Razaghi v Director General, Department of Health & anor [2006] NSWADTAP 33

Appeal Panel - Internal

CITATION: Razaghi v Director General, Department of Health & anor [2006] NSWADTAP 33

APPELLANT Asaad Razaghi PARTIES: FIRST RESPONDENT Director General, Department of Health SECOND RESPONDENT New South Wales Medical Board

FILE NUMBER: 059048; 059066

HEARING DATES: 10/10/05, 17/03/06

SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 03/17/2006

DATE OF DECISION: 07/04/2006

BEFORE: O'Connor K - DCJ (President)

CATCHWORDS: admissibility of evidence - procedural fairness

MATTER FOR DECISION: Principal matter

FILE NUMBER UNDER APPEAL: 991070

DATE OF DECISION UNDER APPEAL: 08/30/2005

LEGISLATION CITED : Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 1997

APPELLANT In person

REPRESENTATION: FIRST RESPONDENT C Ronalds SC instructed by K Thomas, Department of Health SECOND RESPONDENT G Furness of counsel instructed by A Tadros, NSW Medical Board

ORDERS: 1. Leave to appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal made 11 May 2005 and 8 June 2005 refused; 2. Leave to appeal against final decision of the Tribunal made 30 August 2005 refused.

REASONS FOR DECISION As Published to Parties 10 February 2006 (first appeal decision) 1 On 9 July 1999 the Acting President of the Anti-Discrimination Board (ADB), in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (the ADA), as they then stood, referred to the Tribunal a complaint of discrimination made to the ADB by the appellant, Dr Razaghi, on behalf of the Australian Doctors Trained Overseas Association Inc. (ADTOA). The respondents to the complaint are the Department of Health and the New South Wales Medical Board. Both have responsibilities bearing on the policies and practices that have affected the recognition of qualifications of overseas trained doctors and their employment opportunities. 2 The original letter of complaint to the President of the ADB is dated 26 March 1999 and the text is follows. The body, the AMC, to which the letter refers is the Australian Medical Council whose responsibilities include the setting of examinations for overseas trained medical practitioners. 'Australian Doctors Trained Overseas Association Inc "We hunger for Justice" National President Dr Asaad Razaghi [address given] Telephone (mobile) [number given] Phone/Fax [number given] Web site: www.adtoa.org.au Friday 26 March 1999 The President NSW Anti Discrimination Board Chris Puplick Dear Mr Puplick, We wish to complain of direct and indirect racial discrimination against Australian doctors with overseas qualifications in New South Wales. We believe we are qualified and competent to work in NSW. We have been denied employment by NSW Health and the Medical Board despite the final conclusion made by the writers of the report, The Race to Qualify, that employment in NSW has been discriminatory on the basis of race. We wish to remind you that Mr Stefan Kerkysharian, the chair of the independent committee was not impartial because he had a simultaneous role on the AMC exam review board. We wish to remind the board that Dr Robyn Iredale (see attached document) who was included as an observer in the review panel had been officially removed by the ADTOA from her position and had no status. We request the board to investigate the discriminatory processes of NSW Health in promoting the help of the "splinter group" group: Robyn Iredale, Maureen Thomas of NSW Health and Patrick Colmer of the Federal Health Department and others. Your investigation will reveal how the NSW Health covertly and overtly discriminated against the active members of our Association. As a Co-Signatory of the legally-binding Agreement with the New South Wales and Federal governments (to remove discrimination as an essential condition of the suspension of the 1997 hunger strike) I request you while we are on the 40th day of our hunger strike for a public hearing to expose this institutionalised racism which is is (sic) in direct opposition to the aims and objects of your Board. We would like to lodge a formal complaint of discrimination on the basis of race. We are discriminated against to apply for those temporary medical positions which are now being advertised because we are either Australian permanent residents or citizens of this country. The conditions to obtain these jobs are that the OTDs (overseas trained doctors) must be both non-citizens and non-residents at the time of application, despite having the same qualifications. The jobs advertised are open only to the British doctors and this excludes equal employment opportunity to our members. We appeal to you to put to a halt to this illegal practice while our members are on hunger strike. The legal basis for the complaint is as follows: These advertisements are not open to us. The preclusion of an Australian citizen from making application on the basis of citizenship represents discrimination on the basis of race, country of origin and citizenship. We would seek temporary employment in NSW in order to obtain a living and maintain our skills. The maintenance of skills is fundamentally vital to OTDs (overseas trained doctors) seeking registration in Australia. There would seem to be no legal reasons why we should not be afforded the opportunity to apply for those positions. Please regard this as a matter of urgency. It is a matter of life and death to those of us who hunger for justice. All we ask is for a hearing – the Truth will bear any scrutiny. Please forgive any irregularities in this letter as I am on hunger strike. It has been dictated on the phone to a friend of our cause. Yours faithfully, Dr Asaad Razaghi ADTOA National President' 3 Dr Razaghi is an Iranian of Kurdish origin, is a political refugee from Iran, obtained medical training and qualifications in Bangladesh, and is now a permanent resident of Australia. He states that he has been unsuccessful in his attempts to meet requirements enabling him to practise as a doctor in New South Wales. 4 There are two events of particular significance that form part of the background to the letter. 5 In 1997 members of the ADTOA, including Dr Razaghi, held a hunger strike over what they regarded as unfair discrimination against overseas trained doctors by medical authorities in New South Wales, and Australia generally, depriving them of opportunities to continue to practise their profession in Australia; and most particularly, different administrative approaches being taken as between overseas trained doctors qualified in certain countries (for example, England, New Zealand, South Africa) and those qualified in other countries. 6 In response to the hunger strike the Government decided to set up a Committee to examine issues relating to recognition of overseas medical qualifications and employment in New South Wales. 7 The Committee (Mr Stepan Kerkysharian AM, then Chair Ethnic Communities Commission of NSW, Mr Chris Puplick, then President of the Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW and Ms Carol Davies, then Director of Equal Opportunity in Public Employment NSW) reported in October 1998: Report of the Committee for the Review of Practices for the Employment of Medical Practitioners in the NSW Health System. A copy of this report (with some paragraphs blacked out, presumably by the government in the context of a freedom of information release) forms part of the material that Dr Razaghi relies upon in support of his complaint. 8 The report is a substantial document of 172 pages, with numerous recommendations. Dr Razaghi has stated to the Tribunal that the report was not implemented, and he is aggrieved by that. I am not in a position to comment on the degree to which the report may or may not have been implemented. 9 It includes the following passages: 10 At p 13: 'The Committee's quest has therefore been to determine whether the differences in assessment and registration requirements and employment and training opportunities for permanently resident overseas-trained doctors, temporary resident doctors and local graduates are based on medical standards. If they are based on medical standards the differences may be reasonable. But if factors other than medical standards are the basis for different requirements and opportunities the differences may be unfair and have a prejudicial effect on the career development of permanently resident overseas-trained doctors. The differential treatment may also constitute unlawful discrimination.' 