Equal Opportunity Tribunal of New South Wales CITATION: Hafez -V- Warilla Women'S Refuge Ltd, Clegg And Mcewan [1997] NSWEOT COMPLAINANT: Leila Hafez RESPONDENT: Warilla Women's Refuge Ltd, Clegg and McEwan NUMBER: 3 of 1993 & 40 of 1995 Ms Penny Goode ( Judicial Member ) TRIBUNAL: Ms M Alt Mr Neville Rogan GROUNDS OF COMPLAINT: 1) Racial Discrimination 2) Victimisation DATES OF HEARING: 05/17/1995; 05/18/1995; 08/14/1995; 08/15/1995; 09/04/1995; 09/06/1995; 10/09/1995; 10/10/1995; 10/11/1995; 10/30/1995; 11/29/1995; 11/30/1995; 11/11/1996; 03/12/1997 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/12/1997 Complainant: Mr C. Hook Illawarra Legal Centre Inc (Solicitor) Ms J. Keys (Counsel) LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: Respondent: Ms L Irwin Tress Cocks & Maddox (Solicitors) Ms P Hanna (Counsel) JUDGMENT IN FAVOUR OF: The Complainant is an Arabic Muslim woman, her nation of origin is Egypt, and she comes from a non-English speaking background ("NESB"). She alleges that she was employed by the First Respondent as a casual migrant worker from 28 July 1987 until 27 March 1990, on which date her services were terminated. By letter dated 18 June 1990, she lodged a complaint with the Anti-Discrimination Board ("the Board") alleging that the First Respondent had subjected her to "various forms of discrimination" on the ground of her race throughout her employment. She further alleged that she had been dismissed by the First Respondent as a consequence of her "attempts to address" some of the forms of discrimination to which she had been subjected. Although she did not expressly say so in her letter of complaint, she later alleged that this conduct contravened the victimisation provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act ("the Act") set out in s.50(1). She also alleged that the persons who were directly responsible for dismissing her were Ms Clegg and Ms McEwan, both of whom were, at all material times, directors and employees of the First Respondent. The Tribunal addressed these issues, amongst others, in two interim decisions : see Unreported EOT decisions, dated 24 March 1995 and 25 May 1995. In its decision dated 24 March 1995, the Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the victimisation complaint because it had not been the subject of the processes of investigation and referral to the Tribunal, as required by Part 9 of the Act. In accordance with the Tribunal's decision, the victimisation complaint was subsequently investigated by the Board and, like the racial discrimination complaint, referred to the Tribunal pursuant to s.91(2). On 10 March 1995, pursuant to s.98(1), Ms Clegg and Ms McEwan were joined as Respondents to the inquiry into the racial discrimination complaint : see Unreported EOT decision, 24 March 1995. In relation to the victimisation complaint, the President of the Board named both Ms Clegg and Ms McEwan as Respondents. In due course, both complaints were heard together, pursuant to s.97, on the basis that they arose out of the same, or substantially the same, circumstances or subject matter. During the course of the lengthy hearing, a substantial volume of documentary material was tendered, much of it raising issues which required very careful and detailed analysis in order to determine whether there was any substance in the multiplicity of allegations raised by the Complainant. Our determination of the issues was not made any easier by the fact that the Complainant's case did not emerge with any clarity until Ms Keys's final submissions were received. This was, in part, attributable to the volume and complexity of the factual issues raised by the complaint of racial discrimination. It was also attributable to the fact that when several of the Complainant's original claims were revealed to be contrary to the evidence, the nature and identification of her claims changed accordingly. As will be discussed later, this did not reflect favourably on her credit. To the extent that her case is not on all fours with that pleaded in the Amended Points of Claim, we have assumed that the case spelt out in Ms Keys's final submissions is the preferred one. background Unless stated otherwise, the following brief facts are not in dispute. At all material times, the First Respondent ("the Refuge") was a limited company which provided a Centre where women and their children, fleeing from domestic violence, could reside for varying periods of time. It was run by duly appointed directors, selected from the Refuge's employees as well as outside members of the public. In or about 1978, the Refuge received funding from the Department of Youth and Community Services (now the Department of Community Services and hereinafter referred to as "the Department") and, in relation to the position of migrant worker, the Department of Social Security. The Refuge's founding members included the Second and Third Respondents and the Refuge's Administrator, Ms Coleman. For many years, they worked on a voluntary basis without any form of recompense. In or about 1986, the Department of Housing provided the Refuge with larger premises in which to accommodate residents. Following the move to the new premises certain employees left the Refuge and, as a consequence, a new position was advertised for a part-time refuge worker. The advertisement, which was placed in the Lakes Times on 1 July 1987, specifically stated that migrant and Aboriginal women were encouraged to apply. The Complainant applied for this position and was unsuccessful. However, Ms Coleman wrote to her on 17 July 1987 asking her to contact the Refuge if she was interested in working casual hours to fit in with her casual position at the Department of Social Security. At the time, she was working for Social Security on Mondays and Wednesdays. Thereafter, the Complainant attended a meeting with Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent where the terms and conditions of her employment were discussed. The nature of these terms and conditions is disputed. The Complainant subsequently commenced work at the Refuge as a casual worker for 15 hours per week on 28 July 1987. She alleges that she commenced work as a "migrant worker". The Respondents deny this assertion and maintain that at all material times the Second Respondent was employed as the Refuge's migrant worker and that the Complainant was employed as a general worker. The dispute is of considerable significance and is discussed in detail later. The Respondents allege that, some time in 1989, the Complainant commenced a course of conduct which caused disruption and disharmony to the proper running of the Refuge, as well as anguish and, at times, ill health to other workers. In particular, they allege that the Complainant repeatedly made false allegations that the Second and Third Respondents, Ms Coleman and the accountant, Mr Murphy, had misappropriated funds and engaged in corrupt conduct. These allegations are disputed. It is common ground that a special meeting was held at the Refuge on 22 March 1990 to discuss matters of concern raised by the Complainant and that, at Ms Coleman's request, Mr Werner attended the meeting in his capacity as the Department's Community Programme Officer. As a consequence of Mr Werner's recommendations, the position of migrant worker was vacated by the Second Respondent and it was later agreed by the Refuge workers that there should be a major re-shuffle of the hours worked by the various workers, with an allocation of 40 hours for the former migrant worker position, to be shared equally between a general migrant worker and a youth migrant worker. On 27 March 1990, which was the Complainant's next working day at the Refuge after the special meeting, the Complainant's employment was terminated by the Second and Third Respondents. Although no reason was given in the letter of termination, the Respondents allege that the Complainant was dismissed for her ongoing abuse and misconduct, including her allegations of corruption, which she had been warned about verbally many times. The Complainant disputes the genuineness of this reason. the complainant's case In relation to the complaint of racial discrimination, we understand the Complainant's case to be as follows: (a) that the First Respondent unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of her race, pursuant to ss. 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(c) of the Act, by affording her less favourable terms and conditions of employment and by subjecting her to detrimental treatment during the course of her employment; (b) that each of the Respondents unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of either her race or characteristics generally imputed to persons of her race, pursuant to s.8(2)(c), by dismissing her. In relation to the alleged unlawful discrimination during the course of her employment, the Complainant maintains that, although she was employed as a migrant worker, she was afforded less favourable terms and conditions of employment than the Second Respondent, who was designated as the Refuge's migrant worker. In support of her case, she relies on a large number of discriminatory incidents which, if accepted, demonstrate, inter alia , that the First Respondent was motivated by an anti-Egyptian bias. However, she does not maintain that any of these incidents constitute a separate act of unlawful discrimination. Rather, she asserts that these incidents demonstrate the following: o She was repeatedly subjected to discriminatory conduct throughout her employment. o She was afforded differential treatment because she was the only employee with a non-English speaking background. o She was treated in a patronising manner, particularly by the Second Respondent. o At the very least, the Refuge's management practices were questionable and, therefore, there was a reasonable basis for questioning them, as well as the terms and conditions of employment afforded to other employees. o The First Respondent failed to address her many grievances concerning the less favourable terms and conditions of employment she received vis a vis the Second Respondent. In relation to the alleged unlawful discrimination arising out of her dismissal, the Complainant relies on a number of circumstantial matters which, she maintains, cast sufficient doubt on the genuineness of the reason given by the Respondents so as to ground the inference that her racial origin was an operative factor in the decision to dismiss her. In particular, she relies on the First Respondent's failure to provide her with proper grievance resolution processes prior to dismissing her. In the alternative, she alleges that she was dismissed on the ground of characteristics generally imputed to persons of her racial origin, namely, that she was unreasonable, irrational, overly emotional, difficult to understand and threateningly aggressive. In relation to the victimisation complaint, we understand the Complainant's case to be that each of the Respondents subjected her to detrimental treatment in breach of s.50(1) of the Act by dismissing her after she had made allegations that the Respondents had unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of her race. She places particular reliance on the fact that she had approached the Board for advice prior to March 1990 and had made allegations of racial discrimination at the special meeting held on 22 March 1990. The Respondents deny the Complainant's allegations and deny that their conduct falls within either s.8(2) or s.50(1). In relation to the victimisation complaint, they do not raise any matter of exception or defence under s.50(2). standard of proof In determining whether the Complainant has substantiated the racial discrimination and victimisation complaints, we have applied the civil standard of proof. However, in doing so, we have taken into account the gravity of the allegations and the serious consequences of any adverse findings to the Respondents : see the remarks of Dixon J (as he then was) in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR at pp. 361-362. See also O'Callaghan v Loder (1984) EOC 92-024 at pp. 75,511-75,512. On the assumption that the First Respondent afforded the Complainant less favourable terms and conditions of employment than it afforded the Second Respondent in comparable circumstances, there is no direct proof that it did so on the ground of the Complainant's race; nor is there any direct proof that the Respondents dismissed her on the same basis. For this reason, we understand the Complainant to be seeking to establish her case by relying on inferences properly drawn from the large number of allegations made against the Respondents. As was remarked upon by the Western