Law Society of New South Wales -v- Holland [2002] NSWADT 169

CITATION: Law Society of New South Wales -v- Holland [2002] NSWADT 169 DIVISION: Legal Services Division APPLICANT PARTIES: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales RESPONDENT Graeme Holland FILE NUMBER: 022003 HEARING DATES: 13/09/02 SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 09/13/2002 DATE OF DECISION: 09/13/2002

BEFORE: Molloy GB - Judicial Member; Gailey C - Judicial Member; Hayes E - Member APPLICATION: Professional Misconduct - breach of s. 61 of the Legal Profession Act - Professional Misconduct - breach of s. 62 of the Legal Profession Act - Professional Misconduct - misappropriate trust moneys/moneys MATTER FOR DECISION: Principal matter LEGISLATION CITED : Legal Profession Act 1987 CASES CITED: Law Society v. McCarthy [2002] NSWADT 58 Law Society v. Portale [2001] NSWADT 68 APPLICANT REPRESENTATION: L Pierotti, solicitor RESPONDENT No Appearance ORDERS: 1. The name of Graeme Holland be removed from the Roll of legal practitioners.; 2. The practitioner pay the costs of the Law Society of and incidental to these proceedings as agreed, or as assessed.; 3. Costs may be assessed by this Tribunal or, with the agreement of the parties, by a single Judicial Member of this Tribunal.

1 It is often the case that matters come before this Tribunal that involve numerous discrete often interlinking transactions by a legal practitioner which are in breach of the trust account regulations, the practice rules and the general standards that apply to the practise of law. In many of these cases the legal practitioner elects not to appear, thereby leaving it to the Law Society to satisfy this Tribunal to the requisite standard of proof that the various allegations are made out. 2 In this case the legal practitioner has not appeared, although by letter dated 30 August 2001 he made some detailed submissions to the Law Society and by formal Reply filed 6 June 2002 he repeated the contents of that letter and stated "that it is impossible to respond meaningfully to the allegations given that I have not had access to the files concerned now for almost six years". 3 Ms Jean Sayer, Chartered Accountant, was on 9 August 1996 appointed Receiver for the legal practitioner pursuant to Section 92 of the Legal Profession Act 1987. By Report to the Council of the Law Society 4 December 1996 the Receiver reported in detail, with numerous annexures of corroborative material, about various matters that came to her attention during the course of her receivership. It seems to us that there was nothing that would have impeded the legal practitioner from approaching the Receiver and obtaining access to her files and records for the purposes of defending (if he thought fit) these proceedings. In our view, to plead that he does not have access to any of the files or records is not in all the circumstances an excuse simply because all he had to do was ask. 4 In his letter 30 August 2001 the practitioner goes through all of the complaints made against him and in many cases, and curiously, states "I have nothing to submit"; in other matters he indicates that he cannot comment without access to his records and on one or two occasions he strongly disputes the allegations. 5 It seems to us that, although it is true that the onus is upon the Law Society to satisfy this Tribunal to the relevant standard of proof, if a legal practitioner seriously wants this Tribunal to look at his/her submissions, whether by way of denial or confession and avoidance, that practitioner has an obligation to appear at the hearing and conduct his/her case and not simply leave it up to the Members of this Tribunal to try and make some sense of unsupported submissions, in this case, by way of letter to the Law Society. 6 In the Information filed 16 January 2002 the Law Society makes 11 separate allegations against the legal practitioner in relation to 25 separate client matters, many of which involve allegations of misappropriation of trust moneys and in two of which we regret to observe the clients were the solicitor's father and daughter, the latter being at the relevant time a minor. The evidence before the Tribunal consisted of an affidavit of the Receiver together with her Report to the Law Society Council. There is no need for this Tribunal to go through each and every allegation. Suffice it to say that, the Tribunal is satisfied that, with one exception, the grounds set out in the Information are made out and that the factual material in support of those grounds is proved to the requisite standard of proof. Indeed, the corroborative material in the Receiver's Report is more than adequate. 7 Pausing at this point we observe that there is material in the Receiver's Report that does not pertain to the matters the subject of the Information. That material is not in evidence and we have not taken it into account. 8 It is convenient, however, to deal with a number of the matters alleged simply to indicate the sort of activities in which the practitioner was engaged that came to the attention of the Receiver and ultimately to this Tribunal. We shall deal with the examples by reference to the particulars in Schedule 1 of the Information, which particulars are set out alphabetically. 