New South Wales Supreme Court CITATION : REGINA v. NOYES [1999] NSWSC 397 revised - 30/04/99 CURRENT JURISDICTION : Criminal FILE NUMBER(S) : 70011/98 HEARING DATE(S) : Tuesday 27 April 1999 JUDGMENT DATE : 27 April 1999 PARTIES : REGINA v. Jeffrey William NOYES JUDGMENT OF : Greg James J at 1 COUNSEL : Crown: P. Hock Accsed: M. Austin SOLICITORS : Crown: S.E. O'Connor Accused: T.A. Murphy CATCHWORDS : Murder - Defence of mental illness - special verdict - order for detention. ACTS CITED : Evidence Act Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 Regina v. Gillett [1999] NSWSC 115 CASES CITED : Regina v. Maxwell [1999] NSWSC 281 Regina v. Gavranovic [1999] NSWSC 205 DECISION : Special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness pursuant to s.38 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990. Order made under s.39. NOYES -10- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES CRIMINAL DIVISION No. 70011 of 1998 GREG JAMES, J. TUESDAY 27 APRIL 1999 REGINA v. JEFFREY WILLIAM NOYES JUDGMENT HIS HONOUR: 1 The accused, Jeffrey William Noyes, was indicted before me on a single count that on or about 16 November 1997 at Seven Hills in the State of New South Wales he murdered his mother Shirley Adelaide Noyes. 2 An election was made on the advice of his legal representatives for trial by Judge alone, which election was accepted by the Director of Public Prosecutions. I was advised by his counsel, Mr. Austin, and by the Crown Prosecutor that no question of any unfitness for trial or to plead presently existed. 3 When the trial was called on, the accused pleaded not guilty before me. Mr. Austin, who appears for the accused, advised me that the only matter that arose at the trial for decision was as to a defence of mental illness and that no contest was made on the part of the defence with the propositions that the accused caused his mother's death with the requisite intent so that the offence of murder would have been committed except for the mental illness defence. 4 Mr. Austin explained that the plea of not guilty was to be understood as putting that matter only in issue. Thereafter, the accused made all necessary admissions as to the other necessary matters and made them pursuant to s.184 of the Evidence Act. 5 The Crown tendered in evidence a statement of facts cross-referenced to various statements provided to the police prior to committal. Those statements were also tendered. Those statements included various statements made by the accused at the time at which he was apprehended at his mother's home and made subsequently to the police. Those statements were relied on by both the prosecution and the defence, both of which urged me to receive them and to act on them. 6 Both the prosecution and the defence contended that those statements amounted, not only to admissions that the accused had with intent to kill, killed his mother in the very way in which the post mortem certificate of the forensic pathologist indicated she had been injured, but also indicated that at the time his mental state was so deranged that he was, by reason of mental illness, unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his act or, alternatively, that his act was wrong. The statements would at common law have been admissible to prove both the fact of what had occurred and the fact of mental illness. 7 In short form, at about half past four in the morning on 16 November 1997 the accused telephoned 000 and requested an ambulance and a priest attend his mother's home. On the arrival of the police and the ambulance, the accused, who was then wearing green and gold football shorts and other clothing, was seen to be splattered with blood. 8 The accused spoke to Constable Lind, asserted matters from which it appeared he was suffering from religious mania, including his believing that his mother needed to be killed, requesting an exorcism, and that the police should not enter the premises until after a priest had been obtained. 9 The body of the deceased, upon examination in the premises, had been injured in a way which indicated that whoever had inflicted the injuries upon her was severely deranged. On the body a small plaque of stained glass had been placed. There was evidence that the deceased died from a battering to her head and from the infliction of other bizarre injuries which it is not necessary that I detail. 10 The accused admitted to the police that he had killed his mother. He had asserted that he needed to do that because of his views, of a delusional nature, relating to his mother, her relationships, and the imminence of her giving birth to a child. He linked his activities to his wearing the green and gold shorts, which he described as emblematic of Australia. He claimed he had done a service to the world and put paid to the prospective birth of a demon. At one stage it appeared as though he might have become conscious of the nature of what he had done and sought that he be afforded the opportunity to be able to contact his sister in the Nepean Hospital so that "Mum could be put back together again". 11 Numerous statements have been provided by the Crown of the accused's prior mental condition and aggressive and vicious behaviour over many years. No contest has been made as to even the detail of those statements. I accept what is contained in them as powerful evidence to show how grossly the accused's behaviour had become disturbed and how appalling in consequence was his conduct towards the members of his family, and in particular his mother. 12 As the Crown submits, the picture which emerges from the statements is of a very disturbed man who was delusional and aggressive, particularly towards his mother, and that that delusional and aggressive state escalated manifesting itself in peculiar aggressive behaviour in the weeks prior to his mother's death. During that time in particular the behaviour took on a religious dimension, which explained the concerns he had and the manner of the death, to an extent. 