CITATION: GA v The University of Sydney [2010] NSWADT 76 DIVISION: General Division APPLICANT GA PARTIES: RESPONDENT The University of Sydney FILE NUMBER: 093131, 093192,093193 HEARING DATES: On the papers SUBMISSIONS CLOSED: 5 October 2009 DATE OF DECISION: 23 March 2010 BEFORE: Molony P - Judicial Member CATCHWORDS: Freedom of information – access to documents – amendment Personal information and privacy - amendment LEGISLATION CITED : Freedom of Information Act 1989 Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Commissioner of Police v Perrin (1993) 31 NSWLR 606 Crewdson v Central Sydney AHS [2002] NSWCA 345 EG v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 150 GA v The University of Sydney [2009] NSWADT 230 Martin v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 23 News Corporation Ltd v NCSC (1984) 52 ALR CASES CITED: Re Pfizer Pty Ltd and Department of Health, Housing and Community Services (1993) 30 ALD 647 Re Stewart v Department of Transport (1993) 1 QAR 225 Re Williams and the Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (1985) ALD 219 Simring v Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWADT 331 State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel [1998] 1 VR 102 Tredinnick -v- Wentworth Area Health Service [2000] NSWADT 172 WL v Randwick City Council [2007] NSW ADTAP 58 Woods v Chief Executive Officer, State Rail Authority [2002] NSWADT 253 APPLICANT In person REPRESENTATION: RESPONDENT S Heesom, solicitor ORDERS: 1.GA's application on file number 093131 is dismissed as misconceived under s 73(5)(g)(ii) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 2.GA's applications on file numbers 093192 and 093192 are dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear them. REASONS FOR DECISION Background 1 In these reasons the names of private individuals, and other information which might identify them, have been anonymised so as to preserve the privacy of their personal affairs. 2 For some years GA has been in dispute with the University concerning its cancellation of his enrolment in its Graduate Medical Program in 2004. The background to and course of that dispute are more fully discussed in GA v The University of Sydney [2009] NSWADT 230 at [2] – [25]. 3 On 16 March 2009, GA made a request under the Freedom of Information Act 1989 ('the FOIA') for access to documents held by the University. He subsequently amended this by an email dated 30 March 2009. The amended request read: "This request is a formal request for information made under the relevant Freedom of Information (F0I) legislation. The following information is sought [1] The information that shows [GA] has applied to the admissions process for the University of Sydney medical program and indicates by a crossed box [GA] has a first round offer to the University of Sydney Medical Program/Course. [2] The information that shows that a first round offer confirms an offer of a 'Standard place' on a document dated 18 October 2000, signed by the Dean of Medicine Professor Leader. [3] The academic information used to show. [GA] met the requirements to progress to the 2nd Year of the University of Sydney Medical Program. [4] The academic information used to show [GA] met the requirements to progress to the 3rd Year of the University of Sydney Medical Program. [5] The information that shows the selection criteria for MRBSS places will be the same as for standard places. [6] The academic information that shows [GA] has met the requirements to complete and progress from his first integrated clinical attachment (ICA) of the 3rd year of Medicine at Royal Princess Alfred Hospital to the next ICA [7] The academic information that shows [GA]' has met the requirements to complete and progress from his second integrated clinical attachment (ICA) of the 3rd year of Medicine at Royal Princess Alfred Hospital to the next ICA [8] The academic information that shows [GA]' has met the requirements to complete and progress from his third integrated clinical attachment (ICA) of the 3rd year of Medicine at Royal Princess Alfred Hospital to the next ICA [9] The information that shows [GA] has at all times met the requirements of a independently fully funded HECS place, as prescribed by the Higher Education funding Act 1998 (Cth) for the entire duration of USYD medical degree. [10] The Information where the Dean of Medicine confirms to the Department of Health and Ageing that a person must first be offered a fully funded place to medicine before they can be given a contract to consider and that two weeks must be given to consider if they wish to enter a contract with the Commonwealth. 4 On 7 April 2009 the Acting Deputy Registrar of the University determined that request. He advised: "In accordance with the Act, the University has (in response to your earlier Freedom of Information (FOI) applications) previously supplied you with copies of its documents relevant to your application for and enrolment in the University of Sydney Graduate Medical Program. There are no further documents relevant to your current FOI application. The University does not admit any assumption made or implied in your FOI application." 