Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales CITATION: Armytage v Doust Plumbing Supplies [2005] NSWIRComm 1002 APPLICANT: Ms. Allison Armytage PARTIES: RESPONDENT: Doust Plumbing FILE NUMBER(S): 6349 of 2003 CORAM: Ritchie C Termination of employment unfair dismissal whether termination harsh,unresonable, unjust whether application frivolous,vexatious respondent submitted no case to answer respondent provided limited evidence issue of the use of mobile phone for private use CATCHWORDS: no case to answer application dismissed frivolous and or vexatious claim dismissed applicant not provided with any written warnings applicant not provided with substantial or procedural fairness found dismissal harsh,unjust,unreasonable Order made in favour of applicant LEGISLATION CITED: Industrial Relations Act 1996 Peden v Lake Macquarie Refrigeration Pty Limited (IRC 3157 of 2003) Western Suburbs District Ambulance Committee v Tipping[1957]AR (NSW) 273 CASES CITED: Antonakopoulos v State Bank of New South Wales (1999) 9I IR 385 Mason v Electricity Commission of NSW (1995) 62 IR 441 HEARING DATES: 12/03/2004 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/28/2005 APPLICANT Mr. M. Diamond of McCarthy Ausgroup Pty Ltd LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: RESONDENT: Mr G. McCorry of Labourline- Industrial & Workplace Relations Consulting DECISION: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES CORAM: RITCHIE C. 28 January 2005 Matter No IRC 2003/6349 IN THE MATTER OF: Allison Armytage and Doust Plumbing Supplies Application by Allison Armytage re unfair dismissal pursuant to section 84 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996. DECISION [2005] NSWIRComm 1002 Background. 1 On 5 November 2003 Ms. Allison Armytage (the applicant) filed a claim for unfair dismissal under section 84 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (the Act). In her application the applicant stated that she commenced employment with Doust Plumbing Supplies on 12 May 2003 and was terminated on 15 October 2003. 2 The application was allocated to Cambridge C. As a consequence of an application made by one of the parties under section 173 of the Act, the matter was reallocated to myself by the President of the Commission. Whilst Cambridge C. had provided to the parties a timetable for the filing and serving of evidentiary material I varied that and the matter was set down for hearing for 8 November 2004. As a consequence of the sudden ill health of the wife of the applicant's legal representative which required hospital treatment , the hearing date was cancelled and a new hearing date of 3 December 2004 was set. 3 At the hearing the applicant was represented by Mr. Mark Diamond of McCarthy Ausgroup Pty Ltd. 4 Mr. Graham McCorry of Labourline-Industrial &Workplace Relations Consulting appeared for The Leak Doctor Pty Ltd t/a Doust Plumbing Products. 5 A Notice to Produce had been filed by the respondent's legal representative on 1 October 2004 but was not pressed as an agreement had been reached between the two representatives that the information sought would be provided by the applicant during examination in chief. 6 The applicant filed an affidavit on 24 August 2004 and Mr. Phillip Doust the Company Director of the respondent filed an affidavit on 1 October 2004. There was no affidavit in reply filed by the respondent. There was no Employer's Reply to Application For Relief In Relation To Unfair Dismissal in the file. Preliminary Issue. 7 At the commencement of proceedings Mr. McCorry made an application without notice to have the application dismissed on the basis that the claim was frivolous and vexatious. It was the respondent's submission that they had acted on a notice to discontinue that they had received by the applicant's then legal representatives Employment Help Lawyers. The respondent's representative signed the document . The document was never filed. The document as shown to the Commission was not completed correctly as there was no signature in the space allocated for the applicant. 8 Mr. McCorry also argued that as the applicant did not file an affidavit in reply then the applicant had not established her case. The applicant believed she was terminated because she advised the respondent that she was pregnant yet in her own evidentiary material other issues were raised that may have been the reason for termination. Also as she did not file an affidavit in reply then she avoided any inference that would not have assisted her case. 9 The respondent's case was if the Commission only relied on the applicant's affidavit then the Commission can not be satisfied. 10 In reply Diamond quoted Peden v Lake Macquarie Refrigeration Pty Limited (IRC 3157 of 203) which went to the tests of " frivolous or vexatious " and it was his submission that the Commission must be seized of the case prior to making any determination with respect to this issue. 