The Legal Services Tribunal of New South Wales CITATION : David Colin Hundt [1991] NSWLST 14 PARTIES : David Colin Hundt FILE NUMBER(S) : of CORAM: Mr D E Hunt (Presiding Member) - Mr A Martin - Mrs B Ingold CATCHWORDS: Professional Misconduct - gross negligence and delay/gross delay/delay - Professional Misconduct - gross overcharging of client - Professional Misconduct - practice as a Solicitor/Barrister without a practising :- LEGISLATION CITED: Legal Practitioners' Act 1898 Legal Profession Act 1987 CASES CITED: DATES OF HEARING: 20/09/91 - 19/12/91 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/19/1991 LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: Mr I.M. Wales of Counsel Mr L. Pierotti JUDGMENT: The Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal In the matter of David Colin Hundt Determination and orders Before: Mr D.E. Hunt (Presiding Member), Mr A. Martin and Mrs B. Ingold MBE This Complaint was referred to the Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) pursuant to a resolution dated 13 December 1990 by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (the Law Society) that in its opinion David Colin Hundt (the Solicitor) may be guilty of professional misconduct and that a complaint be made to the Tribunal. The hearing took place on the 20 September 1991 and 3 October 1991 when Mr I.M. Wales of Counsel instructed by Mr L. Pierotti appeared on behalf of the Law Society and the Solicitor appeared for himself. The evidence before the Tribunal includes the reports of Miss Jean Sayer, chartered accountant, dated 2 March 1988 and 5 July 1988. Miss Sayer also gave oral evidence but was not cross-examined by the Solicitor. Miss Sayer had been appointed by the Law Society on 12 November 1987 pursuant to Section 82(A) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1898 the old Act) to investigate the affairs of David Edwin Quinn, Maxwell John Berghouse and the Solicitor formerly practising under the firm name of Quinn, Hundt & Berghouse. On 11 February 1988 the Law Society appointed Miss Sayer as an investigator pursuant to Section 55 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (the new Act) to investigate the affairs of David Edwin Quinn, Maxwell John Berghouse and David Colin Hundt formerly practising under the firm name of Quinn, Hundt & Berghouse. The Solicitor filed a Statutory Declaration dated 22 August 1991. He also gave evidence and was cross-examined. The matters the subject of the Complaint concerned various transactions dating from the beginning of 1985 when the Solicitor was in the partnership of Quinn, Hundt & Berghouse and later in the partnership of Quinns. The Solicitor ceased to be a partner in the latter partnership from July 1987. The Complaint comprises six (6) grounds as set out in the particulars of Complaint and the Tribunal makes its determination in respect of each of these grounds. Ground 1: The Flynn matter The Solicitor acted for an Ms Angela Flynn in family law proceedings. At the time the Solicitor commenced to act for her she was in receipt of a grant of legal aid from the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales. On 14 May 1987 the Solicitor received into his trust account the sum of $20,992.19 on behalf of his client pursuant to a settlement of the family law proceedings. Ms Flynn's contribution to the Legal Aid Commission the subject of the grant of legal aid in respect of the proceedings was assessed to be in the sum of $1,020.00. On 11 June 1987 the Solicitor transferred to his office account from his trust account on account of the client the sum of $3,287.54 for his costs and disbursements. It was alleged by the Law Society that this payment was unauthorised by the Legal Aid Commission and in excess of the sum to which the Solicitor was, under the grant of legal aid, entitled. The Solicitor in his evidence sought to explain his conduct that other people in his firm also acted for the client including his partner David Quinn and an employee solicitor a Miss Toose. He said that Miss Toose concluded the matter and prepared the accounts in consultation with his partner David Quinn who was responsible for family law matters. Notwithstanding the evidence and explanations of the Solicitor the Tribunal finds that there was a failure by the Solicitor to carry out his duty of protecting and looking after the interests of his client and that if he left the task of accounting to his partner and an employee he should have ensured that this accounting was proper in every way. In the circumstances the Tribunal finds that the Solicitor's conduct was improper and amounted to professional misconduct. Ground 2: The Brovo Estate matter According to the investigator's report as at May 1986 all that remained to finalise the estate was the transfer of a small parcel of shares and the filing of probate accounts. This matter had been transferred from the practice of Abigail & Co. which practice the partnership of which the Solicitor was a partner had acquired in early 1986. The Solicitor in his evidence said that this estate was handled by Mr Edward Quinn a senior solicitor employed by the firm as a consultant. He further says in his evidence that there was litigation concerning the agreement for the acquisition of the Abigail practice, and that it was found by his Honour Mr Justice Rogers in the Commercial Causes Division of the Supreme Court in June 1986, that in those matters which had