.
"nothing unusual."
The T'or wish that his interest in the Flats not be sold or disposed of for 6 yrs
after his death. Explaining that this "WISH" may not be capable of fulfillment
depending on the [Elilegible] of the estate generally, at his death & the
Elilegible] duties + obligations to administer his estate. He understands but
wants it mentioned in his will anyway.[Mr Brodie's signature]
The reference in those instructions, to "'attached sheet" is a reference to the
document which had been printed out by the Second Respondent earlier that day
and which document the deceased had handed to Mr Brodie saying "I have typed
this out personally. This is what I want in my Will. It ought to help you fix it up
in legal form". As he read the note, Mr Brodie said:
"Please identify for me the persons you have named as 'Executives' and which
should read "Executors ".
to which the deceased replied:
"No 1 Ian Carmody, that's my nephew and No 2 In Deok Jun that's my friend."
Mr Brodie then said:
"What does 'N.mid 2152' mean"
to which the deceased replied:
"Oh, that's Northmead."
Mr Brodie then said:
14 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
"Who is Robyn Read?"
to which the deceased replied:
"That's my niece."
Mr Brodie then said:
"Who are Grahame Wilson and Ken Wilson?"
to which the deceased replied:
"They are my nephews."
Mr Brodie then said:
"What are the nature of the assets you've got now. I don't need to know their
values necessarily, but I do need to know if there is anything special we should
look at."
to which the deceased replied:
'Tve got a three-quarter share in the block off flats at Harbour Street, moneys
on deposit and nothing unusual, by way of assets. I want you to be sure to put in
the will that I don't want the flats sold or disposed of in any way for 6 years after
my death. "
Mr Brodie then said:
"Do you want to have your trustees to have the right and the power to deal with
any of the estate assets as they deem fit for the purposes of attending to the affairs
of the estate generally and winding up the estate?"
to which the deceased replied:
"Yes that's what I want them to be able to do but I just want them to hang onto
the flats for six years after I die and not sell them straight away following my
death. "
(The inventory of property (AB 19) which was filed in connection with the
application by the Respondents for the grant of Probate of the Will made 5
February 1993 discloses that the estate comprised the deceased's interest in the
flats, which was valued at $750,000.00, moneys in Banks or on deposit with
financial institutions totalling about $60,000.00 and the deceased's 1990 Mazda
626 motor vehicle estimated at about $23,000.00)
Having taken instructions for the Will Mr Brodie then asked the deceased to
wait in the waiting room while he dictated the Will and had it engrossed. When
that had been done he took the engrossed Will to the waiting room where the
deceased was sitting and asked the deceased to read it. After he had done so, Mr
Brodie asked the deceased "Is it okay? Do you have any questions", to which the
deceased replied "No, this is just what I want'. The two then returned to Mr
Brodie's office where the deceased executed the Will and Mr Brodie and a
secretary, Miss Tonkin, witnessed it.
Mr Brodie (AB 126) described the deceased as being a remarkably active man
for his age, in complete control of his faculties, cheerful of manner and with a
distinct and jaunty air about him, walking with a noticeable spring in his step;
Miss Tonkin said (AB 118) that the deceased appeared to her to be much younger
in appearance than one of his age, fit and alert; Miss Carrie, Mr Brodie's
secretary, who had made the appointment for the deceased to see Mr Brodie and
who saw the deceased again on 8 February 1993 when he called at the office to
pay his account, agreed with Miss Tonkin's observations (AB 121). Mr Brodie
(AB 126) also said that, in providing his instructions for the Will, the deceased
appeared to him (Mr Brodie) very clear as to what he wanted done, was quite
emphatic about the manner in which he gave his instructions and was anxious to
have the matter dealt with on the day.
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 15
On 12 February 1993, Mr and Mrs Carmody returned to Wollongong to stay
in the deceased's flat to look after the flats generally for so long as was necessary.
Mr and Mrs Carmody both described the deceased as if he were quite well,
although Brownie J held (AB 1280-1281) that, on the totality of the evidence, the
deceased was plainly quite anxious about going into hospital but otherwise he
was apparently quite well.
The deceased swam on each of the following two mornings and in the
afternoons he and Mr Carmody went for a long walk. The deceased gave Mr
Carmody detailed instructions as to the conduct of the flats.
