CITATION: Feuerstein v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2007] NSWADT 114 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the decision for a list of the amendments. DIVISION: General Division APPLICANT PARTIES: Michael Frederick Feuerstein RESPONDENT Commissioner of Police, NSW Police FILE NUMBER: 063407 HEARING DATES: 30 March 2007 SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 30 March 2007 DATE OF DECISION: 28 May 2007 BEFORE: Grant Y - Judicial Member CATCHWORDS: Security Industry Act - security industry licence - revocation or suspension of licence - Security industry licence - revocation or suspension of licence MATTER FOR DECISION: Principal matter Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Crimes Act 1900 Firearms (General) Regulation 1997 LEGISLATION CITED : Firearms (General) Regulation 2006 Firearms Act 1996 Security Industry Act 1997 Security Industry Amendment Act 2002 Security Industry Regulation 1998 Abela & Anor v State of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 170 Cleofe v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service, Alpha Intelligence, NSW Police Service [2001] NSW ADT 2 Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service v Knight (GD) [2000] NSWADTAP 6 Cooper and Brookes v FCT (1980) 147 CLR 297 Doyle v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSWADT 84 Joyce v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2000] NSW ADT17 CASES CITED: Joyce v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2000] NSWADTAP 17 Knight v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSW ADT 99 Krab v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [1999] NSW ADT 29 Law Society of NSW v Bruce (1996) 40 NSWLR 77 Mijo Developments Pty Ltd v Royal Agnes Waters Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 199 Petty v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2003] NSW ADT 20 Phegan v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2002] NSWADT 127 Watkins v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2006] NSWADT 270 APPLICANT A Martin, barrister REPRESENTATION: RESPONDENT W Pisani, agent ORDERS: 1. Affirm the decision of the Commissioner to revoke the Applicant's Class 1 ABC security license and Master Security license; 2. The Stay Order previously granted in these proceedings is revoked. REASONS FOR DECISION Introduction 1 Mr Michael Feuerstein ("the Applicant') is the owner and proprietor of a security business known as CPS Security Pty Limited. He has held his license to operate in the securities industry since 1980 and employs a number of security operatives. 2 On 20 November 2004, the Applicant was issued with a Master Security License. This license was due to expire on 20 November 2009. 3 On 2 December 2004 the Applicant was issued with a Class 1 ABC Security license. This license was due to expire on 2 December 2009. 4 On 22 March 2006, the Applicant appeared at Campbelltown Local Court for the offence "Not Keep Firearm Safely – Not Prohibited Firearm/Pistol" and was fined $500 and ordered to pay court costs of $65. An All Grounds Appeal with Stay was lodged. 5 On 22 March 2006, the Applicant appeared at Campbelltown Local Court for the offence "Employer of Guards Failed to Keep Register re Firearms" and was fined $400 and ordered to pay court costs of $65. An All Grounds Appeal with Stay was lodged. 6 On 22 March 2006, the Applicant appeared at Campbelltown Local Court for the offence "Employer Failed to Produce Register to Police Officer" and was fined $400 and ordered to pay court costs of $65. An All Grounds Appeal with Stay was lodged. 7 On 20 August 2006, the Applicant appeared at Campbelltown District Court in relation to the All Grounds Appeal with Stay lodged. The appeal was upheld in relation to "Not Keep Firearms Safely – Not Prohibited Firearms/Pistol" and the conviction was set aside. In respect to the charges of "Employer of Guards Failed to Keep Register re Firearms" and "Employer Fail to Produce Register to Police Officer", the appeal was dismissed and the convictions and penalties were confirmed. 8 On 15 November 2006, the Notification of Revocation of License was served upon the Applicant by personal service. 9 On 15 November 2006, the Applicant lodged an application for an "Urgent Stay" in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. The Stay was granted on Friday 17 November 2006 and interim licenses were forwarded to the Applicant by facsimile on 20 November 2006. At the hearing on 15 November a direction was made for an internal review to be conducted and provided by the Commissioner. 10 On 30 December 2006 an internal review was completed and the Commissioner affirmed the original decision that the Applicant had been convicted of "prescribed offences" relating to the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon which pursuant to Clause 11(a) of the Security Industry Regulations 1997 ("the Regulations") resulted in mandatory revocation of the Applicant's license Class 1 ABC and Master Security License. The Applicant advised the Commissioner that he did not accept the result of the internal review and proceeded with an application for an external review to be conducted by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal which is the matter that came before the Administrative Tribunal on 30 March 2007. Legislative scheme 11 The Security Industry Act, 1997 established a scheme for licensing people to carry on security activities. Within the Act there are several provisions that allow the Commissioner to revoke a license. The Act was designed with the clear intention of providing the community with confidence in a professional security industry, where competence, integrity and accountability are provided and maintained to a high standard. The legislation was enacted to exclude from the industry persons convicted of prescribed offences. In this regard, criminal record checks are undertaken on a regular basis after licenses are issued to maintain strict licensing requirements by identifying persons who fail to meet the criteria and revoking their licenses. 12 Section 16(1) (a) of the Security Industry Act 1997 ("the Act"), requires that the Commissioner must refuse to grant an application for a license if he is satisfied that the Applicant has been convicted of a prescribed offence within the period of 10 years before the application for the license was made. 13 Clause 11(a) of the Regulations, indicates that for the purposes of Section 16(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, the following is a prescribed offence: 11 – Offences that disqualify Applicants: Section 16. For the purpose of Section 16(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, the following offences are prescribed offences regardless of whether they are committed in New South Wales: "Section 16 An offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm, or any other weapon, committed under:- i. The law of any Australian jurisdiction, or ii. The law of any overseas jurisdiction (being an offence that, had it been committed in Australia, would be an offence under the law of an Australian jurisdiction): and being an offence that would disqualify the Applicant concerned from holding a license under the Firearms Act 1996." 14 The relevant offences that disqualify an Applicant from holding a license under the Firearms Act 1996 are also set out within Clause 5 of the Regulations to the Firearms Act 1997, and are in similar terms to Clause 11 of the Regulations. The relevant portion of Clause 5 is set out below:- "5. For the purposes of Section 11(5)(b) and 29(3)(b) of the Act, the following offences are prescribed offences regardless of whether they are committed in New South Wales:- (a) An offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm, or any other weapon, committed under: i. The law of any Australian jurisdiction, or ii. The law of any overseas jurisdiction (being an offence that, had it been committed in Australia, would have been an offence under the law of an Australian jurisdiction)." 15 The net effect of these various provisions is that the Commissioner is compelled to revoke the security license held by a person if they have committed a prescribed offence which is 'an offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm, or any other weapon' committed under the law of any Australian jurisdiction or overseas. Mr Feuerstein's case 16 Mr Martin on behalf of the Applicant submitted that the internal review conducted by the Commissioner of Police who had affirmed the original decision had done so with reference to a large number of irrelevant considerations and erroneously relied upon offences of which the Applicant had not been convicted. Mr Martin submitted that the Tribunal should only have regard to the material relating to the two offences of which the Applicant was convicted and of which he was unsuccessful on appeal. Mr Martin submitted that the Commissioner had wrongly relied on two offences where the Applicant had been charged and convicted but the convictions overturned on appeal. Accordingly he submitted that the Tribunal should only have regard to the fact of the two convictions which were confirmed on appeal and not have regard to other material that was before the internal reviewer. 