Australian EOT in Alone v State Housing Commission (" Homewest ") (1992) EOC 92-392 at p. 78,789, racial discrimination, of its very nature, is: "... ordinarily something which is manifested indirectly and proved (where it exists) by evidence normally called circumstantial." See also the remarks of Graham DCJ in Atkins & Ors v Director General of Education , which were quoted on appeal by Mahoney J ([1989] EOC 92-263 at p. 77,626). Further, as was pointed out by Dawson J and McHugh J in Shepherd v R 97 ALR 161 at pp. 165 and 175 respectively, it is not necessary for a fact itself to be proved to the requisite degree before it may be used as a basis for an inference adverse to a party. Thus, for example, in relation to the Complainant's dismissal, the issue we have to decide is whether the circumstances of the dismissal were such that they support the inference that the Complainant's racial origin was an operative factor in the decision to dismiss her. When making this determination, however, it is well established that discrimination cannot be inferred where more probable and innocent explanations are available on the evidence : see Fenwick v Beveridge Building Products Pty Ltd (1986) EOC 92-147; Department of Health v Arumugam (1987) EOC 92-195; (1988) VR 319. We propose to deal with the relevant provisions of the Act, the evidence and our findings in relation to the racial discrimination and victimisation complaints, in turn, below. A. RACE DISCRIMINATION Relevant Sections of the Act At all relevant times, the term "race" was defined in s.4 of the Act to include "colour, nationality and ethnic or national origin". At all relevant times, ss. 7 and 8(2) of the Act provided: "7(1) A person discriminates against another person on the ground of his race if, on the ground of - (a) his race; (b) a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of his race; or (c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of his race; he (d) treats him less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, he treats or would treat a person of a different race; or (e) segregates him from persons of a different race." "7(2) A person discriminates against another person on the ground of his race if he requires the other person to comply with a requirement or condition- (a) with which a substantially higher proportion of persons not of the same race as the other person comply or are able to comply; (b) which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case; and (c) with which the other person does not or is not able to comply." "8(2) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the ground of his race; (a) in the terms or conditions of employment which he affords him; (b) by denying him access, or limiting his access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or to any other benefits associated with employment; or (c) by dismissing him or subjecting him to any other detriment." Inquiry Under Section 8(2) of the Act It seems clear that the inquiry under s.8(2) of the Act is directed to the ground of the alleged differential treatment afforded to the Complainant. In this regard, even if the First Respondent had no motive or intention to discriminate, its conduct may still be characterised as discriminatory within the meaning of the Act. This view is consistent with the underlying philosophy of the Act as well as with a significant line of authority : see, for example, the joint judgment of Mason CJ and Gaudron J in Waters & Ors v Public Transport Corporation (1991) EOC 92-390 at p. 78,674; the judgment of Clarke JA in Waterhouse v Bell (1991) EOC 92-376 at pp. 78,589-78,590 and Metwally v University of Wollongong (1984) EOC 92-030. Further, provided that an operative ground of the differential treatment is one of those mentioned in s.7(1) or s.7(2) of the Act, it does not matter that there may have been an additional ground which falls outside s.7 : see Waterhouse v Bell (supra) per Clarke JA at EOC pp. 78,588-78,589 and Holdaway v Qantas Airways Limited (1992) EOC 92-395 at pp. 78,809-78,810. Thus, for example, in relation to the Complainant's claim that the Respondents unlawfully discriminated against her by dismissing her, provided the Complainant can establish that her race was an operative ground of the decision, she is still entitled to succeed even though there may have been additional reasons for dismissing her which do not contravene the Act (Cf. s.4A of the present Act which did not come into effect until 8 August 1994). We turn now to discuss the Complainant's claim that she was afforded differential treatment during the course of her employment in contravention of s.8(2). Alleged Discrimination During the Course of the Complainant's Employment The "Migrant Worker" Position Ms Keys submits that the alleged discrimination during the course of the Complainant's employment centres around the "migrant worker" position. She contends that the Complainant was employed in comparable circumstances to the Second Respondent because both were employed as migrant workers. She further contends that the First Respondent treated the Complainant less favourably than the Second Respondent in relation to their terms and conditions of employment. She points to the fact that the Second Respondent worked 25 hours per week and received six weeks' annual leave, 22 % leave loading, $30 per week "on call" allowance, and superannuation. On the other hand, because the Complainant was a casual worker, she worked only 15 hours per week, received no casual or leave loadings, received $150 only when rostered "on call", and had no entitlement to leave or superannuation. The First Respondent denies that it either employed the Complainant as a migrant worker or that she was employed in comparable circumstances to the Second Respondent. As we understand Ms Keys's submissions, the Complainant alleges, in the alternative, that the First Respondent's failure to acknowledge her as a migrant worker, when she obviously came from a non-English speaking background, constitutes less favourable treatment, in breach of s.8(2)(a). The Complainant gave evidence that she commenced work at the Refuge as a casual migrant worker on 28 July 1987 and that the hours of work were 9.00 am to 4.30 pm on Tuesdays and Thursdays. She said that Ms Coleman made it clear to her that the position was for a migrant worker. Both Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent gave evidence that some time in July 1987 the Complainant attended a meeting with them to discuss the terms and conditions of her employment and that she accepted a position as a part-time Refuge worker. They denied that they had ever held out or represented the position to be that of a casual migrant worker and said that the hours which were offered to the Complainant were intended to complement her position at the Department of Social Security. The Second Respondent said that she had been employed on a full-time basis as the Refuge's migrant worker since late 1984 or early 1985. According to the Wages Book, she commenced in the position on 15 February 1985. It is not disputed that she worked 25 hours per work. She said her duties required her to assist ethnic women and children who were residents of the Refuge, to maintain an Immigration Kit and to liaise and communicate with all ethnic community groups in the Warilla area. The Complainant gave evidence that she first became aware that the Second Respondent was employed in the permanent migrant worker position at a Regional Meeting at the Wollongong Refuge in February 1989. She also said that she learned then that the Second Respondent had been working in this capacity for many years. We accept that the Complainant became concerned when she discovered that the Second Respondent did not fit the definition of a "migrant worker", as defined by the funding body's guidelines, because she spoke English as a first language and did not come from a non-English speaking background. The Second Respondent said that, although her father was Maltese, she was unable to speak the language fluently. She also said that on 1 July 1988, the funding body changed the position of migrant worker to a NESB worker with the stipulation that English not be spoken as a first language. Prior to this, however, she said that the only stipulation was that the person occupying the position had an understanding of migrant issues and that they came from a migrant background. After the funding body changed the requirements for the position, she said she contacted the Department and was told that she could continue in the position because she had originally been appointed under the old guidelines. However, as the minutes of the special meeting held on 22 March 1990 show, Mr Werner took a different view because she did not come from a non-English speaking background and spoke no second language. It is common ground that, as of 22 March 1990, the Second Respondent vacated the migrant worker position by transferring to a general worker position. It is also not disputed that Mr Werner recommended that the NESB position be advertised according to the funding body's guidelines. The President's Report in relation to the complaint of racial discrimination ( Tab 3 ) shows that, following the Complainant's dismissal, the Department recommended that the position not be filled until the issue of the Complainant's dismissal had been resolved. It appears that the position is still vacant and that the work previously undertaken by the Second Respondent in her capacity as the migrant worker is presently shared by all the Refuge workers. We infer from the minutes of the meeting held on 22 March 1990 that the Complainant had maintained to Mr Werner that, in fact, she was the migrant worker and that the Second Respondent was not, and could not be, because she spoke no second language and had no non-English speaking background. The minutes make reference to the Second Respondent being the "claimed other half time" migrant worker. We infer from the evidence that this was how the Complainant described her to those present at the meeting. In order to support her contention that she was the Refuge's migrant worker, the Complainant relies on the following matters: o She comes from an Egyptian background, speaks Arabic fluently and has considerable experience in migrant community issues. o Both Ms Archer, the Co-ordinator of a Women's Refuge at Marsfield at the relevant time, and Ms Alfaro, a health worker at the Warilla Women's Community Health Centre at the relevant time, gave evidence that the Complainant was introduced to them as the Refuge's "migrant worker". o Inspector McCloughlan, a director of the Refuge at the relevant time, described the Complainant as "a casual migrant worker". o At the relevant time, the Complainant was the only employee of the Refuge who satisfied the guidelines laid down by the funding body. o The employment classifications adopted by the Refuge were not immutable, as evidenced by the outcome of the special meeting held on 22 March 1990 and the fact that the Refuge workers were essentially engaged in the same duties. With the exception of the first matter, which is not disputed, we discuss these matters in turn below. o Archer gave evidence that when she attended a Regional meeting at the Refuge, the Complainant was presented to her as the Refuge's "new migrant worker". She was uncertain as to which year it was that she attended the meeting but thought it was probably 1987. Similarly, Ms Alfaro said that when she attended a Domestic Violence Monitoring Committee meeting at the Refuge, the Complainant was presented by the Refuge as the "new migrant worker". In cross-examination, she said that she had only attended a meeting of the Refuge on one occasion and conceded that, although her name appeared on the list of persons who attended the Domestic Violence Monitoring Committee on 6 September 1987, the Complainant was not shown as being present. The Second and Third Respondents and Ms Coleman denied that they had ever introduced the Complainant as the "new migrant worker". In relation to Ms Alfaro's evidence, Ms Coleman said that the Complainant was not introduced to anyone at the meeting because she had been working at the Refuge for 14 months at that time and had attended other Domestic Violence Monitoring Committee meetings. We did not find the evidence given by either Ms Archer or Ms Alfaro to be reliable. They were each recalling an event which had taken place approximately seven or eight years prior to the preparation of their affidavits. Moreover, neither of them was able to say who had introduced the Complainant or precisely when this had occurred. Indeed, Ms Alfaro's evidence suggests that she was not even present at