On 14 February 1993, during the afternoon of which the deceased was to enter
hospital, Mrs McCauley went to Wollongong to visit him. At that time, so Mrs
McCauley said - and Brownie J accepted (AB 1282) - the deceased was very
anxious.
The deceased appears to have been admitted to hospital at about 3.00pm on 14
February 1993. On examination he was recorded (AB 982) as being
"Pleasant 91 yo man, quite deaf, lying comfortably in bed NAD P 72Af T
afebrile RR 18"
The deceased appears to have been taken to theatre during the morning of 15
February 1993. Following surgery he was taken to the recovery ward at 1.00pm
and then to the Intensive Care Unit later that afternoon in a serious but stable
condition (AB 984). The nursing notes (AB 985 et seq) appear to record an
apparently satisfactory recovery in the early stages. At various stages during the
early days following surgery the nursing notes record such things as that the
deceased was alert (AB 987), co-operative (AB 985), easy to nurse (AB 988) but
very deaf (AB 985).
Despite the early apparently satisfactory recovery, on 19 February 1993 (AB
994) the deceased developed an atypical right basal pneumonia. Despite intensive
care over the course of the following two weeks, the deceased's condition
deteriorated and he died on 9 March 1993, as the result of staphylococcal
septicaemia which, although originally thought to have been due to an infected
abdominal aortic aneurism graft, was, after an autopsy, said probably to have
been due to staph epidermidis pneumonia (AB 975-976). It should be noted that,
despite the onset of pneumonia and the deceased's deteriorating physical
condition, the nursing notes at least into the early days of March 1993 recorded
the deceased as being alert (AB 996, 999), orientated (sic) (AB 1002),
co-operative (AB 1003, 1004).
In what I have written above I have endeavoured to summarise, as best one
might in such circumstances - the reading of the affidavit evidence and the taking
of the oral evidence alone having occupied some eight hearing days - the general
nature of the evidence given by the lay witnesses on the hearing before Brownie
J.
The expert evidence which was given on the hearing directed to the question
of the deceased's testamentary capacity was that of Dr R B Milton, a psychiatrist
who, of more recent years, has practised exclusively in the area of forensic
psychiatry - he being called on behalf of the Appellant - and Dr J Phillips, a
consultant psychiatrist in private practice who was called on behalf of the
Respondents.
As will be apparent from what | have earlier recorded, neither Dr Milton nor
Dr Phillips had ever examined the deceased and, in forming their respective
opinions, each was dependent upon material which had been provided to them.
16 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
In the report (AB 182-197) which he provided to the Appellant's solicitors, Dr
Milton concluded (AB 197):
"T consider, from the material presented to me, that the Will on 5 February
1993 was signed while Mr John Wilson was in an abnormal cognitive and
emotional state, and in consequence he was not able to reason with clarity
regarding the disposal of his assets."
Although the report is discursive, it would seem that, in reaching that
conclusion, Dr Milton relied upon the following matters:
1. what he described as "two significant head in injuries prior to making the
Wills in February 1993", the first said to have been sustained in the motor
accident and the second said to have been sustained on 31 December 1992, which
accidents, so he said (AB 196), "probably occurred because of decreased
cognition, but they in turn could have caused minor cerebral damage which
contributed to cerebral difficulties from other causes.";
2. the fact that, so he said (AB 196), "(the deceased) attended hospital in
December 1992 suffering visual hallucinations. Visual hallucinations are
characteristic of organic brain damage, and are extremely rare otherwise.";
3. the fact that there was evidence of vascular deterioration (AB 196):
4. the fact, so he said (AB 196), that "it is common for people who pride
themselves on their health and fitness, and who have enjoyed health and fitness
for many years, to be seriously affected by the knowledge they have a life
threatening condition, especially one that could cause death by such a dramatic
event as the sudden rupture of the largest blood vessel in the body.";
5. the cognitive changes to which he referred, which changes, appear to have
been little more than occasional forgetfulness and vagueness. In this regard,
however, it should be noted that Dr Milton observed (AB 192) that, in respect of
some of the matters upon which the Appellant sought to rely as evidence of the
deterioration of the deceased's mental state, "these events are typical of mild
confusion resulting from organic brain changes" and, later, (AB 196) that "(the
deceased's) cognitive changes might not of themselves have been sufficient to
cause him to act in an irrational fashion. However, he was, in addition, suffering
severe emotional distress, principally from the news of his serious medical
condition and the requirement for surgery.".