9 The most striking example is Particular A. On 26 June 1996 the legal practitioner drew a trust account cheque No. 953 in the sum of $50,000.00 in favour of "G & S Holland", Mrs S Holland being the practitioner's wife. The practitioner created a trust ledger, the client being "G & S Holland" and started off this ledger with an item which he described as "loan" in $50,000.00 and immediately showed the balance in debit at $50,000.00. At the time the cheque was drawn there was no moneys held in the trust account on behalf of "G & S Holland" and the account had a debit balance of $50,000.00 from 26 June 1996 to 8 July 1996. The practitioner informed the Receiver that he needed the sum of $30,000.00 urgently to repay a long standing loan and that he had arranged with his father-in-law, Mr George Thompson, to deposit $50,000.00 into his trust account. Mr Thompson did not transfer the money into the trust account and the practitioner clearly, and wilfully, breached Sections 61 and 62 Legal Profession Act and clearly misappropriated the sum of $50,000.00. On this discrete matter the practitioner in his letter 30 August 2001 stated "I have nothing to submit". 10 Particular B alleged that the practitioner acted for the executrix of an estate. On 10 November 1993 he drew cheques against the estate trust account in $25,671.61 and $1,349.30 both of which were used to pay part of the settlement moneys in respect of the purchase by the practitioner and his wife of a property at 168 James Gibson Road, Clunes. At all relevant times the practitioner had no instructions or authority from the executrix to use estate funds in that manner. In his trust records the practitioner caused to be written up these two cheque transactions with the explanation "trustee Wilson estate" when he knew well that the trustee had not provided any authority and in circumstances where he well knew that the drawing of the cheques against the estate account had nothing to do with the estate. Again, in his letter 30 August 2001 the practitioner stated in relation to this Particular: "I have nothing to submit". Clearly the actions of the practitioner were wilful, were in breach of Section 61 and there is a clear misappropriation of trust funds. 11 Similarly, in Particular C the practitioner acted for a Mr K W Hensby and received into his trust account on 6 October 1994 $50,000.00 being an award made by the Victims Compensation Tribunal. On that same date the practitioner paid $12,000.00 from those trust moneys to Depove Pty Limited and $10,000.00 to D G Seaton, both cheques being used to repay loans made to him by those payees and in circumstances where the practitioner had no instructions or authority to use Mr Hensby's trust funds in that manner. The trust ledger kept by the practitioner shows the purpose of both cheques to be "repayment loan" leaving one to conclude that they were each debts due to the payees from the client. Clearly the allegations of breach of Section 61 and misappropriation of client's funds are made out but we also have formed the clear view that the records kept by the legal practitioner in this case were deliberately misleading. 12 Particular D alleges that the solicitor acted for Messrs Vella and Hall in relation to the sale of a motel and 14 cabins. During the course of the transaction, on 16 February 1995, the practitioner received certain deposit cheques from Davikin Pty Limited in $6,250.00, which were placed into his trust account. The date 16 February 1995 is the date of receipt entered up by the practitioner in his trust ledger. The evidence however shows that by cheque 000572 in the sum of $6,000.00 and dated (curiously) 7 February 1995 the practitioner drew a cheque against this trust money, entered up that cheque as being drawn 11 February 1995 and drawn in favour of Messrs Vella and Hall. The cheque was presented on 16 February 1995. In fact it was drawn in favour of a Mr G Thompson in relation to Mr Thompson's victims compensation claim. The practitioner had no authority from Messrs Vella and Hall to pay the funds to Mr Thompson and clearly there was in these circumstances a wilful breach of Sections 61 and 62 and a clear misappropriation of the clients' funds. 13 However, it gets worse than this because at some stage or other the legal practitioner would have to make up the funds wrongly given to Mr Thompson. How did he do that? Easy, if you have a daughter who is underage and involved in a motor vehicle accident. The legal practitioner acted for his daughter by her next friend, the wife of the legal practitioner, and commenced proceedings in the District Court at Lismore, Motor Accidents List. Those proceedings were settled on 14 February 1995 in $17,500.00 for personal injuries together with costs as assessed in the sum $5,000.00. Because his daughter was at that time a minor the Court ordered the $17,500.00 be paid to the Public Trustee for investment on her behalf. The costs of $5,000.00 were to be paid to the practitioner. By affidavit sworn 10 April 1995 the practitioner told the Court that he was not only the solicitor for the Plaintiff but also "her father" and then stated in paragraph 3: "Having regard to the relatively