The Legal Services Tribunal of New South Wales CITATION : Soterakis Gregory Demetrios [1993] NSWLST 2 PARTIES : Soterakis Gregory Demetrios FILE NUMBER(S) : of CORAM: Ms A Plotke (Presiding Member) - Mr A. Edgar - Dr U. Gault CATCHWORDS: Professional Misconduct - mislead Solicitor - Professional Misconduct - prepare false documents :- LEGISLATION CITED: Legal Profession Act 1987 Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd v Kiriakidis, p.124; CASES CITED: Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Limited; Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration 1894 [1 QB 750]); Fraser v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (LPDR 5 of 1992) DATES OF HEARING: 10/03/93 - 10/05/93 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/10/1993 Mr D. Hipsley LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: Mr F. Smith Mr A.E. Cramer-Roberts Constantine Christopher & Associates JUDGMENT: The Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal In the matter of Soterakis Gregory Demetrios Determination and Orders Before: Miss A. Plotke (Presiding Member), Mr A. Edgar and Dr U. Gault. Appearances: Mr D. Hipsley instructed by Mr F. Smith for the Law Society, and Mr A.E. Cramer-Roberts instructed by Constantine Christopher & Associates for the Solicitor. Hearing date: 10 February 1993. This Complaint was made under Section 135 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (the Act) by the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (the Law Society) against Soterakis Gregory Demetrios (the Solicitor). The Law Society alleged that the Solicitor signed false statements in documents and misled a solicitor. The particulars given specify that the Solicitor acted for Gabriel Kiriakidis (GK) and Eleftheria Kiriakidis (EK) with respect to a mortgage dated 18 December 1985 to Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Limited (Gikas) over certain land and for EK with respect to a mortgage dated 18 December 1985 to Gikas over other land and that he signed his name immediately below the words "signed in my presence by the mortgagor who is personally known to me" on the mortgage documents (the mortgages) opposite signatures "E. Kiriakidis" whereas EK did not sign the mortgages in the presence of the Solicitor. A further particular related to the Solicitor acting for GK and EK on the purchase of property 43 Lackey Street, Summer Hill and that the Solicitor signed his name below the words "signed by the Vendor (sic) in the presence of" and adjacent to the word "witness" on the contract of purchase of that property (the contract) below the signature "E. Kiriakidis" whereas EK did not sign the contract in the presence of the Solicitor. A third particular related to a Statutory Declaration on which the Solicitor signed his name below the words "Declared at Sydney this 18th day of December, 1985 before me" opposite a signature "E. Kiriakidis" whereas EK did not sign that Statutory Declaration in the presence of the Solicitor. The allegation of misleading a solicitor was particularised as arising when the Solicitor handed the mortgages to Richard Martyn Woolner, the solicitor for Gikas, when the Solicitor knew that the mortgages contained false statements by him that EK had signed them in his presence. By that action, it was alleged, the Solicitor misled Richard Martyn Woolner into a belief that those mortgages were properly registrable. As regards the contract the allegation was that the Solicitor acted to ensure that the contract came into the possession of Richard Martyn Woolner in circumstances in which the Solicitor knew that that contract contained a false statement by him that EK had signed the document in his presence. By that action it was alleged, Richard Martyn Woolner was misled into a belief that the signature "E. Kiriakidis" on the contract was authentic. Facts About mid July 1985 the Solicitor was instructed by GK to act on behalf of himself and his wife EK on the purchase of a property 43 Lackey Street, Summer Hill (the Summer Hill property). He was to apply for finance required for the completion of the purchase and the discharge of mortgages on a property in Hunt Place, Queanbeyan owned by EK. These properties were to provide security together with a property at Crawford Street, Queanbeyan. It transpired later that the Crawford Street property was not owned by GK and EK who carried on a delicatessen business there but was rented by them. A Traders Bill of Sale over this business was then to be part of the security given. The Solicitor unsuccessfully applied for finance to ANZ Bank Newtown, Alliance Acceptance Company Limited and Finance Corporation of Australia. The Solicitor contacted the selling agent, a Mr Perry, who re-negotiated the sale on the basis that the vendor would provide the necessary finance to cover the purchase price of the Summer Hill property, the amounts payable to discharge three mortgages on the Hunt Place property and the Stamp Duty and legal costs of the purchasers. The purchase price for the Summer Hill property was $210,000.00. The overall