In the report (AB 422-433) which, in June 1994, he provided to the
Respondents' solicitors, Dr Phillips, after reviewing the material which had been
provided to him - that material including all the Affidavits and reports which had
prior to that time been filed in the proceedings, and the available medical records
- concluded (AB 432-433):
"Putting the above together, I believe it should be accepted that (the deceased)
at/about 5 February 1993 was an elderly man in generally good physical health
(excepting the abdominal aortic aneurism). He probably did not have advanced
arterial disease given the comments of his examining physicians. He probably
was experiencing considerable anxiety at the time, this being understandable and
appropriate in the circumstances. He may also have had symptoms suggestive,
but not indicative, of early frontal brain atrophy. The major pointers were his
diminishing care of the household and some loss of interest in his choice of
clothes.
There is evidence that (the deceased) had significant impairment of emotional
control and/or cognition at/about 5 February 1993. It is highly unlikely that he
was clinically depressed or suffering a psychotic disorder at that time and it is
improbable that he had any organic brain disorder prior to his post-operative
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 17
deterioration. Finally, there is no evidence of significant memory impairment at
that time. He might, however, have had minor problems of recall consistent with
benign forgetfulness, rather than a chronic dementing process.
It is only at this point where I can link (the deceased's) mental state at/around
5 February 1993. with issues essential for testamentary capacity. The following
can be stated with a high degree of probability:
(The deceased) understood the issue of making his Will and the effects of that
Will on others.
He had a firm knowledge of the extent of his bounty including the properties
which he owned.
He understood the expected claims in the sense of the usual claim of relatives
and in particular the relatives who had previously anticipated becoming
beneficiaries.
He had no psychological illness or significant cognitive impairment which
would have affected his capacity to understand the foregoing points.
In my opinion and on my reading of the two files of documents, (the deceased)
was of clear mind on/about 5 February 1993 and had the capacity to properly
make his last Will. He proceeded with deliberation and no apparent uncertainty.
(The deceased) had full testamentary capacity."
In the course of his cross-examination, Dr Phillips' attention was drawn to the
incident which occurred late in the evening on 20 December 1992 and which led
to the Second Respondent taking the deceased to hospital. While agreeing that
that incident involved a visual hallucination on the part of the deceased, Dr
Phillips (AB 825-827) described the incident as an "hypnagogic event" as to
which he said (inter alia) (AB 826):
"Hypnagogic event is an hallucination, it is a visual hallucination, so Dr
Milton is absolutely correct. This is a visual hallucination but I wish to make it
perfectly plain that this is a visual hallucination which is occurring at a particular
point in time, as he is going off to sleep and as such is a visual, it becomes a
visual hallucination of very little importance."
and (AB 827):
"To make it quite clear, hypnagogic event is a true hallucination. I do not want
to suggest it is not because it is as much as an hallucination as any other
hallucination, but what I had said earlier, and I repeat it, that the hypnagogic
hallucination will occur in the twilight season when a person is not fully awake
and when a person is not fully asleep. Now that is usually when a person is lying
in bed and drifting off to sleep. It can occur if a person gets up in a half awake,
half asleep state, goes to the toilet or whatever, and walks back to bed, almost
asleep as he goes, and the hallucination appears at that moment.
(I am saying that (a hypnagogic event) is not indicative of organic cerebral
damage). It is not indicative of any permanent organic change. It is an example,
however, of a malfunction, a transient malfunction of the brain, something that
passes. Now, in the ultimate this must be an organic event. There is some
chemical error at that moment in time but it is transient, it is unique, and it is
unlikely to occur again.
If a person has a true visual hallucination, they see something which does not
exist and it occurs in clear consciousness, in a wakeful state, that is a visual
hallucination and there will be an organic origin, either because of significant
error within the brain or because the person has taken perhaps a drug which
induces hallucinations. "
18 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
In the course of his Judgment, Brownie J recorded - as I have attempted to do
- and sought to analyse, the evidence of all the lay witnesses and of Dr Milton
and Dr Phillips insofar as it bore upon the question of the deceased's alleged lack
of testamentary capacity because of what were alleged to be the significant
cognitive defects which were said to have been revealed by the evidence. Having
done so, his Honour concluded on this aspect of the matter (AB 1285):
"Both Dr Milton and Dr Phillips say that the testator had some vascular
changes, as was to be expected, given his age and family history, but on the
whole, I prefer the view of Dr Phillips. These vascular changes are not shown to
have caused any cognitive defect, or to be related to any significant cerebral
change.