11 At p 52: ''Successive governments' failure to implement the recommendations of various reports advocating changes to the system of recognition for overseas-trained doctors was one factor that led to the December 1997 hunger strike by New South Wales and Victorian members of the Australian Doctors Trained Overseas Association. Another factor was permanently resident overseas-trained doctors' concern at the continued immigration of temporary resident doctors to fill employment positions with no formal test of medical skills and knowledge whilst the permanently resident overseas-trained doctors were unable to apply for the same positions without passing an examination. … A third factor was a series of changes to the system of recognition of overseas-trained doctors that ran counter to spirit [sic] of previous reports on the matter by imposing harsher requirements and further limitations on overseas-trained doctors' access to employment in their profession.' 12 At p 53 the report refers to the imposition of a quota which: 'meant that to enter the workforce overseas-trained doctors had to demonstrate higher standards than local graduates. Overseas trained candidates who did not come in the top 200 had to re-sit the multiple choice question exam (sometimes over and over) in order to sit the clinical exam. On each attempt they had to pay the examination fee.' 13 The report refers at pp 54 and 55 to the case of Siddiqui v Australian Medical Council (1995) EOC 92-730 where the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) upheld a complaint by an overseas-trained doctor of indirect racial discrimination focusing particularly on the practice of repeated imposition of the multiple choice test and found that the quota system (though on its face neutral) operated differentially. HREOC awarded damages including costs. The Federal Court set aside the decision, and found the quota system and the attendant function of the multiple choice test to be reasonable in the circumstances and not to have a proscribed effect: Australian Medical Council v HREOC & ors (1996) EOC 92-838. One result was that Dr Siddiqui was left with an order to meet the costs of the Australian Medical Council. In the course of his submissions in these proceedings Dr Razaghi has frequently referred to this case. 14 At p 57 the report noted that: 'The use of temporary resident doctors to fill area-of-need positions and resident medical officer positions in metropolitan hospitals has continued. Although permanently resident overseas-trained doctors have been allowed to apply for area-of-need positions, they are still required to pass an exam; temporary resident doctors have automatic recognition.' 15 This issue is one of Dr Razaghi's key concerns. 16 The report goes on in detail to deal with a number of the matters already mentioned, for example there are several recommendations dealing with practices as they affect area-of-need positions. 17 I will now turn to the handling of the complaint before the Tribunal. The Tribunal gave directions of the usual kind, and Dr Razaghi filed a very long document as his 'Points of Claim' as well as much other material. 18 In 2001 the Tribunal, as it was then constituted (with Professor Rees, Judicial Member, presiding) heard an application from the respondents for summary dismissal of the complaint, and heard submissions going to other issues relating to the proceedings. The Tribunal decided (see Razaghi v Director-General, NSW Department of Health & Anor [2002] NSWADT 4 (1 February 2002)) to refuse the application for summary dismissal. However it held that the proper complainant was Dr Razaghi individually; and the complaint was no longer to proceed, as it had to that time, as a representative complaint with the complainant being the ADTOA. The Tribunal also made rulings as to the terms of the complaint which the respondents were to meet. These rulings were given in response to submissions by the respondents that it was difficult to ascertain from the voluminous material filed by Dr Razaghi what his complaints were, having regard to the terms of the ADA. As to this matter, the Tribunal said: '40 In the circumstances we believe it appropriate to attempt to express what we have identified as the applicant's potentially triable claims in terms which may be understood and answered by the respondents. It is appropriate to present these claims together, for some involve allegations that the first and second respondent acted in concert to contravene the Act. There appear to be four separate allegations against the first respondent, and two allegations against the second respondent. The allegations which we have identified are as follows: (a) the first respondent [the Department of Health] discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race when it advertised "area of need" medical practitioner positions and informed the applicant that he was not an eligible applicant because, as an Australian permanent resident, he lacked credentials, being a pass in Australian Medical Council examinations, which were not required of applicants who were not permanent residents. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent contravened s8(1)(b) of the Act, either as a principal, or as someone who aided and abetted another to do an unlawful act contrary to s52. It appears to be a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of race, in that the applicant was treated less favourably on the ground of his Australian nationality than other similarly placed people who did not have Australian nationality (b) the first respondent and the second respondent [the Medical Board] discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by requiring him, because he is an Australian citizen with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia, to pass an examination conducted by the Australian Medical Council before he could obtain temporary registration in NSW as a medical practitioner. People with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents are not required to pass this examination in order to obtain temporary registration in NSW as a medical practitioner. This appears to be an allegation that the second respondent contravened s12(b) of the Act as a principal, and that the first respondent caused, induced or aided the second respondent to do an unlawful act contrary to s52. It appears to be a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of race, in that the applicant was treated less favourably on the ground of his nationality than other similarly placed people who did not have Australian nationality. (c) despite the existence of the temporary registration policy referred to in paragraph (b), the first respondent and the second respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by allowing the temporary registration of two people with medical qualifications from Wales (Dr Robin Williams) and South Africa (Dr Harry van Rensberg) in circumstances where the applicant would not be permitted temporary registration. Those circumstances were that, even though they were Australian permanent residents with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia, Drs Williams and van Rensberg were not required to pass the Australian Medical Council examination, which the applicant was required to pass, before being granted temporary registration as a medical practitioner. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent, contrary to s52, caused, aided or induced the second respondent to contravene s12(b) of the Act. The applicant appears to be alleging indirect discrimination on the ground of race, in this instance, on the ground of national origin. The allegation appears to be that the second respondent imposed a condition or requirement in order to be granted temporary registration. That condition or requirement was that in order for an Australian permanent resident with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia to be granted temporary registration without having passed the Australian Medical Council examination, it was necessary to possess medical qualifications obtained in one of five preferred countries. This condition or requirement could be complied with more easily by people whose national origin was one of the five preferred countries, rather than by people with the same national origin as the applicant, which is Iranian. It is further alleged that this condition or requirement was not reasonable and that it could not be complied with by the applicant. (d) the first respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by denying him access to educational programs and work experience programs which have been provided to people with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent has contravened s19(a) of the Act as a principal, and that it has, contrary to s52, aided, induced or permitted others to contravene s8(1)(a). The allegation appears to be one of direct discrimination on the ground of race, in that the applicant was treated less favourably on the ground of his Australian nationality than other similarly placed people who did not have Australian nationality. 