amount advanced was $335,000.00 and this was the principal sum shown in the mortgages from GK and EK to Gikas over the Summer Hill property and from EK to Gikas over the Hunt Place property. The further sum of $35,000.00 was secured under a Traders Bill of Sale given by GK and EK over the delicatessen business in favour of Mr Spiros Gikas. The contract for purchase of the Summer Hill property originally sent to the Solicitor contained only the name of GK as purchaser and did not have a vendor finance clause. This clause, Special Condition 32, was subsequently added to the contract and the Solicitor added the name of EK as purchaser to it in his own handwriting. Thereafter GK called at the office and the Solicitor explained the basic conditions of the contract and particularly the repayment clause to him. He gave the contract to GK and told him where it was to be signed. Some time thereafter GK delivered the contract back to the Solicitor who asked him if his wife had signed the document and he replied "yes". The Solicitor then applied his signature to the witnessing of the document on the back page and contracts were subsequently exchanged by the selling agent on 2 October 1985. When the Solicitor received the mortgage documents from the vendor's solicitor he again saw GK and explained the terms of the mortgages to him and indicated where he and his wife should sign them. When they were returned a few days later by GK the Solicitor asked whether his wife had signed the documents and he replied "yes". The Solicitor signed both sets of mortgage documents as attesting witness to the effect that they had been signed by both GK and EK in his presence. He delivered the documents to the vendor's solicitors on settlement of the purchase and mortgage transactions which took place on 18 December 1985. About November 1985 a fire occurred at the delicatessen business which was the subject of the Traders Bill of Sale. GK mentioned this to the Solicitor who enquired further about it. GK told the Solicitor "there was a little fire at the back room" (Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Ltd v Kiriakidis, p.124 Transcript), and in response to the Solicitor's further enquiry GK denied that any plant was destroyed. It was not until early January in 1986 that the Solicitor was told by GK that the whole of the shop was destroyed. At this time the Solicitor was instructed to send a letter to the solicitors for the vendor/mortgagees to advise them that there was a pending insurance claim and that on receipt of the proceeds these would be paid to Mr Gikas. GK and EK defaulted under the mortgages and Gikas commenced proceedings against EK in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1986 claiming possession of the Hunt Place property. GK disappeared some time late in May 1986. In the course of the proceedings commenced by Gikas the facts relating to the attestation by the Solicitor of the signatures on the contract, the mortgages and the Statutory Declaration came to light and he was joined as second Defendant and as second Cross-Defendant/Third Cross-Defendant in relation to various cross claims which arose. The matter was heard before Mr Justice Finlay at a hearing where the Solicitor was represented by counsel. In his judgment Finlay J found on the claim by Gikas as the Cross-Claimant for damages against the Solicitor as the Cross-Defendant that the action of the Solicitor in completing a conveyancing transaction by handing over to the mortgagee's solicitors a mortgage signed by the mortgagor's solicitor as attesting witness when in fact he had not been present when the mortgage was signed amounted to fraud. At pages 41/42 of the judgment the following appears: "Here the written representations in each of the mortgages (Exhibits 4 and 5), `signed in my presence by the mortgagor who is personally know to me', are clear representations of fact, namely, that each mortgage was signed by the mortgagor, Mrs Kiriakidis, in the presence of the witness, the solicitor Mr Demetrios. As I have previously found, this statement of fact was untrue as the solicitor well knew. He further knew that a solicitor acting for the mortgagee would accept such a statement as in fact true. "I have accepted Mr Woolner's evidence that as solicitor for the mortgagee he would not have completed the transaction had be been aware that the attestation of the second defendant was no attestation at all. The security documents, which he had prepared, required only the signatures of the mortgagors and attestation of the witness that they had been signed in his presence by the mortgagors who were personally known to him. These were the only elements required to be checked by Mr Woolner. I accept that it is inherently probable that Mr Woolner would not have proceeded to advance moneys if he had been made aware of a fundamental falsehood in the only matter that Mr Demetrios, as solicitor for the mortgagors, had to provide. "It is a relevant consideration that solicitors rely on their professional counterparts at a conveyancing settlement that they have in fact