13 The accused plainly had suffered from prior bouts of insanity, if not a continued and chronic condition, as was evidenced on his admission to Cumberland Hospital on 13 January 1996, to Bungarribee House at Blacktown Hospital on 19 January 1996, the finding of the magistrate of mental illness on 25 January 1996, and the admission of 6 May 1997 to Bungarribee House. 14 In addition, he had suffered a closed head injury in a motor bike accident occasioning his admission to the Westmead Hospital on 13 June 1993. I do not detail to any greater extent the observations made by his family members of him or the material contained in the hospital files and discharge summaries since the question of whether at the time the accused was suffering from mental illness has been investigated thoroughly by Dr. Bruce Westmore, whose report, Exhibit 1, of 19 May 1998 has been provided to me, and subsequently most extensively by Dr. Robert Lewin on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, whose report of 2 October 1998 comprises part of Exhibit A. 15 Dr. Westmore examines the background of the accused and in particular his assertions at the interview he had with the doctor on 16 May 1998. He notes that there was a recent history of delusions referred to in the prison hospital medical notes. 16 He concludes:- "The history indicates that your client was severely mentally ill at the time this incident occurred. The attack on his mother which resulted in her death was driven by delusional beliefs. There is a religious flavour to his delusions, as well as beliefs regarding the devil and cults. The banging of the mother's window appears to have particular significance for him, he believed people had been entering the mother's bedroom and possibly have sexual relationships with her. He talks about his mother becoming fatter, his belief that she might be pregnant and that she might deliver the devil's child. The nature of the offence appears to have some relevance to these belief systems. Your client was mentally ill at the time this incident occurred, he has the defence of mental illness available to him. He is suffering a disease of the mind, specifically paranoid schizophrenia. The illness would have totally deprived him of his capacities at the time the offence occurred. He requires ongoing psychiatric support and supervision and will need this to be in place for some time to come." 17 Dr. Lewin examined in detail the medical notes and reports both in the Corrections Health Service medical file and from the various hospitals to which the accused had previously been admitted. He had already read the coroner's report and the police statement of facts, together with much of the material contained in the statements by members of the family concerning the accused's prior conduct. He was aware of the physical consequences of the motor bike accident. He had the advantage of Dr. Westmore's report and himself was able to have the advantage of interviewing the accused. He refers to the delusional beliefs and hallucinations of a bizarre kind suffered by the accused, which were consistent with the written records and the physical evidence recorded by the anatomical pathologist. 18 He considered the background history of Mr. Noyes and his past psychiatric history, which it seemed again was consistent with the diagnosis to which he eventually came. He concluded:- "At the time of the death of his mother, Mr. Noyes was clearly suffering from a psychotic illness. That illness had its origins in a genetic predisposition but it is very likely indeed that this condition was worsened to a very marked degree by his abuse of marijuana. On clinical grounds I suspect that he was using amphetamine much more heavily than he acknowledged. These drugs of abuse are known to worsen the severity and intensity of a paranoid psychotic illness." 19 Dr. Lewin went on to discuss the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and expressed the view that Mr. Noyes had a mental illness at the time of the death of his mother, harbouring a range of delusional beliefs over a prolonged period of time. His report regarding those delusional beliefs was consistent with and reiterated the data Dr. Lewin had gained from other sources. 20 He was of the opinion that at the time of the death of his victim Mr. Noyes was labouring under a defect of reason which he attributed to Mr. Noyes' delusional ideas regarding the devil. These delusional ideas were, in Dr. Lewin's opinion, part of a paranoid schizophrenic illness. Dr. Lewin was of the view that at the time the act occurred Mr. Noyes did not know that what he was doing was wrong. 21 Having regard to the whole of the material, I conclude that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had attacked his mother with intent to kill her, occasioning her death; that at the time that he did so he was suffering from the conditions that the unchallenged, unanimous views of the psychiatrists, supported by the whole of the evidence, consider was then afflicting him. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt therefore of all the matters that, except for the defence, would constitute the offence, but I am satisfied to the requisite extent that at the time of the acts causing death the accused was suffering from mental illness so as not to be responsible according to law for his actions, that is to say, he was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. 