5 On 16 April 2009, by email, GA sought to 'appeal' that decision, which request the University took as a request for internal review. "I appeal the FOI on the following basis - Any and all commentary of the University be redacted from the FOI response. The place for any commentary such as 'the University does not admit to any assumption implied in your FOI application' is not in an answer to a FOI application under the FOI Act. If the University wishes to supply a view it can not be part of a FOI communication. The FOI is not a vehicle for the University to put down it views in relation to anything I have or have not done or assumptions I have or have not made. … My FOI requires a provision or non provision of information. The University is limited to a binary choice. The University can only say, [a] 'we have the information here it is', or [b] 'we deny your FOI request because on this basis as provided by the Act' The 'assumptions' commentary of the University is irrelevant and only services 'to muddy' the waters by the University. Causing confusion or muddying the waters is antithetical to, and beyond the FOI Acts requirements and jurisdiction to given to respond to FOI requests. The FOI act clearly sets out an enumerated basis to deny or perform a FOI request. Beyond this basis to confirm or deny the FOI request as set out by the FOI Act, there is no provision for commentary of the University." 6 On 28 April 2009 the Deputy Registrar completed the internal review. She wrote: "As you are aware, section 34 of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 ('P01 Act') permits a person 'aggrieved by a determination made by an agency' to a review of the determination. Subsection 34(7) of the FOI Act defines the circumstances in which a person is considered to be 'aggrieved by a determination'. The University does not accept that you are a person 'aggrieved by a determination' for the purposes of subsection 34(7). The University has not refused to give you access to a document, or otherwise prevented you from accessing information held by the University. Notwithstanding, I have, in the interests of expediency, decided to review the determination of the Acting Deputy Registrar, dated 7 April 2009. 1 advise that I agree with [the Acting Deputy Registrar's] finding that the University has previously supplied you with copies of its documents relevant to your application for and enrolment in the University of Sydney Graduate Medical Program, and confirm that there are no further documents relevant to your 30 March 2009 application. I am, therefore, in agreement with [the Acting Deputy Registrar's] determination. I confirm [the Acting Deputy Registrar's] advice that the University does not admit any assumption made or implied in your 30 March 2009 application." 7 On 20 May 2009 GA made an application for external review of that decision on Tribunal file number 093131. 8 On 28 April 2009 GA, by email, sought to 'appeal' the Acting Deputy Registrar's letter of 7 April 2009. He did so in reliance on 'the amendment power' under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (the PPIPA). The focus of his 'appeal' was the statement that his FOI request contained assumptions or implications that the University did not accept. 9 On 4 May 2009 GA, by email, 'entirely replaced' that request with a similar request this time relying on the amendment powers contained in both the FOIA and the PPIPA. That new request read: I refer to my communication by email on the (sic) Tuesday, 28 April, 2009 12:16:49 PM This communication entirely replaces that communication (but this communication will not materially change any action taken to date, it practically enlarges jurisdiction) This is a formal request to amend the information about me supplied in the document the university supplied, holds and created in its reply to 'FOI 12/12A' I request under the material PIPA amendment and FOI amendment legisaitions (sic). I request on the following basis; The University can not establish, in fact that I made 'any assumption'. The University additionally can not in fact establish that I made any implication. Further In fact I did not make an assumption or implication, I requested particular information, which on every point the University confirmed under FOI law existed and was provided to me. For example; If I had been a full fee paying student, then the University would have had to deny that I they had any information that I was HECS funded, because in fact that information would not exist. Or, If I had failed 1st year or second year then there would be no information to held by the University to show that I had met the requirements to progress to the second of third year on the medical degree. Accordingly I am seeking that the FOI/F012A response have the sentences redacted such as 'the University does not admit to any assumption implied in your FOI application' Because this is misleading or incorrect. I have not used the word 'assumption' or 'implication' in my FOI request. It is the University making assumptions about fictitious assumptions, as I have made no assumptions. My FOI makes no assumption or implication it merely requires documents or information to be returned as identified by a set of criteria (scope). The