New South Wales Court of Appeal CITATION : Archer v Archer [2000] NSWCA 314 FILE NUMBER(S) : CA 40455/99 HEARING DATE(S) : 16 March 2000 JUDGMENT DATE : 7 November 2000 PARTIES : Una Evelyn Archer (Appellant) Trevor Robert Archer (Respondent) JUDGMENT OF : Handley JA at 1; Beazley JA at 103; Fitzgerald JA at 180 LOWER COURT JURISDICTION : Supreme Court - Equity Division LOWER COURT 2040/95 FILE NUMBER(S) : LOWER COURT Windeyer J JUDICIAL OFFICER : COUNSEL : Appellant: B Coles QC/P Walsh Respondent: J A Trebeck SOLICITORS : Appellants: Peter Adams & Co Respondents: Garden & Montgomerie by their city agents Turner Whelan CATCHWORDS : Equity - Unconscionable conduct - Undue influence Suitor's Fund Act 1951 (NSW) LEGISLATION CITED : Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW) Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 Linderstam v Barnett (1915) 19 CLR 528 Watkins v Combes (1922) 30 CLR 180 CASES CITED: Hilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646 Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395 McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457 Hawke v Edwards (1947) SR (NSW) 21 Snook v London & West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786 ICT Pty Ltd v Sea Containers Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 640 VACC Insurance Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1999) 47 NSWLR 716 Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 DECISION : Appeal dismissed with costs THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL CA 40455/99 EQ 2040/95 HANDLEY JA BEAZLEY JA FITZGERALD JA Tuesday, 7 November 2000 ARCHER v ARCHER FACTS The appellant and her husband owned a farming property in western New South Wales known as 'Sussex'. The husband also owned a nearby property called 'Glenroy'. Both properties were farmed as a farming partnership. The respondent, one of their three sons, had worked on the properties in partnership with his parents and lived on Sussex. The respondent wanted to have Sussex transferred to him and made arrangements with a solicitor for the transfer to be affected. The appellant was initially reluctant for the transfer to occur but agreed and signed all the necessary documents to transfer the property. No consideration passed from the respondent for the transfer of his parents' interest in the property to him. The appellant appealed on grounds of undue influence and unconscionable conduct. It was the appellant's argument that the trial judge had identified the correct principles of law in relation to these grounds but had not applied the law correctly to the facts. The appellant and her husband initially brought proceedings on the basis that the transfer had been obtained by their son's undue influence on them or by his unconscionable conduct. The trial judge dismissed the claim brought by the appellant and her husband. Only the appellant appeals from that order. HELD Undue Influence (i) per Handley JA, Beazley JA and Fitzgerald JA (in separate judgments): the appellant had not demonstrated that her will was overborne, although she was a reluctant participant in the transaction. (a) per Beazley JA (Handley JA agreeing): the making of a filial claim inconsistent with the wishes of a parent or the potential claims of other siblings does not of itself constitute the exertion of undue influence. Nor does acquiescence in such a claim. (b) per Fitzgerald JA: the appellant cannot succeed on the ground of undue influence if she cannot succeed on the ground of unconscionable conduct. Unconscionable Conduct (ii) per Handley and Fitzgerald JJA (in separate judgments): the appellant was not in a position of special disadvantage and therefore the ground of unconscionable conduct was not made out. (a) per Handley JA: the appellant did not establish that she was unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what was in her best interests nor did her concerns for her husband's health put her in a position of disadvantage. (b) per Fitzgerald JA: the appellant's concern for her husband's health and her knowledge of his wishes for their properties placed her in an initial position of disadvantage vis-a-vis the respondent. However, the relevant point of time for considering the issue is after the signing of the initial documents. At this time, the appellant's decision to proceed with the gift to the respondent implicitly affirmed her earlier signature and delivery of the relevant documents and her decision was unaffected by any position of special disadvantage. (iii) per Handley and Fitzgerald JJA: the respondent did not take unconscientious advantage of the appellant in the steps he took to have Sussex transferred to his name. (a) per Handley JA: it was not unconscionable for the respondent to persuade the appellant or her husband that his moral claims on the property should be recognised so long as they fully understood what they were doing and freely entered into the transaction, nor was there anything unconscionable in taking normal steps to have that agreement implemented. (b) per Fitzgerald JA: the methods used by the respondent to obtain the appellant's signature on the initial documents were unconscionable. However, even if the appellant remained in a position of disadvantage after this time, the respondent's conduct did not constitute operative unconscientious conduct at the relevant point in time. (iv) per Beazley JA (dissenting): the appellant was faced with a situation where she had to either stand on her own against the wishes of her husband and son or accede to their wishes at the expense of her own. This factor, in addition to her concern for her husband's health, placed her in a position of disadvantage vis-a-vis the respondent. (v) per Beazley JA (dissenting): in view of the improvidence of the transaction and the absence of legal or other advice, the respondent took unconscientious advantage of the appellant's position of disadvantage and, accordingly, the appellant should be entitled to relief. ORDERS Appeal dismissed with costs. THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL CA 40455/99 EQ 2040/95 HANDLEY JA BEAZLEY JA FITZGERALD JA Tuesday, 7 November 2000 ARCHER v ARCHER JUDGMENT 1 HANDLEY JA: In this appeal I have had the benefit of reading the reasons for judgment of Beazley JA and Fitzgerald JA in draft form. The basic facts and the history of these proceedings have been set out by Beazley JA. I agree that Mrs Archer's appeal against the dismissal of her undue influence claim fails and I agree with the reasons of Beazley and Fitzgerald JJA for coming to this conclusion. 2 Unfortunately I am unable to agree with the conclusion of Beazley JA that the transfer of two thirds of Mrs Archer's undivided interest in "Sussex" should be set aside because of the unconscionable conduct of Trevor Archer. 3 The principles which the Court is bound to apply in determining whether this particular head of equitable fraud has been established are derived from decisions of the High Court. The transaction was in form a sale of "Sussex" by Mr and Mrs Archer to Trevor for a price of $436,500 which approximated the full market value of the property. Trevor has never paid any part of this price to his parents and both trials were conducted on the common assumption that the transaction was, and was intended, as a gift and that its validity should be determined on that basis. It is now far too late to question this assumption but it does cause certain difficulties. 4 The first consequence of this assumption which calls for comment is that the equitable principles which are relevant to the disposition of this part of the appeal are not those applicable to unconscionable bargains but those applicable to unconscionable voluntary dispositions. The leading decisions therefore are Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 CLR 646; Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; and Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395. 5 The contract of sale (6/1323), which was dated 20 March 1990, was on the standard Real Estate Institute and Law Society form and provided for the full purchase price to be paid by the purchaser on completion. This took place on 9 April 1990 (6/1424-5) when the executed stamped transfer was sent by Cheney & Wilson to the Commonwealth Bank, Canowindra to enable Trevor's mortgage to that Bank to be registered. The certificates of title and discharges of the old mortgages had been sent to the Bank by Cheney & Wilson on 21 March 1990 (6/1414). 6 If the contract of sale had taken effect in accordance with its terms, completion without payment of the purchase price would have created a legally enforceable debt payable by Trevor to his parents (McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Limited (1933) 48 CLR 457, 475-8) secured by an unpaid vendors' lien. 7 The original statement of claim filed on 22 April 1995 did not include any claim to recover the debt, but the amended statement of claim filed on 4 May 1995, and all later versions, sought judgment for the unpaid purchase price. The defence filed on behalf of Trevor pleaded that the transaction had been intended to be, and was, a gift (pars 9-17, 1/22-5). The plaintiffs did not press their claim to recover the unpaid purchase price. 8 The defence of non est factum raised by Mrs Archer before Simos J (that is her defence that there was a radical or fundamental difference between the documents she thought she was signing and the documents she did sign) was rejected by Simos J (7/1573), and has been abandoned. 9 Early in the argument on this appeal (T 3-4) Mr Coles QC said, in answer to a question from the Bench, that the parties had conducted the case on the basis that the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor was a gift of the property. After some further discussion, Fitzgerald JA said that the promise to pay the purchase price in the contract was a sham "because it was never intended that it should operate". Mr Coles agreed and Fitzgerald JA added: "The parties have acted on that basis". Mr Coles then said "It was never Mrs Archer's case she expected to receive any money from the transaction". 10 The full implications of this common assumption may not have been recognised. In Hawke v Edwards (1947) 48 SR (NSW) 21 at 23 Jordan CJ said: "Oral evidence may … be given that the document is a sham - that it was never intended by the parties to be operative according to its tenor at all, but was meant to cloak another and different transaction". 11 In Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, 802 Diplock LJ said: "… if 'sham' has any meaning in law it means acts done or documents executed by the parties … which are intended by them to give to third parties or to the court the appearance of creating … legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend to create. The one thing, I think, is clear … that for acts or documents to be a 'sham' … all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they have the appearance of creating". (emphasis supplied) 12 See also ICT Pty Limited v Sea Containers Ltd (1995) 39 NSWLR 640 at 655-6. 13 The parties must accept this common assumption and the consequences which flow from it. See VACC Insurance Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (1999) 47 NSWLR 716 at 722-5. This appeal must therefore be determined on the basis that "all the parties" to the Contract of Sale had a common intention that "Sussex" would be transferred to Trevor as a gift, and understood that the documents signed in Mr Cheney's office on 24 November 1989 would achieve this result. 14 A claim that Trevor had been guilty of unconscionable conduct in procuring the transfer to himself of the whole of "Sussex" did not become part of the plaintiffs' case until the tenth day of the first trial (7 December 1995), which was the last day on which evidence was taken (4/942). 15 Paragraphs 24-26A of the Statement of Claim, then added in substitution for earlier paragraphs by leave granted by Simos J, alleged (par 25) that the plaintiffs were in a position of special disadvantage when dealing with the defendant by reason of the illness of the first plaintiff, inexperience, inequality of bargaining power and inability to protect their interests, and that (par 16) the defendant took unconscionable advantage of the plaintiffs' disabilities. 16 These paragraphs were added on the limited basis recorded by Simos J (4/942), who stated that counsel for the plaintiffs had informed him: "… that it is not intended that those proposed new paragraphs should raise any new cause of action but [they] are in elaboration of … his clients' current claim related to undue influence". 17 Counsel for the defendant informed Simos J that on that basis he was not prejudiced and did not need to adduce further evidence or undertake further cross-examination. 18 This Court, differently constituted, gave judgment on 23 February 1999 allowing Trevor's appeal from the decision of Simos J setting aside, to the extent of a two thirds share, Mrs Archer's transfer of her half interest in "Sussex". The principal judgment was delivered by Priestley JA, who noted that the case before Simos J had been conducted throughout as an undue influence case, and that it wasn't open to counsel for Mrs Archer to rely in that appeal on an independent case based on unconscionability. 19 On the first day of the new trial before Windeyer J, a further amendment was allowed to make the claim of unconscionability an independent claim (red 65). This amendment was allowed only because counsel for Mrs Archer said he would call no additional evidence. The defendant elected not to seek an adjournment and the trial was able to proceed. In his reserved judgment Windeyer J indicated that he had begun to doubt whether he acted appropriately in allowing the amendment, but the question was not pursued in this Court. 20 It is important to bear in mind that the evidence at the first trial was never directed to this cause of action and Trevor was never called upon to deal with it as an independent claim. The second trial proceeded on the evidence at the first trial, supplemented by fresh cross-examination of the principal witnesses. There was no additional evidence-in-chief on the new cause of action. This Court should therefore hesitate before concluding that the state of the evidence imposed any evidentiary burden on Trevor, and it should be cautious in drawing inferences in favour of Mrs Archer. 