22 I am thus satisfied of the matters which would require the special verdict required by s.38 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, that is, that the accused is not guilty by reason of mental illness be reached and I return it. In doing so I have regard to the consequences of that verdict. 23 The relevant tests that I have applied in this regard are set out in my judgment in The Queen v. Gillett [1999] NSWSC 115. They also appear in the decision of Hidden, J. in Regina v. Maxwell [1999] NSW SC 281 and that of Regina v. Gavranovic [1999] NSW SC 205, a decision of Newman J. 24 I am required by the legislation to have regard to those matters when reaching my verdict. I have done so, and indeed they are referred to in the judgment of Gavranovic (supra) to which I have referred. 25 As is required by the legislation, I make the order required by s.39 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, that is that Mr. Noyes be detained in such place and in such manner as the court thinks fit until released by due process of law. 26 Jeffrey William Noyes, I order that you be detained in strict custody at the A Ward of the Long Bay Prison Hospital and thereafter in such place as is determined according to law until you are released by due process of law. 27 I am finally obliged to explain to you and to the public generally the legal and practical consequences of the findings and the verdict that I have just delivered. Mr. Noyes will not return to the community but will be detained in strict custody in a place which one may assume will be a psychiatric hospital gazetted under the Mental Health Act 1990. While detained in strict custody in that way he will come under the supervision of a body known as the Mental Health Review Tribunal. It comprises a president or deputy president who has qualifications as a barrister or solicitor, and two other members, one of whom must be a psychiatrist, and the other of whom must be a person having suitable qualifications and experience to serve on that body. 28 Within 14 days after the verdict the tribunal will commence a review of Mr. Noyes' case. At the conclusion of the review it may make a recommendation to the Minister for Health. The recommendation could be either unconditional or subject to conditions as to the manner in which he should be detained thereafter and treated. 29 If the tribunal was satisfied, but only if it was satisfied, that neither his safety nor that of any member of the public would be seriously endangered by his release, it could make a recommendation for his release. If it makes such a recommendation that would be considered by the Department of Health, which in turn would advise the Governor. The Governor, in accordance with the recommendation and advice, could either make an order for the detention or for release, conditional or unconditional. The Governor could only make an order for release where the tribunal itself had recommended release. 30 After that first hearing of the tribunal it can at any later time, and must at least once every six months, review the case. 31 After hearing evidence at a later review it would make a recommendation to the Minister for Health as to the continued detention, care or treatment or as to release, conditional or unconditional. The tribunal would not be free at any such review to make a recommendation for release unless it is satisfied that his safety or that of any member of the public would not be seriously endangered by release. Again, following such a review or recommendation the matter would go to the Department of Health and the Minister would advise the Governor. Any recommendation so advised will only be carried into effect by order of the Governor. 32 If Mr. Noyes was at any time released back into the public on conditions and it appeared that a breach of those conditions took place, then the Governor may order that he be apprehended and detained. Such an order would follow by reason of the practical consideration that if a person is released the Department of Health would maintain a watch over his case with the assistance of a Community Health Centre, a private psychiatrist, or one of the other public facilities available. In other words, if a person is released conditionally back into the community the Department would maintain a watch over him and a breach of any conditions would lead to him being apprehended and detained once again. 33 The conditions which could be applied include matters such as living in a particular place, taking particular medication and so on, to ensure that he was properly cared for and members of the public were protected. Other than pursuant to any such release, Mr. Noyes will remain, as I have said previously, in strict custody in one of the psychiatric institutions catering for forensic patients. 34 The only manner in which a person ceases to be a forensic patient for the purposes of these provisions is when he is unconditionally released by the Governor, or is released upon conditions which include a condition as to the time that his release should become unconditional. If that time expires, then his release becomes unconditional and he ceases to be a forensic patient. However, as I have previously explained, Mr. Noyes or a forensic patient in his position could never be released unless the Mental Health Tribunal, comprising those persons with special qualifications, be satisfied on the evidence available to it that his safety and the safety of any member of the public would not be seriously endangered. 35 In this case therefore it will be a matter for the tribunal as to whether Mr. Noyes should be at liberty at any time during the remainder of his life and the conditions, if any, upon which he should be admitted ********* Last Modified: 30/04/99 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. 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