17 Mr Martin also submitted that the only relevant issue for determination by the Tribunal was whether the confirmed convictions were "prescribed offences" triggering the mandatory revocation of the Applicant's licenses. Mr Martin further contended that this was the only matter that should be properly considered by the Tribunal in making the correct and preferable decision, and the other material referred to in the Internal Review – Statement of Reasons, should not be taken into account. 18 Mr Martin asserted that the manner in which the mandatory refusals was approached by the Tribunal was established in Doyle v Commissioner of Police [1999] NSWADT 84 where it was stated:- "In cases of the present kind two steps are usually involved in establishing the objective facts – being satisfied that the criminal record relied upon is accurate, and being satisfied that the conviction (or proven offences) recorded falls within the parameters of the categories prescribed for mandatory refusal of an application." 19 Mr Martin contended that the sole ground relied upon by the Commissioner in both the initial Notice of Revocation and Internal Review is that the Applicant has been convicted of prescribed offences and accordingly the Commissioner must revoke the license on this ground, pursuant to Section 26(1)(A) of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) ("the Act"). 20 Mr Martin submitted that the question the Tribunal must determine is whether the offences that the Applicant was convicted of under Clause 67 of the Firearms Regulations 1997 (which has now been repealed and replaced by the Firearms Regulation 2006 with a comparable provision being found in Clause 81) are offences relating to "the possession or use of firearm or any other weapon" for the purposes of Clause 11 of the Regulations. 21 Mr Martin stated that the result of this inquiry determines whether or not the Applicant is liable to the mandatory revocation of the security license 1ABC held by him, and the master license he holds on behalf of CPS Security Pty Ltd for having been convicted of allegedly prescribed offences. 22 Mr Martin stressed that the Commissioner's erroneous reliance on two offences where the convictions were quashed on appeal to the District Court must form no part of the decision-making process of the Tribunal, and be considered irrelevancies for this review. These offences are entitled "offence 1" and "offence 2" within the Commissioner's 'Internal Review – Statement of Reasons'. Mr Martin also submitted that the other material dealing with the alleged facts of offences the Applicant was charged with and acquitted and those he was convicted of is also not relevant to the issue to be determined by the Tribunal, that being whether those offences the Applicant is convicted of are prescribed offences triggering the mandatory revocation of security licenses held by him. 23 Mr Martin submitted that the Applicant Mr Michael Feuerstein, is the owner and proprietor of the security business known as CPF Security Pty Limited and he has held licenses to operate in the security industry since 1980 and employs a number of security operatives. Mr Martin further submitted that the result of this inquiry determines whether or not his client is liable to the mandatory revocation of the security license 1ABC held by him, and the Master License he holds on behalf of CPS Security Pty Ltd for having been convicted of allegedly prescribed offences. Mr Martin stressed that the effect of the revocation of the license will put an end to Mr Feuerstein continuing to own and operate his security business, or working in the security industry. 24 Mr Martin acknowledged that his client had been convicted of two offences in breach of Clause 67 of the Firearms Regulations 1997. Clause 67 of the Regulations to the Firearms Act 1996 providing as follows: "67 Registers to be kept by Security Guard Employers (i) A person who employs security guards must keep in the approved form:- (a) a register in which are kept particulars of the acquisition of firearms by, the servicing of firearms on behalf of, and of the disposal of firearms and ammunition by, the employer and (b) a register in which are kept particulars of the names of each employee who is authorised by a license to possess a firearm, and of the periods for which such employee has possession of the firearm. (ii) The employer must ensure that each register is maintained in a book of not less than 100 pages in the following manner: (a) the heading of each page is to be machine printed, (b) the pages are to be bound in a manner that would prevent any page being readily removed, (c) each page is to be machine numbered consecutively, (d) entries are to be made in black or blue ink and any alteration to an entry must be made by interlineation or by striking out and not by erasure, and (e) no pages to be extracted. (iii) The employer must:- (a) ensure that each register is kept in a place of safekeeping (not being a place in which any firearms are kept) at the place of business of the employer, and (b) ensure that each register is kept for not less than three years after its completion, and (c) ensure that an appropriate entry is made in the register referred to in sub-clause (1)(a) within 24 hours of the acquisition, servicing or disposal of a firearm, and (e) ensure that an appropriate entry is made in the register referred to in sub-clause (1)(b) when any firearm (and any ammunition for the firearm) is transferred from the employer's store of firearms to the custody of an employee and when the firearm and ammunition is returned to the store of firearms, and (f) immediately produce, if requested to do so by a police officer at any time, any such register to the officer and permit the officer to inspect, and make copies of any entry contained in the register. Maximum penalty (subclauses (1) to (3)): 50 penalty units." 25 It was the view of the Applicant's counsel that a review of the provisions of Clause 67 above demonstrate that a breach can be occasioned by failing to make entries in black or blue ink (Clause 67(2)(d)) or for removing any page of the register (Clause 67(2)(e)). He further submitted that it would be difficult to believe that the legislature intended that such breaches were properly contemplated as leading to the mandatory revocation of a security license, and that they would be offences "relating to the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon", except where the legislature has stated this to be its intention in a most clear manner. Mr Martin submitted that - "It cannot be properly concluded when examined as a whole, that Clause 67 of the Firearms Regulations 1987 is properly a prescribed offence leading to mandatory revocation, (although it is a significant part of the Act that must be complied with) given that it is directed to requiring certain methods of record keeping by using a register and ensuring that the register is kept, maintained and produced pursuant to the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) and its regulations." Mr Martin submitted that this was not a clause creating offences relating to the possession or use of a firearm as contemplated by the legislature to trigger the mandatory revocation of a security license. Judicial Consideration of the Act and its Regulation in this Context 26 Mr Martin submitted that there appeared to be no authority where the particular construction of the Act contended for by the Commissioner of Police in this case has been considered by either the Tribunal, or the courts. The only relevant case he was able to find was that of Abela v State of New South Wales [2000] 49 NSWLR 171 where the meaning of the phrase "offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm" in the context of a licensing decision was considered. The facts of that case concerned a firearms dealer being convicted of two offences under the Regulations, which essentially involved two firearms being displayed in a store that were not under the immediate control of a license holder or employees, and displayed in a manner that did not prevent persons from removing those firearms. 27 It was unsuccessfully argued in that case by the licensed holder that the prescribed offence in this instance only related to "unlawful" possession of firearms, and not to offences committed in the circumstances of lawful possession. This argument was rejected by the Court of Appeal. 