41 In both sets of Points of Claim the applicant has made allegations of victimisation. As we have noted, neither Ms Ronalds [for the Medical Board] nor Ms Furness [for the Department] made submissions to us concerning the identity of the initial complaints of victimisation to the President of the ADB. We cannot identify anything in the initial complaint of discrimination on the ground of race (Exhibit 1) which could be characterised as a complaint of victimisation against either respondent. We invite further submissions from the parties about this matter. 42 Subject to those submissions, we propose to deal with the victimisation allegations in the Points of Claim in a similar way to the manner in which we have dealt with the claims of discrimination on the ground of race. There is an allegation of victimisation by the first respondent in paragraph 115 of the first Points of Claim. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent contravened s50(1)(a) of the Act by reducing the amount of work which it offered the applicant as a medical interpreter, because he lodged a complaint under the Act against the first respondent. There is an allegation of victimisation by the second respondent in paragraph 4 (page 4) of the Points of Claim directed to the second respondent. It is alleged that members of the second respondent have caused medical schools in NSW not to admit the applicant as a student because he has made allegations of discrimination on the ground of race. This appears to be an allegation that the second respondent has contravened s50(1)(c) of the Act. 43 We do not know whether the applicant has any evidence to present in support of the allegations which we have identified as being possibly triable, or whether the incidents fall within the period of time covered by his initial complaint, or complaints, to the President of the ADB. If any of the alleged incidents of discrimination on the ground of race occurred outside of the period 26 September 1998 to 26 March 1999, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to inquire into those matters, regardless of the strength of the evidence which the applicant is able to present in support of his allegations. As we are not in a position to make a determination about the date of the initial complaint, or complaints, of victimisation it is not possible, at this stage, to delineate the relevant time period for any victimisation allegations. 44 Subject to our comments about the relevant time periods, the applicant should be given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the allegations which have been identified in paragraphs 40 and 42, above. That evidence should be limited to those allegations. Once that evidence has been filed the respondents will be in a position to determine whether to contest the allegations, to admit them or to make fresh applications under s111.' 19 It should also be noted that in the course of this decision the Tribunal dealt with the scope in time of the complaint(s). In line with the ADA, the evidence relevant to the complaints was limited to a period within 6 months of the date of the lodgment of the complaint (therefore back to 26 September 1998). The ADA s 88 provides: '(3) A complaint shall be lodged within 6 months after the date on which the contravention of this Act or the regulations which is the subject of that complaint is alleged to have been committed. (4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), the President, on good cause being shown, may accept a complaint which is lodged more than 6 months after the date referred to in that subsection.' 20 One of the recurring submissions of Dr Razaghi is that he is disadvantaged by not having the Tribunal allow him to put forward evidence in support of the complaints as now formulated which predates 26 September 1998. He states that his expression of concerns over the issues the subject of his complaint to the ADB goes as far back as 1992 (as I understand the material, the time when the quota system was introduced). On that basis he wishes to rely on material going back to that time. 21 An appeal by Dr Razaghi against aspects of the 2002 decision was dismissed: Razaghi v Director General, New South Wales Department of Health & Anor [2003] NSWADTAP 42. 22 The Tribunal's constitution has changed over the years, though until July 2004 the presiding member throughout had been Professor Rees. In July 2004 he was replaced by Magistrate Hennessy, Deputy President. On 15 March 2005 and 4 May 2005 the Tribunal (now presided over by Hennessy DP) held a further a hearing with a view to ruling on a number of issues. There is a tape of the proceedings of 15 March 2005, which has been transcribed privately by the second respondent, the Medical Board. There is an official transcript of the proceedings of 4 May 2005. I have examined both of these transcripts. 23 The rulings made in the course of the two day hearing are summarised in a letter from the Registrar to the parties dated 11 May 2005. The main purpose of that hearing was to decide what, among the material filed by the appellant, should properly be admitted as evidence for the hearing of the complaints. The respondents had applied for rulings on these matters. Relevant extracts from the letter follow: ' Evidence Attached to this letter is a list of the exhibits in the applicant's case as of 5 May 2005. The documents in bold type are additional to the documents which the respondents agreed were admissible. The folder contains the exhibits. No other documents have been admitted into evidence. Certain documents which Dr Razaghi pressed to be admitted were not admitted because they fall into one or more of the following categories: The content of the document is not relevant to any of the complaints because, for example: · the document does not relate to anything that happened within the period of the complaints; · the document does not relate to the conduct of either of the respondents; or · the document relates to other applications or issues which have been previously before the Tribunal and which have now been determined or resolved including an application under s 111, the identity of the applicants and the respondents, whether or not the complaint is a representative complaint and submissions to the Appeal Panel in relation to preliminary issues which have now been resolved. The document expresses an opinion which the maker is not qualified to give. The document contains hearsay evidence which in all the circumstances, is unreliable. Summonses Dr Razaghi has requested that several summonses be issued. The reasons given by Dr Razaghi in support of these summonses being issued do not appear to relate to any of the complaints as accepted by the Tribunal. Unless Dr Razaghi can specify the precise conduct about which a witness can testify which occurred within the period of the complaints, none of these applications for summons will be approved. Evidence in support of complaints Set out below is the documentary evidence which appears to relate to the complaint. This list is not intended to be exhaustive. If the applicant can identify further evidence which has already been admitted and which relates to any of the complaints then he should do so by 3 June 2005 (see directions below). (a) direct race discrimination against 1st respondent: the first respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race when it advertised "area of need" medical practitioner positions and informed the applicant that he was not an eligible applicant The evidence contains information about the 1st respondent's policy in relation to Area of Need positions in NSW prior to and after 7 May 1999. The 1st respondent's policy in relation to those positions between 26 September 1998 and 26 March 1999 is relevant to this aspect of the complaint. (See, for example, Ex 5, 7, 8, 9 & 10). (b) the first respondent and the second respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by requiring him, because he is an Australian citizen with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia, to pass an examination conducted by the Australian Medical Council before he could obtain temporary registration in NSW as a medical practitioner. The evidence in support of this allegation includes Ex 2: letter to Dix dated 7/11/98 referring to meeting in October 1998 where the applicant sought advice regarding the possibility of obtaining application forms for conditional registration. (c) despite the existence of the temporary registration policy referred to in paragraph (b), the first respondent and the second respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by allowing the temporary registration of two people with medical qualifications from Wales (Dr Robin Williams) and South Africa (Dr Harry van Rensberg) in circumstances where the applicant would not be permitted temporary registration. There is evidence in Ex 5 that the 1st respondent's policy during the relevant period was that temporary resident doctors from 5 countries (Great Britain, Ireland, South Africa, Hong Kong and Singapore) whose medical assessment standards align with Australia, were allowed to work in Area of Need positions for up to two years