21 Unconscionable conduct, as a ground for equitable relief, focuses on the conduct of the defendant. Equitable relief is available on this ground "whenever one party by reason of some condition or circumstance is placed at a special disadvantage vis a vis another, and unfair or unconscionable advantage is then taken of the opportunity thereby created" (Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 at 478-9 per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ citing from the judgment of Mason J in Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 462). The majority in Bridgewater v Leahy referred at 479 with approval to the judgment of the Privy Council in Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 at 1024, where unconscionable conduct as a basis for equitable relief was described as "victimisation which can consist either of the active extortion of a benefit, or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances". In Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (above) Mason J added at 461: "Relief on the ground of unconscionable conduct … will be granted when … [unconscientious] advantage is taken of an innocent party who, though not deprived of an independent and voluntary will, is unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what is in his best interest". 22 Mrs Archer's case essentially depends on the events at the offices of Cheney & Wilson, solicitors, in Orange on Friday 24 November 1989. Of course these events must be set in their context but it was not and could not be alleged that Trevor had been guilty of unconscionable conduct prior to making the relevant appointment to see Mr Cheney, or that he had been guilty of such conduct in what he did, or failed to do, afterwards. 23 Trevor was in partnership with his parents in a grazing business conducted on "Sussex" and "Glenroy". He had a half interest in the partnership and each of his parents had a quarter interest. These proceedings have been conducted on the basis that this was a stock and plant partnership only, and the properties were not partnership assets. It may be noted however that for many years, up to and including 1994, the annual accounts of the partnership showed the properties as partnership assets, and clause 12 of the Partnership Agreement made the accounts binding on the partners after 3 months (5/1114). 24 Windeyer J found that in 1979 the partners had intended to purchase "Sussex" in their joint names, giving Trevor a one third interest, but the Rural Assistance Board (RAB) loan required the title to be taken in the names of Mr and Mrs Archer (red 59). However Trevor was a joint borrower under the loan and the partnership made the payments of principal and interest under that mortgage and the first mortgage to the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, which helped to fund the purchase of "Sussex". 25 Trevor and his wife Sue lived on "Sussex" with her children from a previous marriage, and they had devoted much time and effort to improving the homestead and its surroundings. Trevor and Sue were concerned about their future and their lack of security at "Sussex". From time to time Trevor raised the question of "Sussex" with his parents, but was told that nothing could be done until the RAB loan was paid off. However on 7 January 1988 the RAB wrote to Mr & Mrs Archer requiring the balance of its loan to be paid off by 30 September 1989, and this was confirmed by a follow-up letter on 21 August 1989 (6/1305-6). 26 Trevor had left "Glenroy" as a young man to make his way in the world, but in 1976, when he was working in Canberra, his father asked him to return to "Glenroy" and he did so (1/103). His two other brothers had left at different times, Neville for the second time in 1987, and they were not expected to return. "Sussex" was purchased in 1979. 27 In 1988 Mrs Archer told Trevor that one day "Sussex" would be owned by he and his brothers. Trevor protested saying "that's a bit rough" because he had stayed on at "Sussex" and helped to get the loans to buy it and pay them off and Mrs Archer had said: "I suppose that's right. I'll have to think about that. Anyway we can't do anything until we have paid out the Rural Assistance Board". (1/108) 28 Mrs Archer agreed that such a conversation may have occurred in November or December 1988 (2/468). 29 In March 1989 Mr and Mrs Archer made mirror wills, each in favour of the other if he or she were the survivor, but if that spouse did not survive "Sussex" was given to Trevor, and the residue, which presumptively included "Glenroy", was given to the three sons in equal shares. Windeyer J accepted Trevor's evidence that about that time Mrs Archer gave him copies of both wills and the following conversation took place. Mrs Archer said: "Dad and I have just made new wills and we have appointed you co-executor. Is that all right with you?" He replied "Yes that's fine". She said "Here is a copy of each of our wills". He looked quickly at the wills and said "You're leaving "Sussex" to me?" She said "Yes we've agreed to that". He said "Thanks". (1/108-9) Mrs Archer's evidence that she had not given Trevor copies, and there had been no such conversation, was rejected by Windeyer J. 30 Mrs Archer said in evidence that as she was younger than her husband she expected to survive him, and that her intention in that event was to make a new will leaving "Sussex" to all three of her sons (1/67, 2/418, 472-3). It had been in her family for several generations, and she wanted all her sons to have a share in it. This underlying intention, which seems to have driven this litigation, remained concealed from Trevor who thought that he would be protected by his parents' wills. 31 Matters may have remained there for some years at least, if not indefinitely, but for a further conversation between Mrs Archer and Trevor in August 1989 when she said that if Mr Archer died before her she would have to sell up "Sussex" as well as "Glenroy" to provide for her old age. Trevor said "but if Dad dies you'll get "Glenroy". Won't that be enough?" Mrs Archer replied, "I don't really know" (1/109-10). 32 Trevor was concerned and a few days later, when his wife Sue was present, he told his father about the conversation and said: "That would be very difficult for me. For a start I would not have a house. I've put a lot of time into "Sussex". I know that you and Mum have already put it in your wills but what are the chances of having "Sussex" transferred into my name now?" His father replied: "Yes, I suppose it's time that we transferred it to you. You'd better make some enquiries with a solicitor to see what's involved and let me know". (1/109-10) 33 It has not been suggested that Trevor acted unconscionably in making this request. Beazley JA states in her reasons (12): "The making of a filial claim, inconsistent with either the wishes of a parent or the potential claims of other siblings, does not of itself constitute the exertion of undue influence", and I would add that it does not constitute unconscionable conduct either. Fitzgerald JA in his reasons states (16) that Trevor's attitude was "understandable". I agree and would add that he also had a duty to his wife and stepsons to provide for their future. Trevor's claim was inherently meritorious, bearing in mind that he had returned to "Glenroy" at his father's request in 1976, that he had been working with them on that property and "Sussex" for some 13 years, and but for difficulties created by the RAB loan, he would already have been a one third owner of "Sussex". Mrs Archer agrees that her husband told her about this conversation (2/413-4). 34 On 21 September Trevor and Sue saw Mr Cheney. They were given general advice about their position and the cost, particularly for stamp duty, that would be incurred in taking a transfer of "Sussex". Trevor disclosed to Mr Cheney his mother's attitude to such a transfer, in so far as this was known to him. Mr Cheney's diary note records (6/1382): "She apparently takes the view that the property should be divided among all three sons notwithstanding that the others haven't worked on the property, and Trevor is concerned to protect his interests in this regard. She is also reluctant to transfer her interest in the property during her lifetime as apparently it was a property originally held in her family and she is concerned that in the event that she transfer her assets she will be left without assets in her old age. They are going to discuss the matter further with Mr and Mrs Archer Senior with a view to try to establish a basis on which the transfer can be entered into". 35 Trevor spoke to his father and told him that the stamp duty would be about $27,000 and there would be some legal costs, both of which he would be happy to pay. He said his father told him to "go ahead with it" (black 76). 36 Mr Archer said that he did not tell his wife about all of his conversations with Trevor (1/43), but the findings of Windeyer J establish the contrary. He found that on 26 September there was a conversation between Trevor and his parents at "Sussex" to this effect: Trevor said: "I am relieved that you and Dad have agreed to transfer "Sussex" to me". Mrs Archer said: "I'm prepared to give it to you but not to Sue. I won't have her name on the papers. We will give it to you but not to her". 37 At this stage Sue came into the kitchen and said: "Put it in Trevor's name. It doesn't worry me at all". Trevor said: "I understand the papers will be drawn up in my name only". (1/112) 38 Mr and Mrs Archer must have discussed the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor and reached agreement among themselves, even if agreement had not been reached after Mr Archer's conversation with Trevor referred to in para 32. 39 Trevor fixed the date of this conversation with his parents because they then went to the State Bank, Canowindra to arrange to pay out the outstanding debt to the RAB. The State Bank agreed to make a loan for this purpose, and the partners returned the following day to sign the documents (1/149-156). The RAB mortgage had been secured over "Sussex" and "Glenroy" (5/1082) but the new loan was secured only over "Glenroy" (1/151, 155). 40 Trevor gave evidence, which was accepted, that his father told the Bank Manager that if the Bank required security it should be over "Glenroy" "because we're going to transfer "Sussex" to Trevor" (1/114). Mrs Archer was present and was present the following day when the partners signed the loan documents and Mr Archer signed the mortgage over "Glenroy". The events of 26 September, and the conversation about the transfer of "Sussex", are referred to in Trevor's farm diary (1/157), and the two visits of the Bank are noted in Mr Archer's diary (6/1336). 41 On 16 October Trevor and Sue saw Mr Cheney again and told him that Mr and Mrs Archer had agreed to transfer "Sussex" to Trevor, but not to Sue. Mr Cheney was instructed to prepare the necessary documents. 42 This summary is based on matters which are not in dispute and on the findings of Windeyer J which have not been challenged. On these uncontested facts and findings Trevor was justified in informing Mr Cheney that his parents had agreed to transfer "Sussex" to him by way of gift because this was the truth. Mr Cheney had no reason for disbelieving Trevor, particularly in the light of his frank disclosure of his mother's attitude at their first meeting. 43 After two conversations with Trevor in August and September 1989, Mr Archer had agreed to the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor by way of gift. He kept Mrs Archer informed and she had also agreed that the transfer should take place. She confirmed her agreement in the presence of her husband, Trevor and Sue at "Sussex" on 26 September, and was present when her husband arranged for the State Bank loan to be secured on "Glenroy" because "Sussex" was to be transferred to Trevor. 44 Mr Archer, as Simos J held, was not subject to Trevor's undue influence. His discussions with his wife about the transfer were in private. Mrs Archer was not subject to Trevor's undue influence either, as Windeyer J has held, and this Court will affirm. Mr Archer was apparently in good health and had not yet had his first heart attack. The discussions had proceeded over a number of weeks without any pressure or manipulation from Trevor. In between Mr and Mrs Archer had been away on holidays in Western Australia from 26 August to 16 September (2/403). 45 Mr Archer was the managing partner as a matter of contract under the partnership agreement (1/59), and also in fact as Priestley JA held (red 8). Mrs Archer had the fullest opportunity to discuss the pros and cons of the proposed gift over many weeks with her husband, its effect on her financial security after his death, and any need she might have in that event for both "Sussex" and "Glenroy". She did not need legal advice to know that the immediate gift of "Sussex" to Trevor spelt the end of her wish that all her sons should share in that property after her death. 46 There was no reason for Mr Archer to agree to a transfer of the whole of "Sussex" if he had any doubts about the sufficiency of "Glenroy" and its proceeds of sale to provide for his wife and himself after he retired and to provide for Mrs Archer after his death. There was no evidence that Mr or Mrs Archer suggested to Trevor at this time that he should be content with something less than the whole of "Sussex" because they needed something more than "Glenroy". 47 Trevor received a letter from Cheney & Wilson dated 17 October 1989 (1/163) informing him that the documents had been prepared and that an appointment should be made for his parents to call and sign them. Trevor did not follow up this letter with any haste, and before an appointment could be arranged Mr Archer, on 6 November, suffered his first heart attack and was admitted to Orange Base Hospital. He remained there until 17 November. 48 Soon after his father's discharge from hospital Trevor had a conversation with his parents at "Glenroy" when he told them: "The papers are ready to sign "Sussex" over. When will it suit you to go in and sign the papers?" He said that one of his parents, he did not remember which, said that they could go in on 24 November as Mr Archer had an appointment to see Dr Winkworth (1/118). Trevor made an appointment with Mr Cheney for 12.30 pm that day and told Mrs Archer that he had done so. She said that this was OK (1/119). On the morning in question he went to "Glenroy" to milk the cows and then called at the house to remind his parents of the appointment. He spoke to one or other of them and arranged to call for them at 11.30 to drive them into Orange for the appointment. 