28 Mr Martin referred to the argument in that case concerning the width of the phrase "relating to possession" and the fact that the Court of Appeal said:- "In the course of argument, reference was made to the width of the phrase "relating to". It is unnecessary to give "relating to" a wider meaning in the present matter. The offences of which the appellant was convicted were directly concerned with the unlawful manner in which her otherwise lawful possession of the firearms was exercised. As such, the offences related to possession of the firearms." 29 Mr Martin submitted that although the extent of the potential width of the phrase "relating to" was not ultimately determined by the Court of Appeal, he saw this authority as persuasive of the fact that in the case of Abela v State of New South Wales (see above) the Court was concerned with the manner in which the possession of a firearm takes place. The Applicant contrasted that case with the present case where the offences that the applicant had been convicted of do not arise out of the manner in which he possessed a firearm or firearms. The Applicant argued they arise, from a conviction for the offences of failing to keep or produce a register in breach of Clause 67 of the Firearms Regulations 1997. Thereby concluding that they could not be regarded as offences that trigger the mandatory revocation of the security licenses held by the Applicant. 30 Mr Martin contended that it would be going too far to say that when taken as a whole, that the mandatory revocation provisions were intended to extend to offences under Clause 67 arising out of a manner in which the license holder keeps, maintains or produces a firearms register. It was Mr Martin's submission that a reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and the regulations in context demonstrates that the offences the Applicant has been convicted of are "not convictions in relation to the use or possession of a firearm as required to trigger the automatic revocation of his license under the statutory regime. These offences are regulatory offences dealing with the manner in which records are kept under the Firearms Act. The construction the Commissioner is contending for is straining too far the ordinary meaning of the words of the Act, and making the ambit of "prescribed offences" to be far greater than that which parliament intended." 31 In support of his submissions Mr Martin referred to the need when considering the relevant legislative provisions to have regard to the provisions of the Interpretation Act 1987, in particular Section 33 dealing with the objects or purposes of an Act and Section 34 dealing with the manner in which extrinsic material can be used to interpret an Act or statutory law. Facts Affecting the Interpretation of the Relevant Provisions 32 Mr Martin submitted that in interpreting the relevant provisions to consider whether the offence the Applicant has been convicted of is a prescribed offence the statute must be considered as a whole and given its ordinary meaning. He cited the case of Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v FCT (1981) 147 CLR 297 per Mason and Wilson JJ at 320-321:- "The fundamental object of statutory construction in every case is to ascertain the legislative intention by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole. But in performing that task the courts look to the operation of the statute according to its terms and to legitimate aids to construction. … …If the choice is between two strongly competing interpretations, as we have said, the advantage may lie with that which produces the fairer and more convenient operation so long as it conforms to the legislative intention. If, however, one interpretation has a powerful advantage in ordinary meaning and grammatical sense, it will only be displaced if its operation is perceived to be unintended." 33 Mr Martin saw the application of the principles of statutory construction stated above as supporting his proposition that the provisions of the Act specifying the types of offences to which mandatory revocation of a license will be triggered does not extend the revocation provisions to the type of offences that the Applicant has committed under Clause 67 of the Firearms Regulations. It was Mr Martin's submission that the literal reading of the definition of the prescribed offences does not extend as far as the Commissioner intends to include regulatory type offences such as those under Clause 67. Mr Martin stated:- "The plain words of the regulation mean that prescribed offences encompass only those offences "relating to the possession or use of a firearm, or any other weapon" and do not extend to include offences under this clause 67." Meaning of Possession and Use 34 Mr Martin submitted that in the context of considering the ambit of the phrase "relating to the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon", it is appropriate to consider the definition of "possession" itself under the Firearms Act and "use" under that Act. The Firearms Act 1996 defines "possession" as follows:- "4A. Meaning of "possession" of a firearm – proof of possession. (1) Without restricting the meaning of the word "possession" for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act, a firearm is taken to be in possession of a person so long as it is in or on any premises owned, leased or occupied by, or in the care, control or management of the person unless the court is satisfied that:- (a) The firearm was placed in or on, or brought into or onto, the premises by or on behalf of a person who was lawfully authorised by or under this Act to possess the firearm, or (b) The person did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to have known that the firearm was in or on the premises, or (c) On the evidence before it, the person was not in possession of the firearm. (2) In this section "premises" means any place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft. 35 The definition of "use" under the Firearms Act is as follows:- "Firearms means fire or hold it so as to cause a reasonable belief that it will be fired, whether or not it is capable of being fired." In the light of this definition of "use" of a firearm Mr Martin submitted that the offences of which the Applicant were convicted could not in any way be related to the "use" of a firearm as failure to keep a register or produce a register has nothing to do with the "use" of a firearm as defined. 36 Mr Martin also submitted that failure to keep a register or produce a register was not an offence related to the "possession of a firearm as defined". He argued that offences relating to possession of a firearm are limited to those offences connected to situations where the manner (emphasis added) in which the firearm was "possessed" is a relevant consideration, as in the sense set out in the Firearms Act and that an offence is committed thereby. Mr Martin cited offences that would suitably be included in that category as:- Section 93GA of the Crimes Act 1900 NSW, Section 62 of the Firearms Act 1996. Section 40 of the Firearms Act 1996, (failure to keep firearms stored in accordance with the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)), and Section 33B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 37 Mr Martin argued that the meaning contended for by the Commissioner is erroneous and is demonstrated by the potential width of offences relating to the possession or use of a weapon, if one adopts the approach of the Commissioner and extended it to matters incidental to firearms and weaponry offences, such as record keeping provisions of Clause 67 of the Regulations. 38 The Applicant referred to the Second Reading Speech in the Internal Review Statement of Reasons in paragraph 13 when he stated that the legislation had quite clearly been enacted to "exclude from the industry persons with convictions for certain criminal offences and he referred to the second reading speech saying:- "The Second Reading Speech for the Security Industry Bill by Mr Whelan (then the Minister for Police) on 19 November 1997 demonstrated that this was the clear intention of parliament … the legislation will therefore exclude from the industry persons with convictions for certain criminal offences within the past ten years … and if at any time a person fails to meet the licensing criteria, his or her license will be refused or revoked." (Hansard page 2088-89). 39 Mr Martin submitted that parliament was concerned to protect persons within the industry and the public from those who commit certain serious offences. Mr Martin stressed that this was the context in which the Act should be construed, such that the term " an offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm" does not extend to all regulatory offences under the Firearms Act, or to the offences of which the Applicant has been convicted. 