In summary, I find that, more likely than not, the testator did not suffer from
organic brain damage, or significant cognitive defect."
Then, having dealt with the question of the deceased's "emotional distress"
Brownie J recorded his ultimate conclusion in the paragraph which I have earlier
set out (see p2-p3 ((above)). His Honour then recorded (AB 1286):
"T therefore dismiss the summons. The plaintiff asked for an order that her (sic)
costs be paid out of the estate. The defendants did not oppose this, and it seems
quite proper in the circumstances. I order that the costs of the parties be paid out
of the estate, the defendants' on an indemnity basis. "
(I record this latter matter for two reasons: first, since the order as to costs
which his Honour made was not one which was one which would, in the
circumstances revealed by the evidence, normally be made in a contested probate
suit (see, Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges*); and second, since, in a Notice of
Cross-Appeal filed on their behalf, the Respondents sought an order that the
Appellant pay the Respondents' costs of the proceedings before Brownie J as
well as the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal - in the end, however, no
argument in support of the cross-appeal was advanced on the hearing of the
appeal (T 22)).
In the Notice of Appeal which was filed on behalf of the Appellant, a number
of grounds of appeal were taken. In addition to those grounds of appeal which
asserted that Brownie J had failed to given any, or sufficient, weight to the
evidence of Dr Milton, the following particular grounds might be noted: 1. that
his Honour failed to find that the deceased, at the time of his execution of the Will
of 5 February 1993, was suffering from a combination of cognitive defects and
overwhelming emotional distress
6. that his Honour gave no, or insufficient, reasons for accepting the evidence
of Dr Phillips over that of Dr Milton.
8. that his Honour failed to consider the submission of the Appellant that the
deceased was suffering from an 'insane delusion'.
9. that his Honour failed to find (or make any finding on the Appellant's
submissions) that the deceased's explanation for removing Mrs Read from his
Will of 5 February 1993 was one which was 'not capable of rational explanation
or amenable to reason and not explicable by reference to the subject person's
education or culture.' - language, or language similar to, which is commonly used
4. supra at 709 and cases there cited
URJ READ v CARMODY (Powell JA) 19
when one is seeking to define a delusion (see, for example, Re Hodges; Shorter
v Hodges5 In addition to seeking an order that the appeal be allowed the Notice
of Appeal sought an order that Probate of the Will of the deceased made on 3
February 1993 be granted to the Appellant and the First Respondent.
What I have recorded above will make it clear that it was not asserted that
Brownie J misdirected himself as to the principles of law to be applied to the
determination of the questions arising in the proceedings and that, except for the
complaint that his Honour did not give any, or gave but insufficient, reasons for
preferring the evidence of Dr Phillips to that of Dr Milton (see Pettitt v Dunkley®
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd') the appeal did not involve an question
of law and that the main complaint of the Appellant was that Brownie J had made
errors in fact finding.
Bearing in mind that fact, the fact that, as I have earlier recorded, the hearing
before his Honour was a protracted one in which the principal lay witnesses and
both Dr Milton and Dr Phillips were cross-examined at length, and the further
fact that the findings which his Honour recorded in his Judgment were based at
least in part on his Honour's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and, in
particular, of the Second Respondent, the appeal would seem clearly enough to
invite the observations of Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Devries v
Australian National Railways Commission':
"More than once in recent years this Court has pointed out that a finding of fact
by a trial judge based on the credibility of a witness is not to be set aside because
an appellate court thinks that the probabilities of the case are against - even
strongly against - that finding of fact. If the trial judge's finding depends to any
substantial degree on the credibility of the witness, the finding must stand unless
it can be shown that the trial judge 'has failed to use or has palpably misused his
(or her) advantage' or has acted on evidence which was 'inconsistent with facts
incontrovertibly established by the evidence' or which was 'glaringly
improbable'.
(see also Abalos v Australian Postal Commission?)