49 Windeyer J rejected the evidence of Mr and Mrs Archer that they had no idea on 24 November 1989 that they were going to see a solicitor in Orange to sign documents transferring "Sussex" to Trevor and he accepted Trevor's evidence to the contrary. It was not suggested to Trevor that either of his parents had objected to an early appointment, or asked for it to be put off until Mr Archer was better. If Mrs Archer was starting to have second thoughts she had the better part of a week to raise them with Mr Archer in private. On the findings of Windeyer J Mr and Mrs Archer acted as if they had made their decision and had no second thoughts, and it was just a question of signing the necessary documents to carry their decision into effect. There can be no question of Mrs Archer being taken by surprise either when she was called for at "Glenroy", or when she was taken to Mr Cheney's office and asked to sign documents transferring "Sussex" to Trevor. 50 The events in the solicitor's office were the culmination of a process which had begun more than three months before. Mrs Archer had had the fullest opportunity to discuss the matter with Mr Archer and obtain his advice both before and after his heart attacks. She had confirmed her willingness to proceed with the transaction more than once over the period of two months since 26 September. She may have harboured doubts and some resentment that her wishes for "Sussex" were being frustrated, but she gave no hint of this to Trevor, and could not have given any hint of it to Mr Archer either. He could so easily have put off signing the documents by pleading indisposition following his heart attacks. 51 Mrs Archer was no shrinking violet. She did not hesitate to make known her wish that "Sussex" should not be transferred to Trevor and his wife but only to Trevor alone. Although her note dated 1 December 1989 (Ex 18) has been rejected as a fabrication, her willingness to create and back-date it, and support it with sworn evidence over two trials, demonstrates exceptional determination. Windeyer J, who saw her in the witness box, said: "It is perfectly clear that Mrs Archer was not a person who could be dominated" (red 143). 52 Windeyer J accepted (red 72) the evidence of Mr Cheney about what took place during the appointment on 24 November (1/207-211). His evidence included the following: "I said to Mr and Mrs Archer senior: I have had discussions with Trevor about the transfer of the property "Sussex" into his name. He tells me that he has discussed the transfer with you. Is that correct? Mrs Archer looked at her husband as if waiting for him to answer. I asked Mr Archer senior: Is that correct? He said: Yes. I then said to them: You understand that by signing the documents I have prepared the property will be in Trevor's name and will no longer be your property. You will remain the owners of "Glenroy" and these documents have nothing to do with the property, "Glenroy"? One of them (I cannot remember which) said: Yes, that's right. We continue to own "Glenroy". I then said to them: I have prepared a contract and a transfer and I have made enquiries about the mortgages which have to be discharged. The amount shown on the contract as the price is an estimate only based on figures supplied to me by Trevor but this figure will have to be supported by a valuation to calculate stamp duty. … I then said: Trevor tells me you have paid out the private mortgage. Is that correct? One or both of them answered: Yes. I said: Trevor also tells me the Rural Assistance Board loan has been refinanced and he will take over the National Bank debt and will pay legal costs and stamp duty. Are you prepared to sign the documents and transfer the property to him on that basis without any further payment? Mr Archer Snr answered: Yes. Mrs Archer nodded her head … I then showed them the front page of the contract and where they were described as the vendors. I pointed out to them that Trevor alone was shown as the purchaser. I said: This has got nothing to do with Sue … You will see that the contract refers to "Sussex" only on the front of this contract and that the description of the titles inside the contract has nothing to do with "Glenroy". The contract includes all of the improvements erected on the land. … I then said: You will see the sum of $436,500 on the front of the contract. That has been calculated by reference to a figure of $500 per acre which Trevor regarded as a realistic value for stamp duty purposes and which we believed should be confirmed by the valuer. Do you understand those matters? Both of them said or indicated "yes". I then turned the contract over and I said to them: Would you each like to sign the contract here. They each said or indicated "yes" and both of them signed the contract in my presence". 53 Mr Cheney then explained the transfer and they executed it. Finally he told them that he needed their authority to collect the title deeds from the State Bank at Canowindra and they signed a document for this purpose (6/1332). 54 Mr and Mrs Archer understood the explanations given by Mr Cheney and knew they were making a gift of "Sussex" to Trevor. If Mrs Archer had second thoughts when she was faced with these documents and asked to sign she kept them to herself. Mr Cheney understood that he was documenting a gift which Mr and Mrs Archer had willingly agreed to make. He was entitled to assume that they had discussed the implications of the gift before agreeing to proceed. 55 Mrs Archer said that she did not want to sign the documents but was worried about Mr Archer's health and thought that he might have another heart attack if she refused. I agree with Beazley JA that Windeyer J had no proper basis for rejecting her evidence that she was worried about her husband's health. However this does not establish that these concerns were operating on her mind in Mr Cheney's office and caused her to sign the documents against her will. 56 Mrs Archer's concerns arose after her husband's first heart attack on 6 November, but she had agreed to the transfer of "Sussex" some six weeks before. 57 After Mr Archer was discharged from hospital, he and Mrs Archer agreed to the making of an appointment with the solicitor to sign the documents, were told that it had been made, were reminded of it, and were then called for and driven into Orange. Mrs Archer did not say that she had acquiesced in these arrangements because of her concerns about Mr Archer's health. Her case was that she had no prior knowledge of the appointment or its purpose, and that she was suddenly confronted in Mr Cheney's office with the choice between acquiescence or refusal, and only acquiesced because she feared that her refusal might provoke another heart attack. 58 Mrs Archer's evidence of these events has been rejected. Her case that her will was not independent and voluntary because it was overborne has failed, and the decision by Windeyer J that she knew what she was doing and did it freely (red 82) is to be affirmed. 59 The result in my opinion is that the substratum of fact to support a finding that she only executed these documents because she was concerned about her husband's health does not exist. 60 Such a finding would require acceptance of Mrs Archer's evidence about her thought processes which was inextricably linked with her evidence about earlier events which has been rejected. Indeed she was not accepted on any disputed question. Accordingly a finding that she only signed the documents because of her concerns about her husband's health is precluded by the Abalos principle. In my opinion Mrs Archer did not prove that in the period up to and including 24 November she was "unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what was in [her] best interest" (Amadio at 461 per Mason J). 61 Mr Cheney knew that Mr Archer was retaining "Glenroy". This was subject to the State Bank mortgage of $16,500 (1/152) but was otherwise unencumbered. He mentioned the value per acre put on "Sussex" and its total value on that basis. If Mr and Mrs Archer were not already aware of the value of "Sussex" (an unlikely situation) they were informed about this before they signed the documents. Since the transaction was a gift questions as to the adequacy of the consideration and the awareness of the disponor of any inadequacy do not arise. 62 It was no part of the case of Mr and Mrs Archer in the first trial that they were not aware of the real value of "Glenroy" in 1989 and for this reason lacked a proper understanding of the effect of the transfer of "Sussex" on their interests. The terms on which Windeyer J allowed the amendment to raise unconscionability as an independent claim precluded Mrs Archer from leading evidence on these issues at the second trial. 63 Trevor gave evidence about a conversation with Mrs Archer in August 1989 when she said that she might need both "Sussex" and "Glenroy" to provide for her old age. When Trevor asked her why "Glenroy" would not be enough she merely said "I don't know". She denied this conversation but Windeyer J accepted Trevor's evidence. No attempt was made at the first trial to prove that "Glenroy", or the proceeds of its sale, would not be able to support Mr and Mrs Archer in reasonable comfort and security. Mr Archer told the National Australia Bank in 1992 that he expected "Glenroy" and its stock and plant to realise $500,000 to $600,000 nett (6/1341, 2/391-2) and he said at the first trial that he thought the land was worth $400,000 (2/391). 64 Mr Archer bought "Glenroy" in 1948 (7/1526) and it had been the home of Mr and Mrs Archer ever since. It had been the sole basis of support for them and their family until "Sussex" was acquired in 1979. By 1976 Mr Archer felt the need for help in running "Glenroy" because he asked Trevor to come back to help. Without Trevor's assistance he and Mrs Archer would, almost certainly, not have been willing or able to purchase "Sussex". There is therefore no reason to suppose that "Glenroy" and the proceeds of its sale would not be sufficient to provide for Mr and Mrs Archer in their old age. Mr Archer said that most of the partnership income came from "Glenroy" (1/78) although "Glenroy" comprised only 536 acres (1/46), while "Sussex" had 874 acres (1/77). 65 Mr and Mrs Archer retained their half share in the partnership and the annual accounts for 1989 were in evidence (5/1525 and foll). These disclose a gross income of $101,139.46, expenses of $57,489.30 and nett profits of $43,650.16. The nett assets at book values, excluding the properties and their mortgages, totalled $58,698.17. However the real value of the stock and plant was much greater. On the informal winding-up after 30 June 1994 the stock and plant were divided. Calculations based on market values as at 30 June 1994 show a surplus over book value of over $117,000 (6/1294). Exhibit 36 tendered by Trevor's counsel before Windeyer J, but not included in the appeal books, established that "Glenroy" was sold in August 1995 for $455,000. It is not clear whether the price included stock and plant. 66 Trevor had no evidentiary or legal onus of proving that this transaction by Mrs Archer was not an improvident one. Transactions alleged to be unconscionable bargains attract somewhat different principles which were summarised by Deane J in Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 474: "The jurisdiction of courts of equity to relieve against unconscionable dealing developed from the jurisdiction which the Court of Chancery assumed, at a very early period, to set aside transactions in which expectant heirs had dealt with their expectations without being adequately protected against the pressure put upon them by their poverty … The jurisdiction is long established as extending generally to circumstances in which (i) a party to a transaction is under a special disability in dealing with the other party with the consequence that there was an absence of any reasonable degree of equality between them and (ii) that disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima facie unfair or 'unconscientious' that he procure, or accept, the weaker party's assent to the impugned transaction in the circumstances … Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is cast upon the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable: 'the burthen of shewing the fairness of the transaction is thrown on the person who seeks to obtain the benefit of the contract'." (citations omitted) 67 The cases cited involved bargains between strangers dealing at arm's length. In this case there was no bargain. Mr and Mrs Archer knew the value of "Sussex" and no question of adequacy of consideration arises. In many of the cases referred to the facts spoke for themselves and established a prima facie case which placed an evidentiary onus on the purchaser. In my judgment the facts as found or admitted in this case do not speak for themselves of equitable fraud and unconscionable dealing, and do not establish a prima facie case which imposed any evidentiary onus on Trevor. It would be quite unfair, given the history of this case, for any evidentiary onus to be placed on Trevor. 68 Mrs Archer's gift removed her interest in "Sussex" from her power of testamentary disposition. However there is no evidence that she had no other assets, apart from her interest in the partnership. Her case at the first trial was based on the actual exercise of undue influence over her by Trevor. In other words, her case was that her "will" was "not independent and voluntary because it [was] overborne" (Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 461 per Mason J), and that she did not execute the documents "as the result of the free exercise of [her] independent will"; Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 at 477 per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ. 69 She did not establish, or even attempt to establish, the precise effect of the gift on her disposable property. Her case was not that the disposition was improvident, but that she did not want to part with her interest in "Sussex" because she wanted to leave it to her three sons equally. 70 Windeyer J found that Mrs Archer "well knew what she was doing and did it freely" (red 82). In the light of the Judge's findings, the effect of this gift on the assets presumptively available for her testamentary disposition, and the consequences for the hopes and expectations of her other sons, cannot, in my judgment establish, or assist in establishing, that this was an unconscionable transaction. The Family Provision Act 1982, and cognate legislation, does not, during the lifetime of a disponor, affect or restrict his or her legal capacity to dispose of property by gift. 71 It would have been unconscionable for Trevor to defeat Mrs Archer's intentions for "Sussex" by the exercise of undue influence, by misrepresentation, or by unconscientiously taking advantage of some physical or mental weakness. But none of this has been established and the gift was not shown to be an improvident transaction. It was not unconscionable for Trevor to persuade Mr Archer, and directly or indirectly Mrs Archer, that his moral claims on their bounty should be recognised by an immediate gift of "Sussex" so long as they fully understood what they were doing and freely entered into the transaction. 