University has confirmed that the information exists and has returned concordant information in every case. Even if it was the opinion of the author of FOI 12/12A that I had made assumptions or implications, an opinion can be misleading where the substratum of underlying facts show there is no basis for the opinion. In this case the facts confirmed by the university is that all the information I sought was held by the University. I simply asked for particular information and it was returned. Please send any response by PDF to this email address or I will arrange for pickup from the university-. I will bring in payment for both the appeal and internal review. I also include in this communication, here, request of a internal reviews should the appeals not be granted. I also note that the FOI appeal (non amendment powers) for foi 12/12A has been returned. I think it is in the interests of efficiency to have the 3 issue run together, so I also formally ask for internal review of that also and will furnish monies for that purpose" 10 On 12 May 2009 the Deputy Registrar responded. She treated GA's email as a request to amend her letter of 28 April 2009, as well as the Acting Deputy Registrar's letter, insofar as they referred to implications or assumption contained in GA's entail FOI request. She wrote: "The University does not accept that the FOI Determination and the FOI Review Determination, to the extent that you seek to have them amended, contain information concerning your 'personal affairs' or 'personal information' for the purposes of the FOI Act and PPIP Act respectively. Further, it is clear from relevant case law and the NSW FOI Manual that these amendment provisions are not intended as a means of reviewing previous determinations with which an applicant is dissatisfied. Paragraph 5.2.12 of the NSW FOI Manual states: The section can not be used to authorise or allow decisions of agencies to be changed, or for appeals against agencies' decisions to be made, under the guise of amending records. In other words, an application for amendment of documents should not be made where the sole intent of the application is to obtain an agency's admission that an earlier administrative decision is in error. It was never intended that the FOI Act provisions relating to the amendment of records could be used as an administrative appeals mechanism about the decisions of agencies. It is not intended as a means of reviewing previous determinations with which the applicant is dissatisfied. The University does not accept your email dated 28 April 2009, or your email dated 4 May 2009, as an application for amendment of information concerning your 'personal affairs' under the FOI Act, or as an application for alteration of 'personal information' under the PPIP Act. Accordingly, the University has not assessed or made a determination in respect of any such application." 11 On 13 May 2009 GA sought an internal review of that decision under the FOIA and the PPIPA. 12 On 18 May 2009 the Deputy Registrar confirmed her earlier advice that the University did not accept that its records, to the extent that GA sought to have them amended, contained information concerning his 'personal affairs' or 'personal information' for the purposes of the FOIA and the PPIPA respectively. The Deputy Registrar advised the Applicant that the University did not consider that he had a right of internal review arising under the FOIA or the PPIPA and, accordingly, that the University had declined to assess or make a determination in respect of any such application for review. 13 On 31 July 2009 GA filed applications to review those decisions. The review under the FOIA is on Tribunal file number 093192, while the PPIPA review is file number 093191. 14 At a planning meeting held on its was agreed that I should determine the University's applications to have GA's applications for review dismissed for want of jurisdiction (093912 and 093913) or on the basis that they are misconceived or lacking in substance under s 73(5)(g)(ii) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (the ADTA) – all applications. The parties were given an opportunity to make written submissions on the issues. Consideration - 093131 15 The issue here is whether this application should be dismissed under s 73(5)(g)(ii) on the ground that it is misconceived or lacking in substance. 16 When the Acting Deputy Registrar considered GA's initial FOI request he did so under s 24 of the FOIA. It relevantly provides: (1) After considering an application for access to a document, an agency shall determine: (a) whether access to the document is to be given (whether immediately or subject to deferral) or refused, and (b) if access to the document is to be given—any charge payable in respect of the giving of access, and (c) any charge payable for dealing with the application. 17 The Acting Deputy Registrar found the University had previously supplied GA with the documents relevant to his enrolment, and specifically chose not to admit 'any assumption made or implied in your FOI application.' The University's submissions make it clear this denial or rider ('the rider') was included because the University was concerned that GA had framed his FOI application so as 'to elicit admissions from the University for use in other litigation.' 