witnessed the execution of a signature attested as such by them. If the documents are not in order the settlement will go off. "Here Mr Demetrios, the solicitor for the mortgagors, uttered the mortgages knowing that the statement in the attestation clause signed by him as witness was false. He intended that Mr Woolner, the solicitor for the mortgagee, would not go behind it but would rely upon the face value of the document in making his decision to proceed. He intended thereby to cause the mortgagee to part with its money. That I consider is a fraud on the mortgagee plaintiff company and the cause of action occurred as the money was passed over. Mr Demetrios is not relieved from liability by the Court subsequently giving relief to Mrs Kiriakidis on equitable grounds." Finlay J ordered damages against the Solicitor in the sum of $225,192.52 in favour of Gikas. The Solicitor appealed unsuccessfully against the judgment. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Limited was given on 19 April 1991 and is reported in 1991 22 NSW LR 561. The Registrar of the Court of Appeal forwarded a copy of the catchwords and orders of the Court and of the judgments of Mahoney, Meagher and Handley JJA and of the judgment of Finlay J to the Law Society. As a consequence the subject complaint was brought before this Tribunal. The evidence at the hearing before the Tribunal comprised the following: (a) In the complainant's case: (i) the complaint (exhibit A) (ii) the Statutory Declarations of Frederick John Smith dated 28 August 1992 and 5 January 1993 (exhibits B & C). Annexed to these Declarations were copies of correspondence passing between the Solicitor and the Law Society which in effect further particularised the facts and conduct which are the subject of the complaint and contained the responses and admissions of the Solicitor. Copies of the relevant pages of the mortgages and the contract and a copy of the transcript of evidence given in the proceedings in the Supreme Court before Mr Justice Finlay were also annexed. (iii) the Statutory Declaration of Eleftheria Kiriakidis made 18 December 1985 (exhibit D) and, (b) In the Solicitor's case: (i) oral evidence of: the Solicitor Terence Gregory McGuinness solicitor Nicholas Constantine Coombs solicitor Thomas Anthony Doumanis solicitor and, (ii) the following Statutory Declarations all of which were directed to character evidence: Terence Gregory McGuinness dated 11 December 1992 (exhibit 1) Nicholas Constantine Coombs dated 5 October 1992 (exhibit 2) Tom A. Doumanis dated 6 November 1992 (exhibit 3) Sophie Antoniades dated 5 November 1992 (exhibit 4) Angelo Andresakis dated 5 February 1993 (exhibit 5) Constantine Dion Vertzayias dated 8 February 1993 (exhibit 6) George Shad dated 4 November 1992 (exhibit 7) Ian Tremback dated 10 November 1992 (exhibit 8) James Soulos dated 4 December 1992 (exhibit 9) Peter Bouzanis dated 20 January 1993 (exhibit 10) Kenneth Norman Magnus dated 8 January 1993 (exhibit 11) Archibald Anthony Olliffe dated 6 November 1992 (exhibit 12) Gregory John Stanton dated 18 December 1992 (exhibit 13) and (iii) three character references: James Kaldis dated 13 October 1992 (exhibit 14) John Constantine dated 11 October 1992 (exhibit 15) Dr P.N. Vanezis dated 12 October 1992 (exhibit 16). The Solicitor admitted all the facts alleged in the complaint and the particulars. These are set out in summary form in the above recital. He also admitted the evidence as contained in the transcript of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales before Finlay J. Solicitor's response The Solicitor's response to the admitted allegations in the complaint may be summarised as follows: 1. The finding of fraud against him should be viewed in the context that he stood to make no personal gain other than the ordinary fees for the transaction. There were no commissions or procuration fees involved. 2. GK and EK were not personal friends of the Solicitor. They were new clients and nothing more. 3. In considering the liability which the Solicitor incurred as a consequence of his actions, regard should be had to the conduct of GK who forged the signature of his wife on the contract, misrepresented to the Solicitor the size and nature of his assets, misrepresented to the Solicitor the size of the fire, paid no moneys under the mortgage and finally absconded from Australia. In support of this submission the Solicitor relied on the following remarks of Mahoney JA at 564 in Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Pty Limited: "I am conscious that, in a sense, the liability of Mr Demetrios for the loss suffered by the plaintiffs in the two transactions arises by a side wind. It may be said that the reason why the plaintiffs did not receive the moneys which Mr and Mrs Kiriakidis had promised to pay them was because the transactions entered into by Mr and Mrs Kiriakidis were hopelessly improvident and because Mr Kiriakidis, having misled his wife, fled the scene. The fraud of which Mr Demetrios was guilty, viz, that relating to the witnessing of Mrs Kiriakidis' signature, was collateral to the losses which in any event would have been suffered, even if Mrs Kiriakidis' signature had been properly witnessed by Mr Demetrios." 