not been billed by Abigail & Co. the purchasers (the partnership) were entitled to issue accounts and recover those fees as though they were their own. Furthermore that one of the partners Mr Berghouse arranged for cost assessors to cost the files of Abigail Co. and that was done during those months between the exchange of the agreement and the final completion of the purchase of the practice of Abigail & Co. Miss Sayer in her report says that she could not find a bill of costs. The Solicitor in evidence said that whilst he did not act in the estate he did seek to have the matter resolved as there were difficulties in having Ms Abigail, who was an executor, to act as such and he had these concerns early in 1987. He further says that the costs of $1,995.00 arose as a result of an assessment by costs assessors Mahlab. The Tribunal is unable to accept the explanations of the Solicitor in their entirety and is of the opinion that he had a responsibility at least as a partner of the firm for the supervision of the matter and that he has failed to establish that he did not have this responsibility. The Tribunal finds that the Solicitor improperly dealt with funds of this estate and whilst he may have relied on statements of others in transferring from the trust account to the office account $1,995.00 for costs in the belief that he was entitled to do so by reason of the agreement with Abigail he was guilty of professional misconduct. Ground 3: The Estate of Jones It is alleged by the Law Society that between March 1986 and March 1987 the Solicitor delayed unreasonably in obtaining a grant of probate of the will of Amelia Jones and did mislead the executor in relation to progress of this application. The co-executor of the will Harry Louis Jones made a Statutory Declaration which was tendered in evidence by the Law Society. Mr Jones was not cross-examined by the Solicitor. In November 1985 the deceased Amelia Jones made her will which had been drawn up by her solicitor Ms Abigail of Abigail & Co. of Bondi Junction. On 25 February 1986 Amelia Jones died. Within days of her death her brother Harry Louis Jones the co-executor produced all the papers relating to the estate to Ms Abigail for the application for the grant of probate. In March 1986 Mr Jones was introduced at the offices of Abigail & Co. to Mr Edward Thomas Quinn who told him that the law practice of Ms Abigail had been sold to Quinns. Mr Quinn then introduced Mr Jones to the Solicitor who asked him to return to the office in a few days to sign some papers which Mr Jones did. In June of 1986 Mr Jones enquired of the Solicitor as to the state of the estate and the Solicitor told him that matters were being held up because Ms Abigail would not sign the necessary papers for the application. Again in August of 1986 Mr Jones enquired of the Solicitor who then told him that he was still waiting for Ms Abigail to sign the documents. On or about 23 October 1986 Mr Jones received a letter from the Solicitor of the same date which letter stated that a letter had been forwarded to all parties (including creditors) interested in the estate. This letter also confirmed that Mr Jones had signed all necessary papers to enable the probate application to proceed and advised that as soon as the papers were returned by Ms Abigail the application would be lodged with the Court. There then followed a number of enquiries by Mr Jones of the Solicitor leading to an enquiry by Mr Jones of the Solicitor in December 1986 in response to which enquiry the Solicitor advised Mr Jones with words to the following effect: The papers have been lodged with the Probate Court and matters should be completed by Christmas 1986. A search by Mr Jones at the Probate Registry of the Supreme Court on 4 February 1987 revealed that no application for a grant of probate of his sister's will had been lodged up to that date. Mr Jones subsequently changed his solicitor to a Mr Murphy who obtained the grant of probate. The Solicitor stated in evidence that when he made the statement to Mr Jones in December 1986 that the probate documents had been lodged he did so in the belief that this was the fact. Mr Edward Quinn looked after the probate matters whilst he fronted Mr Jones, the work was being done by others behind him. It is clear that the Solicitor in December 1986 made a statement to the executor that the papers for the application for grant of probate had been lodged with the Court and that this statement was untrue. Whilst the Tribunal does not find that the Solicitor made this statement knowing it to be untrue the Tribunal is of the opinion that the Solicitor made this statement recklessly and without taking any proper steps to ascertain the true position of the application for grant of probate. Any client who entrusts his or her affairs to a solicitor is entitled to expect that any factual statement made by the solicitor concerning those affairs is true and a failure by a solicitor such as the Solicitor in this case to ensure that such a factual statement was true amounts to professional misconduct. The Tribunal finds the Solicitor guilty of professional misconduct in this matter. Ground 4: The matter of Connie Yu The Law Society alleged that between 1985 and 1987 the Solicitor acted improperly in relation to the conduct of the affairs of Connie Yu (the client in relation to a claim arising from a lease of premises by the client). The client made a Statutory