18 GA then sought internal review under s 34 of the FOIA. In his request for internal review GA did not claim to be aggrieved by the University's failure to provide him with the information he sought. Rather his internal review sought that, 'Any and all commentary of the University be redacted from the FOI response.' While the request was two pages long, the balance of it was an explanation of his objection to the 'commentary.' 19 In his submissions to the Tribunal GA explained, at [80]: "In the first instance provision of the individual documents and the sentence in issue were to be sought to be reviewed. However in the interests of narrowing each application as far as possible, the inclusion of 'the sentence' was only pursued." 20 Section 34 of the FOIA is concerned with internal reviews. Relevantly, it provides: (1) A person who is aggrieved by a determination made by an agency is entitled to a review of the determination. (2) ... (4) An application under this section shall be dealt with in accordance with this Part as if it were an application under section 17. … (7) For the purposes of this section, a person is aggrieved by a determination: (a) if the determination relates to an application made by the person under section 17 and is to the effect that: (i) an agency refuses to give the applicant access to a document, or (ii) access to a document is to be given to the applicant subject to deferral, or (iii) access to a copy of a document from which exempt matter has been deleted is to be given to the applicant, or (iv) access to a document is to be given to the applicant subject to a charge for dealing with the application, or for giving access to a document, that the applicant considers to be unreasonable, or (v) a charge for dealing with the application is payable by the applicant, being a charge that the applicant considers to have been unreasonably incurred, or … 21 While the effect of the Acting Deputy Registrar's decision was to refuse GA access to the documents he sought, on the basis that he had already been provided with documents relating to his enrolment, there is no dispute that this was not the basis on which GA sought the internal review. Rather GA was aggrieved by the inclusion in the decisions of the rider in the original decision. 22 On the internal review the Deputy Registrar found that he was not a person 'aggrieved by a determination' but for the purposes of expediency confirmed the Acting Deputy Registrar's decision. She also confirmed the rider. 23 GA then sought external review by this Tribunal under s 53 of the FOIA. The section relevantly provides: (1) A person who is aggrieved by a determination made by an agency or Minister under section 24 or 43 may apply to the Tribunal for a review of the determination. (2) … (3) For the purposes of this section, a person is aggrieved by a determination: (a) in the case of a determination that relates to an access application made by the person under section 17, 34 or 36—if the determination is to the effect that: (i) an agency or Minister refuses to give the person access to a document, or (ii) access to a document is to be given to the person subject to deferral, or (iii) access to a copy of a document from which exempt matter has been deleted is to be given to the person, or (iv) access to a document is to be given to the person subject to a charge for dealing with the access application, or for giving access to a document, that the person considers to be unreasonable, or (v) a charge for dealing with the access application is payable by the person being a charge that the person considers to have been unreasonably incurred, or … 24 In his application for external review, and in his written submissions in support of it, GA has agitated and pressed his grievance with respect to the rider. His submissions are replete with arguments advancing the proposition that the inclusion of such a rider in a determination under the FOIA is contrary to and not authorised by the Act. 25 GA argues that the inclusion of the rider renders the decisions invalid. He says its inclusion results in non-compliance with s 24, s 27, s 28, and s 34 among others. This is an extreme, black letter law view of the FOIA. It would result in a decision which contains any additional, or unnecessary, statements or commentary being rendered invalid, despite the decisions otherwise complying with the requirements of the Act. There is nothing in any of those sections which prohibits the inclusion in an original or internal review decision of additional communications or commentary, such as that contained in the rider. There is nothing in the Act which suggests it should be construed as strictly as GA contends. 26 Indeed, s 4(3) contains a declaration of legislative intention which indicates that the Act is to be interpreted so as to facilitate access, in a prompt and low cost manner. It provides: "(3) It is the intention of Parliament: (a) that this Act shall be interpreted and applied so as to further the objects of this Act, and (b) that the discretions conferred by this Act shall be exercised, as far as possible, so as to facilitate and encourage, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of information." 