the time. Taking into account the denials given on behalf of the Respondents, we are not satisfied that the Complainant was introduced to either Ms Archer or Ms Alfaro as the "new migrant worker". In any event, even if she had been described in this way, in the absence of other evidence, we do not find that it was intended to convey the impression that the Complainant was working in the designated migrant worker position, as distinct from being a migrant working in a general Refuge position. Although Ms Keys did not specifically refer to it in her submissions, the Complainant said, in response to questioning from the Judicial Member, that she had been introduced as the Refuge's migrant worker on at least 20 to 25 occasions from 1987 through to March 1990. She nominated Ms Coleman and the Third Respondent as introducing her in this way to Police and Departmental officers and various other people she came into contact with at Refuge meetings. Significantly, the Third Respondent said that for about the last 12 months of her employment, the Complainant had maintained to people, both within and outside the Refuge, that she was the "migrant worker". She also said that the Complainant had been told by Ms Coleman that she was a general Refuge worker and not the migrant worker. Since none of the First Respondent's witnesses conceded that the Complainant had ever been introduced as a migrant worker, it is necessary to determine whether the Complainant's evidence should be accepted. We found her overall evidence to be lacking in reliability and credibility. It contained many inconsistencies and contradictions which we could not reasonably attribute to any difficulties she might have had giving evidence of events which had obviously evoked strong emotional responses on both sides. She also displayed a tendency to make serious allegations against the Respondents without being able to substantiate them and, on occasions, without making any real endeavour to do so. On the other hand, we found the evidence given by the various witnesses called on the Respondents' behalf to be generally credible and reliable. Where their evidence differed from that given by the Complainant, we had no difficulty preferring their evidence. Accordingly, we are not satisfied that the Complainant was ever introduced as either the Refuge's migrant worker or a migrant worker. Ÿ Inspector McCloughlan said in her statutory declaration sworn on 10 April 1990, that she had known the Complainant for approximately 18 months. In her statutory declaration she described the Complainant as "a casual migrant worker" with the Refuge. She gave evidence that she had referred to her in this way on the basis that it was the description that the Complainant had given her when she spoke to her about the various allegations against the Refuge. In cross-examination, she said that she had also become aware of the Complainant's employment as a casual migrant worker from her own knowledge. She did not, however, give any details. She denied that the Complainant had ever been introduced to her as the casual migrant worker. Taking into account the denials given on behalf of the Respondents that the Complainant was a migrant worker, Inspector McCloughlan's relatively minor involvement in the day-to-day running of the Refuge, and the fact that the Complainant had been maintaining to people within and outside the Refuge that she was the migrant worker, we are not satisfied that Inspector McCloughlan's evidence, of itself, supports the inference that the Complainant was employed as a migrant worker. o The evidence clearly shows that as of 1 July 1988, when the new guidelines were laid down by the funding body, the Complainant was the only Refuge employee who satisfied the funding body's guidelines. Prior to this, we accept that the Second Respondent complied with the relevant guidelines despite the fact that she did not come from a non-English speaking background. As mentioned previously, we accept that, when the guidelines changed, the Second Respondent was told by the Department that, notwithstanding her inability to satisfy the specified criteria, she could remain in the position because she had originally been appointed under the old guidelines. Given the circumstances which arose after 1 July 1988, we can readily understand why the Complainant felt a sense of injustice that the Second Respondent was able to remain in the migrant worker position when she did not satisfy the new guidelines. Nonetheless, the changed circumstances did not mean that the Complainant would automatically have been entitled to step into the position, particularly in view of the Department's attitude, the many years of experience the Second Respondent had gained in the position, and the fact that the position had not been advertised. In these circumstances, it does not follow, as was submitted by Ms Keys, that the First Respondent's failure to appoint the Complainant as a migrant worker supports an inference of unlawful racial discrimination. o In relation to the final matter, the evidence shows that, with three exceptions, the general duties and obligations of all Refuge employees were of the same or a similar nature. The exceptions are Ms Coleman, the Administrator, Ms Uhr, the Child Care worker, and Ms Holz, the Court Support worker. The evidence discloses that the general duties of all Refuge employees included the following: o admitting new residents; o checking the residents, the residents' quarters, the stores and the provisions; o organising outside relief and/or benefits for the residents; o arranging emergency relief, clothing and alternative housing for residents, if required; and o arranging and, where necessary, attending Court with residents. We are satisfied that the casual Refuge workers and the migrant worker performed the same general duties. However, the evidence shows that the migrant worker was also required to attend Migrant Support meetings, to liaise with all ethnic and community groups, to maintain an Immigration Kit and to give talks at specific venues. We accept the Second Respondent's evidence that she had undertaken these duties for a number of years and that she had specific knowledge of the relevant issues. We also accept that, over the years, she had compiled a list of relevant contacts for various NESB groups. We are not satisfied that any of the matters relied upon by the Complainant support her case that she was employed as a migrant worker. In fact, the Respondents' evidence is quite to the contrary. We discuss this below. Although the Complainant said that Ms Coleman had made it clear to her that the position was for a migrant worker, she conceded that no mention was made of any migrant worker position in either the initial advertisement, which appeared in the Lakes Times on 1 July 1987, or in Ms Coleman's letter to her dated 17 July 1987. The initial advertisement stated, however, that migrant and Aboriginal women were encouraged to apply, and stipulated that the hourly rate was $12.35 per hour. The documentary evidence shows that, with the exception of the first week, the Complainant commenced her employment on an hourly rate of $12.375. This was identical to the rate paid to the other casual workers. On the other hand, for the first 14 months of the Complainant's employment, the Second Respondent received $11.00 per hour which was less than all other workers. She did, however, receive other entitlements which the Complainant did not receive, because she was employed as a permanent employee. We do not accept the Complainant's assertion that Ms Coleman told her at the initial interview that she was being employed as a migrant worker. First, it was never put to Ms Coleman and, secondly, it is inconsistent with the overall evidence. Further, we do not find that the Complainant subsequently became a migrant worker at any later stage of her employment. While she clearly accompanied the Second Respondent to some migrant support meetings, we are satisfied that she did so in her capacity as a migrant woman, who worked in a Refuge, rather than as a migrant worker. This finding is consistent with the evidence given by the Second Respondent. The Second Respondent also said that, following her attendance at these meetings, the Complainant declined to go to any further meetings because she thought they were "all shit". The Third Respondent also said that, in the presence of other Refuge workers, the Complainant told her the same thing. The Complainant denied that she had denigrated the meetings. She said that she had been precluded from attending the meetings because they were held on Fridays and that, on several occasions, Ms Coleman had refused to re-schedule her hours so that she could attend. We do not accept the Complainant's evidence. It is common ground that the Complainant initially worked for the Department of Social Security on Mondays and Wednesdays but, at her request, changed the Mondays to Fridays. The Complainant said that she could have changed Fridays' hours to another day as her hours were flexible. Ms Coleman said that she had never prevented the Complainant from attending any meetings and denied that the Complainant had ever asked her if she could work on a Friday so that she could attend a migrant support meeting. The Complainant's evidence on this issue was somewhat inconsistent. At one point in cross-examination, she said that she would not sacrifice her Fridays at the Department of Social Security unless there was "an extreme urgency" at the Refuge. We are satisfied that the Complainant was not prevented from attending the migrant support meetings and that the reason why she did not continue to attend the meetings was because they were held on Fridays and she did not consider she gained anything from them. Further, on those occasions when she did attend, we find that she did so in her capacity as a migrant woman who worked at the Refuge rather than as a migrant worker. It follows from the above analysis that we are not satisfied that the Complainant was employed, at any stage of her employment with the Refuge, as a migrant worker. Therefore, it cannot be said that she was afforded less favourable treatment in the same or not materially different circumstances. We now turn to discuss Ms Keys's alternative submission that the First Respondent's failure to acknowledge the Complainant as a migrant worker constitutes less favourable treatment, in breach of s.8(2)(a). As mentioned previously, the evidence shows that the general duties of many of the Refuge's workers were the same. In view of the apparent flexibility under which the Refuge operated, Ms Keys submits that it was always open to the First Respondent to have more than one migrant worker. Indeed, as a result of the special meeting held on 22 March 1990, the documentation shows that the accountant, Mr Murphy, was asked to allocate 40 hours to the NESB position, to be split equally between two people. It is common ground that, prior to 1991, there was no award which governed refuge workers. The evidence relied on by the Respondents shows that, at the relevant time, the Department did not require the Refuge to pay its workers a set hourly rate; nor did it stipulate how many hours should be allocated to each position. Further, although the First Respondent's books were regularly audited by the Department, there was no suggestion that the Refuge's wages and conditions of employment were either dissimilar to other comparable refuges or outside the Department's own general guidelines. The minutes of the special meeting held on 22 March 1990 show that, based on Mr Werner's calculations, the First Respondent was "underutilising" its funded hours by 19 hours and that various casual workers, including the Complainant, appeared to have been underpaid. However, the evidence given by Ms Coleman shows that she disagreed with Mr Werner's calculations to the extent that they did not make sufficient allowance for "on call" costs. In any event, notwithstanding the presence of certain anomalies in the system, there is no evidence to suggest that the Respondents had committed any impropriety. Significantly, Mr Werner did not recommend that the migrant worker position should be automatically given to the Complainant after it was vacated by the Second Respondent. Taking into consideration all the relevant matters, including the fact that the Refuge never advertised for a migrant worker position to be filled in addition to that held by the Second Respondent, we do not find that the First Respondent's failure to acknowledge the Complainant as a migrant worker constitutes less favourable treatment on the ground of her race in contravention of s.8(2)(a). The final matter to be canvassed under