40 Mr Martin provided further case references in the context of the meaning of the words "in relation to", in particular he referred the Tribunal to Krab v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [1999] NSW ADT 29 at 13 and 14 in which it was said – "The phrase "in respect of" is used frequently in legislation as a means of connecting two subject matters, one being more general in scope than the other. Other phrases playing a similar role are, " in relation to", "with respect to" and "in connection with" while a word that sometimes performs that role is "for". There are many decisions dealing with the use of the phrase "in respect of". Generally it has been regarded as a phrase which seeks to express a wide connection between the principle and more specific subject matter. On the continuum of similar expressions to which I have referred, it has been seen as wider in its import than the phrase "in relation to" which in turn has been seen as wider than the word "for". See generally Trustee Executive Agency v Riley [1941] VR 110 at 111 per Mann CJ; Cars v Maher (1959) 103 CLR 478 at 484-5 per Kitto J; and Evans v Button (1998) 13 NSWLR 51 at 72 per Mahoney JA. The High Court has cautioned however, that regard should always be had first to the context in which a term such as "with respect to" appears: Workers Compensation Board of Queensland v Technical Products Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 462." 41 Mr Martin further referred the Tribunal to the decision of the Law Society of NSW v Bruce (1996) 40 NSWLR 77 which was recently cited with approval in Mijo Developments v Royal Agnes Waters [2007] NSWSC 1 99 by Hammerschlag J. where His Honour said: "The phrase " in relation to" is one of wide import and is satisfied by a connection or association between the two things in question. It should not be read down unless there be compelling reasons to do so. …" 42 Mr Martin submitted that if parliament intended every breach of the Firearms Act or its Regulations to constitute prescribed offences then it would have said so expressly in the Act, by saying "that is any breach of the Firearms Act or its Regulations is a prescribed offence". Mr Martin submitted that because parliament had not done so it can be assumed that the choice of wording was deliberately adopted to refer to offences concerning the way in which firearms were used or possessed. Furthermore it was Mr Martin's contention that the two offences of which the Applicant had been convicted and which convictions were confirmed on appeal are not comparable to offences such as the failure to store firearms safely dealt with by the Tribunal in such cases such as Watkins v The Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2006] NSWADT 276 and Phegan v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2002] NSWADT 127. Mr Martin acknowledged that offences dealing with the manner in which firearms themselves are safely kept are properly offences falling within the definition of "relating to the use or possession of a firearm, or any other weapon", as they deal with the possession of the firearm itself. He referred the tribunal to Knight's case in which the Judicial Member stated that:- "A strict approach to the definitions of offences said to excite the mandatory refusal provisions of Section 60 of the Security Act seems to me to be consistent with the search for the 'correct preferable decision, under Section 63 of the Tribunal Act having regard to the written or unwritten law' that underpins the strict approach taken to the interpretation and application of penal statutes, and to be not inconsistent with the policy and attendant security licensing scheme." 43 Mr Martin submitted that the wide construction of the definition of prescribed offences contended by the Commissioner was inconsistent with the harsh consequences of the Act which while not penal nevertheless impact on the ability of the ability to earn a livelihood. Mr Martin submitted that the critical phrases that must be focused on to connect the types of offence such that they properly fall within the Act as prescribed offences, is that the offence considered is related specifically to the "possession" or "use" of a firearm or any other weapon. Mr Martin contended that the breaches of the Act by the Applicant are not such prescribed offences as they go to the manner in which records are required to be kept under the Act. 44 Mr Martin further contended that the offences under Clause 67 of the Regulations that the Applicant had been convicted of, are not such offences on an ordinary reading of the relevant provisions. 45 Mr Martin submitted that as no one need possess any firearms at all to be guilty of the offence under Clause 67 of the Regulations this supported the submission that they are not offences relating to the use or possession of firearms as no one need possess any firearms at all because the terms of Clause 67 require a person to keep a register for 3 years during which time the employer may no longer be in possession of the firearms. The Applicant contended that the legislature could not possibly have intended the license holder to be guilty of these offences even after he had ceased to possess the firearms as was in fact the case in the matter before the Tribunal. The Commissioner's case 46 Mr Pisani on behalf of the Commissioner submitted that he relied on the Statement of Reasons contained in the Internal Review conducted by the Commissioner's Delegate dated 14 December 2006. While Mr Pisani agreed with Mr Martin that the bail report of the Applicant should not form part of the materials to be placed before the Tribunal, he was nevertheless of the view that all material that had been placed before the Administrator in making his decision should be available to the Tribunal for its deliberations. He made reference to the case of Petty v The Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2003] NSWADT 20. In particular paragraph 4 which comments on the nature of proceedings before the Tribunal stating:- "The Tribunal undertakes a review of the merits of the original decision, with the obligation to reconsider all the material first considered, together with any further relevant material, so as to either confirm the original decision, vary it or set it aside and substitute another. The duty of the Tribunal is to satisfy itself by the decision in respect of which an application for review is duly instituted is a decision which in its view was objectively the right one to be made." (Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 at 77). 47 Mr Pisani further referred the Tribunal to Section 63 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 which states:- "1. In determining an application for review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following: a. any relevant factual material, b. any applicable written or unwritten law. 2. For this purpose, the Tribunal makes all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant enactment on the Administrator who made the decision. …." 48 Mr Pisani also referred to Section 73 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 which states that the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. He referred to the unashamed stringency of the Firearms legislation in response to the Applicant's submissions concerning the strict approach required to the definitions of offences in the context of the mandatory refusal provisions of Section 16 of the Security Industry Act 1997 and in recognition of the fact that the Act itself whilst not penal in the strict sense does affect the ability of individuals to earn their livelihood. Mr Pisani said that the offence must be reviewed in the context of the intent of the legislation having regard to its objects and the intentions espoused in the second reading speech. 49 Mr Pisani submitted that the Tribunal had to have regard to the context and the intent of the Security Industry Act 1997 and the Firearms Act 1996 and in particular Mr Pisani referred to the statements made by the Deputy President Hennessy in the case of Cleofe v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service; Alpha Intelligence Securities Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2001] NSW ADT 2 when she stated at paragraph 31:- "In 1996 the government enacted "tough" new gun laws. (See Second Reading Speech, Hansard, 25 June 1996, Legislative Council, page 3557). One of the underlying principles of that law is to improve public safety by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms, and by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms. (Firearms Act Section 3(1)(b)). Ensuring that firearms are stored in a safe and secure manner decreases the likelihood that they will contribute to an accidental or deliberate injury or death." 50 Mr Pisani stated the objects and principles of the Firearms Act 1996 and the Security Industry Act 1997 are unequivocally strict in controlling the possession and use of firearms and he referred to the provisions of the Firearms Regulation Clause 67(1) which stipulates that:- "1. A person who employs security guards, or is self employed as a security guard, must keep in the approved form: a. A register in which are kept particulars of the acquisition of firearms by, the servicing and inspection of firearms on behalf of, and of the disposal of firearms and ammunitions by the person and b. If appropriate a register in which are kept particulars of the names of each employee who is authorised by a license to possess a firearm, and of the periods for which each such employee has possession of the firearm." 