4. The Solicitor's conduct was not motivated by greed or personal gain but rather expediency. It was not his intention that anyone should suffer loss and the conduct of GK was the dominant cause of the loss. He was held liable for the entire loss although his action was only one of a number of causes. 5. The Solicitor faces financial ruin in compensating the plaintiffs. He is liable to pay interest on the judgment at 17 per cent per annum and as at July 1991 the amount payable by him apart from costs was $487,986.92 none of which is recoverable from his professional indemnity insurer. He was made bankrupt on 31 August 1992 on the petition of the plaintiff. 6. The Solicitor attested both signatures on the mortgages without any wrongful intention to mislead the mortgagees or their solicitors. There was no suggestion that EK did not in fact sign the mortgages and she never challenged the authenticity of her signatures on the mortgages. This finding was made by Finlay J on page 28 of his judgment. He also found that it was likely, contrary to her evidence, that she knew the effect of the mortgages (page 29). 7. The Orders of the Court of Appeal requiring the Solicitor to bear the complete responsibility for the plaintiff's loss in a judgment now reported in the law reports and by reference to him by name constitute the heaviest possible censure and the gravest disapprobation. The Supreme Court proceedings and the judgments involve such devastating redress against him that a salutary lesson has been learnt and he will not transgress again. The interests of the public and the profession will not be prejudiced by permitting him to continue in practice as a solicitor. The complainant's submissions Mr Hipsley on behalf of the complainant invited the Tribunal to consider the following: 1. The conduct of the Solicitor did not relate to an isolated document but to the agreement for sale the two mortgages and the Statutory Declaration. The act complained of therefore cannot be described as an isolated incident. 2. There is evidence that there were warning signals that occurred prior to the Solicitor signing the documents. Information given to him by GK regarding ownership of a Batemans Bay property was false as was the suggestion that the Crawford Street Queanbeyan property was owned by GK and EK. 3. The Solicitor had never seen EK's signature yet he was still prepared to sign four documents as witness to her signature in those circumstances. 4. He was not required to sign the contract of sale and he could have taken steps to ensure that GK and EK signed that document in the presence of someone else. Determination The Solicitor was born in 1941, arrived in Australia in 1951 and completed high school education in 1959. He was admitted as a solicitor in 1968 having completed five years' articles, three with the office of M.D. Nikolaides and the final two years with J.B. Ferguson. In 1973 he became a partner with N.P. Angelos and this partnership continued until 31 March 1991. In 1973 he was elected a director of the Cyprus Community of New South Wales being the Ethnic Community representing the Cypriot people of this State and in 1974 became the treasurer. Thereafter he held the position of president from 1979 to 1982. Although now not in an executive position he continues to be active in affairs of this ethnic community. Consequent upon judgment against him in the proceedings commenced by Gikas in the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Demetrios v Gikas Dry Cleaning Industries Pty Limited the Solicitor faces payment of the amount of the judgment plus costs which as at July 1991 was of the order $488,000.00. He was made bankrupt on the application of the plaintiff on 31 August 1992. At the time of the hearing before the Tribunal he was practising from an office set up within his home. He has been allowed by the Law Society and by the Official Receiver to continue his practice and his net earnings after expenses in 1992 were less than $26,000.00. His wife and daughter both of whom have extensive experience from working in the firm of which the Solicitor was formerly a partner assist him in his practice in connection with secretarial, bookkeeping, registration work and generally. He has kept his long term clients and has a small clientele in the area. It is a very small practice of conveyancing and his future plans, if he is allowed to practise, are to continue on the same basis. He has no training for any other occupation. Whilst at the time when the Solicitor falsely witnessed the signatures of EK appearing on the contract and the mortgages he did not fully appreciate the significance of his conduct the Tribunal finds that he has come to a full understanding of the gravity of his actions. The following evidence was given (page 63T): "Mr Demetrios, in respect of the actual offences that you have committed, part of the complaint is that you put forward documents and, in