So far as concerns the Appellant's complaint that Brownie J did not, either at
all, or at least adequately, record his reasons for preferring the evidence of Dr
Phillips to that of Dr Milton is concerned, I say no more than that the duty of a
judicial officer to give reasons for the decision to which he ultimately comes is,
as I understand it, not one which requires him to examine and determine every
issue which has been raised in the proceedings, or to record in extreme detail the
reasons which have led him to any particular conclusion, or the process of
reasoning which has led him to his ultimate conclusion; it is enough if the judicial
officer sufficiently exposes the facts which he has found which are relevant to his
ultimate conclusion and the process of reasoning based on those findings which
led him to his ultimate conclusion (Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd!0;
Apps v Pilet!!). In my view, the Judgment which Brownie J delivered did record
supra at 706
[1971] 1 NSWLR 376;
(1987) 10 NSWLR 247
(1993) 177 CLR 472, 479; 112 ALR 641, 645-646
(1990) 171 CLR 167; 96 ALR 354
supra
(1987) 11 NSWLR 350
FSC PrINAM
20 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
the facts which his Honour found and which provided the basis for the conclusion
to which he ultimately came, and sufficiently recorded the process by which he
came to that ultimate conclusion.
So far as the second matter of complaint upon which the Appellant seeks to
rely is concerned, it is my view that the evidence which was tendered on the
hearing before Brownie J provided an ample foundation for the conclusion to
which his Honour ultimately came. In this regard I note the following:
1. despite the Appellant's persistent attempts to assert that the deceased's
alleged lack of testamentary capacity was due to delusions - whether "insane
delusions" or "non-insane delusions" does not matter - there was not the slightest
evidence before the Court that, at the relevant time, the deceased was subject to
any "delusions"; at most, Dr Milton, as I have earlier pointed out (see p32-p33
(above)), seemed to accept that the deceased's apparent, and intermittent,
forgetfulness and vagueness evidenced no more than mild confusion consistent
with his age;
2. in this regard it is to be noted that, in the course of his Judgment in Banks
v Goodfellow!2 (upon which judgment counsel for the Appellant sought to rely)
Cockburn CJ said (inter alia)!3
"Tt may be here not unimportant to advert to the law relating to unsoundness
of mind arising from another cause - namely, from want of intelligence
occasioned by defective organisation, or by supervening physical infirmity or the
decay of advancing age, as distinguished from mental derangement, such defect
of intelligence being equally a cause of incapacity. In these cases it is admitted
on all hands that although the mental power may be reduced below the ordinary
standard, yet if there be sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the
testamentary act in its different bearings, the power to make a will remains. It is
enough if, to use the words of Sir Edward Williams, in his book on executors,
'the mental faculties retain sufficient strength fully to comprehend the
testamentary act about to be done.'" (see also Hughes v Public Trustee!4)
3. the evidence of, in particular, Mr Brodie, in my view is more than sufficient
to demonstrate that, on 5 February 1993, the deceased's mental state was more
than adequate to meet the test so described by Cockburn CJ;
4. the fact - if it were the fact - that, at that time, the deceased may have been
"in emotional turmoil" because of his anxiety over his forthcoming admission to
hospital did not, in my view, render the deceased lacking in testamentary capacity
(see Re Hodges; Shorter v Hodges!) for such an emotional state would not affect
one's capacity to reason but would at most affect one's motivations for action;
5. finally, the Appellant's persistent attempts to assert that, notwithstanding the
deceased was lacking in testamentary capacity on 5 February 1993, he
nonetheless had such capacity on 3 February 1993, is to say the least
incongruous.
The Appellant having, in my view, failed to demonstrate that Brownie J failed
to use, or palpably misused, his advantage or acted on evidence which was
inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence or which was
glaringly improbable, it follows, in my view, that his second challenge to his
Honour's Judgment must fail.
12. (1870) LR 5 QB 549
13. supra at 566
14. Court of Appeal 19 August 1990 (unreported)
15. supra at 708-719
URJ READ v CARMODY (Stein JA) 21
I therefore propose the following Orders: 1. ORDER that the Appeal be
dismissed.
2. ORDER that the Cross-Appeal be dismissed.
3. ORDER that the Appellant pay the Respondents' costs of the Appeal.
5 4. MAKE NO ORDER as to the costs of the Cross-Appeal.
Stein JA I agree with Powell JA.
ORDER that the Appeal be dismissed.
ORDER that the Cross-Appeal be dismissed.
ORDER that the Appellant pay the Respondents' costs of the Appeal.
MAKE NO ORDER as to the costs of the Cross-Appeal.
BYNE
Counsel for the appellant: A W Street SC
15 — Solicitors for the appellant: John R Quinn & Co
Counsel for the respondent: P W Neil SC and R S Bell
Solicitors for the respondent: Ewart & Ewart (Parramatta)