without having to pass the AMC exam. There was indirect evidence in Ex 13 that Dr Williams had been registered as at July 1999. There is no evidence in relation to Dr Rensberg. (d) the first respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by denying him access to educational programs and work experience programs which have been provided to people with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents. The Tribunal is unable to identify any evidence of any denial of access to education programs or work experience programs during the relevant period. (e) The first respondent victimised the applicant contrary to s 50(1)(a) of the Act by reducing the amount of work which it offered the applicant as a medical interpreter, because he lodged a complaint under the Act against the first respondent. The Tribunal is unable to identify any evidence of any reduction in the amount of work offered to the applicant as a medical interpreter during the relevant period. (f) The second respondent victimised the applicant contrary to s 50(1)(c) by causing medical schools in NSW not to admit the applicant as a student because he has made allegations of discrimination on the ground of race. The Tribunal is unable to identify any evidence of the second respondent causing medical schools in NSW not to admit the applicant as a student, during the relevant period. Directions and hearing The Tribunal makes the following directions: 1. By 3 June 2005, the applicant is to file and serve a document which specifies: · the precise conduct about which a witness who he wishes to summons can testify which is relevant to the complaint and which relates to the period of the complaint; · any documentary evidence in addition to that outlined above, which has been admitted and which the applicant alleges supports any of the complaints. This document must specify which aspect of the complaint it relates to. 2. By 24 June 2005, the respondents to file and serve any material in reply on which they intend to rely at the hearing. 3. The matter is listed for hearing on a date to be fixed after 24 June 2005 to consider whether, in the light of the documentary evidence identified by the applicant and any further evidence which could be given by a witness, any or all of the complaints should be dismissed as lacking in substance under s 102 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977.' 24 The Tribunal also heard submissions on other issues, and they were the subject of reasons for decision published 8 June 2005: Razaghi v Director General, Department of Health and NSW Medical Board [2005] NSWADT 125. 25 These rulings had the effect of limiting the scope of the proceedings in ways that Dr Razaghi sees as disadvantageous to him: the Tribunal reiterated the previous Tribunal's position, that the evidence in support of the complaints should be confined only to the period from 26 September 1998; and, further to the decision on summonses reflected in the letter of 11 May, the Tribunal rejected Dr Razaghi's application to have summonses issued to the Presidents of the ADB as at 1999 (Mr Puplick) and 1992 (Mr Marks) in connection with his submission that he should be entitled to have considered evidence that predates September 1998. The Tribunal, in its decision of 8 June, also dismissed an application to have Deputy President Hennessy disqualify herself on the ground of actual or apprehended bias. 26 These rulings having been made, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the respondents' renewed application for summary dismissal, the relevant provision now being s 102 of the ADA which provides: ' 102 Tribunal may dismiss complaint The Tribunal may, at any stage in proceedings relating to a complaint, dismiss the whole or any part of the complaint on a ground on which the President may decline the whole or any part of a complaint under section 92 (1) (a) (i) or (ii) or (b).' 27 Section 92 provides relevantly: ' 92 President may decline complaint during investigation (1) If at any stage of the President's investigation of a complaint: (a) the President is satisfied that: (i) the complaint, or part of the complaint, is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance, or (ii) the conduct alleged, or part of the conduct alleged, if proven, would not disclose the contravention of a provision of this Act or the regulations, or … (b) the President is satisfied that for any other reason no further action should be taken in respect of the complaint, or part of the complaint, the President may, by notice in writing addressed to the complainant, decline the complaint or part of the complaint.' 28 In its decision dated 30 August 2005 the Tribunal upheld the respondents' application and dismissed the complaints: Razaghi v Director General, Department of Health and NSW Medical Board [2005] NSWADT 202. 29 Dr Razaghi now appeals. There are two notices of appeal, the first filed 22 July 2005 and referring to the decision dated 8 June 2005; the second filed 30 September 2005 and referring to the decision dated 30 August 2005. 30 The appellant's right to appeal (subject to one exception not presently relevant) applies to any 'order or other decision made by the Tribunal pursuant to this Act': ADA s 115. The appeal is made 'under under Part 1 of Chapter 7 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 [ADT Act]'. 31 The Appeal Panel is constituted by a presidential member sitting alone as permitted by the ADT Act in the case of an 'interlocutory' appeal. The relevant provisions are s 24A and s 113(2A), (2B) and (2C). 32 Section 24A provides: ' 24A Constitution of Tribunal for exercise of interlocutory functions (1) In this section: interlocutory function means the making of any order or other decision by the Tribunal (including an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal) in proceedings in respect of any of the following: (a) stays or adjournments, (b) prohibition or restriction of the disclosure, broadcast or publication of matters by order under section 75, (c) summonses, (d) extensions of time for any matter (including for the lodgment of applications or appeals), (e) evidential matters, (f) disqualification of members, (g) joinder of parties to proceedings, (h) summary dismissal of proceedings, (i) any other interlocutory issue before the Tribunal. (2) In exercising any of its interlocutory functions, the Tribunal may be constituted by: (a) in the case of a function of the Tribunal in relation to an internal appeal or external appeal—one presidential judicial member who is assigned by the President for the purpose of exercising the function, or (b) in the case of a function of the Tribunal otherwise than in relation to an internal appeal or external appeal—one judicial member of the Division to which the function concerned is allocated who is assigned by the President or (subject to any direction of the President) the Divisional Head for the purpose of exercising the function. (3) Nothing in this section prevents a differently constituted Tribunal from exercising an interlocutory function or any other function of the Tribunal if the Tribunal is duly constituted to exercise that function apart from this section. (4) This section has effect despite any other requirement of this Act or any other enactment relating to the constitution of the Tribunal for the exercise of its functions.' 33 In this case all of the matters raised fall within the meaning of 'interlocutory functions', being summonses (item(c)), extensions of time for any matter (item (d)), evidential matters (item (e)), disqualification of members (item (f)) and summary dismissal of proceedings (item (h)). 34 Section 113 of the ADT Act, as amended, imposes a leave requirement on interlocutory appeals: see s 113(2A), (2B) and (2C). ' 113 Right to appeal against appealable decisions of the Tribunal (1) A party to proceedings in which an appealable decision of the Tribunal is made may appeal to the Tribunal constituted by an Appeal Panel. (2) An appeal under this Part: (a) may be made on any question of law, and (b) with the leave of the Appeal Panel, may extend to a review of the merits of the appealable decision. (2A) Despite subsections (1) and (2), an appeal does not lie to an Appeal Panel of the Tribunal against an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal except by leave of the Appeal Panel. (2B) For the purposes of determining whether to grant leave to appeal under subsection (2A), an Appeal Panel may be constituted by one presidential judicial member who is assigned by the President to make that determination. (2C) The provisions of subsection (2B): (a) have effect despite any other requirement of this Act or any other enactment relating to the constitution of an Appeal Panel for the exercise of its functions, and (b) do not prevent a differently constituted Appeal Panel from determining whether to grant leave to appeal under subsection (2A) if the Panel is duly constituted to exercise that function apart from subsection (2B). (3) An appeal under this Part must be made: (a) within 28 days after the Tribunal furnishes the party with written reasons for the appealable decision under section 89, or (b) within such further time as the Appeal Panel may allow. (4) An appeal under this Part is to be made in the manner prescribed by the rules of the Tribunal.' 