ANSETT TRANSPORT INDUSTRIES (OPERATIONS) PTY LIMITED t/a ANSETT AIR FREIGHT v MITSUI COMPUTER LIMITED SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES — COURT OF APPEAL PRIESTLEY JA and FITZGERALD AJA 10 August 1998 [1998] NSWCA 16 Priestley JA. This summons for leave is from a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in the District Court which for purposes of this leave application has been treated by the parties as bringing into play section 127 of the District Court Act. This says that among the appeals which lie only by leave of the Supreme Court are appeals from final judgments or orders other than appeals involving a matter at issue amounting to or of the value of $100,000 or more or involving, and, I paraphrase part of the subsection, claims respecting property or civil rights amounting to or of the value of $100,000 or more. The unsuccessful defendant suffered final judgment almost amounting to $100,000 and almost giving a right of appeal, but nevertheless falling short, so that leave has had to be sought. The money restriction on the right of appeal is a recent innovation brought about by amendments to the District Court Act in the last two years or so. The effect of the amendments has been to limit the matters in which there are rights of appeal from the District Court. Underlying the amendments is the necessity for there to be a limitation of appeals from the District Court to this Court in view of the very large increase of jurisdiction in the District Court and the pressure of numerous appeals on the appeal system. The principal matter which concerns the claimant defendant is that the trial judge found that the contract pursuant to which goods were carried by the defendant was not a contract in accordance with its regular form of contract which had been signed by an employee of the plaintiff opponent but an earlier contract that had been made between agents of the two principals. I use the word 'agent' to include employee. The claimant/defendant is fearful that its long established procedures and the basis upon which it sets its prices for different sorts of freight and contracts may be disturbed by the judge's decision. However, it seems to the Court on this leave application that the judge's decision was based upon his view of an unusual sequence of facts which preceded the carriage of the goods subsequently lost while in the possession of the claimant/defendant. The arguments on both sides in the leave application are set out in detail in writing. Those of the claimant are in the Summary of Argument required by the Rules. Those of the opponent are in its Response dated 24 June 1998. These set out both sides" submissions fully and clearly. The Court is of the view that it need not go into greater detail in dealing with the opposing arguments than by adding to what has already been said that it adopts as substantially correct the written argument of the opponent. What has been earlier said in addition to what is contained in those written arguments was in response to some oral submissions by Mr Parsonsfor the claimant who stressed the matters earlier dealt with. As indicated in the course of argument the Court is of the view that the judge's decision here was essentially a factual one and that 2 UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS nothing that he did cuts across the accepted line of authority in regard to what are called ticket cases, into which category this particular case might well fall. The Court is of the view that leave should not be granted but also wishes to make it clear that this Court regards the decision of the trial judge as one which will have no particular value as a precedent either in academic or commercial circles, resting as it does, entirely in our view, on the judge's view of the facts and involving no misuse of legal principles by him. On that basis the application for leave is refused with costs. Orders accordingly.