small amount of money involved, the short period of time before the Plaintiff turns 18 and the charges made by the Public Trustee I am prepared to give the Court my undertaking to invest the money on behalf of the Plaintiff as trustee for her should the Court see fit to allow me to do so". In reliance upon that affidavit and undertaking the District Court ordered the Registrar to remit the $17,500.00 to the practitioner and that he immediately invest the moneys in interest bearing investments as trustee for the education, welfare and benefit of his daughter. What did the practitioner do with the $17,500.00? Firstly, in August 1995 he transferred by journal entry to the trust account of Messrs Vella and Hall the sum of $6,200.00. That transfer satisfied that deficiency. Secondly, he transferred to himself the sum of $3,300.00 by two cheques said to be on account of "costs". Clearly both of these transactions were in breach of the undertaking and in breach of his obligations to his daughter. Thirdly, he paid $8,000.00 by cheque 000709 payable to "Molly Jamieson". 14 This payee is one and the same as Mrs M A Jamieson for whom the practitioner acted in relation to a claim for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Her claim was settled for $18,000.00 inclusive of costs and that money was deposited into the practitioner's trust account on 6 June 1995. On that day and on 15 June 1995 the practitioner withdrew two cheques respectively in the sum of $10,000.00 and $8,000.00 and each credited to his office or general account. Of course, that left absolutely nothing standing to the credit of Mrs Jamieson, the practitioner having taken the whole of the verdict moneys. 15 It was alleged by the Law Society that the practitioner had no authority from Mrs Jamieson to take those moneys and place them into his office or general account. In his letter 30 August 2001 the practitioner submits "that Ms Jamieson did provide her authority". No material was available to the Receiver to show that Mrs Jamieson did provide any authority, there being no documentation in the practitioner's files confirming Mrs Jamieson's agreement to settle or any advice to her in relation to the amount received on settlement or any form of accounting issuing to her. The evidence discloses that there was a letter to Mrs Jamieson 15 June 1995 enclosing a Bill of Costs of the same date in $10,000.00, the letter stating that the Bill had been paid. There had been a previous Bill dated 20 July 1993 in $1,000.00 which had in fact been paid and which, on the practitioner's own records, means that he had charged her $11,000.00 to obtain a verdict of $18,000.00 inclusive. Putting that aside, the practitioner's statement that "Ms Jamieson did provide her authority", pleaded by him in relation to both the $10,000.00 and the $8,000.00 cheque, makes no sense having regard to the fact that from his daughter's trust moneys he paid to Mrs Jamieson the sum of $8,000.00 on 2 August 1995. 16 The allegations relating to his daughter are found at Particular Y (to which allegations the practitioner said in his letter 30 August 2002 that he had "nothing to submit") and it is plain from the above factual recital that the practitioner breached Section 61, misappropriated his daughter's trust fund, used for his own purposes funds held by him for his daughter contrary to the orders of the Court and it would be not unreasonable to also conclude that the practitioner broke his undertaking given to the District Court at Lismore. The allegations relating to Mrs Jamieson are found at Particular F and the practitioner's conduct is clearly a breach of Section 61 and demonstrates that he misappropriated her funds. 17 Pausing at this point it is now appropriate to look at Particular W which alleges breaches of Section 61 and 62 in relation to trust moneys held by the practitioner on account of his father. As at 12 January 1994 an amount of $64,308.20 was held in the practitioner's trust account for his father. A cheque in $65,000.00 was then drawn payable to a Mr Neil Murray, which payment was described on the trust ledger as "repayment of loan". The cheque was presented on 12 January 1994 and there was consequently a debit balance in the trust account of $691.80 which was not rectified until 24 January 1994. Clearly, the practitioner was in breach of Section 61 and 62. In addition, the Receiver's report (page 90) shows that the funds covering the $65,000.00 cheque (presented 12 January 1994) to the extent of $49,308.12 were not in fact received and deposited to the trust account until 14 January 1994 - the receiver says that the entries in the trust ledger are posted out of date order making it appear that there was in fact no initial debit balance whereas in fact there was a debit balance of $50,000.00 as at 12 January 1994. 