STONE v FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) [1998] NSWCA 218
NSW Caselaw
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STONE vy FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LID (IN
LIQUIDATION)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
MASON P, SHELLER and POWELL JJA
27 April 1998, 27 April 1998
[1998] NSWCA 218
JUDICIAL REVIEW — no error of principle shown in refusal of application for stay
of judgment
Sheller JA Mr George Barry Everett Stone filed a notice of appeal with
appointment in September 1997 from a decision of Bainton J which had been
given on 23 May 1997.
Mr Stone applied to this Court for a stay of judgment and of Bainton J's orders.
His Honour had given judgment for the respondent, Farrow Mortgage Services
Pty Ltd, in liquidation for an amount in excess of $1.7 million. The application
for stay came on for Beazley JA who gave judgment on 23 February 1998
refusing Mr Stone's application for costs.
This is an application by Mr Stone to the Court to review Beazley JA's
decision. It appears that the application is brought by way of a notice of motion
which was filed on 23 March 1998 and on its face asks an extension of time.
However, that point is of no significance. In order to succeed, Mr Stone has to
persuade the Court that there was some error of principle to be found in the
decision of Beazley JA. In order to support the application, Mr Stone filed this
morning a document which was made apparently today and runs to twenty pages
and is called an affidavit. He has also referred to three affidavits filed in the
Federal Court and sworn on 24 March 1998, 20 April 1998 and 22 April 1998
respectively. There is an additional affidavit referred to which was apparently
filed in the Federal Court and sworn on 19 February 1998.
We have been referred to a decision of Emmett J of the Federal Court and his
Honour's reasons for judgment of 24 March 1998. All these documents I have
read in addition to the notice of appeal to which I have referred.
Mr Stone has filed a supplementary notice of appeal and an extension to the
supplementary notice of appeal, the last document running to some forty pages.
Mr Stone informed the Court that gathered together and set out in this last
document are the arguments that he would wish to raise on this appeal and on
which he relies in support of this application for review.
The matter upon which Mr Stone relies on the appeal is an allegation that the
sale by the mortgagee, the respondent in the appeal, of a property which was
owned by Mr Stone and mortgaged by him to the respondent was made at an
undervalue and that the power of sale exercised by the respondent was not
exercised in good faith. A principal matter for consideration in the hearing before
Bainton J was whether the sale of this property which is at 2A Duke Place, East
Balmain, was a sale at an undervalue. On this question valuation evidence was
called by both parties. In Bainton J's reasons for judgment, this evidence was
carefully reviewed. His Honour accepted the valuation evidence of the
respondent and did not accept the valuation evidence led on behalf of Mr Stone.
In the course of the review by Bainton J he explained his reasons for this
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
conclusion. However, in considering the defence of want of good faith in the sale
his Honour also referred to the appellant's evidence and said for reasons that he
gave that he was unable to place any reliance on it on any matter in which there
was controversy.
Bainton J, having reviewed the evidence from the valuers, said that he was not
satisfied that the power of sale was not exercised in good faith and, accordingly,
there should be judgement for the respondent. Other defences were raised by Mr
Stone which his Honour dealt with and rejected, but it is the defence of a failure
to exercise the power of sale in good faith which is at the centre of the appeal as
it is now put before the Court and of the material relied upon in support of this
application.
Beazley JA referred to Bainton J's preference for the evidence of the
respondent's witnesses including their expert witnesses over the evidence of Mr
Stone himself and the evidence of his expert witnesses. Beazley JA then
expressed the view in the light of the principles enunciated in the High Court in
Abalos v The Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 and later
confirmed in Devries v Australian National Railway Commission (1993) 177
CLR 472 that Mr Stone would face some difficulty in being able to prove that the
trial Judge erred in his preference of those witnesses unless he was able to
demonstrate that the trial Judge palpably misused the advantage which he had in
preferring the evidence of the Farrow witnesses.
Beazley JA went on to say, "There is nothing in the material which Mr Stone
has presented to the Court today nor on the face of the judgment which
demonstrates that he is likely to be able to do that. It is difficult to see therefore
that the appeal has much prospect of success and that is a very telling reason why
a stay ought not be granted."
Against that Beazley JA balanced the fact that the respondent had put in train
the processes which would eventually lead to Mr Stone's bankruptcy. Her
Honour observed that if Mr Stone was made bankrupt the decision as to whether
the appeal would proceed would be in the hands of the trustee rather than the
hands of Mr Stone. She observed it is well known that it is a relevant
consideration for the trustee's decision in that case whether there is any means of
funding the litigation. It seems no doubt that in this case Mr Stone would not be
able to fund the litigation and the Court must assume therefore that there is a real
likelihood that if Mr Stone is made bankrupt that the appeal will thereby come
to an end.
Notwithstanding that consideration, Beazley JA was of the view having regard
to the matters to which she had referred in respect of the prospects for success,
that it was not an appropriate matter for a stay and in those circumstances she
refused the application.
Mr Stone has put before this Court additional material which as I say I have
read. He has also put before the Court his oral submissions in support of the
application. For my part, I have not seen or heard any part of that material or any
part of the oral submissions which in any way suggest that there was any error
in principle in the way in which Beazley JA dealt with the application before her.
l agree with her Honour when she said that the prospects of success in this appeal
do not appear to be great.
Altogether, apart from the valuation material which Bainton J gave careful
attention, his Honour also observed that the context of the mortgagee's
endeavours to attract a buyer for the premises was that no later than April 1990
the property was auctioned unsuccessfully by Richardson and Wrench on Mr
UFSTONE v FARROW MORTGAGE SERVICES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (Mason P) 3
Stone's instructions, after that auction the property was listed by Mr Stone with
other agents, again it did not sell. It was not suggested that these efforts were kept
hidden from Farrow. No later than July 1990, after Farrow had commenced
proceedings to obtain possession, Farrow was persuaded by Mr Stone to let him
remain in the property for at least six weeks from 23 August 1990 so as to keep
the property in good condition and allow him to continue his endeavours to sell.
The position was to be reviewed at the end of that period. Mr Stone was unable
to find a buyer, at least at the price he was asserting the property was worth. He
did not reduce his asking price though advised by two local agents to reduce his
asking price below $700,000.
Having afforded Mr Stone that latitude, Farrow obviously concluded Mr Stone
either could not or was not really trying to sell the property. Farrow then took
over the handling of the realisation. It took advice from a local agent and from
a valuer. It obtained a valuation from a competent valuer. The market was
depressed with no indication of any likely recovery in the short term. Indeed,
Balmain values were falling. During the period between the decision to proceed
and the date fixed for the auction there was extensive advertising in publications
with state wide circulation and in local papers. Notwithstanding that Christmas
was but two weeks away, that advertising attracted inspection by some fifty-eight
groups. Four of them sought a copy of the proposed contract. Had Farrow put off
the auction until after Christmas 1990, it probably would have been delaying it
until the end of January or thereabouts because so many people take holidays in
January. In fact, though the property was not sold at the auction, Farrow did not
execute a sale contract until mid February 1991, a little over two months after the
auction date. During that period Mr Stone was unable to obtain a better offer.
In my opinion, for the reasons that Beazley JA gave, I think that the application
for a stay was rightly refused. More importantly, there is no sign of any error in
her Honour's judgment. Accordingly, this application should be refused with
costs.
Mason P IJ agree.
Powell JA I also agree.
Mason P The order of the Court is as proposed by Mr Justice Sheller.
Application refused with costs.
The appellant appeared in person.
Counsel for the respondent: J Bartrop
Solicitors for the respondent: Abbott Tout
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