72 The Court in its jurisdiction over equitable fraud cannot find that Trevor acted unconscionably simply because it forms the opinion that his moral claims did not warrant the making of this gift. 73 Mrs Archer had no proprietary interest in "Glenroy" and it is suggested that this made the gift of her interest in "Sussex" improvident. It is said that Mr Archer was not bound to leave a will giving her "Glenroy" or its equivalent. This is literally correct, but there was no suggestion at either trial that Mr Archer was likely to make a will which did not properly provide for his widow. His 1989 and 1990 wills are in evidence (6/1315, 1348) and these made Mrs Archer his sole beneficiary if she survived him. Mrs Archer's 1994 will is also in evidence (6/1365) but not Mr Archer's. He was not asked about his 1994 will and there is no reason to think it failed to make proper provision for his widow. 74 In any event the Family Provision Act 1982 authorises court orders in favour of widows out of their husbands' testamentary and notional estates and Mrs Archer had rights under this Act which practically guaranteed that, to the extent of the assets available, the Court would make proper provision for her even if her husband did not. 75 Mrs Archer's gift is not shown to be improvident simply because it left her maintenance and support during widowhood dependent either on her husband's testamentary dispositions or the exercise of the court's powers under the Family Provision Act. In the circumstances of this case that risk in 1989 was speculative and theoretical rather than real. Neither Mr Archer nor Mrs Archer gave any evidence directed to this question. Any claim to set aside this gift on such a basis can properly be seen to be based on a technicality. 76 In my opinion Mrs Archer's case that this was an unconscionable transaction broke down completely. It was not improvident. Mrs Archer was not in any situation of disadvantage in dealing with Trevor. The fact that Mr Archer considered that "Sussex" should be transferred to Trevor did not place her in such a position. She was able to discuss with him the merits of Trevor's claim and its effect on the financial interests of herself and her husband. Mr Archer was familiar with the finances of his wife, himself, and the partnership. His financial interests were substantially identical with hers. He was evidently satisfied that they did not need to retain "Sussex" in order to have adequate financial security in their old age, and was able to satisfy Mrs Archer about this. There was no evidence to the contrary. 77 Mrs Archer's concerns about her husband's health did not put her in a position of disadvantage when she agreed in September to the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor because those concerns did not then exist. 78 The question whether Trevor took unconscientious advantage of Mrs Archer's situation can hardly arise. Nevertheless it is important to focus on the position prior to 6 November when Mr Archer had his first heart attack. Mrs Archer's case in respect of this earlier period broke down completely because there is no evidence that she was then in a situation of disadvantage, there is no evidence that Trevor knew this, and there is no evidence that he exploited the situation which did exist. 79 If there was nothing unconscionable in Trevor's conduct before agreement on the transfer of "Sussex" was reached, there could be nothing unconscionable in taking normal steps to have that agreement implemented. Nothing happened between 17 and 24 November to alert Trevor to any change of mind by Mrs Archer. He did not know that he needed to do anything unusual to obtain her signatures. Trevor acted openly, and without undue haste. In my opinion Mrs Archer's claim that the transfer of the whole of her interest in "Sussex" was an unconscionable transaction procured by Trevor fails, and her appeal should be dismissed. 80 Simos J rejected the defences of laches and acquiescence based on events after 24 November, and this part of his decision was not challenged. However those events may be considered to see whether they support Mrs Archer's claim that she had been victimised and "tricked" into signing the transfer documents. 81 Trevor gave evidence that a few days after 24 November Mrs Archer said to him at "Glenroy" (1/123): "We've signed the farm over to you now. Are you happy about that?" He replied with words to the following effect: "Yes I am and thank you very much". 82 Windeyer J found that this conversation took place (red 71). 83 The transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor was not registered until after 9 April 1990, and this was only possible because on 2 March Mr and Mrs Archer authorised the National Australia Bank to send the title deeds of "Sussex" to Mr Cheney. On 24 November 1989 they signed an authority directed to the State Bank, Canowindra authorising the release of the title deeds, but this was ineffective because the deeds were held by the National Australia Bank, Orange. 84 On 6 December 1989 the National Australia Bank, Orange wrote to Mr and Mrs Archer C/- "Sussex" (7/1517 and Ex 32 tendered before Windeyer J) asking them to call at the Branch "at your earliest convenience to sign necessary settlement authority and security release". The letter stated that settlement had been requested by Cheney & Wilson. Mrs Archer said they could have received it but she did not recall doing so (4/961), denied receiving it (black 22), and said she received such a letter in October 1989 (1/68, black 22). There is no October letter from the National Bank to Mr and Mrs Archer in the Bank file (Ex 36). Mr Archer said he probably did receive the letter of 6 December (4/951). 85 Mr and Mrs Archer did nothing about the December letter and on 26 February Mr Cheney wrote to them, again C/- "Sussex", stating "that it will be necessary for you to attend at the National Australia Bank … Orange to sign a Surrender of Deeds form to enable the Bank to hand the Deeds to the Commonwealth Bank on settlement of this matter". The letter was headed "Sale to T J Archer Property: "Sussex" Toogong". Mr Archer denied receiving this letter (black 54), but Mr Cheney said that it was not returned to his office (1/212). Mrs Archer does not appear to have been asked about its receipt. 86 On 2 March 1990 Mr and Mrs Archer attended at the National Australia Bank, Orange and signed the necessary authority (Ex 34). It is a fair inference that they did so because they had received the letter of 26 February. Mrs Archer denied going to the Bank on 2 March and signing any authority (black 23), but said that the signature on the original looked like hers but she would not say it was (black 23). Mr Archer agreed that the document bore his signature (black 55). Windeyer J found that this document bore the signatures of both and that Mrs Archer's evidence about this document "was completely unacceptable" (red 83). 87 Mrs Archer knew on 2 March 1990 that the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor had not yet been registered and that Trevor could not become the owner of "Sussex" without the deeds (4/965). More than three months had elapsed since the signing of the transfer documents on 24 November. The Bank authority was just as important as the transfer documents if Trevor was to become the registered owner of "Sussex", but Mrs Archer did not claim that her signature on this had been unfairly obtained by Trevor, or that she only signed because of her fears for Mr Archer's health. Her signature, and that of Mr Archer, were obtained without either haste or pressure. Mrs Archer's conduct in signing the Bank authority is not only significant in itself, it also throws light on her belief at that time about the events on and before 24 November. Mrs Archer failed to establish that between 24 November and 2 March she was "unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what [was] in [her] best interest" (Amadio at 461 per Mason J). 88 On 13 March Mr Archer was again at the National Australia Bank to arrange overdraft accommodation so he could pay his income tax. The Bank's file states that he informed the Manager that day that "he wishes to transfer his property "Sussex" to his son" (6/1339, 2/376-7). 89 On 12 September 1990 Mr and Mrs Archer made new wills (6/1348-55), again in mirror form. Mr Archer made Mrs Archer and Trevor his primary executors, and Mrs Archer made Mr Archer and Trevor her primary executors. Clause 4 of both wills provided: " I DECLARE that I have made no provision for my son TREVOR ROBERT ARCHER as I have provided adequately for him during my lifetime". 90 This shows that Mr and Mrs Archer knew that "Sussex" had been transferred to Trevor and their appointment of him as their executor shows that he then had their trust and confidence. Mrs Archer claimed (1/75) that cl 4 in her will referred to the transfer to Trevor of only one third of her interest. However Ex 18 records her belief when it was written that Trevor owned the whole of "Sussex" ("he has got over 800 acres") and that she had no interest ("He should pay 2/3 of my 400 odd acres to me or Colin or Neville when I am gone") (red 68). 91 Windeyer J found that when Mrs Archer made this will she was then "well aware" that she had transferred her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor (red 83). Moreover she had full knowledge of the material facts. The trial Judge rejected her claim that material facts came to her knowledge later (the terms of the contract of sale) which made her aware for the first time that she had been "tricked" into signing documents which she did not want to sign and did not understand. (Compare red 67-8.) 92 Trevor's title to "Sussex" remained unchallenged until 1992. In October or November that year Mrs Archer asked Trevor about the house he had promised to buy her. Trevor denied making such a promise (1/127). On 21 December 1992 Cheney & Wilson received a letter of demand from Timmins & Partners who were acting for Mr and Mrs Archer, which foreshadowed proceedings to overturn "the conveyance" pursuant to the Fair Trading Act and the Contracts Review Act (6/1430). Timmins & Partners could not have been aware at that time of Ex 18 because they emphasised "the state of mind of Mr Archer" rather than Mrs Archer at the time the transfer documents were executed. As late as 9 March 1995, when Mr and Mrs Archer lodged their first caveat over "Sussex" (6/1344) through Timmins & Partners, their claims were as unpaid vendors and under an oral agreement. 93 Mrs Archer obtained a copy of the Contract of Sale from Mr Cheney in April 1992 (red 63), but Trevor was not aware of any moves by his parents to challenge the transaction until 24 December when he received a copy of the letter of demand from Mr Cheney. Mrs Archer's interest in obtaining a copy of the contract had been aroused as a result of a conversation with Neville (1/50) who had been told by Trevor that he was the owner of "Sussex" (red 63). 94 On 9 September 1992 Mr Archer told the Manager at the National Australia Bank, Orange that he was contemplating retirement and would most probably sell "Glenroy" and expected to nett $500-600,000 but that Trevor would retain and operate "Sussex" (6/1341). 95 In August or September 1993 Mr Archer told Trevor that he was going to put "Glenroy" on the market but was prepared to give him first option. Trevor said he could not afford it (2/252). The property went to auction on 3 December 1993 but was passed in (1/130). Notice that "Glenroy" would be put on the market and the attempts to market it culminating in the auction showed that Mr and Mrs Archer wished to retire from the land and terminate the partnership. On 19 May 1994 Trevor gave notice terminating the partnership on 30 June 1994 (1/130). He said he did this because his father had decided to sell "Glenroy" and because relationships had become strained as the result of his parents' allegations that he had tricked them into transferring "Sussex" (1/130). 96 In these circumstances Trevor's conduct in 1994 does not throw any light on the nature of his conduct leading up to the transfer of "Sussex", and cannot assist in establishing that it was unconscionable. 97 Mr Cheney purported to act for all parties on the transfer of "Sussex". Although his explanation of the documents was sufficient, he failed to properly consider his duty to Mr and Mrs Archer. He should have interviewed them privately, without Trevor present, to satisfy himself that both of them were perfectly happy with the transaction. He knew "they" were retaining "Glenroy", but failed to ask them whether it was sufficient for their needs in their old age. He knew that Trevor and his parents were in partnership but he failed to ask them about the nature of the partnership, and whether the parents wanted protection against the risk of an early dissolution of partnership from Trevor. 98 Mr Archer was then about 70 and Mr Cheney either knew about Mr Archer's heart attacks (2/413), or would soon have found out if he had interviewed them privately and asked appropriate questions. Knowledge of Mr Archer's health should have demonstrated the need for Mr and Mrs Archer to have some protection against an early dissolution of partnership from Trevor, and they should have received advice to that effect, although they may still have been prepared to trust their son. 99 The absence of protection against an early dissolution of partnership was never part of the case brought by Mr and Mrs Archer in the first trial, or Mrs Archer's case in the second trial. The risk did not eventuate and it was Mr Archer who made the first move for a dissolution by putting "Glenroy" on the market. It is doubtful whether any contractual protection against a dissolution of partnership by Trevor would have lasted for more than 5 years, and the partnership continued for more than 4½ years anyway. 100 Trevor is unable to claim the protection that the provision of sound, independent, legal advice to his parents would have provided, but in this case he does not need that protection because the transaction has not been shown to be improvident, and Trevor's conduct has not been shown to be unconscionable. 101 Trevor had no plans in 1989 for an early end to the partnership once he became the owner of "Sussex" and it continued for a further 4½ years. The absence of legal protection for Mr and Mrs Archer in their partnership agreement with Trevor is at most a matter of professional negligence for which Trevor was not responsible either in law or in fact. He was not shown to have been conscious of the risk his parents faced, or their need for any protection against himself. The situation may have been different if "Sussex" had provided substantially more than half the partnership income, but Mr Archer said that most of the partnership income came from "Glenroy" (1/83). 