27 The inclusion of the rider in the original decision and internal review did not result in those decisions being void, voidable or otherwise invalid. 28 The University submits that GA's application should be dismissed under s 73(5)(g)(ii) on the ground that it is misconceived or lacking in substance for two reasons. 29 First, it argues that that GA already has been given access to all documents relating to his enrolment and that the present FOI application is framed in such a way as to enable him - if access were granted to the same documents in response to that request - to argue that the University has made admissions of fact contrary to its long held position regarding GA's enrolment. This, it submits, is an improper use of the FOIA. 30 Secondly, the University submits that when reviewing a determination under the FOIA the Tribunal's powers are limited to those which could have been made by the original decision maker. 31 Section 63 of the ADTA provides: "(3) In determining an application for the review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide: (a) to affirm the reviewable decision, or (b) to vary the reviewable decision, or (c) to set aside the reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the reviewable decision it set aside, or (d) to set aside the reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal." 32 In making a decision under sub-sections (3)(a)(b) and (c) the Tribunal is constrained by the same limitations as those imposed under the FOIA on the original decision maker. As a result, the University submits: "In relation to the review of an agency's decision concerning an application for access to documents under the FOI Act, the Tribunal's power is limited to deciding whether access should or should not be provided, and on what conditions. The Tribunal does not, in the University's respectful submission, have power to address the Applicant's objection to the written form of its decision. The University submits that the Applicant has misapprehended the powers of the Tribunal in this regard, with the effect that the application is `misconceived or lacking in substance' for the purposes of s73(5)(g)(ii) of the ADT Act." 33 In relation to what is meant by the terms misconceived and lacking in substance Ormiston JA in State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel [1998] 1 VR 102 (at 108-109) said, with respect to a similar provision found in the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic): ""Frivolous" and "vexatious" are terms which have been known to the courts for many years, forming the primary basis for dismissal in the inherent jurisdiction of the courts and which now may be taken as indicative of "abuse of process", but the terms "misconceived" and "lacking in substance" have not, so far as I am aware, been used in this context before though each expression is commonly used by lawyers, the one connoting a misunderstanding of legal principle and the other connoting an untenable proposition of law or fact. If one may discern, in these provisions, an attempt to express the powers of tribunals in non-technical language, then "misconceived" would represent a claim which did "not disclose a cause of action" (as in para. (1)(a) of r. 23.01), whereas "lacking in substance" might be seen to represent a claim where the defendant could obtain summary judgment, …" 34 The majority of reported decisions in this Tribunal relating to the power to dismiss an application as misconceived or lacking in substance are to be found in the Equal Opportunity Division. Those decisions often address the President of the ADB's power to summarily dismiss under similar provisions in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1997. With respect to that power, in Tredinnick -v- Wentworth Area Health Service [2000] NSWADT 172, the Tribunal took the evidence relied on by an Applicant at its highest in determining "determine whether he could possibly substantiate a complaint under the Act." This cautious approach has been followed since. 35 Central to the concerns I hold with respect to the present application is GA's insistence that the issue he wishes to agitate before the Tribunal is the inclusion of the rider in both the original decision and the internal review. He did not press for access to the information he sought in his internal review application, and does not do so now. Rather, he relies on the failure to give him access to the documents he sought, and the fact that he is thereby aggrieved, as a vehicle to agitate issues with respect to the rider. 36 I am also aware that many of the documents that one might expect to be produced in response to GA's request are already in his possession. They were the subject of his unsuccessful applications for their amendment considered in GA v The University of Sydney [2009] NSWADT 230. This lends weight to the University's contention that by framing his request in the manner he did, GA is engaged in an attempt to obtain admissions from the University contrary to its long held position. Such a use of the FOIA for collateral purposes is to be rejected: Crewdson v Central Sydney AHS [2002] NSWCA 345; GA v The University of Sydney [2009] NSWADT 230. 