effect, put the vendor's solicitor where he had to accept falsely attested documents, you are aware of that?...Yes, sir. As a result of that there was some loss to the vendor by reason of the conduct of Mr Kiriakidis, you say?...Yes, sir. And also it has been found against you, by reason of your having falsely attested these documents?...Yes, sir. Do you feel that this is something that you are quite cheerful about doing again?...No, I am not cheerful about it at all. I am very, very sad about the matter and never, never, never. Do you tell the Tribunal that you now fully appreciate the consequences of your actions in doing what you did?...Yes, I do. In fact that has resulted in your bankruptcy?...Yes. You are not likely to have gone bankrupt prior to this occurrence?...No definitely not." The Tribunal finds established the grounds set out in the complaint and the particulars that the Solicitor signed false statements in documents and that he misled a solicitor. The finding of false statements relates to his signing as a witness the contract, the two mortgages and the Statutory Declaration of EK dated 18 December 1985. The misleading of a solicitor relates to the forwarding of the falsely witnessed contract and the delivery of the falsely attested mortgages to the Solicitor for Gikas. The conduct of the Solicitor in signing his name as witness of a signatory on documents which were not signed by that signatory in his presence is clearly conduct which would be regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable by solicitors of good repute and competency (Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration 1894 [1 QB 750]). The misleading of another solicitor by the delivery of documents purporting to be properly executed when this was not the case is of the same order. In respect of both the Tribunal finds the Solicitor guilty of professional misconduct. The remaining question is to determine what order should be made by the Tribunal as a result of these findings. The Tribunal has carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the Solicitor and the complainant. It has also considered 13 Statutory Declarations in support of his character 11 of which are by solicitors and two by barristers. Twelve of the declarants have known the Solicitor professionally for periods ranging from seven to 25 years. His professional peers variously found him to be trustworthy and reliable, honest and forthright and a person of integrity. His actions leading to the complaint were described as out of character and as an isolated incident contrary to his normal behaviour and practice. In addition there were three references from Dr P.N. Vanezis, former High Commissioner for the Republic of Cyprus, the Honourable J. Kaldis MLC and Mr John Constantine, solicitor. These had also known the Solicitor for periods ranging from 10 to 20 years but had not been informed about the complaint. These references were put before the Tribunal as evidence of the value and standing of the Solicitor in the community. The Statutory Declarations, by way of contrast, did refer to the knowledge of the persons making them of the complaint against the Solicitor and three of the declarants gave oral evidence before the Tribunal supplementing their Declarations. The Tribunal was referred to a number of cases in addition to Demetrios v Gikas. In the matter of Ian Burnham Mitchell LPDR 1 of 1992 at page 7 one of the grounds of complaint against the solicitor related to signing documents falsely stating that the solicitor was a witness to the signature thereon and that the signatories were personally known to him. The Tribunal which heard that case stated at page 9: "The form of attestation could not be clearer: `Signed in my presence by the mortgagee who are personally known to me. In the view of the Tribunal it is untenable even to contemplate that a person as qualified as a solicitor should be unable to understand those words and the actions they require. They are simple and direct. They are obviously there to mean what they say, and to be used for a real purpose. They are clearly there to ensure that the documents which bear them, and which are capable of creating important legal interests in property, are executed under rigidly controlled principles. In the view of the Tribunal, any solicitor who departs from those principles is guilty of disgraceful conduct." In the matter of David John Twomey reported in LPDR 6 of 1992 the solicitor appended his signature to a mortgage as a witness to the apparent signature of the mortgagor who did not sign in the presence of the solicitor. The solicitor delivered the documents to the lending bank. The mortgagor's signature was in fact forged. That conduct was found to be common law professional misconduct. On page 5 the Tribunal stated: "In the view of the Tribunal, there is no doubt that purporting to personally witness the signature of a mortgagor on a guarantee mortgage when the solicitor did not in fact so witness that signature is conduct that would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by the