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PURCELL v SPROULE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
MASON P, FITZGERALD AJA and HODGSON CJ in Eq
10 November 1998, 10 November 1998
[1998] NSWCA 177
CONTRACT — construction of loan agreement — plain promise to pay by
borrowers whether as principal debtors or guarantors.
Fitzgerald AJA The appellant, the defendant in the District Court, has
appealed against a judgment in the respondent's favour for $277,009 plus costs.
The dispute between the parties relates to a loan made by the respondent on 1
March 1991. That transaction was documented by a deed of agreement dated that
day which was signed by the respondent, the appellant and another man, Mr
Leigh Randell. The document was in the following terms:
"Deed of Agreement between Reginald Norris Sproule of 8 Marinella Street,
Manly Vale Sydney, New South Wales hereinafter called the Lendor and Vesodi
Pty Ltd of 253 Broadway, Sydney New South Wales and Brian Gerald Purcell of
9 Yuruga Avenue, Caringbah, Sydney New South Wales and Leigh Randell of
137 St Johns Avenue, Gordon, Sydney New South Wales hereinafter called the
Borrowers.
Whereas the Lendor is lending to the Borrowers a sum of Two Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($200,000) to be used within the business operated by Vesodi
Pty Ltd and Vesodi Pty Ltd undertakes to pay interest to the Lendor at the rate
of 17% (seventeen percentum) per annurn on the balance owing at any time.
Now it is agreed that:
1. The Borrowers will recompense the Lendor for all costs and expenses
incurred by the Borrower in making this loan including loss or deferral of
interest.
2. The Borrowers will repay the sum lent on the following dates;
a) $32,500.00 on the 4" April, 1991
b) $67,500 on the I May, 1991
c) $100,000,000 on the 1°' March, 1992
3 The Borrowers will each guarantee the repayment of the sum lent in
accordance with 2a), 2b), 2c) above.
4. Interest will be payable at monthly intervals commencing 1 April, 1991.
5. The Borrowers further guarantee that Vesodi Pty Ltd will pay to the Lendor
a sum of $46,397.16 prior to 30" June, 1993. This amount is interest free."
It is common ground that some payments were made to the respondent and
there is no challenge to his Honour's conclusion that of the $200,000 referred to
in the recital to the deed of agreement, $126,850 remains unpaid. It is also
common ground that Vesodi Pty Ltd has not paid the respondent the sum of
$46,379.16 referred to in para5 of the deed of agreement.
The trial judge awarded the respondent interest at seventeen percent on the
sum of $126,850, bringing the total principal and interest in respect of that
amount to $206,456. His Honour also awarded the respondent interest at the
District Court rate on the sum of $46,397.16, bringing the total of principal and
2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
interest in respect of that amount to $70,553. The total judgment sum of $277,009
is the aggregate of the two sums of $206,456 and $70,553.
Only two points were argued by the appellant. The first was that he was
entitled to adduce oral evidence and I now quote from the written submissions:
"To support the submission that on a proper construction of the agreement, he
was a guarantor of the loan rather than a principal."
From that it was said by the written submissions to follow that:
"He is not liable to be sued as per the terms of the Amended Statement of
Claim. If he is to be sued, it must be as a guarantor so that he may arrange his
defence accordingly."
The appellant's written argument gave no indication of any defence that might
have been available to him as a guarantor but I will come back to that point.
Numerous matters were raised in the appellant's defence in the District Court and
in the notice of appeal to this Court but all except that referred to and another
matter, to which I will come, have been abandoned.
In my opinion, the respondent's argument on the initial aspect of the matter
does not require this Court to discuss the well-established principles concerning
the circumstances in which extrinsic evidence is admissible with respect to an
agreement which has been reduced to writing. As I construe the deed of
agreement, there is a plain promise to pay by each of the borrowers and nothing
which was said called into question the operation of those promises, whether
given as principal debtors or guarantors.
Before this Court, the appellant was specifically asked what matter he would
rely upon if the agreement was construed such that he was a guarantor and not
a principal debtor. The only matter to which he could point was that, according
to his submission, the respondent did not act immediately to enforce his
entitlement to the principal sums on the date upon which they respectively fell
due, thereby continuing to attract interest of seventeen percent per annum, on
those sums, a submission which, as which will be seen, is inconsistent with the
second part of the appellant's case. It is sufficient for present purposes for me to
say that, even if the deed of agreement did constitute the appellant a guarantor
and not a principal debtor, the matter to which he refers would not have
exonerated him from liability under the deed of agreement.
The appellant's other point is that, when the recital to the deed agreement and
cl4 are taken together, the promise to pay interest at the rate of seventeen percent
per annum on the sum of $200,000 lent by the respondent on the date of the deed
of agreement was a promise by Vesodi Pty Ltd only and that the appellant did not
promise to pay that interest, either as a principal debtor or a guarantor.
In answer, the respondent relied upon cll of the deed of agreement. So far as
that clause is concerned, the appellant contended, and I accept, that the word
"borrower" in the second line should read "lender". Nonetheless, having
accepted that submission, it does not seem to me to assist the appellant's case. My
understanding of the operation of the agreement as a whole is that it is intended
to ensure that the respondent will receive repayment of the sum of $200,000
advanced on the date of the agreement, together with interest on that sum at the
rate of seventeen percent per annum and that he would also receive a further sum
provided for in para5 of the deed of agreement interest-free.
In my opinion, the proper way to read cll of the agreement, taken with the
recital under which Vesodi Pty Ltd undertakes to pay the interest, it that it is
Vesodi Pty Ltd which specifically agrees to pay the interest, is that Vesodi is to
URJ PURCELL v SPROULE (Mason P) 3
pay that interest and the other borrowers promise to recompense the lender for
any loss of interest which Vesodi fails to pay.
Accordingly, in my opinion, neither of the matters raised by the appellant
justify interference with the decision of the Court below and the appeal should be
dismissed with costs.
Mason P J agree and wish to add only this. Under modern pleading rules, in
relation to pleading a cause of action based on a written document, the plaintiff
will not be confined strictly to the basis upon which the document is construed
in the pleading. From start to finish, this was a claim based on the deed of
agreement.
The notice of grounds of defence filed in the Court below contain defences on
the basis that the defendant, the appellant in this Court, was asserting that he was
a guarantor and not a principal debtor; and advancing various contentions on that
basis. The learned trial judge addressed those contentions and dismissed them on
their merits and no appeal from that dismissal has been advanced.
It therefore seems to me to matter not whether, by a process of construction or
admission of additional evidence, it could be shown that the appellant were a
guarantor and not a principal debtor. I believe the better construction is that he
was principal debtor and, while I believe that the evidence was inadmissible.
Nevertheless, it seems to me to make no difference because of the way the matter
was pleaded below and dealt with at trial.
I agree with the orders proposed.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
The appellant appeared in person
Solicitors for the appellant: Lorton Duke & Co
Counsel for the respondent: G P McNally
Solicitors for the respondent: Tesoriero Kwan
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