this heading is whether the First Respondent nevertheless held the Complainant out to be a migrant worker and, if so, whether it constitutes less favourable treatment, in breach of s.8(2)(a). We have previously found that the Complainant was not, as alleged, introduced as a migrant worker. However, the Complainant also gave evidence that, prior to attending a Child Support Conference in 1987, Ms Coleman had told her to say that she was a migrant child support worker. This was denied by Ms Coleman. The Complainant also said that, prior to attending the Regional meeting at the Wollongong Refuge in February 1989, Ms Coleman told her to "keep quiet". She said that after she learned at the meeting for the first time that the Second Respondent was employed in the permanent migrant worker position, she raised the issue with her in the presence of Ms Coleman and the Third Respondent. She said the Second Respondent told her, "You are skating on thin ice". From the alleged context in which these remarks were made by Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent, we understand the Complainant to be alleging, inter alia, that because the Second Respondent did not satisfy the funding body's guidelines in relation to her ethnic background, that the First Respondent had held the Complainant out to be a migrant worker. Ms Coleman conceded that she had told the Complainant words to the effect of "keep quiet", but said that the words had been used totally out of context. She said that, when the Complainant asked her what to do and say, because it was her first attendance at a regional meeting, she told her to sit back and listen and then make a contribution when she felt comfortable about doing so. The Complainant said in her evidence in chief that it was not her first regional meeting. However, in re-examination she contradicted herself by stating that it was her first regional meeting and the first time that she had attended the Wollongong Refuge. On balance, we accept Ms Coleman's explanation and we do not find that it carries with it the alleged connotation. The Second Respondent conceded that she had said to the Complainant that she was "skating on thin ice" but denied that the statement was used in the context of a discussion concerning the employment of a migrant worker. Rather, she said the statement formed part of the discussion she had with the Complainant when she was warning her that her ongoing assertions of misconduct against directors of the Refuge would be regarded as misconduct sufficient to bring about her dismissal. She also said that this statement formed part of the warnings that the Complainant was given about her conduct as an employee of the Refuge and her behaviour with respect to other Refuge workers. We accept the Second Respondent's explanation and we do not find that the statement in question was used in the context alleged by the Complainant. In the absence of any reliable evidence on the issue, we are not satisfied that the First Respondent ever held the Complainant out to be a migrant worker. Accordingly, it is not necessary to determine whether she was afforded less favourable treatment, in contravention of s.8(2)(a). We now turn to discuss the various discriminatory acts which allegedly occurred during the course of the Complainant's employment. Alleged Discriminatory Acts (1) Undermining of the Complainant's Participation in Refuge Meetings The Complainant alleges that her participation in Refuge meetings was often undermined because she was asked to perform various menial tasks. She gave evidence that both Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent said to her on occasions to pick up the mail from the Warilla Post Office, to get the lunch orders and to pick up and clean the cups and dishes. She also relies on Ms Archer's evidence that, when she attended a meeting at the Refuge shortly after the Complainant had commenced employment, she observed the Complainant cleaning up. Ms Archer also gave evidence that the Second Respondent said to her: "Laila will do anything we ask. She cleans up all the time - she brings her own lunch and then we get her to go and buy our lunches for us - and she does." She said that she did not observe the other workers being treated in the same way. The Second Respondent denied that she had made any of these remarks to Ms Archer and, like Ms Coleman, she also denied the assertion that the Complainant's participation in meetings was undermined. The Second Respondent specifically denied the assertion that the Complainant had ever been directed to collect the mail and engage in cleaning duties and said that the Refuge workers shared these tasks as part of their duties. With the exception of Ms Uhr, who said she normally took rubbish to the tip, the evidence of the other Refuge workers was that no particular employee was ever directed to carry out tasks on behalf of other employees. On balance, we are not satisfied that the Complainant's participation in Refuge meetings was undermined in the manner alleged; nor are we satisfied that the alleged conversation between Ms Archer and the Second Respondent occurred as Ms Archer described it. Ms Archer's affidavit was sworn some eight years after the meeting took place and, given the fact that on 6 April 1990 she had presided over the Nowra Dispute Committee meeting (which, after hearing evidence from the Second and Third Respondents, made adverse findings against the First Respondent), it cannot, in our view, be said that she was a truly impartial witness. In any event, even if the conversation had taken place as alleged and her participation in meetings had been undermined as alleged, in the absence of other evidence, it does not support an inference of unlawful racial discrimination. (2) Smoking at Meetings The Complainant gave evidence that on several occasions she asked if she could open the window to let out some of the smoke. She said the Second Respondent replied: "This is the way it is here. If I were you, I would be happy just to work here under any conditions." The Second Respondent denied this conversation. The Complainant also said that on one occasion the Second Respondent told her that, if she didn't like the smoke, she should go into the other room or go home. The Second Respondent conceded that she had said to the Complainant to go into the other room if the smoke was annoying her, but added that it was a very cold day and the wind was blowing directly onto her. While the Second Respondent could clearly have dealt with the issue more sensitively, we are not satisfied that she said to the Complainant that she should be happy to work at the Refuge under any conditions. We also acknowledge that, at the relevant time, the Refuge did not have a policy precluding employees and residents from smoking on the premises. In the absence of other evidence, we do not find that the statement made by the Second Respondent supports an inference of unlawful racial discrimination. (3) Ethnic Background : A Source of Ridicule The Complainant said that aspects of her NESB and ethnic background were frequently a source of ridicule. The four specific examples she mentioned are discussed below. (i) Egyptian food The Complainant said that the Second and Third Respondents and her co-workers often made disparaging comments about the Egyptian food she ate for lunch. She said comments were made such as, "How can you eat that?"; "Can't you eat normal food?"; and "That looks revolting". The Respondents denied the allegations and described specific instances where they not only ate the Complainant's food, but also asked for the recipe and extra helpings. In cross-examination, the Complainant reluctantly conceded that workers at the Refuge were sometimes complimentary in relation to her food and that they had also eaten and enjoyed food which she had prepared and brought to work for everyone to share. It is not disputed that it was common practice for food to be shared amongst co-workers. While it is likely that some of the food the Complainant ate for lunch was, on occasions, the subject of negative comments, we are not satisfied that the Complainant was ever ridiculed about it. As the Complainant herself conceded, there is nothing particularly unusual about people having different tastes in food. (ii) Derogatory comments about migrants The Complainant gave evidence that, on several occasions, Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent spoke to her in derogatory terms about migrants. She said, on one occasion Ms Coleman asked her: "When you were having a baby, did you scream and wail like all those migrant women do when they are having babies in hospitals?" Ms Coleman denied that she had said this and, like the Second Respondent, she also denied that she had ever spoken about migrants in derogatory or deprecating terms. They both said that their treatment of migrant women was in keeping with the Refuge's policy of protecting, promoting and enhancing the interests of migrant and ethnic women. We accept the denials made by Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent and, accordingly, we do not find that they made the alleged derogatory comments. (iii) The Complainant's clothing The Complainant alleged that, on occasions, she was criticised by her co-workers in relation to her clothing, In particular, she said she was sent home on two separate occasions because Ms Coleman did not approve of what she was wearing. In relation to the occasion of the Refuge Christmas party on 21 December 1989, she said Ms Coleman told her to go home and get some warmer clothes on. Ms Keys tendered a photograph of the "off the shoulder" dress the Complainant said she had subsequently worn. On another occasion, she said Ms Coleman told her that her dress did not suit her personality and her background. Ms Coleman and her co-workers denied that the Complainant had worn the dress depicted in the photograph to the Christmas party in 1989. In fact, the Complainant ultimately conceded, in cross-examination, that she had worn the dress in question to a Christmas lunch held in 1989. The Second Respondent said that, on the day of the 1989 Christmas party, the weather became inclement in the afternoon, whereupon she had asked the Complainant if she would like to go home and get some warm clothing. She said that the Complainant was wearing a very pretty cotton top and had no jumper or coat to protect her from the cold. She said the Complainant seemed concerned that the rest of the workers would not wait if she returned home. Both Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent gave evidence, which was supported by a number of the other Refuge workers, that the Complainant was told to go home if she wanted to and that they would wait for her return. We accept this evidence. We also accept Ms Coleman's denial that she had said to the Complainant that her dress did not suit her personality and her background. Based on the evidence given by the various witnesses called on the Respondents' behalf, we find that there were no occasions on which any adverse comments were made about the Complainant's dress or clothing. (iv) The Complainant's background The Complainant said that, because she is of the Muslim faith, she was often harassed and pressured to explain what was happening in Iraq and Iran, and expected to support the fundamentalist Islamic revolution in Iran. On one occasion, she said the Second Respondent said to her: "You should be ashamed to have family in Egypt or relate to Islam in any way at this time." The Second Respondent denied that any such discussion had ever taken place. We accept this denial. We also accept the Respondent's denials that the Complainant was either pressured or harassed in the manner alleged. (4) Pronunciation of "Ahmed" The Complainant gave evidence that, when she commenced employment at the Refuge, she used the name "Ahmed", which was her father's name. She said that Ms Coleman and the Second and Third Respondents persisted in mocking her name by pronouncing it as if they were clearing their throats between the "Ah" and "med". She said she felt her father's name was being ridiculed and that she felt humiliated by this disrespect. As a consequence, in about March 1988, she said, she changed her name to "Hafez" in order to avoid the stigma. The Second Respondent said that at no stage did she or, in her presence, any other Refuge worker use the name "Ahmed" in a mocking way. The evidence discloses that "Ahmed" was one of a number of names appearing on the Complainant's birth certificate and that the change of name to "Hafez" coincided with proceedings against her husband for child maintenance. The Second Respondent said that the Complainant had asked her how to change