11 After hearing the submissions of both parties I was not satisfied that the application should be dismissed at that stage of proceedings under section 162 of the Act. The matter then proceeded and at the end of final submissions I reserved my decision. The Applicant's Case. 12 As previously stated the applicant commenced with the respondent on 12 May 2003. The respondent is based in Western Australia. It was her responsibility as a Sales Representative/Merchandiser to sell the respondent's products to retailers in New South Wales. She was provided with a car and a mobile phone. She was the sole respondent's employee in New South Wales. She received a letter dated 10 April 2003 from Mr. Phillip Doust headed RE- EMPLOYMENT PACKAGE CONTRACT. The letter stated that enclosed was an Employment Application form and Terms and Conditions of Employment and a Position Description. The applicant completed the Employee Application Form on 15 April 2003. In cross examination the applicant denied that she had received a document entitled TERMS and CONDITIONS of EMPLOYMENT and denied that she ticked an INDUCTION AND ORIENTATION CHECKLIST. As a consequence of not sighting these documents she was unaware that she was on a five month probationary period. She stated that she had received the named documents post her termination. 13 Annexures B and C to Exhibit A (the applicant's affidavit) had the respondents legal representative fax name printed on top dated 17 /11/03. The Terms and Conditions of Employment document had the respondent's fax name printed on top with a date of 15 October 2003. 14 The applicant stated that as well as working for the respondent she also worked on a part time basis for Sunpac Finance ,a pharmaceutical company named North-Western Brokering and a company called Motor One. Work for these other companies was done at night and or weekends. The applicant advised that the respondent was aware of this other employment. The applicant stated that she carried out this work to pay for her financial commitments prior to her achieving her bonus with the respondent. During her short period of employment she did not receive a bonus because she did not reach her target. 15 It was the applicant's submission that after she told Mr. Doust in the second or third week of September 2003 that she was pregnant, his attitude towards her changed. She stated that his attitude was one of aggression and hostility. 16 The applicant then received a letter from Mr. Doust dated 24 September 2003 (annexure D). The letter in brief sought for the applicant to fill in the time sheets in a particular fashion as per an attached example, to fill in the kilometres at the start and finish of each week, to extend her five month trial period to seven months and commented about the servicing of the company car. It ended with a hope " that these issues can be resolved for a more harmonious and successful workplace." The applicant's reaction to this letter was one of shock. The applicant said she did not agree to the extension to the probationary period. She believed she had a permanent job. It was the applicant's view that Mr. Doust was imposing unrealistic workloads and did not appreciate that she was pregnant. She believed that Mr. Doust's attitude towards her had changed and she assumed it was because she was pregnant. 17 Attached to the applicant's affidavit (annexure E) was a memo from Head Office dated 26 September 2003 from Kai asking for input into a promotion that the applicant had recently successfully carried out . She became confused with this memo because it was contrary in tone to what she had received in comparison to the letter of two days before. 18 The applicant recalled that she had a telephone conversation with Mr. Doust on 10 October 2003. She stated that she asked whether her job was safe and he replied that he would be coming to Sydney and that nothing would be done that was not mutually agreed upon. The applicant said that as a consequence of the tone of the call she contacted a person to seek legal advice because she had concerns about her job. 19 The applicant stated in cross examination that she was told by phone on 15 October 2003 that the reasons for termination was because she had refused to pay for personal telephone calls, she was not servicing her territory properly and that he was the boss and he could do what he wanted. She also agreed that Mr. Doust had said he would rather loose business than have her working for him, because he could not trust her ,was tired of asking her to do things and that he could not afford to have an employee like her working for him because he was " fucking punch drunk from all the problems you have caused me. " (transcript p.41. 20) 20 The applicant agreed that she had been given reasons for her termination and that Mr. Doust had denied that pregnancy was the reason. 21 The applicant received a letter dated 15 October 2003 signed by Mr. Doust confirming her termination. He sought to arrange to pick up the company car within 24 hours. If this did not occur he would report the car as stolen. The applicant would be paid the full amount owing to her once the personal expenses had been calculated and deducted. It stated that he was happy to meet with the applicant on 29 October when stock and the return of equipment could be reconciled. 22 The applicant received a letter dated 16 October 2003 signed by Laura Kazmirowicz, Officer Manager of the respondent stating that $700 of private phone calls had been incurred on the respondent's mobile phone . The letter went onto to say that as the applicant had failed to cooperate in the returning of company equipment, then the company were undertaking legal advice in calculating a new termination package. 