51 He further referred to what was Clause 67(3) and is now Clause 81(3) which stated that:- "A person must:- a. ensure that each register is kept in a place of safekeeping (not being a place in which any firearms are kept) at the place of business of the person and b. ensure that each register is kept for not less than three years after its completion and c. ensure that appropriate entry is made in the register referred to in sub-clause (1)(a) within 24 hours of the acquisition, servicing, inspection or disposal of a firearm and d. if appropriate, ensure that an appropriate entry is made in the register referred to in sub-clause (1)(b) when any firearm (and any ammunition for the firearm) is transferred from the person's store of firearms to the custody of an employee and when the firearm or ammunition is returned to the store of firearms and e. immediately produce, if requested to do so by a police officer at any time, any such register to the officer and permit the officer to inspect, and make copies of any entry contained in, the register. Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units." 52 Mr Pisani submitted that were these regulations not in place it would be impossible to police the possession of firearms. He submitted that records are kept so these firearms are accountable. If firearms are lost without record it is very difficult to see where such firearms have gone and who is currently in possession of such firearms. Mr Pisani accepted the submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 57 regarding the breadth of meaning of the words "in relation to" and the quotations from the Law Society of New South Wales v Bruce (1996) 40 NSWLR 77 which stated that the phrase "in relation to" is one of wide import and is satisfied by connection or association between the two things in question. Mr Pisani referred the Tribunal to the Decision of Joyce v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2000] NSWADT 17 (1 March 2000). In particular paragraphs 10 and 13 which refer to the breadth of meaning attaching to the inclusion of the word "involving" in a statutory offence. In particular he referred the Tribunal to the statement in paragraph 13 which read: "These cases make it clear that there is no need for fraud, dishonesty or stealing to be a legal requirement of the offence for the offence to "involve" them. It is sufficient that these concepts are present in their ordinary sense." 53 It was Mr Pisani's contention that as for the purposes of Section 16(1)(a) and (b) of the Act offences are prescribed offences if they are an offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon committed under the law of any Australian jurisdiction or the law of any overseas jurisdiction being an offence that, had it been committed in Australia would be an offence under the law of an Australian jurisdiction. It was Mr Pisani's submission that offences concerning a failure to maintain a register or produce a register were indeed offences relating to the possession or use of firearms or any other weapons in that the objects and principles of the Firearms Act 1996 and the Security Industry Act 1997 were the objects of minimising the risk of firearms being utilised for criminal purposes which is higher in circumstances where there is increased access by different persons to the firearms. 54 In summary, Mr Pisani looked to the spirit and intention of the legislation both in the Security Industry Act and the Firearms Act and their associated Regulations which were designed to ensure safety in the community and the regulated use and possession of firearms such that their possession and use could be properly policed which would not be possible in the absence of the employer's obligation to maintain current records for a period of three years. For the reasons set out above Mr Pisani maintained the view expressed by the Commissioner's Delegate in the Internal Review that the Tribunal should be satisfied that the Applicant had been convicted of prescribed disqualifying offences pursuant to Clause 11(a) of the Regulation and that pursuant to Section 26(1)(a) of the Security Industry Act there was no discretion for the revocation of the Applicant's license and accordingly the Tribunal should affirm the decision of the Commissioner to revoke the Applicant's Class 1 ABC license and Master Security license. Findings 55 I am at all times mindful that the result of this inquiry will determine whether or not the Applicant is liable to the mandatory revocation of the Security License 1 ABC held by him and the Master License he holds on behalf of CPS Security Pty Ltd having been convicted of prescribed offences. I am also acutely aware that the Applicant has held a license to operate in the security industry since 1980 and employs a number of security operatives and accordingly the effect of the revocation of the license will put an end to Mr Feuerstein continuing to own and operate his security business or working in the security industry. I am also mindful of the spirit in which the government in 1996 enacted "tough" new gun laws with the underlying principles of that law being to improve public safety by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms, and by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms (Firearms Act Section 3(1)(b)). 56 I do not accept the submissions of Mr Martin concerning the nature of the proceedings undertaken by the Tribunal when an appeal is made from the Administrator's decision concerning the Notice of Revocation and Internal Review. I do not accept that the only material that the Tribunal should have regard to is the fact of these convictions and nothing further. 57 I am supported in this view by the provisions of Section 63(1) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act (ADT Act) which provides that in determining an application for review of a decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including any relevant factual material and any applicable written or unwritten law. As was stated in McDonald v Director General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 at 357 the Tribunal makes its own decision in place of the Commissioner's and "there is no presumption that the decision of the [Commissioner] is correct". 58 The Tribunal undertakes a review of the merits of the original decision, with the obligation to reconsider all the material first considered, together with any further relevant material, so as to either confirm the original decision, vary it, or set it aside and substitute another - "The duty of the Tribunal is to satisfy itself whether a decision in respect of which an application for review is duly instituted is a decision which in its view was obviously the right one to be made" (Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 at 77). 59 These are not adversarial proceedings in which the Applicant carries an onus of proof. The Applicant, by making the application, triggers a process of merits review by the Tribunal. The Applicant does not take on the responsibility of having to prove a case nor does an Applicant cause an administrator to have to prove a case. The Applicant and the Administrator are before the Tribunal as parties by virtue of Section 67(2) of the ADT Act. 60 When there is a fact in issue as to the existence of which the Tribunal must be satisfied it must be satisfied to the civil standard of proof, that is, on the balance of probabilities (McDonald at 357). 61 Mr Martin does not dispute that the Applicant was convicted of the two offences identified as offence 3 (not maintain register) and offence 4 (not produce register). But he does however on behalf of his client dispute that these offences are "prescribed offences" under the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW) resulting in the mandatory revocation of his client's two security licenses. In the Internal Review – Statement of Reasons document prepared by the delegate of the Commissioner of Police the Administrator indicated at paragraph 15 that he had taken into account the details of the offences committed by the Applicant including offence 3 (not maintain register) which summarised the fact sheet from the court proceedings as follows: Offence 3: Not Maintain Register As indicated, police conducted an initial audit on 13 February 2004. During this audit it was ascertained that the company CPS Security Pty Ltd did not possess a Register of Acquisition, Disposal and Servicing of Firearms. This is a required business record. Police asked the Master License Holder, Mr M. Feuerstein to purchase one. This was recorded on the audit form at the time. Police made inquiries in relation to an outstanding firearm, then served a Notice to Produce certain items on 13 December 2004. The Register of Acquisition, Disposal and Servicing was listed on this document as being required for production. It was not produced, nor has it been ascertained that the company ever purchased one at the request of the police. 