her name and telephone number in the telephone book. The Complainant denied ever having her name in the telephone book because she has always had a silent number. However, in cross-examination, she conceded that her name appeared in the telephone directory for the years 1987 and 1988 under the name "Ahmed". Taking all the relevant matters into consideration, we are not satisfied that the Complainant was mocked in the manner alleged, or that she changed her name to avoid being ridiculed. (5) "Arabic Muslim" Introductions The Complainant gave evidence that Ms Coleman introduced her to another person at a Domestic Violence Support Group meeting in January 1989 in the following way: "This is Laila. She is Arabic and she is Muslim. Can you believe it? This one doesn't seem Muslim. We are trying to change her." The Complainant said that this was not an uncommon introduction. By way of illustration, she said that, on 22 September 1989, in a social setting at the Dapto Leagues Club, Ms Coleman introduced her to her companion by saying, "This is Laila. She is Arabic and Muslim ... fucking hopeless". Ms Coleman denied that she had ever introduced the Complainant in this way. Mr Jackson, her husband and companion on the evening in question, said she did not introduce the Complainant in the manner alleged. Indeed, he said it was unnecessary for the Complainant to be introduced to him because she had been a guest at their home for various Refuge social gatherings. He also said he had carried out some handyman work for her by laying a slab of cement and erecting a pergola in her backyard prior to September 1989. In response to this, the Complainant said that there was another man with Ms Coleman and Mr Jackson on the evening in question. She did not dispute the fact that she had met Mr Jackson prior to September 1989. Ms Coleman gave evidence, which was supported by the Second Respondent, that she had never introduced the Complainant in terms of her religious or ethnic background. She said, however, that on numerous occasions, in her presence, the Complainant had said, "Where do you think I'm from?" and, without allowing the person a chance to respond, would say, "I'm Egyptian and Muslim". The Second Respondent's evidence was to a similar effect. The other evidence given on behalf of the Respondents does not suggest that any of the Refuge workers harboured any negative views in relation to people of the Muslim faith. In fact, their treatment of a Muslim woman named Azmir, a resident at the Refuge for approximately 2 years, shows that they harboured no such views. Weighing up all the competing considerations, we do not find that the Complainant was introduced in the manner alleged. (6) Maltreatment of Muslim Residents During the course of her evidence, the Complainant suggested that the Respondents had maltreated the Muslim women who were residing at the Refuge. In relation to Azmir, she said that she "lived like an animal", was isolated and neglected for a very long time, and, for a period of six months, was the only resident in the Refuge. Ms Hanna submits that these allegations are totally false and that they have been raised in an attempt to sully the Respondents and their witnesses. Whatever motivation the Complainant might have had for making the allegations, we do not find that there is any substance in them. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Azmir, in particular, was well treated and well liked by both the Refuge workers and the other residents. The Second Respondent said she got on very well with all the workers because she was a very pleasant lady and very easy to get on with. She also said that she herself was very upset when her attempts to gain permanent residency for Azmir proved to be unsuccessful. The evidence given on the Respondents' behalf in relation to Azmir's treatment at the Refuge shows that she was taken on various outings and excursions, she undertook a course at the local TAFE, personal items such as spectacles were purchased for her, money was given to her, lawyers were engaged to act on her behalf in relation to both family law and immigration proceedings, and an airline ticket to Indonesia was purchased for her out of Refuge funds. Had the allegations made by the Complainant been true, it is reasonable to expect that she herself would have taken some positive action Further, the admission books for the relevant period show that, while the Refuge was not always full, Azmir was not, as alleged, the only resident for a six month period. (7) Patronising Behaviour The Complainant asserts that her behaviour was often patronised while she was working at the Refuge and relies on a number of incidents to support her assertion. These incidents primarily relate to Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent. The Complainant also points to particular sections of the evidence given by the Second and Third Respondents to demonstrate her assertion that she was treated in a patronising manner. Although we have given very careful consideration to all the incidents referred to by Ms Keys, we are not satisfied that any of them demonstrate that the Complainant was patronised in the manner alleged. The primary incidents are discussed below. (i) The Complainant said that, on 16 February 1989, a friend delivered an important message to her at the Refuge. When she came back into the Refuge building, she said Ms Coleman said to her: "We don't want people coming to the door. You will have to let your friend know that you cannot have visitors here." She contended that she was afforded differential treatment because she had seen family, friends and male partners of other workers at the Refuge. Ms Hanna submits that this claim is vexatious. Ms Coleman gave evidence that in or about 1989 the Complainant advertised in the Illawarra Daily Mercury for a "male companion" and she brought the advertisements into the Refuge. When she discovered that the Complainant had given the Refuge as a contact point, she told the Complainant not to give out the Refuge's telephone number. She said she later explained to her that it was to ensure that women and children at the Refuge were physically secure. She also said that the Refuge has a silent telephone number and that, when the number is answered, no identification is made of the fact that it is a Refuge. The Complainant denied that she had ever advertised in the Illawarra Daily Mercury for a "male companion" and said the friend who had visited her at the Refuge was a female. She maintained that she had only divulged the telephone number of the Refuge to her family and one close friend. Clearly, the accounts given by Ms Coleman and the Complainant are totally at odds with each other. Taking into consideration the unfavourable view we have formed of the Complainant's credit, we prefer the account given by Ms Coleman. (ii) The Complainant said that, on the occasion of the Refuge Christmas party on 21 December 1989, she, along with others, was tested on the breathalyser by a Sergeant of Police who was attending the party. Although the sergeant said she was "okay to drive", Ms Coleman said to her in front of a number of people, "If you drive your car home, you will have no job to come back to". She alleges she was afforded differential treatment because Ms Coleman did not make similar threats to any other workers who attended the party. Ms Coleman said that, on the occasion in question, to which local police officers had been invited, she observed that the Complainant had been drinking alcohol from lunch time and appeared to be intoxicated as she was lying on the floor wriggling around, talking loudly and dancing provocatively. The Complainant denied this and said that she had been drinking at the Christmas party so as to avoid being ridiculed by her co-workers for not drinking. Ms Coleman said that one of the police officers who was present asked the Complainant if she was "okay to drive", She said the Second Respondent then asked her whether she wanted to endanger her job. This evidence was corroborated by the Second Respondent. Ms Coleman conceded that she had warned the Complainant not to drive but said she had done so because she considered her state of intoxication was such that it was dangerous for her to drive. In fact, she said that one of the police officers who was present drove the Complainant's car home. Ms Coleman also conceded that the Complainant was the only worker to have been given this warning but she said that all of the other workers had left their cars at home. On balance, we accept the account given by Ms Coleman (iii) The Complainant said that, on one occasion, when she was helping a resident of the Refuge complete a Social Security form, she was told by Ms Coleman to leave it because she didn't know what it was all about. Ms Coleman's evidence was that she had mistakenly thought the form was a Department of Housing form but, upon realising her mistake, she had apologised to the Complainant at the time. We accept this explanation. (iv) Treatment of the Complainant by the Second and Third Respondents Ms Keys relied on a number of passages of the transcript to demonstrate the Complainant's assertion that she was treated in a patronising manner by the Second and Third Respondents. These passages reveal that the Complainant's respective relationships with the Second and Third Respondents were initially close but started to sour some time in 1989. Both Respondents deny that they ever treated the Complainant in a patronising manner. We accept their denials and we do not consider that the examples relied upon by Ms Keys, the most significant of which are discussed below, demonstrate that the treatment of the Complainant was patronising. Ÿ On one occasion, when the Complainant brought a photograph of her mother to work, the Second Respondent said the Complainant commented that her mother had changed in appearance and then made the derogatory remark, "Look at her now, she is fat". The Second Respondent said she replied, "Laila, you should be ashamed to speak about your mother like that". It is not disputed that, prior to the souring of their relationship in 1989, the Complainant had displayed affection towards the Second Respondent and had told various people that she considered her to be like a mother to her. Similarly, the Second Respondent said she felt as if the Complainant could have been her own daughter. She also said she had twin daughters, both of whom were adopted and of European descent, and that she felt she would have treated them in the same way if they had made such a remark. Ms Uhr expressed the view that the Second Respondent had a soft spot for the Complainant and seemed to favour her over other workers. Ÿ On another occasion, the Second Respondent said that the Complainant asked her to correct a paper she had done for an English course she was undertaking at the time. She said the Complainant asked her to correct it very honestly and not to make any allowances for her being a friend or a workmate. When she gave her a mark of 6 out of 10, she said the Complainant became very angry and said, "Give me the paper back darling, you don't know what you're doing and I'm sorry I even asked you". The Second Respondent said she had corrected the paper as she would have corrected a child's test paper. We can readily understand why the Complainant felt offended when she was given a mark out of 10 for her paper. However, while we consider that the Second Respondent could have handled the issue more sensitively, given the nature of her relationship with the Complainant, we do not find that the incident supports the assertion that the Complainant was treated in a patronising manner. Ÿ The Third Respondent gave evidence that she had offered to take the Complainant shopping to buy some personal things for her and said she felt their relationship was close enough for her to be able to make such an offer. When they went shopping together, she said the Complainant was grateful and quite emotional and she told her, "No-one, not even my mother, has taken me shopping before". Although the Complainant denied saying this, we accept the account given by the Third Respondent. It follows from the above analysis that we are not satisfied that the Complainant was either patronised or afforded differential treatment in the manner alleged. In any event, in the absence of other evidence, we are not satisfied that the alleged patronising treatment of the Complainant was on the ground of her race. (8) The Complainant's Accent The Complainant said that, on several occasions, Ms Coleman told her she could not do Court Support work because her accent was "too thick" and got "in the way". Ms Coleman denied this and said that she had never