23 The applicant stated that she was stunned by the letter of 16 October. She had never been told not to use her mobile phone for personal calls. The issue of the $700 phone calls had not been raised prior to 15 October. She said that she was then told that she would not be getting paid that week because they were deducting it out of her pay. She felt that this was unfair as she had never been given the opportunity to review the phone bills. 24 The applicant believed that the letter of the 16th was an attempt to intimidate her. As a consequence she wrote back to the respondent agreeing to pay, even though she thought this is unfair, some $486. 25 The applicant stated that there had been a conversation with Mr. Doust about her using the mobile too much for personal calls. She was unsure as to when that call actually took place but was around 10 October 2003 or the Monday prior to her termination . She told him that she had never been told not to use the phone for private use. She said she would cut back the use and only use it for emergency calls. It was the applicant's view that because of the long days that she was putting in and the distances she was travelling in New South Wales that using the company mobile phone for private use was a fringe benefit. 26 A great deal of time was spent by the respondent's legal representative in the cross examination of the applicant concerning her movements on particular days. By taking her weekly time sheets and seeking to match them with the mobile phone calls the respondent sought to show that the applicant had not completed her weekly time sheets accurately. The documentation for this was found as annexures to the affidavit of Mr. Phillip Doust. The issues raised in cross examination had not been previously raised by the respondent whilst the applicant was in employment but had been discovered after she had been terminated. 27 The applicant stated that she completed her weekly time sheet at the end of each week by noting what was written in her diary. The requirement to fill out the actual times and the hours had only commenced at the end of September. 28 One example raised by the respondent was 7 October. The applicant stated that on the afternoon/night she attended a water conservation night for the retailer Bunnings at the Lidcombe RSL. On that night the applicant was accompanied by her husband who assisted her in carrying some heavy boxes. Phone calls were made during the period of the function away from the Lidcombe area. During that period the applicant and her husband separately left the club to either return to their house to pick up extra pamphlets or drop off their daughter. The calls were made in areas between the club and her house. The applicant denied that she had lied on her time sheet. 29 The respondent had a UBD map of Sydney made exhibit 1. 30 The applicant admitted that occasionally she used the respondent's assets for her other jobs but denied not giving all her time and effort towards the respondent's business. 31 The applicant was asked about her travels on 9 October . On that day the applicant travelled around Sydney visiting clients. The applicant admitted that she noted the time she left home, the stores she visited and the time she returned home. In doing that, she noted that she had not accurately complied with a direction from the respondent of noting the actual time she arrived/departed each store. 32 The applicant was questioned about her store movements on 10 October and how they matched her mobile phone calls. She admitted that she may have made some errors but she had not lied. 33 The applicant was examined on her whereabouts on 22 September . On that day she had the company car booked in for a service to be carried out at the applicant's house. At the time of the service the applicant used her own car and made phone calls. There was a dispute between the parties as to what time the service was actually carried out and what happened with respect to having the tyres changed that afternoon. 34 The applicant was asked about her movements on 21 July. At that time the applicant said that she was required to call on small retail chains but was only required to list the major chains or ones that showed an interest. She therefore did not list the cold calls. She denied carrying out her own business at that time. 35 The applicant was then asked about her movements on 26 and 27 July. Again the respondent said there was a discrepancy between her time sheets and the mobile phone calls. The applicant was travelling from Tamworth to Coffs Harbour and then back to Sydney. In reality it would seem that the applicant started in Dubbo travelled up to Tamworth and onto to Coffs Harbour and then back to Sydney. The applicant confirmed that she arrived in Coffs Harbour on 25 July after travelling from Tamworth. The applicant advised that she never noted any cold calls because she was not required. 