35 A hearing was held on 10 October 2005, and I ruled on that occasion on whether to grant leave to the appellant in relation to some of the Tribunal's rulings recorded in the decision of 8 June 2005; and reserved in relation to the remaining matters dealt with in that decision and the evidential matters dealt with in the letter dated 11 May 2005. 36 There was an issue as to whether to permit the appellant to proceed to appeal out of time, his first notice of appeal was lodged about 14 days after the expiry of the 28 day appeal period (see ADT Act s 113) commencing 8 June 2005, and the second notice of appeal may have been lodged out of time by a day or two (it was lodged 30 September 2005 in respect of a decision delivered 30 August 2005). There was no objection by the respondents to receipt of the second notice of appeal. I granted leave for both notices to proceed, especially as the matters covered by the first notice of appeal bear directly on the decision the subject of the second unchallenged notice. Leave to Appeal 37 While s 113(2A) involves a recent change to the Tribunal's legislation, provisions of this kind effectively seeking to restrict or filter interlocutory appeals are common in court statutes. In Xu v Sydney West Area Health Service [2006] NSWADT 3 there is a useful discussion of some of the criteria that have been seen as relevant by appellate courts in dealing with leave applications (though I note that that case was dealing with the question of leave under ADA s 96, which concerns an application by a complainant for the Tribunal to inquire into a complaint which had been declined by the President of the ADB as lacking in substance). 38 On 10 October 2005 I made ex tempore rulings to the following effect as to the points of appeal relating to the Tribunal's ruling on disqualification for bias, the summons to Mr Puplick, and other persons occupying the position of President, ADB. (1) Disqualification for Bias (paras 4-16, Decision 8 June 2005) 39 What the appellant says, as best I understand it, is that the proof of the Tribunal's bias at the hearings on 15 March and 4 May is to be found in the ruling that the Tribunal ultimately decided to make - which was to exclude from its consideration a large number of documents that the appellant felt was relevant to its deliberations. He believes that had Professor Rees remained, the result would have been different. The Tribunal had regard, as I read the reasons, to the appropriate test when considering a bias objection; and went about the process of informing themselves as to the nature of the bias objection in the appropriate way. Though the appellant is disappointed at the ruling there is nothing, it seems to me, that raises any arguable appeal point about the Tribunal failing to apply the relevant standard appropriately. (2) The Proposed Summons to have Mr Puplick or other persons occupying the position of President, Anti-Discrimination Board at certain times to be called (paras 17-23, Decision 8 June 2005) 40 The discretion conferred on the President (on good cause shown to accept a complaint which is lodged more than six months after the events to which it refers) is an important official discretion, one that would, I think, be very well understood by the holder of the discretion. If (as is asserted by Dr Razaghi) the President had agreed or contemplated the possibility that he would allow the complaints to extend further back than the allowed period of six months, one would expect that matter to have been addressed formally in the report given to the Tribunal as part of the referral process. It is a matter well known to be of the greatest significance in the management of anti-discrimination complaints. It seems to me that the Tribunal was quite entitled in circumstances where there is an absence of any reference to this issue not to approve issuance of a summons to the then President requiring him to give evidence as to his dealings with the file and the appellant. I agree with the Tribunal that the summons would have been issued in circumstances which were entirely inappropriate. The Tribunal in this part of its decision was dealing with the question of whether or not its discretion to approve issuance of the summons should be exercised. I think the factors that it took into account were the relevant factors and that this was not a matter appropriate for the issue of summons. Leave denied. (3) Fairness of Procedure followed by the Tribunal at its hearings on 15 March 2005 and 4 May 2005 41 Dr Razaghi asserted that he had not been accorded fairness in the way the Tribunal conducted itself over these days. I have perused the transcript. In my view the Tribunal followed an entirely orthodox procedure of examining each of the documents that Dr Razaghi claimed provided evidence in support of his complaints, heard from him, heard from the respondents and made rulings. There is nothing in my view in this point. Dr Razaghi's real concern is the rulings themselves. 42 On 10 October 2005, I reserved in relation to the following matters, and now deal with them. (4) Rulings on Evidential and Procedural Matters (proceedings 15 March 2005 and 4 May 2005, see letter from Registrar, 11 May 2005) 43 The net result of this hearing was that the documents contained in a red folder marked 'A' were admitted. The appellant wanted a lot more material to be treated as evidence, and he challenges what he sees as the unfairly limiting nature of the rulings. In this regard it must be remembered that the onus lies on the complainant in equal opportunity proceedings. 44 Section 73(4) of the ADT Act provides: '(4) The Tribunal is to take such measures as are reasonably practicable: (a) to ensure that the parties to the proceedings before it understand the nature of the assertions made in the proceedings and the legal implications of those assertions, and (b) if requested to do so—to explain to the parties any aspect of the procedure of the Tribunal, or any decision or ruling made by the Tribunal, that relates to the proceedings, and (c) to ensure that the parties have the fullest opportunity practicable to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered in the proceedings.' 45 In this case the Tribunal in its 2002 decision went, in my view, to enormous lengths in seeking to assist Dr Razaghi to formulate his grievances in a manner which corresponds relevantly to the terms of the ADA. 46 The Tribunal of 2002 made it clear that Dr Razaghi now had to supply the evidence – the particulars – to support the allegations as they had now been formulated. The Tribunal of 2005 was engaged in the exercise of assessing where the matter now stood, three more years down the track. Moreover, in my view counsel for the respondents (consistently with the Bar's Guidelines for barristers on dealing with self-represented litigants (2001)) have been diligent and helpful in their attempts to identify material that might be relevant to Dr Razaghi's case. 47 In these regards, I agree with the following observations made by the Tribunal in University of New South Wales v McGuirk (No 1) (GD) [2005] NSWADTAP 65 (8 December 2005): 'The Tribunal is not required to go through large quantities of material in search of evidence that could possibly support the University's claim. That point was made clear by the High Court in Gamester Pty Ltd v Lockhart (1993) 112 ALR 623 at 626 when the Court rejected a submission that a decision maker is obliged to sift through large volumes of written material in order to identify relevant submissions or evidence. The submission was described as suggesting: ... that a judge who has given a party a reasonable opportunity to state that party's claim for relief is under an obligation, without having the benefit of relevant and intelligible submissions, to extract from a mass of apparently non-supportive evidence any pieces of the evidence which could be regarded as supportive. The submission is misconceived. In court proceedings, a judge is bound to give a party a reasonable opportunity to state the party's claim for relief and to point to the evidence, which supports it. But if the opportunity is not taken, the judge is not bound to set out in search for supportive evidence to support a claim which the party has failed to articulate intelligibly.' 48 Dr Razaghi made the following points. He noted that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence; as to which see ADT Act, s 73(2). In that regard he referred also to s 73(3) of the ADT Act requiring the Tribunal to act with as little formality as the circumstances of the case permit and according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal forms. 