62 The Administrator also indicated in paragraph 15 that he had taken into account the details of the offence committed by the Applicant identified as offence 4 (not produce register) which was summarised as follows: Offence 4: Not Produce Register As indicated previously in facts, the outstanding firearm AZE 7665 was last signed into the Register of Transfer of Firearms and Ammunition on 6 November 1999. No following register was able to be located detailing any further movements of the firearm (the entry of 6 November 1999 completed use of this book). It is clear that the company used another register in the field during dates of 21.4.1998-27.8.1998). Security Officer M. Vallack utilised this request for another company firearm. This Register then ceased use until 24 October 2003. Inquiries were made of the officers of CPS Security to locate the Register utilised during the dates of 7.11.99 to 23.10.03. During a follow up visit on 29 December 2004 where further time to locate the missing Register was given. On 13 December 2004 a Notice to Produce this item was served, however the required Register was not able to be produced. There is a requirement under law for Registers to be kept for a period of 3 years in a secure location separate from firearms at Company premises. The lack of production of this item is a direct breach of the requirements for maintenance and retention of Business Records. 63 These offences 3 and 4 (hereinafter "the offences') were confirmed on appeal and it is Mr Martin's submission that the Tribunal must only consider whether or not offence 3 and offence 4 are prescribed offences pursuant to Clause 11A of the Security Industry Regulations 1997 (NSW) and such a characterisation necessarily results in the mandatory revocation of the Master Security license and the Class 1 ABC license held by the Applicant pursuant to Sections 16 and 26(1A) of the Security Industry Act 1997 (NSW). 64 Mr Pisani for the Commissioner opposed this submission citing in support of his submission the case of Petty v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [2003] NSW ADT 20. 65 I do not accept Mr Martin's contention that it would be going too far to say that when taken as a whole, the mandatory revocation provisions were intended to extend to the Offences. Nor do I accept that a reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations in context demonstrates that the offences the Applicant has been convicted of are "not convictions in relation to the use or possession of a firearm as required to trigger the automatic revocation of his license under the statutory regime as these are regulatory offences dealing with the manner in which records were kept under the Firearms Act…. and making the ambit "prescribed offences" to be far greater than that which parliament intended." I do not accept the Applicant's submission that the fact that a breach can be occasioned by a failure to make entries in black or blue ink (Clause 67(2)(d)) demonstrates the unlikelihood that the legislature intended such breaches to result in a revocation of license. Indeed my view is quite the contrary. I regard the particularity of Clause 67(i)(ii) and (iii) demonstrate the importance Parliament placed on the maintenance of the Register and the procedures it mandated to ensure its security and integrity. 66 The view espoused by Mr Martin seems to somewhat beg the question in suggesting that the definition of prescribed offences does not include the regulatory type offences stipulated under Clause 67 and thereby concluding that offences under Clause 67 could not properly be regarded as offences "relating to the possession or use of a firearm, or any other weapon". I am of the view that the Offences are indeed offences relating to the possession or use of a firearm, or any other weapon and accordingly would give rise to a mandatory revocation of the licenses in question. The regulatory offences under Clause 67 are in respect of the obligation for employers of security guards to maintain registers and to ensure that the register is maintained and produced when required and do indeed relate to the manner or circumstance of possession of a firearm and more particularly to the security of possession of a firearm. This is an appropriate subject of legislative concern and is reflected in the principles and objects in Section 3 of the Firearms Act 1996 which states as follows: "3 Principles and Objects of Act (1) The underlying principles are:- (a) to confirm the firearm possession and use as being a privilege that is conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety, and (b) to improve public safety (i) by imposing strict controls on the possession and use of firearms, and (ii) by promoting the safe and responsible storage and use of firearms, and [emphasis added]. (c) to facilitate a national approach to the control of firearms. (2) The objects of this Act are as follows: (a) to prohibit the possession and use of all automatic and self loading rifles and shotguns except in special circumstances, (b) to establish an integrated licensing and registration scheme for all firearms, (c) to require each person who possesses or uses a firearm under the authority of a license to prove a genuine reason for possessing or using the firearm. (d) to provide strict requirements that must be satisfied in relation to licensing of firearms and the acquisition and sales of firearms, [emphasis added] (e) to ensure that firearms are stored and conveyed in a safe and secure manner, [emphasis added] (f) to provide for compensation in respect of and an amnesty period to enable the surrender of, certain prohibited firearms. 67 The strict controls on possession and use of firearms and the provision of strict requirements in respect of licensing of firearms and the acquisition and sale of firearms cannot be achieved in the absence of the maintenance of a register which provides a means by which the identity of the party in his possession can be ascertained at any point in time. It is evident that the maintenance of a register and its availability on demand by the police is an integral part of maintaining secure possession of firearms. Such an approach is consistent with the legislative intention as espoused in the objects of the Firearms Act and does not require a strained interpretation of the meaning of the words of that statute which simply state in Clause 5 of the Regulations of that statute – "The offences that disqualify applicants for the purposes of Sections 11(5) (b) and 29(3) (b) of the Act include in 5(a) an offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon …" 68 I accept that the precedents in respect of the words "in relation to" suggest that it generally expresses a wide connection between the principle and more specific subject matter in this instance between the offence and "the use or possession of a firearm or any other weapon". While insight can be obtained by looking at the application and use of a word in the context of other legislation one is required to interpret its meaning in the context of the legislation in issue. The Tribunal can derive some guidance from the cases on the phrase "in relation to" and whether accordingly it can be regarded as extending the ambit of prescribed offences to encompass breaches of Clause 67 of the Regulations. 69 The views expressed by Fitzgerald JA in Abela & Anor v State of NSW [2000] NSWCA 140 are supportive of this view in particular the passage cited below:- "Another submission made by the appellants was that, in Regulation 5(a) of the Firearms (General) Regulation 1997, relating to "is broadly equivalent to" "concerned with" and that "possession" ("or use") must be an element of an offence "concerned with" possessions. However the two propositions again do not mesh. An offence which is "concerned with" the safekeeping of firearms in the course of the lawful possession is "concerned with" the possession of the "firearms"." 70 The quotation above refers to safekeeping in the context of safe storage of firearm but it would be equally applicable to security of a firearm, that is to say it is the intent of the legislature to ensure that the possession of firearms is one which is secure and ensures that strict requirements must be satisfied in relation to the possession and use of the firearms so as to ensure public safety. This is further supported by the definition of possession as contained in the Firearms Act 1996 at Section 4(1) which states that "possession" includes:- "… any case in which a person knowingly:- (a) has custody of the firearm; or (b) has the firearm in the custody of another person; or (c) has the firearm in or on the premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft, whether or not belonging to or occupied by the person." 