102 In my opinion the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs. 103 BEAZLEY JA: The appeal in this matter from a decision of Windeyer J involves a family dispute in which the appellant, the respondent's mother, alleges she agreed to transfer her interest in a rural property known as "Sussex" to the respondent in circumstances where he had either exerted undue influence over her or acted unconscionably towards her. Windeyer J rejected the appellant's claim and entered a verdict for the respondent in the proceedings. 104 The facts as found by the trial judge were accepted by the appellant for the purposes of the appeal. However, counsel for the appellant sought to give the facts a different emphasis from the trial judge, submitting that on the found facts, his Honour should have determined that the transaction was affected by undue influence and unconscionability. Background Facts 105 The appellant and her husband (Mr Archer Snr), were what I will describe as a farming family in the Orange district in western New South Wales. Mr Archer Snr was born in 1919 and the appellant in 1920. Mr Archer Snr had purchased the first family property, called "Glenroy", in 1948 and he and the appellant had carried on a farming enterprise on the property in partnership. Two of their three sons became partners in the enterprise. Trevor, who is the respondent, became a partner in 1978. Neville became a partner in 1980, but withdrew from the partnership in 1987. It appears Neville was 'paid out' for his interest in the partnership at that time, but there was no evidence as to the amount he was paid. 106 In 1979, the appellant and Mr Archer Snr purchased as joint tenants a second property in the area, called "Sussex". This property had been owned by the appellant's father. The appellant and Mr Archer Snr purchased it from the father's estate. "Sussex" is the property subject of the present dispute. 107 It had originally been intended that the respondent would be a co-purchaser of "Sussex" but the lending conditions of the Rural Assistance Board precluded this and the property was purchased in the joint names of the appellant and Mr Archer Snr. The purchase of the property plus plant machinery was financed in part out of the appellant's one-sixth share of her late father's estate, in part from joint resources and in part by loans from the Rural Assistance Board ($30,000), from the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Ltd ($27,000) and from the appellant's sisters ($40,000). The respondent guaranteed the Rural Assistance Board loan. He also claimed to have contributed to the mortgage repayments. Whilst there does not appear to be any dispute that this was the case, the trial judge made no such finding and it appears from the evidence that some of the claimed payments made by the respondent were for purchases of cattle and farming equipment. The respondent also had accommodation on the property. 108 In September 1989, the $40,000 loan from the appellant's sisters was repaid in full. At the same time, the Rural Assistance Board loan was refinanced with a loan from the State Bank of New South Wales. However, there was a significant change in the substituted borrowing. The Rural Assistance Board loan had been secured over both "Glenroy" and "Sussex", whereas the new loan from the State Bank was secured over "Glenroy" only. 109 Both properties were worked by the partnership. The appellant and Mr Archer Snr lived on "Glenroy" and the respondent and his family lived on "Sussex". At various times, the respondent supplemented his income from the partnership by additional employment as a security guard in Orange. Only limited partnership accounts were in evidence and they do not disclose whether the two properties were partnership assets. Whatever be the legally correct position, those involved in the partnership appear to have regarded the properties as being owned by Mr Archer Snr in the case of "Glenroy" and the appellant and Mr Archer Snr in the case of "Sussex". 110 Sometime in 1988 the respondent asked the appellant what her testamentary intentions were in relation to "Sussex" and expressed a sense of unfairness when the appellant told him she proposed to leave it equally amongst the three sons. The appellant responded that she would have to think further about it but that the matter was not an immediate issue as the Rural Assistance Board loan still had to be repaid. 111 The respondent raised the question of the testamentary disposition of "Sussex" shortly thereafter, this time with both the appellant and Mr Archer Snr but was not given any specific answer as to their testamentary intentions. 112 In March 1989, the appellant and Mr Archer Snr made their wills in which each provided for his or her estate to be given to the other, provided the other survived, but if that did not happen, "Sussex" was given to the respondent and the balance of the estate was given to the three sons equally (except that the son Colin's share was charged with certain legacies). The appellant and Mr Archer Snr gave copies of the wills to the respondent shortly after they executed them. The respondent expressed appreciation at the provision for him in relation to "Sussex" and the appellant said to him at the time: "Yes, we've agreed to that". 113 In September 1989 the appellant had a conversation with the respondent, this time about both "Glenroy" and "Sussex". She told him that if Mr Archer Snr died first she would have to sell both "Glenroy" and "Sussex" "to provide for her old age". The respondent said "but if Dad dies you will get Glenroy. Won't that be enough?". The appellant replied "I don't really know". It will be remembered that at this time the respondent had an expectation that he would be left "Sussex" in the will of the survivor of the appellant and Mr Archer Snr. 114 A few days later the respondent saw Mr Archer Snr and told him of the conversation he had had with the appellant. Referring to the appellant's intention to sell "Sussex" if she survived Mr Archer Snr, the respondent said to his father: "That would be very difficult for me. For a start I wouldn't have a house. I've put a lot of time into 'Sussex'. I know that you and Mum have already put it in your Wills but what are the chances of having 'Sussex' transferred into my name now?" 115 Mr Archer Snr responded: "Yes, I suppose its time we transferred it to you. You'd better make some enquiries with a solicitor to see what's involved and let me know." 116 Although the Archers had a family solicitor, the respondent made enquiries and was recommended to Messrs Cheney and Wilson solicitors in Orange. He consulted with Mr Cheney. The respondent's first appointment with Mr Cheney was on 21 September 1989. 117 Mr Cheney's file note of the conference read: "Mr Archer was seeking advice on the procedure and costs involved in the transfer of the title to the property 'Sussex' which is currently registered in the names of his parents. … It is estimated that its value is approximately $700,000.00 taking into account the improvements that are erected on the land. … There have been funds borrowed on the security of the property over the years from both the Rural Assistance Board and the Commercial Banking Company. There is also a private mortgage at the present time. We are instructed that at least two of these mortgages are very close to being fully discharged. The clients are in the process of making investigations as to the best method of refinancing the property as a whole with one mortgagee. Prior to doing so however we are asked to advise on the question of costs and procedure on transfer. … Trevor has been contributing towards the reduction in the borrowings on the freehold however these borrowings would also appear to relate to plant and equipment and stock. He therefore maintains that he has made a capital contribution to the acquisition of the property and that this should be taken into account in determining the amount of stamp duty payable on the transfer from his parents to himself. I advised him that in the first instance he should be prepared to pay [ad valorem] stamp duty on the face of the Valuer General's valuation. Any application for a rebate of that duty would require very concise evidence as to the amount of money spend (sic) and the manner in which the money was applied during the course of the partnership to the acquisition of the property or improvement of the property. … [The respondent and his wife] are concerned should Mr Archer senior die prior to [the appellant]. In these circumstances the property would pass automatically by operation of law to [the appellant]. She apparently takes the view that the property should be divided among all three sons notwithstanding that the others haven't worked on the property and Trevor is concerned to protect his interest in this regard. She is also reluctant to transfer her interest in the property during her lifetime as apparently it was a property originally held in her family and she is concerned that in the event that she transfer her assets she will be left without assets in her old age. [The respondent and his wife] are going to discuss the matter further with Mr Archer senior [and the appellant] with a view to try to establish a basis on which the transfer can be entered into. Our advice to [the respondent] was that to properly protect himself he should take all necessary steps, notwithstanding the amount of stamp duty payable, to transfer the property into his name as soon as possible . He should be prepared to pay the stamp duty and regard any refund of duty as a result of his contribution to the property as simply a bonus. He will consider the position further and get back to us." (emphasis added) 118 The advice contained in the penultimate paragraph of the file note was reiterated in a confirmatory letter dated 22 September 1989, written to the respondent and his wife. The respondent did not show the letter to the appellant or Mr Archer Snr. 119 Shortly after his visit to the solicitor's, the respondent spoke to his father and told him the stamp duty would be about $27,000 and there would be some legal costs, both of which he would be happy to pay. He said his father told him to "go ahead with it". 120 A few days later the respondent had a conversation with the appellant and Mr Archer Snr as follows: "[Respondent]: I am relieved that you and Dad have agreed to transfer 'Sussex to me. [Appellant]: I am prepared to give it to you but not to Sue. I won't have her name on the papers. We will give it to you but not to her. At this stage [the respondent's wife] came into the kitchen and said: Put it in Trevor's name. It doesn't worry me at all. [Respondent]: I understand, the papers will be drawn up in my name only." 121 Presumably, the respondent gave Mr Cheney instructions to proceed as Mr Cheney prepared the necessary documents to transfer "Sussex" to the respondent. The purchase price specified in the transfer was $436,500, significantly less than the original estimation of value of $700,000 the respondent had given to Mr Cheney. A valuation of the property, received subsequently by the solicitors, valued the property in the same amount. It was, of course, never intended between the parties that any purchase price was to be paid. 122 Mr Cheney wrote to the various banks which had or had held security over the property to prepare discharges of mortgage and, in the case of the State Bank, for the delivery up of the title deeds. 123 The trial judge found that the transfer documents were signed in Mr Cheney's office on 24 November 1989, although they were dated a few months later. The circumstances of signing the documents are important in the case presented for both parties. A week earlier, Mr Archer Snr had been discharged from a two week period of hospitalisation, having suffered a heart attack on about 6 November 1989. Shortly after his discharge from hospital, the respondent advised his father that the documents for the transfer of "Sussex" were ready for signature. An appointment had been made for Mr Archer Snr to see a specialist in Orange on 24 November, and it was agreed either with the appellant or Mr Archer Snr (the respondent cannot recall with whom) that an appointment could be made with the solicitors the same day. The respondent and his wife agreed to drive Mr Archer Snr and the appellant to Orange for the doctor's appointment. 124 Mr Cheney saw the appellant, Mr Archer Snr and the respondent together for the purpose of signing the transfer. Apart from confirming that the appellant and Mr Archer Snr were transferring "Sussex" to the respondent, that "Glenroy" was to remain in their ownership and that the respondent was paying the legal costs, the solicitor did not give any advice to the appellant in relation to the transfer, nor suggest or recommend that they obtain independent legal advice. He did not make any inquiry of the appellant as to why she had changed her mind as to how the property should be dealt with as between her three sons. 125 A few days after the documents were signed, the appellant asked the respondent whether he was happy at having the property transferred to him. The respondent thanked the appellant for the transfer. 126 Mr Archer Snr was again hospitalised for his heart condition in late February/early March 1990, this time in Sydney. The appellant and Mr Archer Snr signed an authority dated 2 March 1990 to the National Australia Bank at Orange authorising it to send the title deeds to "Sussex" to Cheney & Wilson Solicitors. 127 On 12 September 1990 the appellant and Mr Archer Snr made new mirror wills, in which no provision was made for the respondent. Clause 8 of each will provided: " I DECLARE that I have made no provision for my son Trevor Robert Archer as I have provided adequately for him during my lifetime." 128 The facts related above were the facts found by the trial judge and involved an acceptance of the respondent's evidence and a rejection of the appellant's evidence. The appellant had denied all conversations about "Sussex" with the respondent, except for the initial one, when she said she would think about the respondent's claim in respect of the property. 