Declaration which was tendered in evidence. The Solicitor did not cross-examine the client on this Declaration. In her Declaration the client declared that the Solicitor had acted for her and her husband since some time in late 1981 or early 1982 when the client was having certain difficulties in respect of a dispute with their landlord of the premises of a restaurant business. The client instructed the Solicitor to look after this dispute and negotiate with the landlord. The lease of the premises was to expire in March 1987 and the client and her husband were contemplating selling the restaurant business which was carried on at the premises. In April or May of 1985 the client became pregnant at which time she instructed the Solicitor to negotiate with the landlord on the surrender of the lease and an extension of time in which to move out of the premises. It appears that these negotiations were unsuccessful and by May 1985 the client had to vacate the premises. They had paid the then outstanding rent and thought that all matters of the landlord had been resolved by the Solicitor. The client then had difficulties in speaking or hearing from the Solicitor or obtaining a final bill of account. However she was advised by letter from his office that the Solicitor was ill and she subsequently received an account which she paid. In approximately September 1985 the client received a statement of claim from the Solicitor from her former landlord alleging there had been damage to the premises and demanding damages. The client was unable to contact the Solicitor as she was informed that he was still ill and she therefore sought the services of another solicitor in order to file a defence. Late in 1985 she happened to meet the Solicitor in the street and as a result of discussion they then had the file was transferred to the Solicitor upon his assurance that he would give it his best attention and handle the case. In early 1986 the client had a conference with a barrister and following that conference she had a number of conversations with the Solicitor who stated to her in words to the following effect: Do not be concerned, all is OK. We have time to do things before the hearing. Definitely I will let you know once we learn the hearing date. In early 1986 the client telephoned the Solicitor and said to him: I'm pregnant again. I do not want to have any problems during this pregnancy so I ask you to give the matter your attention and keep me informed at all times. The Solicitor assured her he would do just that. During the ensuing months the client had difficulty in contacting the Solicitor but on 25 August 1986 she received a letter from him asking her to attend a conference with Ms Cohen of Counsel. On 27 September 1986 the client gave birth to her son and was in hospital for some 15 days. After several attempts she finally was able to get in touch with the Solicitor, when she asked the Solicitor if he and the barrister could attend at her home. The Solicitor and the barrister were to attend her home on a Tuesday but did not arrive. When she telephoned the Solicitor he said: I forgot to arrange the barrister to come to your house we will come tomorrow, Thursday. Again there was no attendance by the Solicitor and the barrister and her attempts to contact the Solicitor were unsuccessful. In mid October 1987 it appears that the proceedings instituted by the landlord against the client were heard and as there was no appearance on her behalf an order was made against her. It should be mentioned that at the time of this hearing the Solicitor was no longer in practice as a partner of Quinns and that in correspondence between the landlord's solicitors and Quinns in 1987 the landlord's solicitors asserted that he had been advised by Quinns that they were no longer acting for the client. The client subsequently brought a claim for compensation in the Consumers Claims Tribunal and obtained an order against David Quinn solicitor and the Solicitor for the payment of compensation to her in the sum of $3,587.40. The Solicitor in his evidence said that contrary to what the client had said in her Declaration that he did attend at her home with a Mr Vernon, barrister, for a conference with her. This conference took no longer than 15 minutes. The purpose of this conference, according to the Solicitor, was to take some instructions for the purpose of preparing a defence but that he and the barrister came away seeking further details from the client so that a draft defence could be prepared. Following this conference the Solicitor's recollection was that he returned the file to the Campbelltown office from which time it appears that he had no further involvement in the matter. The Solicitor was aware that in July 1987 when he was overseas and after he had left the firm that the client endeavoured to get in touch with him at his home and he had told his wife to tell her to contact Mr David Quinn who was looking after the matter. In evidence the Solicitor stated that, as far as the payment of compensation to the client was concerned that whilst the order had been made against both Mr Quinn and himself he made the payment in full some 12 months ago. He had not sought to recover any of this compensation from Mr Quinn. In cross-examination the Solicitor stated that his recollection was that he had paid the client this compensation by cheque and that the reason that he had not sought reimbursement from Mr Quinn in respect of his share of that payment was that the fight that would be involved with Mr Quinn would just seem to be too hard. It appeared however from correspondence that the Solicitor was shown that in fact the payment to the client had been made by Mr Quinn and the Solicitor had reimbursed Mr Quinn. In this regard the evidence of the Solicitor was unsatisfactory and displayed a lack of care on his part in answering the complaint against him. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the Solicitor neglected the affairs of his client and that up to the time that he was in practice in the firm of Quinns in July 1987 he failed to exercise an adequate degree of care and skill to ensure that the affairs of the client were properly attended to. The Tribunal does not find that the Solicitor has given false evidence in the matter but nevertheless that his conduct amounts to professional misconduct. Ground 5: Breaches of Sections 41(1) and 42(2) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1898 Particulars of these complaints are set out in the Complaint and each of them was considered by the Tribunal in the matter of David Edward Quinn. The Law Society by its Counsel, Mr Wales, submitted that the Tribunal would not take a different view from the view taken in the case of Quinn when the Tribunal found that the breaches were not wilful. However it is necessary for the Tribunal to shortly refer to each of these so that the extent of the involvement of the Solicitor can be determined. The Firm Control matter In the matter of Quinn the Tribunal made no adverse findings in respect of this ground against David Quinn and found that except to the extent of $347.00 there were sufficient funds in the trust account to cover the transfer to the office account of the costs and disbursements in question. The Solicitor in his evidence stated that although he visited the Campbelltown office of the partnership a couple of days a week at which office the accounting records and procedures were carried out he could not genuinely say that he made regular inspections of the trust account records. Nevertheless he had asked staff if there was anything that they did not understand to speak to him about it. Every time he made an inquiry about the trust account he found that they were running behind with postings and everyone was working flat out and whilst he says that this was not so much an excuse it was just a very believable reason as to why things were not always available when one would want them. The Solicitor did have some responsibility in the matter of Gavrilovic which resulted in the debit of $347.00. He said that he acted for this client as duty solicitor at Campbelltown local Court, the client was a Yugoslav and in their office they had a paralegal lady who spoke Yugoslav. What he believed occurred was that this paralegal assistant had at the request of his partner David Quinn prepared a reconciliation and that this reconciliation had been acted upon by their accounts department. He had no recollection of authorising this reconciliation. In the circumstances and despite the somewhat casual approach of the Solicitor to the supervision of the trust account the Tribunal makes no adverse findings in this matter. The Nimdex matter In this matter the Tribunal found in the Quinn matter that David Quinn was guilty of professional misconduct by statute and at common law. However the evidence before the Tribunal in this case clearly establishes that the Solicitor David Hundt had no financial interest in Nimdex Pty Limited and took no part in the dealings of that company so far as the trust account was concerned. The Solicitor of course had some responsibility to ensure that the trust account was not at any time in debit and it was in debit to the extent of some $7,000.00 from 31 July 1986 to 27 November 1986 for which the Solicitor as a partner had a responsibility. Nevertheless the Tribunal makes no adverse findings against the Solicitor in this matter. The Morrison matter It is alleged that the Solicitor acted for a client Morrison in 1986 in respect of a purchase and drew a cheque on the trust account of the client for $1,776.08 and the balance in this account was $1,731.08 which was insufficient to meet the cheque so drawn thereby causing a debit in the trust account of $45.00. This debit remained some 2 to 3 weeks when the sum of $45.00 was credited to the trust account by the Solicitor's firm. The Solicitor denies that he had the carriage of this matter and stated that he had no knowledge of the debit. In the circumstances although there was in fact a breach of Section 41(1) of the old Act the Tribunal finds that the Solicitor did not act wilfully in this instance. The Aratex matter It is alleged that between December 1986 and September 1987 the Solicitor permitted the trust account for the client Aratex Pty Limited to be in debit in the sum of $2,148.27. This debit arose as a result of the Solicitor's bank incorrectly crediting deposits totalling $3,040.00 made on 17 December 1986 to the Solicitors general account instead of the Solicitors trust account. The deposit slip was in evidence and this clearly establishes the deposit of $3,040.00 was for the credit of the firm's trust account not the general account. Nevertheless the Solicitor as well as his partner failed properly to supervise the trust account reconciliation at the end of each month. The Solicitor denies