made any comment to the Complainant about her accent. We had no difficulty understanding the Complainant when she gave evidence before us; nor did we find her accent to be particularly pronounced. We do not accept that the Complainant was precluded from doing Court Support work because of her accent. In fact, she herself said she had attended Court to assist a woman named Yasmina, who was an Egyptian of the Muslim faith and a resident of the Refuge. Further, it was the unchallenged evidence that the only Refuge worker whose usual job included attending and assisting at Court was Ms Holz. We accept that she had been specifically employed by the Refuge to undertake this task as she had considerable expertise in, and knowledge of, the area. The evidence also shows that, with the exception of Ms Uhr and Ms Betts, who did not attend Court at all, other workers, including the Complainant, only undertook Court Support work on specific occasions. Taking these matters into account, together with the fact that Court days were usually on Wednesdays and Fridays, when the Complainant was working at the Department of Social Security, we do not find that the Complainant was afforded differential treatment in the manner alleged. (9) Christmas Holidays The Complainant alleges that she was afforded differential treatment because she was forced to work over the Christmas period without being given any leave. She said that, in about mid-November 1989, she applied for unpaid leave from 20-28 December for the first time since commencing work with the Refuge. Although she was initially given approval, she said that on 18 December 1989, following the resignation of another Refuge worker, Ms Coleman said to her: "You will have to work between Christmas and New Year. If you don't work throughout the Christmas period, you will have no job to come back to." Ms Coleman described the events quite differently. She said that, on 29 November 1998, the Complainant asked her if she could have a couple of days off over Christmas and whether she [ie, Ms Coleman] could do her "on-call". She said she replied "No", but suggested that she ask someone else. In response to this suggestion, she said the Complainant began talking in an hysterical manner and then ran into the back yard in tears before coming back into the room. Ms Coleman's account of the alleged dispute was corroborated by the Third Respondent. She said the Complainant became very aggressive and she was screaming and yelling. Ms Uhr gave evidence to a similar effect. The Complainant denied that she had behaved in the manner described by the Respondents' witnesses and said that the dispute did not arise until about 19 December 1989. On balance, we accept the evidence given by the Respondents' witnesses and we do not find that Ms Coleman threatened the Complainant, in the manner alleged, if she didn't work over the Christmas period. The oral and written evidence relied on by the First Respondent shows that it had been standard Refuge practice and policy for many years for Refuge workers not to take their holidays or to have time off during the Christmas holiday period. Further, the records show that various workers were on duty in accordance with the ongoing roster over the Christmas period and that Ms Coleman, the Second and Third Respondents and other Refuge workers had all worked at some stage over a Christmas period. It follows, from our analysis to date, that, pursuant to s.8(2)(a), we are not satisfied that the Complainant was treated less favourably than the Second Respondent in relation to the terms and conditions of her employment. We now turn to discuss the Complainant's claim that the First Respondent's alleged failure to provide her with proper grievance resolution processes prior to dismissing her constitutes a breach of s.8(2)(c). Inadequate Grievance Resolution Processes As we understand the Complainant's case, the Respondents' failure to provide her with an adequate dispute resolution mechanism constitutes a detriment within the meaning of s.8(2)(c). She contends that she was subjected to this detriment on the ground of her race or, in the alternative, on the ground of characteristics generally imputed to persons of her race. Ms Keys submits that the Complainant sought redress of the disadvantage she perceived she was suffering in the terms and conditions of her employment vis a vis the Second Respondent. The Complainant's evidence suggests that she initially became concerned about her terms and conditions of employment in February 1989 when she discovered that the migrant worker position was held by the Second Respondent and that the Refuge was not using all its funded hours. Upon learning that the funding body had changed the guidelines for the migrant worker position, the Complainant may well have questioned the Second Respondent's credentials for the position. However, we do not accept that she clearly identified this as a grievance until the special meeting held on 22 March 1990. The only grievances which she appears to have identified with any clarity prior to March 1990 are the First Respondent's failure to allocate additional hours to her and the alleged misappropriation of Refuge funds by Ms Coleman, Mr Murphy and the Second and Third Respondents. In relation to the issue of additional hours, we accept that the Complainant's major concern was to be given sufficient hours to enable her to become a permanent employee. At the time, she needed 7 additional hours to attain this status. It is the Respondents' case that the Complainant wanted Ms Coleman's full time position and that, in an attempt to accomplish her wish, she embarked upon a course of disruptive and abusive conduct which included making unfounded and unwarranted attacks on the integrity of Ms Coleman, Mr Murphy and the Second and Third Respondents. While we are unable to say whether the Complainant specifically wanted Ms Coleman's position, we are satisfied that she wanted sufficient hours to be able to secure a permanent position, preferably on a full time basis, with an entitlement to holiday pay, sick pay, long service leave and superannuation. As a casual worker, she received none of these benefits. Similarly, the records show that other comparable casual workers such as Ms Holz and Ms McCormack did not receive them either. We are satisfied that the reason the Complainant was not offered additional hours until Ms King's resignation in December 1989 was because none were available. The Complainant said she was denied Ms Bourke's hours when she resigned in 1988. However, we accept that she was not given them because she was not a qualified child care worker. When Ms King resigned in December 1989, we accept that the Complainant was offered five additional hours per week on Saturdays but declined them on the basis that she would not have become permanent. Significantly, the evidence discloses that no other workers were given additional hours during 1988 and 1989. In fact, when a quarterly funding cheque was withheld, the Complainant, unlike other Refuge workers, was not asked to reduce her hours. Aside from the Complainant's requests for additional hours, we find the first occasion upon which her grievances concerning her terms and conditions of employment were raised was at a Refuge meeting held on 13 March 1990. The evidence discloses that this meeting was held at the request of Ms Uhr and the Second Respondent in order to discuss the Complainant's allegations of corruption. While the minutes describe the meeting as "Lailas' (sic) Allegations of Corruption", they suggest that the allegations were not discussed. Rather, they show that the meeting discussed the Complainant's concerns in relation to the following matters: ° The Refuge's failure to allocate her additional hours. ° Underpayment of her wages. ° The Court Support Worker position and the Refuge's failure to allow her to attend Court. The minutes state that these alleged grievances were re-hashed for hours with nothing positive or any resolution coming out of it. The minutes also show that any suggestions put forward by the Respondents to resolve these grievances were ridiculed by the Complainant. For example, in relation to the issue of additional hours, Ms Coleman's proposal that all the staff "throw in" their hours and start again on equal hours met with the response, "While her Majesty [is] sitting in that chair things won't be any better". In relation to the Complainant's wages, the minutes show that Ms Coleman said she was unaware that the Complainant was being underpaid but would make enquiries and do something about it if that were the case. The minutes also show that the Complainant said she did not want Ms Holz's position and, further, that it was explained to her that Court days were usually on Wednesdays and Fridays, when she was working at the Department of Social Security. The grievances outlined by the Complainant on 13 March 1990 were discussed again at the special meeting held on 22 March 1990. In addition, grievances relating to the following issues were raised by the Complainant: ° The position of migrant worker. ° Superannuation. ° Inadequate employment practices and procedures. The minutes of the special meeting show that Mr Werner made a number of recommendations to redress the Complainant's grievances. They included: ° Work formerly carried out by the Court Support worker should be undertaken by all Refuge workers. ° The Refuge was underutilising its funded hours and, accordingly, 19 additional hours should be allocated to staff members. ° Casual workers were being underpaid and should have their hourly rate increased to $14.43 per hour. ° The migrant worker position should be filled in accordance with the Department's guidelines. ° Issues relating to superannuation and other conditions of employment, e.g., "on call" allowances, should be clarified. It is clear from the minutes of the special meeting that the Complainant did have a number of genuine grievances concerning her terms and conditions of employment. It is also clear that, as a consequence of Mr Werner's recommendations, these grievances were partially addressed. However, Ms Keys submits that this does not provide the Respondents with an adequate explanation for failing to provide the Complainant with a proper grievance resolution mechanism, particularly in circumstances where she was ultimately dismissed. Ms Coleman gave evidence that, by convening the meetings on 13 and 22 March 1990, the Refuge had acted in accordance with its written policy concerning the resolution of grievances raised by staff members. She said the Refuge had also acted in accordance with this policy by participating in the Regional Dispute Committee meeting held at Nowra on 6 April 1990. At that meeting it was found, inter alia, that the Refuge members had never made a real attempt to resolve the conflict between themselves and the Complainant in a fair and equitable manner. It was recommended at the meeting that the Complainant be immediately reinstated and that an outside facilitator/conflict resolution service be employed by the Refuge to resolve the conflict: see the minutes of the meeting held by the First Respondent on 6 April 1990. The Refuge's reasons for rejecting these recommendations appear to be based on its irreconcilable differences with the Complainant arising from her abusive behaviour and her unfounded allegations of corruption against Ms Coleman, Mr Murphy and the Second and Third Respondents. The corruption allegations were discussed at the meetings held on 13 and 22 March 1990 and were also communicated by the Complainant to Inspector McCloughlan shortly after the meeting on 13 March. Notwithstanding the Complainant's attempts to portray these allegations in a different light, we are satisfied that the allegations communicated to Inspector McCloughlan were as follows: ° Ms Coleman and the Second and Third Respondents were being dishonest in the financial matters pertaining to the Refuge. ° Their holiday to the USA in 1986 had been paid for out of Refuge funds. ° They were in collusion with Mr Murphy. We accept that Inspector McCloughlan, first, advised the Complainant to speak to the Police about these matters and, secondly, arranged for the Department to examine the Refuge's financial returns. We also accept that both the Police and the Department found the Complainant's allegations to be baseless and that, as a consequence, they took no action on them. The fact that they found no substance in the allegations does not reflect favourably on the Complainant's bona fides . The meetings held on 13 and 22 March 1990 show that the Respondents had made some attempts to resolve the Complainant's grievances. While these attempts were partially