PASMINCO METALS-SULPHIDE PTY LTD v BRAMBLES AUST LTD [1998] NSWCA 169
NSW Caselaw
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PASMINCO METALS-SULPHIDE PTY LTD v BRAMBLES AUST LTD
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL
SPIGELMAN CJ, MASON P, POWELL JA
25 August 1998
[1998] NSWCA 169
CONTRACTS — construction and interpretation — contractual obligation to
procure insurance — meaning of "subcontractor".
Spigelman CJ. Ex tempore
I will ask Mason P to deliver the first judgment.
Mason P. Proceedings were commenced in the Common Law Division by the
second respondent (Mr Murray) against the first respondent (Brambles) as first
defendant and the second respondent (Sulphide) as second defendant. Mr Murray
claimed damages for personal injuries suffered at factory premises at Cockle
Creek.
It was alleged in the Statement of Claim that Sulphide was the occupier of the
factory and that Brambles was in control of and had responsibility for the
performance of sand-blasting work on the premises and/or was the occupier with
responsibility for that part of the factory premises where the sand-blasting work
was being carried out. Each defendant was sued in negligence as well as upon
statutory counts.
Mr Murray did not plead that he was employed by either corporation. His
evidence was that his employer was Allman Industrial Services Pty Ltd, and it
was that employer who instructed him to go to the factory. After commencing
work Mr Murray was injured when he struck his head on a beam obstructing a
walkway on some scaffolding.
Each defendant filed a Defence. Ultimately, on 8 February 1995, Mr Murray
settled his claim against Brambles for $195,000. His claim against Sulphide was
discontinued.
These facts present the background to the appeal, which is concerned with a
contractual dispute between Brambles and Sulphide which was litigated pursuant
to the Second Cross Claim filed in Mr Murray's proceedings. Sulphide had
contracted with Brambles for Brambles to carry out construction work at the
factory. The Agreement is a lump sum contract dated 2 December 1988.
Sulphide, by its earlier name, is referred to as "The Company" and Brambles, by
its earlier name, is referred to as "The Contractor". For a consideration of about
$4 million Brambles agreed to prepare for painting all steel work, apply heavy
duty coatings to protect the steel work from further corrosion, inspect, test,
maintain these coatings and clean up the site on completion of work, as indicated
by the Specification. Details of Brambles' obligations were set out in the 47 page
Agreement (containing its Specification or special conditions) and 5 Appendices.
These included App 1, General Conditions of Contract for Construction
Contracts. Condition 3 of these General Conditions stipulated:
3 PRECEDENCE OF DOCUMENTS
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
If there is any conflict between the agreement including special conditions
relating thereto executed by the parties, the specifications, the drawings and
these general conditions or any of them:
(a) the provisions of the said Agreement and special conditions shall be
paramount; ...
The claim propounded in the Cross Claim is based on cl 9(a) of the General
Conditions which provided:
9 INSURANCE
(a) The Company shall arrange 'Contractors' All Risks' insurance in the
names of the Company and any sub-contractors for the full Contract
value from time to time of the Work done at, and Goods delivered to
the Site during the period of the Contract including the period of
maintenance and guarantee. This insurance shall include cover against
liabilities to third parties in respect of bodily injury (including death)
and damage to property to the limit of $5,000,000 for any one accident
or as otherwise mutually agreed between the Company and the
Contractor, but shall not otherwise cover the plant, machinery, tools
and equipment of the Contractor, his employees or sub-contractors or
their employees.
The policy shall provide that the Company and the Contractor and any
sub-contractors shall be regarded each as third parties to the other. Unless
otherwise specified or mutually agreed the policy will provide for the
following excesses:
Fire, Explosion, third party and all other risks $5,000 and the Contractor
shall be responsible for and shall indemnify the Company against all losses
claims and demands below the amount of such excess ...
The essential case of Sulphide, here and below, was that other parts of the
Agreement imposed and defined the relevant insurance — procuring obligation
of Sulphide. These were cl 3.03 of the Special Conditions and cl 9(d) of the
General Conditions. Each of these provisions relevantly stipulate that the
Contractor, ie Brambles, shall keep itself insured:
against all claims and liabilities arising, whether at Common Law or under any
statute relating to Workmen's Compensation or Employers' Liability, from any accident
or injury to any person employed by the Contractor or by a sub-Contractor on or in
connection with the work ...
The minimum cover differs between the two provisions, being $500,000 in the
Special Conditions and $200,000 in the General Conditions, but nothing turns
directly on this in the present case. The higher sum prevails because of cl 3 of the
General Conditions.
An essential, but not necessarily conclusive, step in Sulphide's argument was
to establish that Mr Murray was an employee of Brambles or of a sub-contractor
of Brambles on or in connection with the work. Unless this were shown, neither
cl 3.03 of the Special Conditions nor cl 9(d) of the General Conditions were
engaged. Absent such engagement, a necessary step in Sulphide's attempt to
escape liability stemming from cl 9(a) of the General Conditions (with its
permitted $5000 excess) failed.