36 The applicant was questioned concerning the respondents requirement to forward receipts of purchases. The applicant stated that she had presented receipts at the Perth conference and that she forwarded other receipts at approximately six week intervals. The applicant said in answering to a question from myself as to what is a termination package ? A. He rang up, he said that if I just went about it without going through solicitors, that he would pay me all my holiday pay, he would pay me a weeks lieu in pay and he would waver the personal phone calls. Q. Right. A. And then he told me that he was not paying me the weeks lieu in pay because I was trying to use things as a bartering tool . Q. You were trying to-? A. He said that I was trying to use the fact that I had his company vehicle and his stock as a bartering tool, and therefore he was going to deduct any expenses he felt that I had incurred out of my allowances, and he put that in, and I did not receive any of my allowances until after a month after I was put off. 37 In answering questions from myself the applicant advised that at the point of interview she advised Mr. Doust that she would continue working for Sunpac Finance as she could not survive on the respondent's salary alone until at least the commissions commenced. She also said that at no time did she " agree " with Mr. Doust as expressed in annexure D exhibit A with respect to the extension of the probationary period. In responding to a question on her annexure D ,whilst the applicant agreed that Mr. Doust had expressed hope for her future employment ,his tone in a telephone conversation the previous day was not the same. The applicant confirmed that she had used the respondent's mobile phone to not only call her family but also business calls with her other employment. The applicant justified the making of such calls and the frequency, on the requirement to work long hours and travel away from home and that she had never been told that she could not do it. 38 At no time was she explained what the company policy was with respect to the use of mobile phones. She advised that at no stage did she receive any written warnings concerning her work. 39 The applicant advised that after her termination by the respondent she continued working a part time job until she started her full time job at the end of December 2003. 40 Prior to the end of the applicant giving evidence Mr. McCorry sought for the affidavit of Mr. Doust to be marked as an exhibit. This I refused and stated that once Mr. Doust was a witness I would then mark his affidavit, subject to any objection by Mr. Diamond. 41 When the applicant's case had closed, Mr. McCorry advised that he would not be calling Mr. Doust as a witness. As a consequence of this, Mr. Diamond made an application that the Commission direct the respondent to give such evidence as may be necessary, limited to the preparedness of the respondent to honour any order made by the Commission. It was Mr. Diamond's submission that the respondent had a complete absence of any business presence in New South Wales . There was not even a registered business. 42 Mr. McCorry submitted that an order made in a New South Wales magistrate's court is enforceable in Western Australia. No undertaking is required. 43 I dismissed Mr. Diamond's application . Applicant's Final Submissions. 44 It was Mr. Diamond's submission that the applicant had been terminated without any written warnings. She had an apprehension that the employment relationship was not going well, but she was unsure of why. It was not until she was terminated that the issue of the alleged mobile phone calls beyond the scope of what should have happened crystallised. 45 In the applicant's mind she felt a change in Mr. Doust's attitude towards her post her telling him that she was pregnant. It was a factor in her thinking. A short period later she received a letter from Mr. Doust raising some issues, then she received phone calls and then she was terminated by phone. The applicant in cross examination made concessions that there were some inaccuracies in her filling out of her time sheets, but there were no documents before the Commission. The application was neither frivolous or vexatious. 46 The Commission should also take into account that the respondent had chosen to evade being tested. It is therefore open to the Commission to infer that the reason he had chosen to evade being tested was because he was most concerned about what that might lead to. 47 The applicant was not given a fair go, was unfairly dismissed within the terms of the legislation and must be compensated. Final Submissions of the Respondent. 48 It was Mr. McCorry's submission that it is not the role of the Commission to conduct an inquiry into all the circumstances of this matter and then make a determination. The role of the Commission is to determine whether the applicant has made out her case. The applicant's case is that she was terminated because she was pregnant. It stands or falls on that. The applicant made no complaint that it was unfair to terminate her because of the phone calls nor did she make any complaint about being terminated due to issues raised in the letter of 24 September 2003. The reason why she was terminated was the problems the respondent was experiencing with the applicant when she was terminated. Her evidence in chief went to her pregnancy and the subsequent perceived change of attitude by Mr. Doust. There was simply insufficient evidence for the Commission to find based on her evidence that she was terminated because she was pregnant. That was why the respondent had made a no case to answer submission. Even if there was a doubt as to the pregnancy issue then there are the applicant's misconduct admissions in cross examination about matters found post termination . 49 The respondent accepted that the letter of 24 September 2003 could not be considered as a warning letter. 