REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL v PELECHOWSKI SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL HANDLEY, BEAZLEY and STEIN JJA 4 and 11 February 1998, 11 February 1998 [1998] NSWCA 184 BAIL — PENDING SPECIAL LEAVE APPLICATION TO HIGH COURT The Court of Appeal, having convicted the applicant of criminal contempt and sentenced him to imprisonment for a fixed term of 6 months, declined to grant bail pending the hearing of an application for special leave to appeal. Handley JA Mr McQuillen has applied for the grant of bail pending the hearing of an application by Karl Pelechowski for special leave to appeal from decisions of this Court of 28 October 1997 and 3 February 1998. An application for special leave to appeal was filed in the High Court registry today which arguably enables this Court to grant bail under the Bail Act 1978. This would only be the case if that part of the definition of appeal in s4(1) of the Act, which includes an application for leave to appeal, applies to an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court which is not self-evident. Assuming that this Court does have power to grant bail under the Bail Act, we are of the view that this is not a proper case in which that power should be exercised. The Court unanimously convicted the applicant of the common law offence of contempt of court on 28 October 1997, and on 3 February 1998 we were unanimously of the view that the appropriate sentence was a fixed term of six months. The Court was informed, without objection, that the applicant's special leave application is not likely to be heard by the High Court until August this year by which time the sentence will have been substantially, if not completely, served. However, the applicant is not bound to wait until the hearing of his special leave application before applying to a Justice of the High Court for bail. The decisions of that Court. commencing from Chamberlain v The Queen (No 1) (1983) 103 CLR 514, establish that the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant bail pending the hearing of a special leave application or an appeal is a limited one and exceptional circumstances must be shown. The decisions In re Cooper's Application for Bail (1961) ALR 584 and Roos v Director of Public Prosecutions (1994) 68 ALJR 632 also establish that these principles apply where the conviction and sentence have been imposed by a Judge sitting without a jury. The applicant is free to apply to a Justice of the High Court in Sydney for the grant of bail pending the hearing of his special leave application. Mr McQuillen submitted that the application was properly made in the first instance to this Court rather than to the High Court in view of the principles established by Jennings Construction Ltd v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 681. We are not I persuaded that those principles apply to the grant of bail pending the hearing of a special leave application where the applicant is serving a full time custodial sentence. In all the circumstances we think that the application should be refused and the applicant should seek relief, if so advised, from the High Court. UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS The order of the Court therefore will be bail refused. Counsel for the applicant: A J McQuillen Solicitors for the applicant: M Latham Crown Advocate Counsel for the opponent: In person Solicitors for the opponent: Crown Solicitor