solicitor's brethren of good repute and competency. This Tribunal has pointed out on a number of previous occasions (In the matter of Paul Fraser and In the matter of Ian Burnham Mitchell (1992) 1 LPDR 6) that serious consequences flow from improperly appending one's signature as a witness to this type of document. The duty that the solicitor owes is not only a duty to the mortgagor. It is also a duty to the incoming mortgagee and any solicitor for the incoming mortgagee." In the matter of Paul Fraser the Tribunal found that the solicitor had voluntarily given a false certificate knowing that it would be relied upon. This conduct was found to be disgraceful and dishonourable and an order was made to remove the name of the solicitor from the Roll. On appeal in Fraser v The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (LPDR 5 of 1992) the Court of Appeal set aside that order and substituted a fine. Two significant factors in favour of the solicitor were that there was no suggestion that he had previously or thereafter acted in a dishonourable or disgraceful way and that he acknowledged that he had acted wrongly. On page 16 Kirby P said: "I do not believe that fraud as such, admitted or proved, requires in every case, without more, the removal of the name of a solicitor from the roll. It is necessary to examine in each case the nature of the fraud involved. Many acts of fraud will indeed require removal from the roll. In other cases, a less drastic determination will be appropriate." That statement is applicable to the present case as are the dicta of Handley JA in the same case at page 18: "In a case such as the present proof of the appellant's fitness to be restored to the Roll of Solicitors depends very much on the Court being satisfied that he fully understands his past error. It is important that a solicitor asked to `cut some corner' and sign a false certificate which will save some person time trouble or expense should be able to recognise that he (or she) is being asked to commit fraud. A solicitor's ability to recognise this should enable him or her to reject the request. Indeed one would hope that the solicitor would tell the person making such a request that compliance would involve committing fraud. This should not only ensure that the request is promptly withdrawn, it should also contribute in a small way to the maintenance and improvement of ethical standards in the community. A solicitor who cannot even recognise that compliance with a request to sign a false certificate will involve him (or her) in committing fraud is far more likely to sign such a certificate. Such a solicitor is a menace not only to those who rely on certificates given by solicitors but also to the profession itself." The passage quoted above from the decision of the Tribunal in the matter of Ian Burnham Mitchell was quoted in the matter of John Anthony Picone LPDR 1 of 1993 at page 14. In that case also a solicitor falsely witnessed and certified signatures of absent signatories. That conduct was found to be professional misconduct. The professional misconduct of the Solicitor is of a grave nature and places in issue his fitness to practise. Nonetheless in considering all the circumstances the evidence and the authorities the Tribunal is of the view that this is not a case where the Tribunal should order the removal of the name of the Solicitor from the roll. The Tribunal has come to this conclusion for the following reasons: 1. The function of the Tribunal is protective and not punitive. The Solicitor has had a very heavy financial burden imposed on him by the award against him of damages and costs in the Supreme Court proceedings before Finlay J and in the subsequent appeal, leading to his bankruptcy. 2. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Solicitor fully understands the gravity of his misconduct and that he is not likely to offend again in a similar manner. 3. The acts complained of arise out of one transaction and in this sense although there were several acts they can be grouped as one incident. 4. The Solicitor has an otherwise unblemished record extending over a period of some 25 years and a number of his professional peers who made declarations on his behalf and who have had dealings with him consider him to be a fit and proper person to practise as a solicitor notwithstanding the subject matter of the complaint. 5. The appropriate order is the imposition of a fine. The Tribunal therefore makes the following orders: 1. The Solicitor pay a fine of $4,000.00 within a period of 30 days from the date of this order. 2. The Solicitor be suspended from practice at the expiration of the said period of 30 days if the said fine shall not have been paid. 3. The Solicitor pay the costs of the Law Society, such costs to be assessed on a solicitor client basis as if taxed in the Supreme Court. 4. If agreement cannot be reached between the Solicitor and the Law Society as to the amount of such costs either party shall have liberty to apply. Dated this 10th day of May 1993. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.