129 Not only did the appellant deny all but the first conversation, she denied any knowledge of the arrangement to see Mr Cheney on 24 November, until in effect, she was guided into his office. Her case was also that on the night of having signed the transfer she was so agitated she wrote a diary note setting out her feelings. The note stated: "To day I did something I will regret for the rest of my life and to make matters worse neither Bob nor I had been told what was on. I know if Bob had known he would have said no I feel to [sic] sick to worry. Bob had an appointment to day to see Dr. Shannon to see how his heart was and if he would have to go to Sydney. Trevor said he would take us up but to our surprise he pulled up in front of a solicitors which we have never heard of and I cant (sic) remember his name. Trevor asked us to go inside with him. I didnt wake up what was on. But he had made arrangments (sic) for us to sign 'Sussex' over to him. … Any way the solicitor had all the papers ready. I was just stuned (sic) because Trevor never said what he had done, so we were tricked into it. Anyway Bob signed he was far to (sic) sick to say anything & I thought what am I going to do if I say no or even say something it would only upset him as he has allready (sic) signed. So I signed but I was so hurt & mad to think he was in such a hurry to get that farm. He must think Bob is dying and he doesn't trust me to be fair in my will. Now I am at home how I wish I had said something, but he new (sic) I wouldn't cause any trouble (thats me) I know Trevor works on the farm, but we found the money he has only helped pay the banks back and we still owe the State Bank money. I feel he won't offer to pay that off." (The references in the note to "Bob" were a reference to Mr Archer Snr and to "Trevor" to the respondent) 130 The note is dated 1 December 1989. It will be recalled the documents had been signed on 24 November 1989. The trial judge found the diary note was a fabrication. His Honour then stated: "Once it is found that exhibit 18 is a fabrication then one is bound to find that it was concocted for the purpose of supporting the plaintiff's case on undue influence. Once that is found then the whole basis of her case falls to the ground at least on undue influence." 131 Nonetheless, his Honour reviewed the evidence and, independently of his finding on the diary note, concluded that the appellant "well knew what she was doing and did it freely". The fact that the appellant had signed the authority to the National Australia Bank in March 1990 provided significant support to his Honour coming to this conclusion. 132 In finding there had been no undue influence, his Honour applied the statement of Dixon J in Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 at 134: "The basis of the equitable jurisdiction to set aside an alienation of property on the ground of undue influence is the prevention of an unconscientious use of any special capacity or opportunity that may exist or arise of affecting the alienor's will or freedom of judgment in reference to such a matter. The source of power to practise such a domination may be found in no antecedent relation but in a particular situation, or in the deliberate contrivance of the party. If this be so, facts must be proved showing that the transaction was the outcome of such an actual influence over the mind of the alienor that it cannot be considered his free act." 133 As Mason CJ pointed out in "The Impact of Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract", Anglo-American Law Review, vol 27 (1998) 1, at 6-7: "… undue influence … denotes an ascendancy by the stronger party over the weaker party such that the relevant transaction is not the free, voluntary and independent act of the weaker party. In other words, it is the actual or presumed impairment of the judgment of the weaker party that is the critical element in the grant of relief on the ground of undue influence." 134 In Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 Deane J noted at 474 that: "Undue influence … looks to the quality of the consent or assent of the weaker party." 135 Senior counsel for the appellant accepted that his Honour had stated the correct principles of law to be applied, but disputed that his Honour had correctly applied the law to the facts. He submitted that: "[T]he Respondent, by a deliberate contrivance in arranging the appointment with Mr Cheney for signing the transfer documents, had a 'special capacity or opportunity' to affect from the … Appellant's will or freedom of judgment of which the Respondent made unconscientious use, through the agency of Mr Cheney, to 'unduly influence' the … Appellant to sign the transfer documents." and that: "The … Appellant's will was overborne by the whole of the circumstances in which she found herself." 136 Senior counsel relied upon a number of factors in support of this submission. In particular, he referred to the respondent's admission that it was his intention to cut across the appellant's intention to leave the property to all three sons and "to thwart her desires for [his] own advantage". He submitted that the respondent arranged for the property to be transferred to him and he thus protected his own interests at a vulnerable time for the appellant, given Mr Archer Snr's precarious state of health and the appellant's preoccupation with that at the time of signing of documents. Further, he submitted that the appellant did not receive any independent legal advice or have the opportunity to obtain any. She was, in effect, presented with a fait accompli when taken to the solicitor's office. 137 On the evidence accepted by the trial judge, I consider his Honour's conclusion that the transfer was the product of the appellant's free and independent will was inevitable. The making of a filial claim, inconsistent with either the wishes of a parent or the potential claims of other siblings, does not, of itself, constitute the exertion of undue influence. Nor does acquiescence in such a claim. The appellant in this case has not demonstrated that her will was overborne, although it must be accepted even on the evidence accepted by the trial judge that she was a reluctant participant in the transaction. There are also countervailing factors which meet or neutralise the factors she relied upon in support of the claim of undue influence. For example, although the appellant relies upon her preoccupation with her husband's health at the time she signed the documents, her consent to the transaction itself was obtained several weeks before her husband's illness. Another important indicator against her will being overborne was that she was prepared to agree to the transfer provided her daughter-in-law was not a transferee. Unconscionability Claim 138 Again there was no dispute as to the correct legal principles to be applied in determining whether a transaction could be impugned as an unconscientious bargain. Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio 139 In Amadio Mason J at 461-462 referred to the well known passage of Fullagar J in Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 at 405: "The circumstances adversely affecting a party, which may induce a court of equity either to refuse its aid or to set a transaction aside, are of great variety and can hardly be satisfactorily classified. Among them are poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary. The common characteristic seems to be that they have the effect of placing one party at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the other." 140 His Honour added: "It is not to be thought that relief will be granted only in the particular situations mentioned by their Honours. It is made plain enough, especially by Fullagar J, that the situations mentioned are no more than particular exemplifications of an underlying general principle which may be invoked whenever one party by reason of some condition of circumstance is placed at a special disadvantage vis-a-vis another and unfair or unconscientious advantage is then taken of the opportunity thereby created. I qualify the word 'disadvantage' by the adjective 'special' in order to disavow any suggestion that the principle applies whenever there is some difference in the bargaining power of the parties and in order to emphasize that the disabling condition or circumstance is one which seriously affects the ability of the innocent party to make a judgment as to his own best interests, when the other party knows or ought to know of the existence of that condition or circumstance and of its effect on the innocent party." 141 As his Honour pointed out in "The Impact of Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract" at 7 "[u]nconscionable conduct, as the term suggests, focuses … on the unconscientious conduct of the defendant". 142 A similar approach is to be found in the judgment of Deane J in Amadio. His Honour said at 474: "Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger party in attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, a dealing with a person under a special disability in circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he should do so. The adverse circumstances which may constitute a special disability for the purposes of the principles relating to relief against unconscionable dealing may take a wide variety of forms and are not susceptible to being comprehensively catalogue[d]." Bridgewater v Leahy 143 In Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457 (Bridgewater) the High Court revisited the principles which govern whether a transaction has been procured unconscientiously. After referring extensively to Mason CJ and Deane J in Amadio, the majority stated at 479: "It should also be noted that in Hart v O'Connor an appeal from New Zealand, the Privy Council described unconscionable conduct which provided a basis for equitable relief as 'victimisation, which can consist either of the active extortion of a benefit or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances'. … it was the 'ordinary jurisdiction' of the Court of Chancery to deal with instruments and transactions 'in which the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he has obtained." 144 The facts in Bridgewater were as follows. The owner of grazing land entered into a contract to sell it to his nephew and the nephew's wife for approximately $700,000. The owner forgave a substantial proportion of that amount, leaving only an amount of $150,000 to be paid. There was another party involved in the overall transaction. The same solicitor acted for all parties. The solicitor made no recommendation that any party have separate legal advice. 145 The owner, who had four daughters and no sons, treated the nephew "as the son he never had". The nephew had lived on and worked the subject land for many years and the owner depended on him to manage it. It was the owner's long term wish that the land not be broken up. 146 By his will made three years earlier than the contract, the owner had given his nephew an option to purchase certain of his property which included the transferred land for $200,000. The residuary estate was left to his four daughters. The owner died after the transfer of land to the nephew. 147 The nephew exercised the option and paid $200,000 for the property (apart from the land already transferred). 148 The effect of selling the land to the nephew was to remove from the owner the power of testamentary disposition over it for a return substantially below its true value, or as was said by the majority (at 484) "for a seriously inadequate consideration". His estate was consequentially depleted and this in turn affected the value of the estate for the purposes of any family provision application. 149 The trial judge considered that a prudent solicitor should actively have canvassed with the owner the issue of obtaining independent legal advice, but given the owner's wish to benefit the nephew concluded the result would have been no different, even if independent legal advice had been obtained. 150 The majority in the High Court noted that the trial judge's approach in relation to independent legal advice had some authority in cases of alleged undue influence: see Linderstam v Barnett (1915) 19 CLR 528 at 530-531; Watkins v Combes (1922) 30 CLR 180 at 197. They noted however at 485: "Where the complaint is of unconscionable dealing, the point is rather different. As Manning J put in Re Levey; Ex parte Official Assignee, 'the Court does not allow any person to take advantage of any known weakness of the vendor' and the Court asks whether that party had 'the opportunity' of professional advice as to 'the effect of what he [was] doing'. This denial of the opportunity to have 'the assistance of a disinterested legal adviser', rather than speculation as to what might have followed had it been pursued, is an element in the unconscientious conduct in respect of which equity intervenes to deny the entitlement of the disponee to retain the property in question, unless the disponee shows the disposition to have been 'fair, just and reasonable'." At 490 their Honours stated: "The position of disadvantage which renders one party subject to exploitation by another such that the benefit of an improvident disposition by the disadvantaged party may not in good conscience be retained may stem from a strong emotional dependence or attachment. Louth v Diprose was such a case. In his judgment in the South Australian Full Court, a decision which was upheld in this Court, Jacobs A-CJ said: 'It is an oversimplification to say that because the respondent acted as he did with his eyes open, and with a full understanding of what he was doing, he was not in a position of disadvantage, and therefore not a victim of unconscionable conduct.'" 151 Their Honours pointed out (at 490) that a position of disadvantage does not "necessarily involve[s] physical frailty and enfeeblement with diminished knowledge by the party in question of that party's property and affairs generally". They also pointed out (at 491) that the question whether there had been unconscionable conduct "involved more than issues of contractual capacity or those issues which arise upon a defence of non est factum". They noted the following matters as being relevant to the transaction under their consideration: (i) the initiative leading to the execution of the transfers and the fact the deed had been taken by the nephew; (ii) the owner had "enormous affection" for his nephew but only what was described as a "reasonable relationship" with his daughters; (iii) the owner wished to retain the properties as an integrated farming enterprise under reliable and experienced management. However, "the transfers … as a means to attain that goal, involved an improvident transaction which was neither fair, just or reasonable" ; (iv) the transaction put it out of the owner's power to change his testamentary arrangements in respect of portion of his assets; (v) the transfer did not necessarily secure his objective of ensuring that his properties remained as a whole farming unit. 152 Their Honours concluded at 493: "[The owner's] goal to preserve his rural interests intact and his perception that [the nephew] was the candidate to provide reliable and experienced management thereof were significant elements in his emotional attachment to and dependency upon [the nephew]. … The relationship between [the owner and his nephew] meant that, when [the nephew] raised the question of using the proceeds of sale of the Injune Land, they were meeting on unequal terms. [The nephew] took advantage of this position to obtain a benefit through a grossly improvident transaction on the part of his uncle." Was This An Unconscionable Dealing? 