that he had any responsibility for this particular matter. The Tribunal finds a breach of Section 41(1) of the old Act and whilst it finds that this breach was not wilful believes that the Solicitor should have been aware of the debit which was present for a period of approximately 6 months up to the time the Solicitor ceased to be a partner of the firm in July 1987. The Sherry matter In this matter it is alleged that the Solicitor transferred from the trust account of the client to the office account of the firm the sum of $500.00 creating a debit balance in the trust ledger account of the client. Once again the circumstances and facts of this allegation were considered by the Tribunal in the matter of Quinn the partner of the Solicitor and the Tribunal found that whilst there was a breach of Section 41(1) of the old Act that this was not a wilful breach and that there were no moneys outstanding from the Solicitor to the client. The sum of money involved was $500.00 which was transferred from the trust ledger account of the client to the office account in respect of costs which had been debited on 4 February 1986 and as a result a debit balance of $500.00 was thereby created in the trust account which remained from 6 February 1986 to 8 April 1986. It appears that for some reason one of the employees of the firm Quinns had entered a disbursement in the statement of account and bill of costs rendered to the client of $500.00 described as Quinns for professional fees. This amount of 500.00 should have formed part of the profit costs of $1,573.00. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the Solicitor was in any way more directly involved or at a greater or higher responsibility for supervising this particular matter and the trust account transactions that took place than his partner David Quinn. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that although there was a breach of Section 41(1) of the old Act that this breach was not wilful. Ground 6: The Wray matter It is alleged that the Solicitor did, whilst not the holder of a current practising certificate, act on behalf of a Mr Wray the client and deliver a brief to Counsel on behalf of the client in breach of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Section 26). It is also alleged that the Solicitor did further act improperly in that the Solicitor gave to the Law Society an undertaking to pay Counsel's fees but failed to honour such undertaking. In October 1987 the Solicitor delivered a brief to advise and to appear to a Mr F. Carnovale of Counsel in the matter of the client in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. At the time the brief was delivered and at all material times while the Solicitor acted for the client in September and October 1987 the Solicitor was not the holder of a current practising certificate issued under the Legal Profession Act. The Solicitor terminated his partnership with David Quinn in June 1987. He then proceeded overseas in July 1987 returning in September 1987. The Solicitor in evidence stated prior to his departure from the partnership he had filled out and signed an application for the renewal of his practising certificate and his arrangement with Quinns was that this application would be forwarded to the Law Society on his behalf when the report of the accountants to the firm was available and which report would accompany this application. He made no enquiries upon his return as to whether in fact his practising certificate had been renewed but assumed that it had been done. He did not learn that he did not hold a practising certificate until June 1983 at which time the matter was concluded. This was the only matter in which the Solicitor acted whilst not holding a practising certificate. During the proceedings the Law Society sought leave to amend the complaint to request an order that the Solicitor pay Mr Carnovale of Counsel the sum of $1,350.00 being fees rendered by Counsel to the Solicitor and which remain unpaid. The Solicitor consented to this amendment and also consented to the order being made against him. The Solicitor in acting for the client without being the holder of a current practising certificate was clearly in breach of the Legal Profession Act. Whilst the Tribunal does not reject the explanation of the Solicitor that he was unaware that his practising certificate had not been renewed the holding of a current practising certificate is not just a matter of form, it is a serious breach for a solicitor to practise without it and the Tribunal finds the Solicitor guilty of professional misconduct in this matter. Background The Solicitor was admitted to practise as a solicitor in February 1974, after completing a degree at the University of Sydney and articles of clerkship for 2 years at Bartier Perry & Purcell. From 1974 to 1978 he was an associate partner with William Patterson & Co. accepting a partnership in that firm in 1978. He resigned from this partnership in November 1979 and accepted a lecturing position at The College of Law. Whilst lecturing he continued to practise as a sole practitioner and in 1983/84 formed a partnership with R. Ayling. He was granted senior lecturer status at The College of Law. He served on certain Law Society committees. In 1984/85 the practice merged with M. Berghouse and he ceased lecturing in 1985. In 1985/86 the practice merged with E. Quinn and this firm subsequently acquired the practice of