Newman J held that Mr Murray came to the site as the employee of Allman
Industrial Services Pty Ltd, a company that provides labour to other organisations
that are engaged in a variety of industrial projects. He reported to Bramble's site
supervisor, Mr McCullough. Having passed a medical examination, he was
directed by Mr McCullough as to the performance of work and supplied by
Brambles with the equipment and clothing necessary to do the job.
URRASMINCO METALS-SULPHIDE PTY LTD v BRAMBLES AUST LTD (Spigelman CJ) 3
At trial Sulphide contended that this made Mr Murray a pro hac vice employee
of Brambles, thereby bringing him within the scope of cl 3.03 of the Special
Conditions and cl 9(d) of the General Conditions. This submission was rejected.
After citing a number of well-known Australian and English decisions, Newman
J concluded that Mr Murray remained the employee of Allman Industrial
Services and that he did not become the employee of Brambles, notwithstanding
that he was willing to accept Mr McCullough's orders. This finding is no longer
challenged in the appeal.
Based on this finding, Newman J concluded that cl 3.03 of the Special
Conditions did not apply and that cl 9(a) of the General Conditions represented
the relevant contract for the purpose of determining the Cross Claim. In my view
he was correct to do so.
The Combined Liability Policy taken out by Sulphide in purported compliance
with cl 9(a) has a $50,000 excess as distinct from the $5000 excess stipulated in
cl 9(a). Brambles succeeded on the basis that the $195,000 payable to Mr Murray
under the Terms of Settlement was recoverable under that Policy, less its $50,000
excess; and that such right of reimbursement was to be brought into account in
Sulphide's favour. Hence the verdict on the Cross Claim of $45,000 plus costs.
The appellant accepts that, if cl 9(a) of the General Conditions is considered
in isolation, Brambles is a sub-contractor in terms of its opening words, and that
the second sentence of cl 9(a) would prima facie include cover against the
liability to Mr Murray.
But cl 9(a) is not to be read in isolation. It is to be read with cl 9(d). So much
must be readily conceded. However, cl 9(d) addresses a distinct area of insurance
cover, albeit one which might partially overlap with the field of cl 9(a). Clause
9(d) is concerned with liability to employees, being employees of Brambles as
the Contractor or by a sub-contractor "on or in connection with the Work". The
distinctive fields of cll 9(a) and (d) are also emphasised by the absence of any
provision for an excess in cl 9(d); and the limits of cover ($5 million in the case
of cl 9(a), and $200,000 in the case of cl 9(d)). See also cl 9(e).
On appeal Sulphide contends that Mr Murray was employed "in connection
with the Work", albeit that his employer never ceased to be Allman Industrial
Services. It is submitted that Allman was a "subcontractor" for the purposes of
cl 9(d).
It is submitted that cl 9(d) should be treated as excising from cl 9(a) the subject
matter of injuries to employees (whether of Brambles or of sub-contractors). I am
not sure that one is driven to this mutually exclusive construction of cll 9(a) and
(d). But the submission goes nowhere unless Allman Industrial Services was a
"subcontractor" of Brambles. The judgment of Newman J does not suggest that
Sulphide's case was run below on this basis. Indeed Brambles submits that this
case was not put. Merely because Allman supplied labour to Brambles would not
necessarily make it a subcontractor any more than the fact that a supplier of steel
wool would necessarily become a subcontractor. The case was run on the basis
of Mr Murray becoming Brambles' employee, and that case failed. It would not
be just for Sulphide to be permitted now to run an alternative case that could turn
upon unexplored evidence.
In my opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Spigelman CJ. I agree. The natural and ordinary meaning of the word
"sub-contractor" suggests a person or firm that performs some part of the work,
rather than a person or firm that supplies services or equipment for use in the
work.
4 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
Mr Jackson directed attention to the nature of the work involved in this
particular contract, specifically painting and application of heavy duty coatings to
steelwork. It is clear that it does involve and assumes the use of labour.
However, in my opinion it also extends to the supply of equipment and other
material required for the work.
I am of the same view that the President has enunciated and would in fact
conclude that the evidence, such as it was, below was not sufficient to establish
that Allman was a subcontractor within the meaning of cl 9(d).
I agree with the order proposed by the President.
Powell JA. I agree with the reasons given by the President and the additional
reasons given by the Chief Justice.
Spigelman CJ. The Court is of the view that indemnity costs are not
appropriate on this occasion in view of the arguments put and, accordingly, the
order of the Court will be that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
[1] Appeal dismissed.
Counsel for the appellant: D F Jackson QC/ R A Pepper
Counsel for the respondents: M L Williams/ B J Shields
Solicitors for the appellant: Rankin & Nathan
Solicitors for the first respondent: Ebsworth & Ebsworth
Solicitors for the second respondent: Moroney Rutter & Mantach