18 Finally, it is convenient to deal with one or two matters that the practitioner in his letter 30 August 2001 disputes. The first is Particular M. It is alleged that the practitioner acted for a Mr & Mrs Thompson who paid to him $1,000.00 for his travelling expenses to come to Sydney for a Supreme Court hearing. The solicitor did not travel to Sydney. On 29 August 1994 he received a further $6,000.00 which he placed into his trust account on account of counsel's fees but on the same day he transferred to his office account $1,000.00 and on 1 September 1994 $6,000.00 without instructions. The position seems to be that on 10 January 1995 the practitioner drew an office or general account cheque in favour of counsel in the sum of $7,000.00. This cheque was dishonoured, apparently by reason that a trust account cheque in $10,000.00 deposited into the office account which had been debited to the trust ledger of another client had been dishonoured. In order to rectify this situation the practitioner paid into the trust account of Mr & Mrs Thompson $7,000.00 on 30 January 1995 and from that he then drew a fresh cheque for counsel. 19 There is some material in the Receiver's report which attempts to explain this curious situation. That material in our view is not in admissible form and the practitioner's file was with a cost assessor in the process of being assessed. Consequently, but with one exception, there was no material that would indicate one way or the other whether at the time of the transfers from trust to office the practitioner was at law entitled to make those transfers. The Receiver concluded that the practitioner had funded his general account with the trust funds of the client from September 1994 until he eventually paid the barrister on 31 January 1995 but in our view, although there may have been material available to the Receiver for her to reach that conclusion, that material in admissible form was not available to us. 20 However, the exception is a trust statement on the practitioner's letterhead (Receiver's affidavit at page 324). It is undated, clearly refers to the Thompson matter, shows $1,000.00 received "on account of costs and disbursements", $6,000.00 received and styled "settlement proceeds", total received $7,000.00, then a payment "To Mr N Francey Counsel's fees" at $7,000.00 and "Balance in Trust NIL". Although there is no material one way or the other before us which would demonstrate whether the practitioner was entitled to transfer the trust moneys to his office or general account on 29 August and 1 September 1994, it is tolerably clear from the practitioner's own trust statement the purpose for which the moneys were deposited, namely for the payment of counsel. In this regard see Law Society v. McCarthy [2002] NSWADT 58, and Law Society v. Portale [2001] NSWADT 68 at paras 13, 23-27, 45-49. Having regard to these facts and the totality of the material available to us on this aspect, the Tribunal is satisfied to the Briginshaw standard that the practitioner had no authority or instructions to transfer the moneys from trust to office on 29 August nor on 1 September 1994, that there was a wilful breach of Section 61 and that on those dates the practitioner misappropriated the relevant moneys. 21 The next Particular with which we wish to deal is Particular G. This alleges that in relation to a Mr & Mrs J R & E D Johnson the practitioner withdrew three separate amounts in total $4,262.52 from his trust account in 1996 when he had no authority from his clients to use their funds in that manner. The practitioner in his letter 30 August 2001 states "my employed solicitor acted in this matter and I am therefore unable to comment without access to the records". As we stated above, that is not an excuse. However, the practitioner's trust ledger is in evidence and it shows that on 8 July 1996 the practitioner deposited into his trust account the sum of $2,250.00 to make up the deficiency in this account in that sum where that deficiency had been outstanding since 1 May 1996. It is difficult to understand the plea of the practitioner when it is plain that it was from his office or general account that a cheque was drawn payable to this trust account to make up the deficiency - in ordinary practice that is not the role or within the power of an employed solicitor and we infer that it was the actions of the practitioner himself. It is plain therefore that the allegations are properly made out, that there was at the relevant times a breach of Section 61 and a misappropriation. 22 A similar plea was made by the practitioner in relation to Particular H, where it was alleged that the practitioner withdrew from moneys held in trust on behalf of a Ms Talber on 15 September 1995 the sum of $5,000.00 by a cheque in his own favour in circumstances where he had no authority from his client in that manner. It is nigh on impossible to believe that an employed solicitor would have the power or the authority to transfer $5,000.00 from a trust account to the practitioner's office account. This observation applies equally to Particular G above. The practitioner's plea in his letter 30 August 2002 cannot withstand scrutiny and it is plain that there was a wilful breach of Section 61 and a misappropriation of the client's money. 