50 There was also the evidence that she was terminated not because of making the private phone calls but that she refused to pay for them. Applicant's Final Submission in Response. 51 In reply Mr. Diamond noted the comments as expressed in paragraph 11 of the Exhibit A. Her complaint goes beyond termination on the grounds of pregnancy. In her view she was being treated differently and she did not know the reason why. He rejected the basis of the respondent's submission. The role of the Commission in a contested unfair dismissal case was to determine whether the applicant received a fair go. The applicant was open and honest in her responses in contrast to the respondent who refused to be tested. 52 The applicant sought an order for three months pay in compensation. Considerations and Decision. 53 It was the respondent's case that there was no case to answer because the applicant had not proven her case that she was terminated because she was pregnant. Because she had failed to prove that this was the reason, then her application must fail. 54 It was the applicant's case that in her view there had been a change in the attitude of Mr. Doust post her telling him that she was pregnant. He became aggressive in his attitude towards her. 55 The termination of the applicant on 15 October 2003 was by way of a mobile telephone call when the issue of the private calls was raised. As stated by the respondent's advocate the termination resulted as a consequence of the argument the applicant and Mr. Doust had over the private phone calls and her refusal to pay for them. 56 The applicant admitted that she was told by Mr. Doust that the reason for termination was the $700 phone bill and her refusal to accept responsibility for same. The applicant denied that she would not accept liability for the phone bill . 57 The applicant believed that she had not been given any direction that she could not make personal calls and that she had not been given the opportunity to review the mobile phone bill. She therefore was of the view that she had been treated unfairly and that the reason given was to mask the real reason ,which in her mind was her pregnancy. 58 The applicant bears the onus of proof to establish that intervention is warranted. In Western Suburbs District Ambulance Committee v Tipping[1957] AR (NSW) 273 at 279 ,the Commission noted that: "the onus is on the applicant to establish that intervention is warranted....he must discharge the onus which rests on him to satisfy the Commission that his is a proper case for the Commission's intervention." 59 In determining whether a decision to dismiss an employee was harsh ,unreasonable or unjust , the Commission will assess the procedures followed by an employer to see whether the procedures that were followed were unfair. A detailed exposition of the application of the relevant principles is contained in Antonakopoulos v State Bank of New South Wales (1999) 91IR 385. In that case , the Commission held that the adoption of, or application of, an unfair procedure may itself result in a dismissal being harsh, unreasonable or unjust (at 387-391). 60 Section 88 of the Act contains provisions which import some of the requirements for procedural fairness where an employee has been terminated from employment. Identical provisions under s249 of the Industrial Relations Act 1991(NSW) were analysed by Hill J. in Mason v Electricity Commission of NSW (1995) 62IR436 at 441 to 442. Hill J's conclusions were referred to with approval by the full bench in Antonakopoulos at 389: We agree with the conclusion of Hill J that procedural issues , that is the failure to deal with the matter in a procedurally fair way, may, in certain cases, of themselves constitute the basis for a determination that a dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. A failure to adopt a procedure which constitutes a breach of "an essential prerequisite to ,or inviolable limitation on, the exercise of the employer's right to dismiss " or a failure to afford procedural fairness which causes a "substantial and irrevocable prejudice to the employee " will often vitiate the decision of an employer and warrant, in itself, a determination that the dismissal was harsh, unreasonable or unjust (and hence, establish the basis for a remedy under the Act). Further , a decision to dismiss made upon the basis of procedures which are unfair and where an innocent explanation or other appropriate explanation is reasonably available will normally constitute a firm basis for a determination that a dismissal , so effected , is harsh ,unreasonable or unjust. 61 After considering all the applicant's evidence and her responses I believe this is a case that requires the intervention of the Commission. In doing so I have considered the submission by the respondent's advocate that this was a no case to answer but have rejected this submission. In considering an unfair dismissal case I believe it is incumbent on the Commission to consider all relevant aspects of the employment history and the actual termination prior to arriving at a determination. 62 I also reject the submission that this application was frivolous or vexatious. I have considered the full bench judgement in Peden and after considering the evidence in this matter I can not come to the conclusion that this application falls under either of those two headings. The applicant had a proper case to bring before this Commission and I saw no collateral purpose for the claim. 