successful, we accept that, as of the date of the Complainant's dismissal, the Respondents had not fully explored other avenues for resolving her outstanding grievances by, for example, referring the dispute to a Regional Dispute Committee. However, given the circumstances, we do not find that there is a causal link between the Respondents' failure to do so and the Complainant's race. Rather, we are satisfied that the Complainant's disruptive and abusive conduct, including her unfounded allegations of corruption, had escalated to the point where the Refuge workers could no longer work with her, as evidenced by the decision taken by staff members on 19 March 1990 not to work with her, and the events preceding her dismissal on 27 March 1990. We discuss this conduct in greater detail later in relation to the Complainant's dismissal. For present purposes, it is sufficient to state that we are satisfied that this conduct: ° was contrary to the Refuge's policies and ideologies; ° caused distress and tension to the Complainant's co-workers at the Refuge; ° adversely affected the proper running of the Refuge; ° adversely affected residents and their children in the sense that the Complainant's co-workers were being upset on a regular basis; and ° comprised physical and verbal threats to the Complainant's co-workers. Taking all the relevant matters into account, we are not satisfied that the Respondents' failure to provide the Complainant with adequate dispute resolution processes was on the ground of her race; nor are we satisfied that there is any substance in the Complainant's alternative claim that she was denied the benefit of these processes on the ground of characteristics generally imputed to persons of her race. In relation to the Complainant's alternative claim, Ms Keys submitted that persons of the Complainant's race were generally imputed to be unreasonable, irrational, overly emotional, difficult to understand and threateningly aggressive. She further submitted that the treatment afforded the Complainant was based on these imputed characteristics of her race. In support, she relied on the decision of the Equal Opportunity Board (Vic.) in Fares v Box Hill College of TAFE and Ors (1992) EOC 92-391. In that case, the Board found that the Complainant had received less favourable treatment on the ground that she and other NESB women were imputed, inter alia, to be generally more emotional, highly strung, demanding, long winded and overly conscientious in their work. However, the present case is very different. Even assuming for present purposes that the Respondents regarded the Complainant as having the alleged characteristics, there is no evidence before us that these characteristics are generally imputed to either persons of the Complainant's racial origin or other NESB persons. Further, the undisputed evidence is that Azmir and Yasmina were regarded as having none of the alleged characteristics. On the contrary, they were regarded by the Respondents as pleasant, reasonable and rational which, interestingly, were characteristics the Respondents had also ascribed to the Complainant prior to the commencement of her disruptive behaviour. We now turn to discuss the Complainant's claim that she was dismissed on the ground of her race or characteristics generally imputed to persons of her race, in contravention of s.8(2)(c). Although the Respondents did not give the Complainant any reasons for her dismissal on 27 March 1990, they maintain that she was dismissed for her disruptive and abusive behaviour, including her unfounded allegations of corruption, which she had been warned about verbally many times. Ms Keys submits that the Respondents' evidence of the events leading to and surrounding the Complainant's dismissal is generally contradictory and unconvincing. She further submits that the Respondents have misrepresented and exaggerated the allegations of misconduct against the Complainant so as to mask the real reasons for dismissing her, namely her race and the fact that she had made allegations prior to her dismissal that the Respondents had unlawfully discriminated against her. We discuss the second factor later under the heading "Victimisation". In support of her submission, Ms Keys relies on the following matters: ° Although it was agreed at the meeting held on 22 March 1990 that all Refuge workers were to have their hours reviewed, the Complainant was dismissed before this occurred. ° The possibility of the Complainant being dismissed was discussed in her absence at the Refuge meeting held on 26 March 1990 before she had resumed duty after the meeting on 22 March 1990. ° Although the Second Respondent said she received a telephone call from the Complainant before the commencement of work on 27 March 1990, she did not advise the Complainant that the hours of all Refuge workers were being recalculated by the accountant in preparation for discussion at a meeting which was to be held on 29 March 1990. ° No reasons for the Complainant's dismissal were provided in the letter of termination. ° No written warnings were even given to the Complainant. ° No proper grievance resolution processes were provided to the Complainant prior to her dismissal. ° Although the Second Respondent occupied the position of migrant worker which was central to the Complainant's dispute, she was responsible for the Complainant's dismissal. ° The Respondents had no intention of reconsidering their decision to dismiss the Complainant, as evidenced by the engagement of an industrial consultant to defend their actions and their refusal to be bound by the Regional Dispute Committee meeting held in Nowra on 6 April 1990. Ms Hanna, on the other hand, submits that the Respondents were fully justified in dismissing the Complainant on the ground of her misconduct and that the Complainant's race had no bearing whatsoever on this decision. The Respondents' witnesses referred to many incidents in the last 6-9 months of the Complainant's employment where the Complainant's conduct was abusive and disruptive. Although the Complainant denied that these incidents had taken place, we are satisfied that they generally occurred as stated by the Respondents' witnesses. Further, we do not find that the Respondents have misrepresented and exaggerated the seriousness of this conduct or that the Respondents' evidence of the events leading to the Complainant's dismissal was generally contradictory or unconvincing. Admittedly, there were some minor inconsistencies in the evidence but this did not affect the overall reliability and credibility of the various accounts given by the Respondents' witnesses. We discuss below some of the more important incidents relating to the Complainant's conduct. Relevant Incidents ° Ms Coleman gave evidence that in about June 1989, she suggested at a Regional meeting that the Refuge workers all surrender some of their hours to enable an Aboriginal worker to be employed. She said the Complainant became very angry and said that the hours belonged to her. She also said that the Complainant then stiffened and yelled that Aboriginal women were all sluts, to which she replied: "I consider that to be gross misconduct and I will not have that said about any woman that comes to this refuge." The Second Respondent gave evidence which was generally consistent with this account, although she was unable to specify the date of the incident. ° Ms Coleman gave evidence that in the latter part of 1989, the Complainant said to her, "I know you took funds from the refuge and went to America in 1986". She said she denied this but the Complainant replied that she knew for a fact that together with the Second and Third Respondents, she had used Refuge funds to go to America. She said she warned the Complainant to be very careful because she was libelling 3 people and she told her that if she continued to state such things, it would be gross misconduct. ° Ms Coleman also said that at the meeting held on 22 March 1990, the Complainant started yelling at her and said, "you had no right to call a meeting". She said she then continued to yell at her saying, "You are British, you should be dead" and "You have a second set of books, you and Peter Murphy". She also said that the more the Complainant screamed the more frightened she became, particularly when she issued her with the threat, "You will go to gaol". In response to this behaviour, she said she warned the Complainant that if she continued to make false allegations it would be considered gross misconduct. ° Ms Coleman said that just before Christmas 1989, the Complainant referred to a Phillipino woman who was a resident of the Refuge and said that she shouldn't be in the Refuge because Phillipino women were all sluts and whores. She said she warned her not to speak about anyone in the Refuge like that and that, if she continued to do so, she would consider it to be gross misconduct. The Second Respondent also gave evidence that the Complainant had said to her on several occasions: "All Phillipino women are prostitutes and should not be here. I won't work with them." The Third Respondent also gave evidence to a similar effect. ° Ms Holz, Ms Betts and Ms McCormack all gave evidence that the Complainant had verbally abused them. By way of illustration, Ms Holz said that on one occasion the Complainant screamed at her and accused her of taking hours that belonged to her and of being a snob because she worked with solicitors. Ms Betts gave evidence that the Complainant constantly made derogatory and insulting comments about her clothing and her dress sense, and accused her of having a "butch image" and of being incompetent as a general worker. Ms McCormack said that the Complainant verbally abused her and said that she shouldn't be working at the Refuge. ° The Second Respondent gave evidence of the Complainant having raised her fist at her after a Refuge meeting which had been called by her to discuss the Complainant's allegations of corruption. She said that after the meeting she said to the Complainant, "Laila, I don't know what you are on about", whereupon the Complainant said, "I could smack people in the face that say that to me". She said the Complainant leapt from her chair and came at her with a clenched fist, then shook the fist in her face as she yelled abuse at her. Ms Uhr corroborated this account and said that she believed that the Complainant was going to strike the Second Respondent. We accept that the Second Respondent was extremely frightened and felt threatened by this conduct. Although the Second Respondent was unable to recall when the incident had taken place, it is likely that it occurred on 13 March 1990, as suggested by Ms Uhr's evidence and the Refuge Minute books. This finding is also consistent with the Second Respondent's evidence that she warned the Complainant on 13 March 1990 by saying: "If anyone else on staff had behaved the way you have over past months they would have been sacked long ago." The Complainant's Dismissal The Second Respondent gave evidence that the Complainant telephoned her before work on 27 March 1990, and told her that she had worked out a new roster for Refuge workers, which gave her and two other workers 35 hours per week. The Second Respondent said she replied that the proposed roster was not very fair on the rest of the workers. Although she only recalled it in cross-examination, she said she also told the Complainant that a meeting had been arranged for 29 March 1990, to discuss the new hours and that the Refuge workers had all decided to throw in their hours so that they each worked about 25 hours per week. She said the Complainant replied, "That's no good to me, I'll still have to have a second job". She further said that after the Complainant arrived at work on 27 March 1990, the Complainant said to her in an abusive manner that she wanted more hours and that Ms Coleman and the accountant were stealing money. She said she was distressed and upset, and she started to feel physically ill as a consequence of the Complainant's conduct. She also said that she told the Complainant that if her abusive conduct continued, something could happen. She said that after discussing the matter with the Third Respondent, she told the Complainant: "As a result of your continuing bad conduct I think we're going to have to terminate you". She also said that after the Complainant tried unsuccessfully to dissuade her from dismissing her, she typed out a letter of dismissal. We are satisfied that this occurred after 1.00pm, because both Ms Betts and the Third Respondent were certain that the Complainant was not dismissed until after Ms Betts had arrived at work at about 1.00pm. According to Ms Betts, both the Second and Third Respondents appeared