23 In relation to Particular I the practitioner pleaded in his letter 30 August 2001 that he believed that he "would have had the client's authority" where it is alleged against him that on 10 May 1995 he transferred from his trust account to his general account the sum of $5,000.00 without authority or instructions. When one looks at the corroborative material the practitioner's plea has no substance at all. The verdict of $30,000.00 was paid into the trust account on 9 May 1995, $8,000.00 transferred from trust to general/office on 9 May 1995, $5,000.00 similarly transferred on 10 May 1995, both in circumstances where the practitioner had rendered a bill of costs and disbursements to the client on 12 April 1995 in total $10,000.00. It is plain therefore that the amount of costs transferred exceeded the bill (inclusive of disbursements) by $3,000.00. To rub salt into the wound the practitioner then paid counsel his fees of $2,000.00 from trust on 11 May 1995 in circumstances where in his Memorandum of professional charges in total $10,000.00 he had already included counsel's fees of $2,000.00. The practitioner's plea is therefore a nonsense and in any event the practitioner puts the lie to the plea himself by entering on his trust ledger a refund of $5,000.00 on 12 October 1995 - in those circumstances how could it possibly be alleged that the practitioner held the authority of the client? The allegations are made out and the Tribunal finds that the solicitor wilfully breached Section 61 and misappropriated the funds as alleged. 24 With regard to the balance of the matters particularised the Tribunal has carefully reviewed the evidence and has concluded that there is more than adequate proof of the matters alleged and the grounds as pleaded but subject to the following matters, findings and observations: 1. In Particular K we are not satisfied that there has been a misappropriation of trust funds in the particular circumstances. Rather, we accept the solicitor's submission in his letter 30 August 2001 that the debit balance arise more as a result of sloppy bookkeeping more than any overt intent. 2. Particular L: it is clearly a breach of Section 61 for a practitioner to overdraw his trust account either generally or in relation to a particular client. After all, firstly the practitioner must be taken to be aware of the status of his individual trust ledgers on behalf of specific clients, and secondly an overdrawing in respect of a particular client is in fact taking money from another client, ie moneys held in trust by the practitioner on behalf of other clients. It is difficult to see how, in ordinary practice, it could be said that a practitioner would not have been acutely aware, when trust account cheques are drawn, of the state of the particular trust ledger account for that particular client. To contend otherwise seems to, not only be at variance with proper practice, but also would be indicative of wilful disregard for the practitioner's obligations to the particular client and to all the other clients whose moneys he holds in trust. It may be, as the solicitor submits in this letter 30 August 2001, that the client deposited an incorrect amount into the trust account prior to settlement. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant simply because there was an absolute obligation on the practitioner to verify, before he drew any trust accounts, that the amount standing to the credit of that client was sufficient to meet the cheque. 3. Particular N: this is worth referring to because it is a somewhat different scenario from many of the other matters. In this case the practitioner persuaded one client to lend $100,000.00 to be secured by a registered first mortgage over property owned by another client. The first client deposited into the practitioner's trust account the $100,000.00 but the practitioner instead of lending it out as he had advised, drew two cheques, one in favour of a barrister for the payment of fees due to that barrister by or on behalf of the practitioner's father and the other cheque ($45,000.00) he simply transferred into his office or general account. The practitioner provided to the first client an Epitome of Mortgage which was totally and absolutely false and no mortgage was ever entered into between the first and second clients. There can be no more obvious a breach of Section 61, and no more obvious misappropriation of trust funds. The allegations of a breach of Regulation 27 of the Legal Profession Regulation 1987 was not pressed. Indeed, the actions of the practitioner clearly were misleading, as indeed were most, if not all, of the matters before the Tribunal. In relation to this Particular the practitioner in his letter 30 August 2001 stated "I have nothing to submit". 4. Particular O: not only was the practitioner party to a breach of an order made by the Family Court on 14 March 1996 in which the practitioner's client was restrained from dealing with an insurance payment of $22,265.00, but on 10 May 1996 the practitioner informed the solicitors for his client's wife that he had "now received into (my) trust account an amount of $22,265.00 (and would) continue to hold this money in accordance with the Orders of the Court" when he had already, on 30 April and 1 May 1996 withdrawn from his trust account and transferred into his general or office account the sums of $15,000.00 and $7,000.00 respectively, being parts of the $22,265.00. The practitioner's conduct in dealing with his client's funds knowing that the disposal of them had been restrained by Court Order and in making a statement to the solicitor's for his client's wife known to be false are both disgraceful and dishonourable and amount to professional misconduct. 