63 I accept the evidence of the applicant that she experienced a change in Mr. Doust's attitude towards her which resulted in her being treated with hostility and aggression. I do this on the basis as there was no evidence from Mr. Doust at all as to what other reasons ,other than her pregnancy, may have changed the way he spoke to her. 64 I asked the following question to the applicant: Q. Why do you remember 10 October then ? A. Because it was my brothers birthday, and he rang me just after my brother had- that was my brother 's birthday and Mr. Doust rang me just after my brother had called me, and I was just turning onto the expressway off Parramatta when I got the call. It was a Friday, and in that conversation I actually asked Mr. Doust was my job safe. And that is what I recall. Q. And what was his answer ? A. His answer was that he would be coming to Sydney and that nothing would be done that was not mutually agreed on. That was his exact answer. And I asked him again but was my job safe, and he said , there is a lot of things that we need to go over when I come to Sydney, we will go through these things , nothing will be done that is not mutually agreed upon. 65 Five days later the applicant was terminated. In my view this termination lacked both substantial and procedural fairness. There was no evidence before the Commission that the respondent objected to the applicant using the company mobile phone for personal use. When the volume of personal calls was brought to the applicant's attention by Mr. Doust on around 10 October the applicant said she would only use the phone for emergency calls. In my view an appropriate request and an appropriate answer. The submission that it was the failure of the applicant to take responsibility for the personal calls was clearly refuted by the applicant. She wanted to sight the itemised phone bill . In my view again a reasonable request. She only agreed to pay a portion of the bill when she feared that her termination pay would not be paid in full, and therefore have difficulties in meeting mortgage repayments. It was to have deductions taken from it ,without her authority. If such deductions had been made without the applicant's authority it would have in my view constituted an illegal act. 66 As Mr. Doust did not give evidence I do not know why he did not stick to his original plan of discussing issues face to face with the applicant on his next visit to Sydney. That face to face meeting should have taken place. It would have given the respondent the opportunity to clearly outline any issues he had with the applicant's work performance, explain and if necessary correct any misconceptions of the applicant. It would have also given the applicant the opportunity to respond and clarify any issues. It is unfortunate that such a meeting did not take place. 67 The applicant was terminated without any written warning concerning any aspect of her work performance. 68 It is my view based on the evidence that came before this Commission that the applicant's termination was harsh, unjust and unreasonable. 69 Whilst it was not strongly pushed by the respondent as a defence to the termination I believe it is appropriate that I consider the probationary period. The applicant worked from 12 May 2003 until terminated on 15 October 2003. A period of 5 months and 3 days. 70 Regulations in the Act under Part 3 -UNFAIR DISMISSALS , Clause 6 OTHER EXEMPTIONS FROM UNFAIR DISMISSAL PROVISIONS (1) (c) state: employees serving a period of probation or qualifying period, if the duration or period, or the maximum duration of the period, is determined in advance and either (i) the period, or the maximum duration is 3 months or less, or (ii) if the period, or the maximum duration is more than 3 months -the period , or the maximum duration , is reasonable having regard to the nature and circumstances of the employment. 71 Whilst it was the applicant's evidence that she was unaware of the five month probationary period placed on her employment until it was extended without her agreement to seven months, there was no evidence before the Commission by the respondent justifying the original five months as opposed to the standard three months period. As a consequence I do not believe the applicant was under a period of probation at the time of her termination. 72 Finally I refer to the issue raised in cross examination that went to the weekly time sheets and the mobile telephone calls. The applicant made admissions that her records were not accurate but were written in a general fashion at the end of each week. She admitted she had made mistakes but had not sought to mislead. As the documentation that was used in cross examination by the respondent did not form part of the case I believe it would be unwise to draw any negative conclusions on such admittances without the author of the proposed affidavit being subjected to cross examination. 73 I therefore conclude that it would be appropriate that an order for compensation be made in this matter. ORDER 1. That The Leak Doctor Pty Ltd t/a Doust Plumbing Products shall pay to Allison Armytage the sum of $5624 within 21 days. 2.This order shall take effect on and from 28 January 2005. D. RITCHIE COMMISSIONER D.W. RITCHIE COMMISSIONER DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.