to be very upset. She said that she had told the Third Respondent that the Complainant should be dismissed because of her behaviour. The Third Respondent said that on the morning of 27 March 1990, the Complainant abused her by questioning whether she had anything to offer the Refuge. Consistent with the evidence given by the Second Respondent, she said that at the time the Complainant was watching television rather than attending to her employment duties. She also said that the Complainant told her that Ms Coleman and the accountant had two sets of books and had stolen money from the Refuge. Consistent with the account given by the Second Respondent, she said that the Second Respondent appeared to be very upset and although she had initially expressed the view that she could not dismiss the Complainant, she returned a short time later and said, "I have just sacked Ms Hafez". The Third Respondent also said that at the Complainant's request, she had signed the Complainant's letter of dismissal. Like the Second Respondent, she said that the Complainant initially refused to leave the premises but eventually left after the Second Respondent said they would have to call the Police. The Complainant's account of the immediate events surrounding her dismissal was totally contrary to that given by the Respondents' witnesses. She said that within an hour of her arrival at work on 27 March 1990, she was approached by both the Second and Third Respondents and that the Second Respondent said: "Our Articles of Association say that it takes two members of the Board to make a quorum and there are two of us - you're out, sacked, fired." She also said that after the Second Respondent handed the letter of dismissal to her, she was told to leave the key and get out or the Police would be called to drag her out. She denied that she refused to leave the Refuge. In relation to the events of 27 March 1990, we are satisfied that the accounts given by the Second and Third Respondents and Ms Betts can be safely relied upon. Admittedly there were some minor inconsistencies in their evidence, particularly in relation to the order of events. However, this is hardly surprising given that they were endeavouring to recall events which happened a long time ago and which obviously caused them a considerable degree of distress. Findings Based on our analysis of the events preceding the Complainant's dismissal, we find that the Complainant was dismissed on the ground of misconduct. We do not find that either her race or characteristics generally imputed to persons of her race were operative factors in the decision to dismiss her. What emerges from the evidence given by the Respondent's witnesses is that the Complainant's disruptive behaviour and abusive conduct escalated to the point where the Second and Third Respondents considered that they had no alternative but to dismiss her. Notwithstanding the absence of any written warnings, we are satisfied that the Complainant was warned on numerous occasions by both Ms Coleman and the Second Respondent about her unacceptable conduct. On one level, it is extraordinary that this conduct was tolerated for so long. However, a moment's reflection on the former closeness of the Complainant's relationship with some of the Refuge workers, particularly the Second Respondent, brings into sharp focus the difficulty of the task of dismissing her. Clearly, it would have been preferable for an independent grievance resolution process to have been provided to the Complainant well prior to her dismissal, particularly in view of the agreement reached at the Refuge meeting on 26 March 1990 to dismiss her if she continued to harass Refuge workers upon her return to work after the special meeting on 22 March 1990. However, we do not find that the Respondents' failure to do so contravened s.8(2)(c); nor do we find that any of the other matters relied on by the Complainant, either taken alone or in combination, support an inference of unlawful racial discrimination in breach of s.8(2)(c). Clearly too, the Complainant's unfounded corruption allegations and the total breakdown of harmonious working relations between the Complainant and the majority of the Refuge workers made it unlikely that the Respondents would reconsider their decision to dismiss her. It follows from our analysis of the evidence to date that we are not satisfied that the Respondents' conduct contravened s.8(2)(c). Accordingly, we dismiss the complaint of unlawful racial discrimination. We now turn to discuss the victimisation complaint. B. VICTIMISATION Relevant Provisions of the Act Section 50 of the Act provides:- (1) "It is unlawful for a person ("the discriminator") to subject another person ("the person victimised") to any detriment in any circumstances on the ground that the person victimised has - (a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act; (b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any person against the discriminator or any other person under this Act; (c) alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which, whether or not the allegation so states, would amount to a contravention of this Act; or (d) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act in relation to the discriminator or any other person, or by reason that the discriminator knows that the person victimised intends to do any of those things, or suspects that the person victimised has done, or intends to do, any of them. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the subjecting of a person to a detriment by reason of an allegation made by the person if the allegation was false and not made in good faith. The wording of s. 50(1) makes it clear that the person victimised must be subjected to a detriment "on the ground that" she has made a complaint or an allegation of the type set out in paragraphs (a) - (d). As was pointed out in Bogie v The University of Western Sydney (1990) EOC 92 - 313 at p.78, 145, the clear legislative purpose of s. 50(1) is to ensure that victims of discrimination shall not be deterred from doing any of the acts set out in paras. (a) - (d) by the fear that they may be further victimised. In the present case, the Complainant seeks to bring the alleged conduct within para (c) only. As to the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase, "on the ground that", which appears in s. 50(1), we have found it helpful to derive assistance from the cases which dealt with the comparable phrase, "on the ground of", in the context of discrimination on substantive grounds, prior to the insertion of s.4A of the Act. (Although it is doubtful whether it applies to the victimisation provisions of the Act, this amendment provides that if an act is done for two or more reasons and one of the reasons consists of unlawful discrimination against a person, whether or not it is the dominant or a substantial reason for doing the act, then the act is taken to be done for that reason.) Prior to s.4A coming into effect on 8 August 1994, this Tribunal had consistently interpreted the phrase, "on the ground of", as requiring the aggrieved person to prove that the prohibited reason was a significant reason for the less favourable treatment. When considering the phrase "on the ground of" in relation to unlawful sex discrimination, Mathews DCJ (as she then was) in O'Callaghan v Loder (1984) EOC 92-022 appears to have used the phrases, "a substantially contributing factor", "a significant factor" and a "causally operative effect", almost interchangeably. In Waterhouse v Bell (1991) 25 NSWLR 99; (1991) EOC 92-376, Clarke JA preferred the phrase "an operative ground" and said (at NSWLR p.106, EOC pp. 78, 588 - 78, 589): "In the event, however, that the Tribunal decides that there are two grounds for the action or decision, one which does and one which does not fall within [the prohibition] then, as it seems to me, a case of discrimination on the ground of marital status will have been made out. That is because less favourable treatment was accorded on the ground, amongst others, of, for example, marital status. The fact that there was another ground for the discriminatory action is, in this context, of no importance." We consider the phrase, "an operative ground", to be equally applicable to the victimisation provisions of the Act. However, as the Tribunal observed in Bhattacharya v Department of Public Works (1984) EOC 92-117 at p.76, 133: "The critical question in such cases is often whether the complainant has proved the necessary causal connection between the respondent's conduct and the detrimental consequences alleged." As mentioned previously, the Complainant maintains that each of the Respondents subjected her to detrimental treatment in breach of s. 50(1) by dismissing her after she had made allegations that the Respondents had unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of her race. Ms Hanna submits that the complaint pressed by the Complainant is tantamount to an abuse of process. Accordingly, she urges the Tribunal to dismiss the complaint pursuant to s.111. In support of this submission, she contends that when the Complainant's abusive and disruptive conduct did not have the desired effect of removing Ms Coleman and the Second and Third Respondents from the Refuge, the Complainant complained to the Board for the purpose of achieving her goal of securing the Administrator's position. Ms Hanna further submits that to utilise legislation for an ulterior purpose or to gain an advantage which she would otherwise not be entitled to constitutes an abuse of process: see Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23 at pp. 71-72 and Gill v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190 at p.211. The evidence discloses that some time in early to mid March 1990, the Complainant contacted an officer of the Board and discussed with him various matters relating to her employment at the Refuge. She did not, however, make a formal complaint at that time. Inspector McCloughlan gave evidence that in about mid March 1990, the officer from the Board telephoned her and told her, inter alia, that the Complainant had been to see him in relation to her employment conditions at the Refuge and had alleged, inter alia, that the management of the Refuge was "cooking the books". In a subsequent interview with the Complainant two days later, Inspector McCloughlan said the Complainant told her about her concerns and alleged that she had been discriminated against on the ground of her race. She further said that she spoke to Ms Coleman a few days later and communicated the Complainant's "accusations" to her, including those involving the Second and Third Respondents. Thus, even prior to the Complainant raising her allegations of racial discrimination at the special meeting on 22 March 1990, the Respondents must have been well aware that the Complainant had complained (although not officially at that stage) to an independent investigative body that she had been subjected to racial discrimination in the course of her employment. Findings However, we do not find that the Complainant has established the necessary causal link between the making of these allegations and her dismissal. We accept the Respondents' denials that the making of these allegations did not in any way influence their decision to dismiss the Complainant. As mentioned earlier in this decision, we are satisfied that the Complainant was dismissed on 27 March 1990 on the ground of her misconduct. While we readily acknowledge that it is possible for a decision to be based on more than one ground, we find that in the circumstances of the present case the only ground of the Complainant's dismissal was her misconduct. Accordingly, we do not find that the victimisation complaint has been substantiated. We do not find, however, that the bringing of the complaint amounts to an abuse of process. As mentioned previously, we are unable to find that the Complainant specifically wanted the Administrator's position, as distinct from a position which attracted permanency. Moreover, we are not satisfied that the Complainant utilised the provisions of the Act for either this reason or some other ulterior purpose. Accordingly, we propose to dismiss the complaint pursuant to s.113(1)(a) rather than s.111(1). Costs By agreement, to date the parties have not addressed the Tribunal on the question of costs. Pursuant to s.114 of the Act the general rule is that each party to an inquiry shall pay their own costs unless the circumstances justify a departure from this rule. Should the Respondents wish to make an application for costs, the Tribunal directs that they contact the Registry within 7 days from today. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.