153 Although each case must be judged on its own facts, the case with which we are dealing bears a number of similarities to Bridgewater, and as Gleeson CJ and Callinan J said in that case (at 472) "the facts [of particular cases] illustrate the practical content of the principles". The similarities relate to the transfer of the property in circumstances which make the transaction improvident. I deal with those, in so far as they relate to this transfer, in detail below. There is also a significant difference. 154 The significant difference between the facts of this case and those of Bridgewater is the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the respondent. The question which arises first therefore, is whether the relationship between the appellant and respondent was unequal so as to bring her into a position of disadvantage in relation to him. If she was, the question which then arises is whether the respondent took unconscionable advantage of that disadvantage. 155 The trial judge found: "None of the pleaded claims of disability stated to arise from the illness of Mr Archer; inexperience; inequality of bargaining power and inability to protect her own interests is made out. Trevor was not very well educated and has difficulty in reading and there was nothing to show that Mrs Archer was in any unequal position as against him. … The medical evidence does not support the fears for her husband's future which she said that she had when she was signing, which evidence was necessary to make good what was said in the note. That is not to say he was in perfect health but to say the stated concern about a further heart attack is not true. The only evidence which could possibly support the claim based on unconscientious behaviour was that passage of the cross-examination of Trevor, which I have set [out]. That however must be considered in light of my acceptance that he went to see the solicitor having been told to do so by his father and the natural progression of events after that. Mrs Archer was never shown to be under the influence of Trevor; she was never shown not to have acted as she wished to act; she was not lured into an office to sign. It was not unreasonable of Trevor to put forward his claims. What has happened in this unfortunate case is that Mrs Archer did what she did because she had agreed to do so but later changed her mind and concocted a story probably because of dissatisfaction expressed by her other sons. The claim based on unconscionability must be dismissed." 156 In my opinion, a number of the factors which his Honour identified in this paragraph did not precisely accord with or overlooked certain evidence. 157 There was no doubt that the appellant did not, initially, wish to make an inter vivos gift of "Sussex" to the respondent. Rather, she had two concerns: first to provide for her "old age"; secondly, to provide equally for her three sons. She considered she needed both "Glenroy" and "Sussex" for both these purposes, but particularly the first. When the respondent realised that he may not have been the recipient of "Sussex" (or at least of its full value), he appealed, not to the appellant, whose concern at the loss of her property interest the respondent wished to overcome, but to his father, Mr Archer Snr. As he admitted, it was his intention "to thwart [the appellant's] desires for [his] own advantage". It is true that the appellant both acquiesced in and understood that she was transferring the property to the respondent for no return. In doing so, I do not consider that she was on equal bargaining terms with the respondent. Mr Archer Snr clearly thought the respondent was entitled to the property. The respondent not only considered he was entitled to it, he appealed to his father to look after his interests in priority to the appellant's. Thus, the appellant found herself isolated from both her husband and her son in relation to her wishes as to the property. 158 There is no evidence as to what occurred as between the appellant and Mr Archer Snr. Only the result is known - the appellant agreed to do something which was against her wishes and against her interests. In my opinion, being placed in a position of having to stand on her own against the wishes of her husband and son or acceding to those wishes and interest at the expense of her own, placed her in a position of disadvantage vis-a-vis the respondent. I consider that circumstance of its own was sufficient to qualify the appellant for relief it if was established that the appellant took unconscientious advantage of her position. 159 Another of the factors which the appellant had relied upon as putting her in a position of disadvantage was her concern over her husband's health. The medical evidence was that Mr Archer Snr had an acute myocardial infarction in early November 1989, for which he was hospitalised for two weeks. Whilst in hospital he had a number of setbacks. For example, three days after admission he had a "severe episode of pain with new inferior changes … and [indications] he had extended his inferior infarction". Progress after that was satisfactory until discharge. However, on return home he developed a respiratory infection. As his specialist reported on 4 December 1989 "[h]e understandably feels less well than he should". It was also probable he "had one or two episodes of angina since his discharge from hospital and these have occurred on minor exertion". (Emphasis added). 160 By 21 December 1989 he was "feeling better and walking about 300 yards twice a day". Walking 300 yards twice a day, I would think, is very limited physical activity for a farmer. By February 1990, Mr Archer Snr had "accelerating angina" which limited him to walking twenty to thirty yards on the flat. By early April he had undergone coronary artery bypass grafting. 161 The history of hospitalisation, setbacks in hospital, angina attacks on minor exertion after his discharge from hospital and feeling less well than expected after discharge would, in any reasonable relationship, be matters of real concern. Although his Honour made no finding on this point, such evidence as his Honour accepted indicated a close and supportive relationship between the appellant and Mr Archer Snr. It would be extraordinary if the appellant did not have concerns about her husband's health at the time. Although Mr Archer Snr's health after 24 November is not relevant to the appellant's concerns as at that date, the later medical history demonstrates that her earlier concerns were not unfounded. But in any event, the fact he had suffered a number of infections and the fact his post hospital progress was not as smooth as was hoped for was a sufficient basis for the appellant to have real concerns about his health. It should also be remembered that one of the factors relied upon by his Honour was the fact that the appellant signed the authority to the National Australia Bank on 2 March 1990. At that time Mr Archer Snr had just been discharged from a further period of hospitalisation and was on a hospital waiting list for bypass surgery. 162 In my opinion, the evidence does not support his Honour's finding that "the medical evidence does not support [the appellant's] fears for her husband's future". Because I consider that premise to be wrong, his Honour's conclusion that "the stated concern about a further heart attack is not true" does not follow. In saying that I am conscious that his Honour did not accept the appellant as a creditworthy witness. However, this conclusion is not based on a lack of creditworthiness as such, but on a supposed lack of supporting evidence. I do not consider there was such a lack of supporting medical evidence. 163 That being the case, I can see no reason why the appellant should not be accepted on that issue. If she is, then her concern for her husband's health contributed to the disadvantage in which she was place. However, as I have identified, even without that factor, I consider that the appellant was in a position of disadvantage in the sense that term is used in Amadio and in Bridgewater. 164 Having concluded that the appellant was in a disadvantageous position it is necessary to determine whether the respondent took unconscientious advantage of that. I consider the following matters to be relevant to that question: (i) the appellant gifted her interest in a substantial property to the respondent. She expected to outlive her husband (a not unreasonable expectation given she was younger than the respondent and he was experiencing health problems) and so would in due course have sole title to that property; (ii) she believed that she would need the property to provide for her in her old age; (iii) the other property "Glenroy" was not hers. It was Mr Archer Snr's; (iv) "Glenroy" had became burdened with a debt which had been incurred in the purchase of "Sussex"; (v) she did not have any independent legal or other advice, nor was any recommended or suggested to her; (vi) the respondent initiated the discussion and arranged the processes which eventually led to the property being transferred to him; (vii) the respondent actively pursued his own interests in having the property gifted to him. In doing so it was his intention to thwart the appellant's desires; (viii) having transferred the property to the respondent, the appellant did not have the power to change her testamentary arrangements, including to make provision for her children in the manner she saw appropriate. 165 The gifting of her interest in "Sussex" of itself made the transaction an improvident one. The additional factors referred to in (ii) - (iv) above underscore this. There were other disadvantages associated with the transfer. For example, it made it easier for the respondent to withdraw from the partnership - either to farm "Sussex" for his own benefit or to sell it for any reason he chose. Although there was no analysis of the partnership accounts provided to the Court, it is known that even with both properties being worked in partnership they were, for some years before the transfer, insufficient to support the appellant and Mr Archer Snr and the respondent and his family. There was no countervailing benefit to the appellant in the transfer. 166 The transaction is even the more improvident when it is remembered that "Glenroy" was not registered in the appellant's name. She was thus solely dependent for her future security on the testamentary largesse of Mr Archer Snr should she survive him. Although their relationship was a good one, and the history of the wills indicated that the appellant would receive "Glenroy" should Mr Archer Snr die first, that was not absolutely certain. He could always change his will. Nor is the likelihood of being beneficiary under a will property of the same type as having property in one's own right. 167 It was also suggested that there was no evidence that "Glenroy" would be insufficient to meet the appellant's needs in the future. That is correct. However, the Court cannot assume the opposite. Further, the question of sufficiency of means is a relative one and there is no reason why the appellant should not have the security of property or assets which would not only provide her with a home, but which would provide her with an income to sustain an appropriate standard of living, including the need to provide for her long term health needs. In any event, if the respondent wished to assert the transaction was not improvident because of that factor, he bore that onus. 168 It was postulated in argument that if for some reason Mr Archer Snr did not provide or provide adequately for the appellant in his will, she would have a strong claim for relief under the Family Provisions legislation in this state. That is undoubted. However, provision made by a court under that legislation is couched within the parameters of the exercise of judicial discretion and such provision would involve the incurring of legal costs. That is a far less advantageous position to be in than having property in one's own right. 169 It is also relevant that the appellant did not have the benefit of independent legal or other advice. It was submitted that the solicitor was acting for and in the interests of the respondent only. It is clear from Mr Cheney's file note of 21 September 1989 and subsequent letter to the respondent, that he was acting in the respondent's interest. The appellant, for her part, was entitled to independent legal advice. It is by no means sure that if she received such advice the appellant would have transferred the property to the respondent. Indeed, the contrary is the more likely, but that is not an issue which needs to be determined. As Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ said in Bridgewater: "…the Court asks whether [the] party [in a position of weakness] had the opportunity of professional advice. … The denial of this opportunity … is an element in the unconscientious conduct in respect of which equity intervenes …" Relief 170 It follows from my reasons that I consider that the appellant is entitled to relief. The question arises as to what relief is appropriate. 171 It has not been necessary up until this point to review the history of the proceedings. However, the history is relevant, not only to the question of appropriate relief but also to the question of costs. 172 The appellant and Mr Archer Snr commenced proceedings in 1995 claiming that the transfer had been obtained by the exercise of undue influence over each of them. The matter was heard by Simos J in late 1995. His Honour dismissed Mr Archer Snr's claim. He upheld the appellant's claim in part and declared that the transfer of her interest in "Sussex" was as to two-thirds of that one half procured by the respondent's undue influence. 173 The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal against the finding of undue influence. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by Simos J and ordered a new trial regarding the appellant's claim. 174 The appellant's claim was re-heard by Windeyer J in May 1999. His Honour also dealt with the question of costs of the first trial as against both the appellant and Mr Archer Snr. 175 The appellant's claim as heard by Windeyer J was only in respect of the fund representing two-thirds of her notional one-half interest in the property (the property having been sold in the meantime) - that is one-third of the proceeds of sale of that property. The claim heard by Windeyer J was based on undue influence and unconscionability. 