5. Particular P: here the practitioner received from a Mr McMillan the sum of $65,000.00 into his trust account on 6 September 1993 as we understand the evidence this sum was in fact paid into the trust account on behalf of a Mr & Mrs Brady. Some of the trust moneys were then used to complete a purchase by Mr & Mrs Brady and the balance ($29,546.33) transferred to the trust account on behalf of Mr McMillan. That trust ledger shows that on 15 September 1993 by cheque 000151 the practitioner drew a cheque in $8,714.71 in favour of "D McMillan". The Receiver has reported that the cheque was in fact drawn payable to the practitioner. In order to balance up the account the practitioner drew a trust account cheque 000540 against the account of another client Mrs Edwards, who is the practitioner's grandmother. These transactions are found in the Receiver's affidavit at pages 385-387. The actions of the practitioner are in clear breach of Sections 61 and 62 and amount to misappropriation. 6. The matter of Mrs Edwards is set out in Particular Q - the facts supporting the allegation are somewhat convoluted but it is plain that what the practitioner did was utilize his grandmother's money to make up deficiencies in other trust accounts and advanced other moneys to himself without authority. The practitioner's response was that "he had nothing to submit" and clearly his conduct was disgraceful and dishonourable and is in breach, in any event, of Rule 23 Legal Profession Regulation 1987. 7. Particular V: although we find the facts and ground proved it is plain that when the practitioner wrote to the solicitors for the vendor on 30 August and 12 October 1993 referring to the moneys he was holding in trust for the fencing, the plain fact is that at that time he was not in fact holding any moneys in trust, he already having transferred the fencing money from his trust account into his office or general account. Clearly the conduct of the practitioner was designed to mislead the vendor's solicitors into thinking that the fencing moneys were still held in trust as agreed. 8. Particular U is the last Particular to which we would make specific reference. Here the practitioner acted for a Mr Crase in a debt recovery matter which was settled for $1,000.00 inclusive of costs. That sum was paid into the practitioner's trust account on 19 July 1993 and on 21 July 1993 the whole amount was transferred into the practitioner's office account. On the preceding day (20 July) the practitioner rendered an account for his professional costs in $100.00. Some years later, on 23 June 1995, the practitioner created another account in $900.00 in relation to the same matter. In his submission letter 30 August 2001 the practitioner stated that he acted for the client "in many matters and he was regularly indebted to me for varying amounts often substantially more than the sum referred to". If that is to be taken as a submission on the facts as alleged in this Particular then that submission must be wholeheartedly rejected for the simple reason that the 23 June 1995 Memorandum of costs relates peculiarly to the particular 1993 debt recovery matter. There was clearly no entitlement on 21 July 1993 to transfer the $1,000.00; rather, the only entitlement was to transfer $100.00. Although only a breach of Section 61 is pleaded, on the facts as before this Tribunal it would also appear that there had been a misappropriation of $900.00 as at 21 July 1993. 25 With regard to all other Particulars to which we have not made reference, we have carefully examined the evidence and we find the facts and grounds proved. There is no need to make any further reference to those Particulars. 26 Consequently, in relation to the whole of the Information we find all of the factual matters proved and the grounds made out with the exception that in relation to Particular K we are not satisfied that there was in the circumstances a misappropriation, rather the facts disclose sloppy bookkeeping. 27 There is no need for us to review the law - the law is clear. The conduct of the practitioner individually and collectively amounts to professional misconduct and the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of legal practitioners in this State. 28 Before making formal Orders we would make this one observation, more as a matter of housekeeping and convenience: where there are numerous pleaded allegations made against a practitioner relying upon report of a Receiver, it would be more convenient if the pleadings were presented in the same order in which they are referred to in the Receiver's Report. To present the pleadings otherwise creates obvious difficulties in locating the evidence in support of each particular pleading. 29 The Orders of the Tribunal are: 1. The name of Graeme Holland be removed from the roll of legal practitioners. 2. The practitioner pay the costs of the Law Society of and incidental to these proceedings as agreed, or as assessed. 3. Costs may be assessed by this Tribunal or, with the agreement of the parties, by a single Judicial Member of this Tribunal.