Abigail & Co. of Bondi Junction. He resigned from the partnership of Quinns in June 1987 and since August 1987 has not practised as a solicitor and has been a consultant to a computer personnel company established by himself and three others. The Solicitor was married in 1974 and has 5 children aged from 11 months to 13 years. The computer business was not a financial success and the Solicitor is presently in dire financial straits. He has no source of income and his outstanding debts exceed $50,000.00 including school fees. He is involved with his wife in defending a legal action in which action the State Bank is claiming $3.3 million and if he is unsuccessful in this action according to the Solicitor he is likely to lose his family home. The Solicitor stated in evidence that he has been under extreme stress and anxiety suffering asthma and migraine headaches daily. He is on daily medication for high blood pressure. There appears to be no doubt the Solicitor's present personal financial difficulties are contributing to his state of health. The Tribunal has made findings adverse to the Solicitor in respect of all the six (6) Grounds and the Tribunal's findings in respect of these matters are that the Solicitor has been guilty of professional misconduct. Counsel for the Law Society in his closing submissions to the Tribunal stated that there was no suggestion of dishonesty in a financial sense or that there had been peculation or misapplication of trust moneys but nevertheless the Solicitor had committed actual acts of dishonesty vis-a-vis clients. The Tribunal accepts this submission of the Law Society that there has been no financial dishonesty on the part of the Solicitor. The professional misconduct which the Tribunal has found is misconduct which demonstrates in some instances gross neglect and in others a slackness or casualness which has led the Solicitor to fail to act in the true interests of his clients. The question is whether this conduct is of a severity justifying removing the name of the Solicitor from the Roll or whether a period of suspension of the Solicitor from practice will adequately protect the interests of the public. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that in all the circumstances that an order suspending the Solicitor from practice for a period of 2 years is the appropriate order. In making this decision the Tribunal has had regard to some of the difficulties that the Solicitor has had in meeting the Complaint of the Law Society. The Solicitor has no recollection of receiving the reports of Miss Sayer in 1988 and he has stated that the first opportunity he had of meeting the Complaint and knowing of the matters referred to in her reports was in January 1991 when he received the Complaint which of course included these reports. Miss Sayer in her evidence admitted that she had not spoken to the Solicitor at any time during her investigations and the Solicitor has maintained that had Miss Sayer spoken to him at the time he would have been of more assistance to her than he has been at a date 3 years later. The Law Society, whilst it had ample opportunity to do so during the course of the proceedings did not produce any evidence that the Solicitor had received the reports of Miss Sayer in 1988 leading to the conclusion that these reports were not seen by the Solicitor until January 1991 some three (3) years after the events the subject of the Complaint. The Tribunal as constituted heard and determined the complaint of the Law Society against David Edward Quinn who was in partnership with the Solicitor during substantially the whole of the period covering the events, which gave rise to the complaints against Quinn and the Solicitor took place. The two (2) investigator's reports were common to both complaints. At the call over when the hearing dates were fixed the Solicitor for the Law Society asked that the two matters be heard consecutively and stated that whereas he had indicated earlier that he would ask that the matters be heard concurrently he did not seek that order. It is the view of the Tribunal that it would have been more desirable had the Law Society filed one complaint against the Solicitor and his former partner Quinn which would have resulted in this complaint being heard and determined in the one hearing. Orders The Tribunal notes that the Solicitor is not the holder of a current practising certificate and accordingly makes the following orders pursuant to Section 163 of the Legal Profession Act 1987: 1. That a practising certificate not be issued to the Solicitor until the expiration of a period of two (2) years from the date of this order. 2. That the Solicitor pay to Mr F. Carnovale of Counsel the sum of $1,250.00 for his outstanding fees. 3. That the Solicitor pays the costs of the Law Society as if taxed by the Supreme Court on a solicitor/client basis (such costs to include the costs of the adjournments of the hearing of the Complaint) and if the amount of these costs cannot be agreed then either party to have liberty to apply to the Tribunal to assess the amount of such costs. 4. That if the fees referred to in Order 2 or the costs referred to in Order 3 are not paid within the period of two (2) years from the date hereof a practising certificate not be issued to the Solicitor until the said fees and costs have been paid. Dated this 19th day of December 1991. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.