37 Issues with respect to the rider are not issues which this Tribunal, on a merits review of the Deputy Registrar's internal review decision, is required to consider. The review conducted by the Tribunal under the FOIA is not based on error of law, but is a merits review in which the Tribunal makes the correct and preferable decision. It is not a forum at which the issue GA wishes to agitate with respect to the rider can be determined. Rather, it is a forum in which his access to documents (which he does not press) could be determined on a merits review basis. 38 As a result GA's application is misconceived in the sense discussed by Ormiston JA. The issues he seeks to agitate are not ones for the Tribunal. The issue for the Tribunal on external review is whether or not GA should have access to the documents requested, not whether or not the rider is or is not authorised by the Act. 39 It follows that GA's application will be dismissed as misconceived. 093193 - Consideration 40 This relates to GA's request under s 39 of the FOIA to amend the Acting Deputy Registrar's decision of by redacting the sentence containing the rider. 41 Section 39 of the FOIA provides: "A person to whom access to an agency's document has been given may apply for the amendment of the agency's records: (a) if the document contains information concerning the person's personal affairs, and (b) if the information is available for use by the agency in connection with its administrative functions, and (c) if the information is, in the person's opinion, incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading." 42 Section 40 provides for the making of amendment application. Section 43 provides: "(1) An agency shall determine an application: (a) by amending its records in accordance with the application, or (b) by refusing to amend its records. (2) An agency that fails to determine an application within 21 days after the application is received by the agency shall, for the purposes of section 47 and other provisions of this Act, be taken to have determined the application by refusing to amend its records in accordance with the application." 43 The reasons for which an amendment application may be refused as set out in s 44: An agency may refuse to amend its records in accordance with an application: (a) if it is satisfied that its records are not incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading in a material respect, or (b) if it is satisfied that the application contains matter that is incorrect or misleading in a material respect, or (c) if the procedures for amending its records are prescribed by or under the provisions of a legislative instrument other than this Act, whether or not amendment of those records is subject to a fee or charge. 44 Section 45 makes provision for the giving of notices of determination, while s 46 gives a person whose request for amendment has been refused a right to add to those records a notation: (a) specifying the respects in which the applicant claims the records to be incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading, and (b) if the applicant claims the records to be incomplete or out of date—setting out such information as the applicant claims is necessary to complete the records or to bring them up to date.' 45 Section 47 gives persons aggrieved by such a determination a right to seek internal review, while s 53 then gives a right to seek review in this Tribunal. 46 Central to the consideration of an application to amend under the FOIA is the requirement that the document contain information concerning the person's personal affairs. 47 The term "personal affairs" is not defined in the Act. As was observed by the Queensland Information Commissioner in Re Stewart v Department of Transport (1993) 1 QAR 225 at [18] there has been a consistent disinclination by courts and tribunals "from attempting any comprehensive explanation of what is encompassed by the phrase." There it was held that held that information about family, marital and other relationships with emotional ties is information about the "personal affairs" of the people concerned. 48 In Re Williams and the Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia (1985) ALD 219 Beaumont J, sitting as a presidential member of the Commonwealth AAT, said, at 221, personal affairs "refer to matters of private concern to an individual." Thus because a persons "vocational competence in not something that is ordinarily treated as confidential" it is not, "prima facie at least" part of person's personal affair." 49 In News Corporation Ltd v NCSC (1984) 52 ALR 277 the Full Court of the Federal Court, at 283, found that personal affairs refers to the affairs of a natural person and not a corporation. 