71 The definition of possession demonstrates that the only way in which the authorities are able to track the possession of firearms and the circumstances of their possession is to place responsibility on the employer and possessor of a Master license to ensure there is in place a Register which enables the employer to identify at any moment in time who has custody of the firearms, where those firearms are located, to whom they have been sold and whether they have been recently serviced. In the absence of such a register it would not be possible to ascertain whether an individual was in fact in possession of a weapon with the associated responsibilities. 72 I accept that while licensing statutes are not penal in character, the severe consequences associated with the revocation of a license used to permit the operation of a business should be a consideration in the deliberations of the Tribunal. Mr Martin submitted that such a consideration should be properly taken into account when interpreting the statute and he supported this proposition by reference to the case of Krab v The Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [1999] NSW ADT 29. 73 I do not accept Mr Martin's submission that the severe consequences associated with the revocation of a Security license was necessarily supportive of the view that parliament intended breaches of record keeping should not be regarded as prescribed offences for the purposes of Clause 67 of the Regulations. Parliament has clearly stated that the revocation provisions should apply to breaches of prescribed offences occurring within ten years prior to application and has identified as a prescribed offence an offence relating to the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon. 74 I do not regard the failure to maintain a Register and have it available for presentation on demand as sufficiently vague or outside the ambit of a prescribed offence as to require that it be more precisely expressed or recourse be had to extrinsic aids to make clear the parliamentary intent. 75 In the case of Krab v The Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Service [1999] NSW ADT 29 which was a case in which following an internal review, the Administrator refused to grant Ms Krab (the Applicant) a license on the ground that she had been convicted within the last ten years of the offence of 'possession of a pipe used in connection with the smoking of a dangerous drug'. In this case discussion was had of the meaning of the phrase "in respect of" where it was said – "The phrase "in respect of" is used frequently in legislation as a means of connecting two subject matters one being more general in scope than the other. Other phrases playing a similar role are "in relation to", "with respect to" and "in connection with", while a word that sometimes performs that role is "for"." 76 The breadth of such phrases is demonstrated in the decision of the President of the Tribunal in that decision when he stated:- "In my view the reference to offences "in respect of a prohibited drug" cannot be reasonably construed as being confined to the primary types of conduct connected with the handling of prohibited drugs, such as cultivation, manufacture, use, possession or trafficking. The reference must also be construed as covering associated conduct, such as the possession of instruments or items that facilitate the commission of the primary offences." 77 Contrary to Mr Martin's submission I believe that the Offences do arise out of the manner in which he possessed a firearm or firearms. The Applicant would be unable to know whether or not he was in fact in possession of the firearm in question if he did not have a Register to enable him to identify at any point in time which of his employees were in possession of particular weapons and whether or not they had returned the weapon. A Register is the prescribed means by which the Applicant can at any point in time identify whether or not the firearms can be said to be in his possession and whether or not they are being retained in a secure manner. 78 Mr Martin made submissions to the effect that the Offences could not be related to the use of a firearm as a failure to keep a Register or produce a Register has nothing to do with the use of a firearm as defined. This is irrelevant because the statute refers to possession as well as use. 79 I do not accept Mr Martin's submission that the Offences namely failure to keep a Register or produce a Register are not offences related to the "possession" of a firearm as defined. Mr Martin cites examples of offences relating to possession of a firearm where he believes the manner in which the firearm is "possessed" is a relevant consideration. Included in those examples is a failure to keep firearms stored in accordance with the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), such as set out in Section 40 of that Act. However, in my view a failure to keep a Register or produce a Register is not dissimilar from the offence identified as set out in Section 40 in that they both relate to the manner of possession of the firearms and whether that manner of possession is in accordance with the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). I do not accept Mr Martin's characterisation of the obligations to maintain a Register and produce such a Register when required as "matters incidental to firearms and weaponry offences" but rather such obligations are critical to the objects of the Act of ensuring public safety by means of strict controls on the possession and use of firearms. Mr Martin cites the fact that the Second Reading Speech which introduced the Securities Industry Bill to the Legislative Assembly in 1997 used the words offences "involving" the use of a firearm to demonstrate the subject matter to which the scheme of the Act is directed. I do not accept this submission because the statute itself used the words "in relation to" the possession or use of a firearm or any other weapon. 80 I do not accept the distinction made by Mr Martin that the Offences go to the manner in which records are required to be kept and are not offences falling within the definition of "relating to the use or possession of a firearm or any other weapon". The manner of securing the firearms in the possession of the Applicant and ensuring that he acquits his responsibilities as an employer in respect of weapons used by his employees is in my opinion an offence relating to the use or possession of a firearm or any other weapon. 81 Support for this view (if needed) is also obtained from reading the Second Reading Speech introducing the Security Industry Amendment Bill in November 2002 where a Minister said:- "New South Wales Police have identified a need for frontline police to be able to instantly identify when a licensed security guard is carrying a firearm without the proper authority. Under the current law, embodied in the Firearms Act 1996 and Part 7 of the Firearms (General) Regulation 1997, only those security personnel with a license for guarding premises or property are permitted to obtain a firearm license for the genuine reason of security. Firearms are not able to be owned by individual security personnel, but must be owned by the security company which must store the firearms safely and keep precise records of usage. [emphasis added] Security personnel who are licensed to carry firearms are only authorised to do so for the purposes of their work and must return firearms to their place of safe storage after the period of duty. Arrangements for off duty possession of pistols by security personnel can be made only with written authorisation of the Commissioner of Police." In the absence of a consciously maintained register there is the risk of security personnel taking their weapons home and being unaccountable for their safe storage and use. 82 Under the sub-heading Identifying Security Industry Firearms Used to Commit Crime the Minister states:- "Possession of a firearm by a security company or security guard should therefore only be granted, or continue on the condition that the controls in place balance the needs of public safety." 83 Then under the heading of Unlawful Use of Firearms by Employees the Minister stated – "The risk of the firearms being utilised for criminal purposes is high in circumstances where there is increased access by different persons to the firearms. To assist with enforcement, police should also be provided with the ability to remove from company premises those records required under law to be kept for the purposes of copying them. Currently, although provided with the power to examine and copy such records, police are not able to remove the records for external copying where the company denies them the use of company photocopiers. Similar to Section 110(3A) of the Liquor Act 1982, police should be able, where they consider it necessary to do so for the purposes of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offence, seize any registers, books, records or other documents relating to the business conducted by a Security Master license holder and require any person to answer any question relating to any such registers, books, records or other documents or any other relevant matter." 