49 He then referred to the video (a document not admitted) which he described as a 'manifest of my grievances'. As I understood his submissions, he felt that the contents of the video would provide evidence in support of his case that he had suffered discrimination. As I read the Tribunal's response it did not regard the contents of the video as providing any direct evidence of a kind that was relevant to any of the complaints. He also wanted to have before the Tribunal as 'evidence' the contents of the report, parts of which I have quoted earlier in these reasons. 50 The rulings that are negative to Dr Razaghi have a consistent pattern to them. Dr Razaghi sometimes ask to have brought forward as evidence the experience of other doctors. It is clear that no statements in a usual form have been filed, and moreover that as the complaint is now one confined to Dr Razaghi as an individual, and is no longer a representative complaint, that statements from other doctors about their treatment are most unlikely to be relevant. The Tribunal's rulings along these lines are, in my view, incontrovertible. 51 There are also rulings going to the question of the incorporation into proceedings of general documents about the treatment of overseas trained doctors. By way of background, I have referred to some of the statements made in the report of 1998. Again it seems to me that the Tribunal took the correct approach, asking Dr Razaghi to focus specifically on his personal circumstances and describe precisely what happened to him: what applications did he make, what responses did he get and, ultimately, what policies or procedures of the respondents where in place at those times which he says were applied to him. It seems to me that he has had ample opportunity to do this and has not responded adequately. As I read the records of these proceedings, the respondents are not contesting the existence of certain policies and practices during periods of time relevant to Dr Razaghi. They are asking him to particularise the circumstances affecting him that have given rise to discrimination. 52 The Tribunal was, I believe, correct in its basic approach to this and a number of his other submissions. The Tribunal did not stop the appellant from putting in an affidavit or statement from persons shown on the video if they had something specific to say about alleged discriminatory conduct as it directly affected the appellant. 53 The other consistent pattern in the Tribunal's approach was to compare the material sought to be entered into evidence with the elements of the ground of discrimination to which the material was said to relate. In my opinion the Tribunal informed itself as to the legal elements of each of the complaints, and, carefully, examined the material that the applicant sought to introduce by reference to those elements. This, in my view, was the proper course. This approach is clearly consistent with s 73. 54 Ms Ronalds (for the Department) noted so far as the evidential rulings were concerned that the principles drawn from the law of evidence were appropriate ones to employ with respect to decisions about admissibility of documents or issuing of summons as to opinions and as to hearsay evidence. I agree. 55 The appellant is, of course, right in pointing out that the Tribunal is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. This does not mean that 'anything goes' by way of what can be placed before the Tribunal. It is clear that the Tribunal was simply using the principles as a guide to informing its mind. 56 The Tribunal is a judicial institution, and while it is not bound to apply the rules of evidence, it must have regard to 'logically probative' material in reaching its conclusions. This is a general requirement of the law. In my view it is quite reasonable, and would be expected, that it use the general principles of the law of evidence for guidance in ascertaining what might be 'logically probative' material. This point was also considered by the Appeal Panel of 2003: see further Razaghi, [2003] NSWADTAP 42 at [15]. 57 Leave is denied to contest the evidential rulings. (5) Summonses to Various Named Persons 58 Apart from the summons to Mr Puplick, the appellant had, as I understand his submissions, also sought summonses against Mr Marks (the President of the ADB in 1992, who, it was said, might have something relevant to say on whether the scope of the complaints should extend beyond the six month period), Mr Kerkysharian, the chair of the 1998 Review and the current President of the ADB, Professor John Horvath, a President of the Medical Board and Mr Andrew Dix, Registrar to the Medical Board. 59 Ms Furness (for the Board) noted that the applicant had not identified or articulated any error of law or question of law with respect to the refusal to issue summons. I agree. She noted that the Tribunal had not finally closed the door to the appellant's applications for summonses in its letter of 11 May. It had said that unless the appellant could specify the precise conduct about which a witness could testify none would be approved. She noted it made a direction that by 3 June he was to file and serve a document which specified the precise conduct about which a witness who he wishes to summons can testify. She noted that no such document was filed and served by 3 June 2005. She submitted that there can be no assertion made that that process involved the want of procedural fairness by the Tribunal to the applicant with respect to the issue of summonses. 60 I agree with Ms Furness's submissions on these points. The appellant has had ample opportunity to explain in a conventional way to the Tribunal why, specifically, he needs particular summonses. He has failed to take that opportunity. The appellant did refer in his submissions to a document dated 22 June 2005 prepared by him. Clearly this was outside the time period allowed by the Tribunal in its directions. 61 Leave is denied to contest the summons rulings. The Summary Dismissal Decision (30 August 2005) 62 Having refused leave in relation to the points arising from the decisions reflected in the letter of 11 May 2005 and the reasons published on 8 June 2005, it remains to hear any submissions going to the grant of leave in relation to the decision of 30 August 2005: Razaghi v Director General, Department of Health and NSW Medical Board [2005] NSWADT 202. Directions will be made for that purpose. 63 That decision refers to the characterisation of the complaints made by the earlier Tribunal, to the evidence in support of the complaints and to the principles relating to applications for summary dismissal. It then assesses the state of the evidence produced by the appellant (at its highest, and without having regard to any defences - as required by the applicable law) to ascertain whether the necessary elements governing each of the seven complaints would be established. It concludes, in each of the seven instances, that some or all of the elements would not be established. Order 1. Leave denied to appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal made 11 May 2005 and 8 June 2005. 2. Leave as it relates to decision of 30 August 2005 – directions to be made. As Published to Parties 4 July 2006 (second appeal decision) [for ease of future reference the paragraph numbering does not recommence with '1' in this version] 64 The appellant, Dr Razaghi, has appealed to the Appeal Panel against the preliminary decisions as well as the final decision of the Equal Opportunity Division of the Tribunal granting the respondent's application for summary dismissal of a complaint made by the applicant under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (until recently, s 111; see now s 102). As the preliminary decisions and the final decision were interlocutory decisions (see s 113(2A) read in conjuction with s 24A(1)), leave must be granted by the Appeal Panel for the appeal to proceed (s 113(2A)). 65 Leave has already been refused in respect of the preliminary decisions: see decision delivered 10 February 2006 (referred to as 'the first appeal decision'). As the preliminary decisions affected the scope of the evidence before the Tribunal when it made its final decision, it was seen as necessary to defer for separate consideration the Tribunal's final decision delivered 30 August 2005 – Razaghi v Director General, Department of Health & Anor [2005] NSWADT 202 ('the final decision'). 66 The Appeal Panel for that purpose may be constituted by one presidential judicial member (s 113(2B)). The respondents oppose the application for leave, and if leave is granted, submit that the appeal be dismissed. 