50 In NSW the ambit of the phrase was considered by the Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Police v Perrin (1993) 31 NSWLR 606 where the issue was whether the name and rank of investigating Police officers constituted their personal affairs. In affirming that they do not Kirby P traversed the authorities and said, at 625: "The ordinary dictionary meaning of "personal affairs" has been held to involve "matters of private concern to an individual": see Re Williams and Registrar of Federal Court of Australia (1985) 8 ALD 219; 3 AAR 529; Young v Wicks (1986) 13 FCR 85 at 88-89; 79 ALR 448 at 452. However, it has been suggested that this might be too narrow a paraphrase: see Department of Social Security v Dyrenfurth (1988) 80 ALR 533 at 539; cf Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] 1 VR 63 at 69. In its context, the words "personal affairs" mean the composite collection of activities personal to the individual concerned. 51 The question of whether a document contains "information concerning the personal affairs" of a person is a question of fact that is determined from the circumstances of each individual case: see Woods v Chief Executive Officer, State Rail Authority [2002] NSWADT 253. In Re Pfizer Pty Ltd and Department of Health, Housing and Community Services (1993) 30 ALD 647 at [79], it was said that where a document contains a statement about a person's private life, which is widely known, "this does not deprive it of the character of information relating to the person's 'personal affairs.'" 52 In Martin v Commissioner of Police [2005] NSWADT 23 Higgins JM considered an application for the release of witness statements relating to allegations of assault made against her by neighbours. The Tribunal found at [65] that "while the statements do contain information concerning the personal affairs of third persons, the majority of the information also concerns the personal affairs of the applicant." That information concerning the applicant was not exempt: clause 6(2). Higgins JM concluded, at [66]: "…the information that concerns the personal affairs of the applicant, in particular the information that records the events involving the applicant on 19 November 2003 (which forms the bulk of the information in both statements) is not exempt under cl.6 of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. The fact that this information is provided by a third party does not make it personal information of that third party exclusively." 53 In Simring v Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWADT 331 the applicant sought access to statement prepared and used in the course of a completed and successful prosecution of the applicant. Pearson JM said of the statements, at [24]: "I am satisfied that they contain information or opinion about the applicant, and information about individuals other than the applicant. Disclosure of these documents would reveal the identity of the authors of the documents, and identify others, as well as reveal the personal reasons for the creation of the documents. As such, disclosure of these documents would involve disclosure of personal information about persons other than the applicant: Kristoffersen v Department of Employment Workplace Relations and Small Business [2002] FCA 55 . " 54 In the present case the University submits that the rider did not contain any information in relation to GA's personal affairs. It submits that the words, "The University does not admit any assumption made or implied in your FOI application," does not contain information personal to or private concern to GA. 55 In response GA made a series of arguments. The first of these repeated his earlier argument that the inclusion of the rider in the determination rendered the determination invalid. As already indicated I do not accept this. 56 Next GA submitted, at [257] – [258]: "The sentence is about the personal information or personal affairs that the University attributed to [GA] by the use of the word 'you' in 'the sentence'. The University is making and taking a position about the position of [GA]." 57 In support of this GA argued that there were no assumptions or implications of any type contained in his FOI request. He said that the description of the documents in his request contain no assumptions, just factual descriptions. As GA is well aware, the University has a different view as to what those documents show: see GA v The University of Sydney [2009] NSWADT 230. This differing view underlies the University's inclusion of the rider in its decisions. 58 I agree with the University that the rider does not contain information about GA's personal affairs. It is an expression of the University's position in respect of assumptions or implications that it might be argued are contained in GA's FOI request. It does not reveal or deal with events or information concerning GA's private life. It does not attribute specific opinions or assumption to GA, but simply states that the University does not admit any assumption made or implied in his FOI application. It does not say what those assumptions or implications are, if any. 59 GA asserts that the internal review is now part of his student file, and as a result attributes 'things' to him. Two points need to be made about this. First, there is no evidence that the FOI decisions form part of his student file. Secondly, those 'things' are not information relating to GA personal affairs. 