84 Independently of whether or not the Act currently provides for such extensive powers of seizure, it nevertheless demonstrates the concern implicit in the legislation to ensure that there is a mechanism, namely registers relating to the business conducted by a Security Master license holder to enable the police to monitor the access and use of firearms by employees of a security firm who access such firearms pursuant to the Master license holder. 85 While I accept the Applicant's submissions that the intent of the legislation is to exclude from the industry persons with convictions for certain criminal offences I also note that part of the object and intent of the legislation was to put in place a licensing criteria which required that license holders conform with certain standards of acquisition, storage, disposal and servicing of firearms so as to ensure that the police could at all times identify the location, possession and ownership of registered firearms. Because, in the absence of a maintained register it is not possible to say who was in possession of the said firearm at any point of time. These measures were designed to ensure security of possession of firearms consistent with the principles and objects outlined in Section 3 of the Firearms Act in particular to require each person who possesses or uses a prohibited weapon under the authority of a permit to have a genuine reason for possessing or using the weapon and to comply with the strict requirements that must be satisfied in relation to possession and use of prohibited weapons. 86 Just as the dealer in the case of Abela & Anor v State of NSW [2000] NSWCA 140 who displayed two rifles at her premises which were neither under the immediate supervision and control of her or her employees nor secured in such a manner as would reasonably prevent the removal otherwise than by her or employees was found on appeal to be an offence directly concerned with the unauthorised unlawful manner in which her otherwise lawful possession of the firearms was exercised and as such the offence related to her possession of the firearms. So too the Applicant's failure to comply with the requirements of Clause 67 of the Firearms General Regulation 1997 in not maintaining a register nor producing a register on demand relates to the conditions to which the licenses were subject and the terms on which possession of the firearms were granted and in my view are appropriately characterised as offences relating to the possession or use of firearms or any other weapon. The register and the obligation to produce a register when required by police is a critical means by which the authorities are able to track the location of firearms at any one point in time and identify the trail of ownership. As was stated in Abela & Anor v State of NSW [2000] 140 by Fitzgerald JA – "The legislative scheme, including the licensing provisions, were intended not merely to permit, but also to control, lawful possession of firearms to ensure that they were safely secured. Likewise, it does not assist the appellants to say that, when Regulation 37 of the Firearms Regulation 1990 is read in the context of lawful possession by reason of a license, "it created an offence related to the security of firearms … and not related to possession". The dichotomy asserted is false. The security referred to is "security" of "possession". An obvious subject for legislative concern. In its argument, the respondent drew attention to the legislative statement of the principles and objects in Section 3 of the Firearms Act 1996 which emphasised that intent." 87 I do not accept Mr Martin's submission that a review of the entire legislative licensing scheme for security officers demonstrates that parliament did not intend that an offence committed under Clause 67 of the Firearms Act, or every and any breach of the Firearms Act would lead to automatic revocation of a license. I believe that it is common ground that the legislative intention was that prescribed offences were offences relating to the use or possession of a firearm or any other weapon and if an offence came within that category or description then it was one that parliament intended the breach of which should result in automatic revocation of a license. 88 Mr Martin submitted that the objects of the Act in regulating the security industry appropriately were in no way frustrated or avoided by interpreting the mandatory revocation provisions as not extending as far as is contended by the Commissioner to include a breach of record keeping provisions set down by regulation of the Firearms Act 1996. Mr Martin submitted that the public remains protected from offences properly relating to the use or possession of a firearm as that phrase would be commonly understood, and such offences continue to result in automatic revocation of the license holder's license. I do not accept Mr Martin's submission that such a construction of the mandatory revocation provisions would not result in compromising the regulation of the security industry appropriately by interpreting the mandatory revocation provisions as not extending as far to include the breaches of offences under Clause 67 of the Regulations. These are provisions designed to ensure safety with respect to the safe possession acquisition disposal and servicing of the firearms by maintenance of a register which enables the authorities at any point in time to identify in whose possession the firearms are to be located and whether such firearms have been improperly disposed of or obtained by criminals for the purposes of criminal offences. 89 In the absence of such an obligation it is not possible to track security of possession of firearms. The importance of registers in ensuring a method of tracking ownership is demonstrated by the obligation under law for register to be kept for a period of 3 years in a secure location separate from firearms at company premises which may result in the firearm records being maintained when the employer is no longer in possession of the firearms. I do not accept Mr Martin's submissions that the failure to maintain and produce a register are not prescribed offences. While I accept that such offences do in part relate to the manner of record keeping required for firearms, I do not accept that they are not offences relating to the use or possession of firearms. They are a means by which authorities control lawful possession of firearms to ensure that they are safely secured as was stated in Abela & Anor v State of NSW [2000] NSWCA 140 - "The circumstance that Regulation 5(a) encompasses the offence of unlawful possession of a firearm does not necessarily mean it is confined to that offence. Indeed one might expect Regulation 5(a) to refer specifically to offences of unlawful use or unlawful possession if that was intended. There is no reason why the manner or circumstances of possession of a firearm of which a person only has lawful possession should not be made the subject of an offence." 90 The Applicant's personal interest in returning his license cannot outweigh the public interest in the maintenance of a safe and responsible system of possession and use of firearms by security license holders. It has been recognised often that the obligations and responsibilities on people who hold Master security licenses are more onerous than on a person who is merely employed. See for example Haynes v Commissioner of Police , NSW Police Service [2001] NSWADT 52 at 22. I note that Section 15(1)(3) of the Security Industry Act 1997 requires paramount consideration is given to public safety. This does not mean that Mr Feuerstein should be prevented from re-entering the security industry at some time in the future if he does not re-offend as he enjoys the good standing of having held his license since 1980 however at this point in time he has been found guilty of prescribed offences which give rise to a mandatory revocation of his Master Security license and 1ABC Security license. Orders 91 Accordingly I affirm the Commissioner's decision to revoke the Applicant's Master Security license and Class 1 ABC Security license. It follows that the Stay Order granted previously in these proceedings is revoked. Amendments: To correct Section Number from 3 to 63 in Paragraph 47 - Paragraph 1 Amend Section Number 3 to 63 - Paragraph(s) Paragraph 47 sub paragraph 1 26/06/2007 - To correct Section Number from 3 to 63 in Paragraph 47 paragraph 1 - Paragraph(s) Paragraph 47 sub paragraph 1 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.