67 Following the delivery of the first appeal decision, I made directions to allow for the filing of any further written submissions relating to the Tribunal's final decision. I directed that the matters to be considered at the further hearing would be whether the final decision involved any error of law and, if leave was granted to extend the appeal to the merits of the decision, regard would be given only to the evidence that was admitted by the Tribunal. This evidence was generally referred to in the proceedings as the material contained in the red folder. 68 The respondents have, throughout these appeals, relied on oral submissions. The appellant did file written submissions with his notice of appeal against the Tribunal's final decision; see, in particular, a folder filed 30 September 2005. His criticisms comprise comments in the form of annotations at various points of the text of the Tribunal's reasons for decision. There were no further written submissions filed after the first appeal decision. 69 I reconvened to hear final oral submissions on 17 March 2006. At that hearing the appellant repeated many of the submissions that he had made unsuccessfully in seeking leave to appeal against the various preliminary rulings. Often he simply criticised the conclusions found in the Appeal Panel's decisions on those points. 70 In its final decision, the Tribunal below commenced by setting out the background to the appellant's complaint and the point it had reached by 2005. Similar material is contained in the first appeal decision. This background will not be repeated in detail here. The Tribunal referred to the relevant provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act and the principles relating to applications for summary dismissal. These provisions and principles were, in my view, accurately stated: and there was no objection by the appellant to the accuracy of these parts of the decision. It then went on to apply the principles to each of the complaints. The appellant's submissions criticised the Tribunal's conclusions. Abuse of Process Submission 71 The appellant made a wider submission – that it was an 'abuse of process' for respondents to seek to have struck out summarily a complaint that had been with the Tribunal for several years, and concerned practices on the part of government agencies of great seriousness bearing on the provision of opportunities for employment to overseas trained doctors. The appellant did not refer to any case-law explaining what has to be demonstrated in order to conclude that an 'abuse of process' is occurring (generally, Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Rogers v R (1994) 181 CLR 251 esp per McHugh J at 286); or to the source of the Tribunal's power to restrain an abuse of process so demonstrated. 72 As the Tribunal below, variously constituted over the years, has sought to explain to the appellant, it is necessary for a complainant of unlawful discrimination to put their complaint in a form, and to supply particulars and evidence in support, which enable the respondent(s) to reply to the complaint, and, if necessary, furnish relevant evidence. The respondent is entitled to know the case it has to meet. If the matter proceeds to hearing, the Tribunal must know, with reasonable precision, what the complainant's case is so that it can be heard and determined according to law. 73 The Tribunal generally, and the equal opportunity jurisdiction in particular, seeks to operate in a manner which recognises that many applicants are unrepresented, are 'one time' participants in the legal system and can not be expected to have a precise understanding of what material may be required at law for them effectively to pursue their case. 74 Because of the way in which equal opportunity complaints reach the Tribunal, there can be special difficulties. The original complaint to the Anti-Discrimination Board may have been dealt with by the Board in a way that has not led to the gathering of all the relevant evidence. The Board may, for example, have sought to dispose of the complaint by conciliation and been unsuccessful in that regard. At the point at which the complaint is referred to the Tribunal, it may not be in a form and have the evidence in support that will enable it to be addressed fully by the respondent(s) and fairly considered by the Tribunal. 75 It is not uncommon for the Tribunal therefore to give applicants a further opportunity to identify precisely the grounds in law upon which their complaint of unlawful discrimination is based, and to put on the relevant evidence. 76 Once the case has been more closely defined by that process, it is sometimes the case that the respondent(s) will move to have the matter summarily dismissed on the ground, essentially, that the case as now formulated could not, viewed at its highest and without any reference to the respondent's defence or evidence, result in an adverse finding against the respondent. 77 This has been a long drawn-out matter. Much of the history of the matter is to be found in the earlier decisions of the Tribunal and will not be repeated here. The complaint was made to the President of the Board on 26 March 1999, and referred by the President to the Tribunal on 9 July 1999. It went through a directions process. 78 Eventually the respondents moved in 2001 for the complaints to be struck out. By decision delivered in February 2002, the Tribunal did not grant the respondents' motion but did reduce the various complaints made by the appellant to six possible categories, four being types of unlawful discrimination, two being victimisation matters: see Razaghi v Director-General, NSW Department of Health & Anor [2002] NSWADT 4 (upheld on appeal, Razaghi v Director General, New South Wales Department of Health & Anor [2003] NSWADTAP 42). The Tribunal made further directions. The matter proceeded slowly after that point, with the appellant being given the opportunity to put on evidence in an appropriate form. 79 Once the appellant had taken that opportunity the respondents moved again to have the matter summarily dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, this conduct on their part was reasonable, and does not, in any way constitute an abuse of the processes of the Tribunal. The Appeal Panel rejects the appellant's submissions to that effect. 80 The Appeal Panel agrees with the submission of Ms Ronalds SC for the first respondent, adopted by Ms Furness appearing for the second respondent, that the appellant has been given ample opportunity to put forward relevant evidence; and it was reasonably open to their clients to make fresh strike out applications. Recapitulation 81 It is helpful to recapitulate here the terms of the complaints, seen as possibly open to be pursued by the appellant by the Tribunal. (The terms of the victimisation complaint had not been formulated in the 2002 decision but were formulated by the Tribunal in its June 2005 decision.) The following text is as set out by the Tribunal in the final decision (the decision under appeal) at [6]. Note that in the Tribunal's list at [6] there is no (d). ' Race discrimination complaint against Department of Health and NSW Medical Board a) the first respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race when it advertised "area of need" medical practitioner positions and informed the applicant that he was not an eligible applicant because, as an Australian permanent resident, he lacked credentials, being a pass in Australian Medical Council examinations, which were not required of applicants who were not permanent residents. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent contravened s8(1)(b) of the Act, either as a principal, or as someone who aided and abetted another to do an unlawful act contrary to s52. It appears to be a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of race, in that the applicant was treated less favourably on the ground of his Australian nationality than other similarly placed people who did not have Australian nationality. b) the first respondent and the second respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by requiring him, because he is an Australian citizen with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia, to pass an examination conducted by the Australian Medical Council before he could obtain temporary registration in NSW as a medical practitioner. People with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents are not required to pass this examination in order to obtain temporary registration in NSW as a medical practitioner. This appears to be an allegation that the second respondent contravened s12(b) of the Act as a principal, and that the first respondent caused, induced or aided the second respondent to do an unlawful act contrary to s52. It appears to be a claim of direct discrimination on the ground of race, in that the applicant was treated less favourably on the ground of his nationality than other similarly placed people who did not have Australian nationality. c) despite the existence of the temporary registration policy referred to above, the first respondent and the second respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by allowing the temporary registration of two people with medical qualifications from Wales (Dr Robin Williams) and South Africa (Dr Harry van Rensberg) in circumstances where the applicant would not be permitted temporary registration. Those circumstances were that, even though they were Australian permanent residents with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia, Drs Williams and van Rensberg were not required to pass the Australian Medical Council examination, which the applicant was required to pass, before being granted temporary registration as a medical practitioner. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent, contrary to s52, caused, aided or induced the second respondent to contravene s12(b) of the Act. The applicant appears to be alleging indirect discrimination on the ground of race, in this instance, on the ground of national origin. The allegation appears to be that the second respondent imposed a condition or requirement in order to be granted temporary registration. That condition or requirement was that in order for an Australian permanent resident with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia to be granted temporary registration without having passed the Australian Medical Council examination, it was necessary to possess medical qualifications obtained in one of five preferred countries. This condition or requirement could be complied with more easily by people whose national origin was one of the five preferred countries, rather than by people with the same national origin as the applicant, which is Iranian. It is further alleged that this condition or requirement was not reasonable and that it could not be complied with by the applicant. e) the first respondent discriminated against the applicant on the ground of race by denying him access to educational programs and work experience programs which have been provided to people with medical qualifications obtained outside Australia who are not Australian citizens or permanent residents. This appears to be an allegation that the first respondent has contravened s19(a) of the Act as a principal, and that it has, contrary to s52, aided, induced or permitted others to contravene s8(1)(a). The allegation appears to be one of direct discrimination on the ground of race, in that the applicant was treated less favourably on the ground of his Australian nationality than other similarly placed people who did not have Australian nationality. Victimisation complaint against each respondent f) the allegation against the Department of Health is that the applicant was subjected to an act of victimisation by the first respondent as the first respondent contravened s 50(1)(a) of the Act by reducing the amount of work which he had offered the applicant as a medical interpreter because he lodged a complaint under the Act against the first respondent ; g) the allegation against NSW Medical Board is that he has been subjected to an act of victimisation by the second respondent as members of the second respondent have caused medical schools in New South Wales not to admit the applicant as a student because he has made allegations of discrimination on the ground of race. This is an allegation that the second respondent has contravened s 50(1)(c) of the Act.' 82 In the following analysis, I will segregate the complaints according to respondent. Summary Dismissal of Complaints against First Respondent 83 Complaint (a) in the above list. The Tribunal deals with this complaint at [14] to [24] of its reasons. The Tribunal below pointed out several deficiencies in the evidence filed by the appellant. In my view, there was nothing said at the appeal hearing by the appellant or contained in his written submissions, which demonstrated any inadequacies in the Tribunal's assessment of the weakness of his evidence. I adopt those reasons. The appellant, despite ample opportunity, failed to particularise his allegation by relevant evidence addressing the elements required by the legislation to be proven to which the respondent could properly respond. 84 Complaints (b) and (c). These complaints primarily implicate the second respondent. 85 The first respondent is said to be connected on an 'aiding and abetting basis'. As the complaints as they relate to the second respondent were, as noted below, properly dismissed, the complaints as they relate to the first respondent must fall away. 86 Complaint (e). Again, I regard the Tribunal's reasons at [37]-[39] as entirely persuasive. I adopt those reasons. The appellant, despite ample opportunity, failed to particularise his allegation by relevant evidence to which the respondent could properly respond. 87 Complaint (f). The Tribunal again found, in my view entirely persuasively, that he had furnished no evidence in support of this allegation. Its reasons are at [40]-[41]. I adopt those reasons. Summary Dismissal of Complaints against Second Respondent 88 Complaint (b) in the above list . The Tribunal deals with this complaint at [25] to [32] of its reasons. The appellant sat the Australian Medical Council examinations on two occasions, and failed to pass. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence as to when the appellant had sat the exams. Issues as to the time when the alleged unlawful conduct took place were critical in this case for the reasons explained in the first appeal decision. 89 In any event, the Tribunal considered that this description of the nature of the complaint did not entirely accord with the legislation. It said, at [27] that the 'alleged act of discrimination' is more properly described as discrimination in 'the terms on which the Board was prepared to register him as a medical practitioner'. The Tribunal found that The appellant had not applied for registration of the kind open to be sought in his circumstances as at November 1998 – conditional registration. The Tribunal referred to s 12(b) of the Act, which provides, and concluded its discussion as follows: '31 Conclusion . Dr Razaghi acknowledges that he was theoretically eligible for conditional registration even without passing the AMC exams. That acknowledgement effectively disposes of this complaint. Even if we were satisfied that the Department of Health failed to advise Dr Razaghi of his entitlements, that conduct does not come within an area of discrimination covered by the Act. 32 Aiding and abetting. Alternatively, Dr Razaghi alleged that the Department of Health "aided and abetted" the NSW Medical Board to breach the Act pursuant to s 52. Since we have found no contravention of s 12(b), the Department of Health cannot have "aided or abetted" the Medical Board to breach the Act.' 90 I see no reason to disturb these conclusions. 91 Complaint (c). The Tribunal dealt with this complaint at [33] to [36] of its reasons. The appellant referred before the Tribunal and again before the Appeal Panel to two instances where doctors from preferred countries had got temporary registration without being required to pass the AMC examinations. The Tribunal, in my view persuasively, found that the appellant had not filed sufficient evidence as to the circumstances of the two doctors, so as to enable any comparison to be made, or any further assessment to be undertaken as to the lawfulness or otherwise of the situation. It found that as the appellant had not adduced reliable evidence of any of the elements of indirect discrimination set out in s 7(1)(c) of the Act, the complaint lacked substance (at [35]). I see no reason to disturb this conclusion. 92 Complaint (g). The Tribunal's reasons are set out at [42] and [43]. While the second respondent is the accreditation and registration authority for entry into practice, the appellant furnished no evidence that the second respondent had in any way 'caused' the various universities to deny him admission to their courses. I agree with the Tribunal that this complaint lacks substance; and that at least in two instances the events sought to be put in issue are barred from being considered on timeliness grounds. The Leave Discretion 93 What considerations might be relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave in an appeal against an interlocutory decision was examined by the Appeal Panel in Chi v Coles Supermarket [2006] NSWADTAP 3; see also Xu v Sydney West Area Health [2006] NSWADT 3. 94 In the present case, I am satisfied that the inadequacies of the evidence in the applicant's case are such that there is no likelihood that, were the case in its present state to go to hearing, that he would be successful. To permit the proceedings to continue would clearly be oppressive. Order 1. Leave to appeal against the rulings of the Tribunal made 11 May 2005 and 8 June 2005 refused. 2. Leave to appeal against final decision of the Tribunal made 30 August 2005 refused.