60 GA's submissions that the rider contains information relating to his personal affairs are circuitous and convoluted. While the University in clearly taking a position with respect to GA's request, the rider does not contain information in relation to his personal affairs. The rider speaks to the University's position, not to matters personal to GA. 61 It does not contain information in relation to GA's personal affairs. As a result the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the external review. 093192 - Consideration 62 This relates to GA's request under s 15 of the PPIPA to amend the Acting Deputy Registrar's decision of by redacting the sentence containing the rider. 63 Section 15 of the PPIP Act provides: (1) A public sector agency that holds personal information must, at the request of the individual to whom the information relates, make appropriate amendments (whether by way of corrections, deletions or additions) to ensure that the personal information: (a) is accurate, and (b) having regard to the purpose for which the information was collected (or is to be used) and to any purpose that is directly related to that purpose, is relevant, up to date, complete and not misleading. (2) If a public sector agency is not prepared to amend personal information in accordance with a request by the individual to whom the information relates, the agency must, if so requested by the individual concerned, take such steps as are reasonable to attach to the information, in such a manner as is capable of being read with the information, any statement provided by that individual of the amendment sought. (3) If personal information is amended in accordance with this section, the individual to whom the information relates is entitled, if it is reasonably practicable, to have recipients of that information notified of the amendments made by the public sector agency. (4) This section, and any provision of a privacy code of practice that relates to the requirements set out in this section, apply to public sector agencies despite section 25 of this Act and section 21 of the State Records Act 1998 . 64 Personal information is defined in the PPIPA. Section 4 relevantly provides: (1) In this Act, personal information means information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a database and whether or not recorded in a material form) about an individual whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion. (2) Personal information includes such things as an individual's fingerprints, retina prints, body samples or genetic characteristics. (3) … 65 The definition of personal information in s 4(1) is a wide one. It is not confined to information about an individual's personal affairs, but is a 'broad, unrestricted' definition: WL v Randwick City Council [2007] NSW ADTAP 58 at [20]. Due to the beneficial nature of the PPIPA, exclusions from the definition are to be construed narrowly, while the definition itself is to be construed widely and beneficially: WL v Randwick City Council at [22]. 66 Section 53 enables a person aggrieved by conduct of an agency to seek internal review of that conduct by the agency. If dissatisfied with the outcome of the internal review, as GH was in the case of his privacy review, s 55 gives a right to seek external review in this Tribunal. 67 The University submits that the rider does not contain personal information concerning GA. Its submissions are essentially the same as those made with respect to information relating to personal affairs under the FOIA. 68 GA relies on the submissions he made with respect to the information relating to personal affairs under the FOIA. In addition, he argues that the use of the word 'your' in the rider attributes an opinion or implication to him, resulting in the rider containing personal information under the PPIPA. He refers to the decision in EG v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 150 where the following sentence was found to contain personal information about an individual: "'I am aware that [the applicant] is in the process of completing his final pre-admission studies at the College of Law and intends seeking admission as a solicitor sometime later this year." 69 GA sought to treat this as analogous with the rider by arguing that it attributed 'something' to him, as if saying, ''I am aware of you application and in relation to any assumption made or implied reject it.' What GA did not address was the nature of that 'something.' 70 In EG the sentence contained the Applicant's name and the information that he was in the process of completing his final pre-admission studies at the College of Law and intending to seek admission as a solicitor sometime later in the year. In the present case the rider appears in a document containing GA's name (about which he does not complain) but does not convey any information or opinions about him. 71 It does not contain personal information in relation to GA. As a result the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the external review. Conclusion 72 GA's application on file number 093131 is dismissed as misconceived under s 73(5)(g)(ii) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997. 73 GA's applications on file numbers 093192 and 093192 are dismissed because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear them. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.