176 The question which arises is, given these circumstances, to what relief is the appellant entitled. Deane J said in Amadio at 480-481: "Relief against unconscionable dealing is a purely equitable remedy. The concept underlying the jurisdiction to grant the relief is that equity intervenes to prevent the stronger party to an unconscionable dealing acting against equity and good conscience by attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, that dealing. Equity will not, however, 'restrain a defendant from asserting a claim save to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him to do so. If this limitation on the power of equity results in giving to a plaintiff less than what on some general idea of fairness he might be considered entitled to, that cannot be helped' (per Lord Greene MR, Wrottesley and Evershed LJJ, In re Diplock). Where appropriate, an order will be made which only partly nullifies a transaction liable to be set aside in equity pursuant to the principles of unconscionable dealing (see Bank of Victoria Ltd v Mueller and the cases there cited)." 177 The relief to which the appellant is entitled has been predetermined to the extent that the claim on the rehearing was limited to the fund representing one-third of the proceeds of the sale of the property (the fund). The genesis of the proceedings being so limited is to be found in the order of Simos J followed by the sale of the property and the agreement between the parties that the fund would be retained out of the proceeds of sale and the claim limited to that fund. 178 Although the appellant gifted away her entire interest in the property, she had always had and retained an intention that the respondent in due course would be entitled to one-third. Indeed, on the original purchase, it was contemplated that the respondent would have a one-third interest. The amount retained in the fund represents what her long term wishes were in respect of the property. In my opinion, the appellant is entitled to an order that the moneys represented by the fund be paid to her. 179 Accordingly, I propose the following orders: (i) Appeal allowed; (ii) Set aside the orders of the trial judge; (iii) Order that there be paid to the appellant the sum separately retained out of the property and representing two-thirds of the appellant's notional half interest of the property; (iv) Order that the respondent pay the costs of both proceedings at first instance. (v) Order that the respondent pay the costs of the appeal, but have a certificate under the Suitor's Fund Act 1951 (NSW), if so qualified. 180 FITZGERALD JA: The first appellant ("Mrs Archer"), who was born in 1920, and the second appellant ("Mr Archer"), who was born in 1919, are the parents of the respondent ("Trevor"), and two other sons, Colin and Neville. All three of the appellants' sons were born on "Glenroy", a mixed farming and grazing property about 40 kilometres from Orange, which was owned by Mr Archer. 181 Mrs Archer's family owned another property, "Sussex", which is located about 12 kilometres from "Glenroy". Late in 1979, Mr and Mrs Archer purchased "Sussex" as joint tenants. A large part of the purchase price was borrowed, part from the Rural Assistance Board. Because the loan obtained from the Rural Assistance Board was a "farm build-up loan", the property was required to be purchased by Mr Archer, or Mr and Mrs Archer, and Trevor was unable to be one of the purchasers, as had been intended. However, Trevor was responsible with Mr and Mrs Archer for repayment of some of the total amount borrowed to purchase "Sussex". 182 After Trevor married in 1982, he and his wife lived on "Sussex". From about mid-1987, Mr Archer, Mrs Archer and Trevor operated the two properties in a partnership in which Trevor had a half share and each of Mr and Mrs Archer had a quarter share. Mr Archer and Trevor worked on the properties. Colin did not work on either property as an adult, and Neville did not work on either property after mid 1987. 183 Partnership funds were used to repay some of the money borrowed to purchase "Sussex". On the other hand, Trevor and his family lived rent-free on that property. 184 On 24 November 1989, Mr and Mrs Archer signed documents for the transfer of their interests in "Sussex" to Trevor. "Sussex" was subsequently transferred to Trevor, who did not provide any consideration to either Mr or Mrs Archer. "Sussex" has subsequently been sold by Trevor, but part of the proceeds of sale have been retained in a trust account to meet Mrs Archer's claim in the present litigation. 185 Initially, Mr and Mrs Archer sought to set aside their transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor on the ground of undue influence." Later, Mrs Archer added a claim alleging unconscionable conduct. 186 At the first trial in the Equity Division, Mr Archer failed but Mrs Archer partially succeeded. Simos J determined that Mrs Archer's transfer to Trevor "was, as to two thirds of her notional half interest …procured by [his] undue influence." Trevor appealed in respect of the orders made in favour of Mrs Archer, and this Court ordered a new trial of her claim. Neither Mr Archer nor Trevor appealed in respect of any order made in respect of Mr Archer's claim. 187 At the second trial between her and Trevor, at which Windeyer J presided, Mrs Archer failed in the Equity Division. She was ordered to pay Trevor's costs of the second trial, and she and Mr Archer were ordered to pay Trevor's costs of the first trial. The costs of the second trial and part of the costs of the first trial were ordered to be paid "on the indemnity basis". 188 Mr and Mrs Archer have appealed, although Mr Archer's appeal relates only to "the question of costs". The orders sought in the notice of appeal were: 1. The appeal be allowed. 2. Judgment below for [Trevor] be set aside. 3. In place of the judgment below, a declaration that the transfer by [Mrs Archer] to [Trevor] of her interest in the property 'Sussex' was, procured by unconscionable conduct or by undue influence either as to the whole of her interest therein or as to two thirds of her notional one half interest therein. 4. A declaration that the net proceeds of sale of 'Sussex' are held on trust for [Mrs Archer] as to a one half share. 5. In the alternative, a declaration that the net proceeds of sale of 'Sussex' are held on trust as to a one third share thereof. 6. Order that [Trevor] pay [Mr and Mrs Archer's] costs of the appeal and the [second trial]. And that each party pay its own costs of the [first trial]". 189 Although Mrs Archer did not apply to amend the relief sought by her notice of appeal, the argument in this Court proceeded on the basis that whoever of Mrs Archer and Trevor succeeds is entitled to the portion of the proceeds of sale of "Sussex" which is held on trust pending the outcome of this litigation and that no other relief, apart from costs, is sought. 190 In a written submission lodged after the hearing in this Court, the appellants submitted that Mrs Archer ".. should have her costs of (i) this appeal; (ii) the [second] trial before Windeyer J; and (iii) the [first] trial before Simos J, at least after the amendment of 27 November 1995 to claim unconscionable conduct", and that Mr Archer "should (i) have his costs of the appeal; (ii) have no order for costs against or for him in respect of the [first] trial before Simos J for the reasons given by Simos J….". 191 In late 1988, and in any event before 1 March 1989, there were two material conversations in relation to Sussex, the first between Mrs Archer and Trevor, and the second, a short time later, between Mr Archer, Mrs Archer and Trevor. 192 In the first of the two conversations, Mrs Archer told Trevor that "Sussex" would one day be owned by him and his two brothers. Trevor protested, and pointed out that he had remained and worked on "Sussex", and had helped Mr and Mrs Archer to obtain and pay off loans which had been used to buy "Sussex", including a loan from the Rural Assistance Board. Mrs Archer said "I suppose that's right. I'll have to think about that. Anyway we can't do anything until we have paid out the Rural Assistance Board." In the previous judgment of this Court, Mrs Archer's statement was described as ".. a reluctant indication … that she would at least consider whether she would change her, until then, strongly held intention of leaving her share of "Sussex" to her three sons to that of leaving it to [Trevor] only." 193 In the second of the two conversations, when Trevor asked what Mr and Mrs Archer planned in relation to "Sussex", he was again told that nothing could be done until the Rural Assistance Board had been paid out. 194 On 1 March 1989, each of Mr Archer and Mrs Archer made a new will. Each appointed the other and Trevor as executors and left the whole of his or her property to the other. In the event that he or she survived the other, each left "Sussex" to Trevor, and broadly speaking, each divided his or her other property equally between their three sons. 195 After Mr Archer and Mrs Archer made wills on 1 March 1989, copies were given to Trevor. Initially, he thought that he would inherit "Sussex". However, in about August 1989, Mrs Archer informed him that, if Mr Archer died before her, she would have to sell both "Sussex" and "Glenroy" to provide for her old age. When asked by Trevor whether "Glenroy" would not be enough for her, Mrs Archer replied "I don't really know." 196 A few days later, Mr Archer and Trevor had a conversation in which Trevor told Mr Archer what Mrs Archer had said, pointed out how difficult it would be for Trevor, who would be left without a house, if "Sussex" was sold, and asked whether there was any chance of getting "Sussex" transferred into his name. Mr Archer replied "yes, I suppose it's time that we transferred to you. You had better make some inquiries with the solicitor to see what's involved and let me know." 197 Trevor and his wife consulted a solicitor in Orange, Mr Cheney of Cheney and Wilson, on 21 September 1989. None of the parties had dealt with Mr Cheney prior to that time. Trevor then became aware that, because Mr and Mrs Archer were joint tenants of "Sussex", Mrs Archer would become the sole owner if, as was apparently anticipated, Mr Archer predeceased her. Mr Cheney advised Trevor that it was desirable that he obtain a transfer of "Sussex" to himself or himself and his wife, and that the stamp duty would be about $27,000. 198 In a letter to Trevor and his wife the following day, Mr Cheney said: "… As advised in our conference, having regard to the fact that Mr and Mrs Archer senior hold the property as joint tenants, it is important from your point of view to discuss with them the possibility of transferring the property to yourselves at the earliest possible time. While this course of action involves a substantial payment of stamp duty we are of the view that the long term protection and certainly that the transfer will ensure outweigh the cost. ..." 199 Trevor told Mr Archer that he would be prepared to pay the stamp duty and other costs associated with the transfer of "Sussex", and Mr Archer said "That's O.K., go ahead." 200 On 26 September 1989, Trevor had a conversation with Mr and Mrs Archer in which he said to Mrs Archer "I am relieved that you and dad have agreed to transfer 'Sussex' to me." Mrs Archer said "I am prepared to give it to you, but not to Sue [Trevor's wife]. I won't have her name on the papers. We will give it to you but not to her." That was accepted by Trevor and his wife. 201 On the same day, Mr Archer, Mrs Archer and Trevor went to the State Bank at Canowindra and obtained a loan, which was used in part to repay the Rural Assistance Board's mortgage over "Sussex". At Mr Archer's suggestion, the State Bank's loan was secured only on "Glenroy". 202 There was another security over "Sussex" in favour of Mrs Archer's sisters. Sometime prior to 16 October 1989, Mr Archer told Trevor that he and Mrs Archer were in the process of satisfying that debt, and the security was discharged on 23 October. 203 Earlier, another security over "Sussex" in favour of the National Australia Bank had also been paid out although the security had not been released. 204 On 16 October 1989, Trevor and his wife again saw Mr Cheney and told him that Mr and Mrs Archer had agreed to transfer "Sussex" into Trevor's name only. There was a discussion about the value of the property and the amount of the stamp duty which the transaction would attract, and Mr Cheney said he would arrange for a valuer to visit "Sussex" in due course. 205 On 17 October 1989, Trevor received a letter from Mr Cheney informing him that documents for the transfer of "Sussex" were ready for signature and stating that the parties should attend on Mr Cheney for that purpose. For reasons which were never satisfactorily explained, Mr Cheney prepared a contract for the sale of "Sussex" by Mr and Mrs Archer to Trevor. No purchase price was paid or intended to be paid, and the parties have proceeded on the footing that, notwithstanding the contract, "Sussex" was given, not sold, by Mr and Mrs Archer to Trevor. 206 On 6 November 1989, Mr Archer consulted Dr Winkworth with chest pains, and was admitted to Orange Base Hospital. He was discharged from hospital and returned home to "Glenroy" on 17 November 1989. 207 Sometime in the ensuing week, Trevor informed Mr and Mrs Archer that the documents for the transfer of "Sussex" to him were ready for signature and asked when they could be signed. Either Mr or Mrs Archer said that Mr Archer had an appointment to see Dr Winkworth on 24 November, and they could call into the solicitor's office and sign the documents that day. Trevor made the necessary arrangements, and informed Mr and Mrs Archer. 208 On 24 November 1989, Mr and Mrs Archer and Trevor and his wife went to Mr Cheney's office. Mr and Mrs Archer confirmed that the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor had been discussed with them and that they understood that, if they signed the documents which Mr Cheney had prepared, "Sussex" would be transferred into Trevor's name but they would remain the owners of "Glenroy". There was discussion about the transfer being a gift, Trevor being the sole transferee, Trevor's payment of all costs and expenses associated with the transfer, the valuation for "Sussex", the possibility of a reduction in stamp duty, and the discharge of securities over "Sussex". 209 At that meeting, Mr Cheney also explained the general terms of the contract which he had prepared and the transfer to Mr and Mrs Archer, who signed those documents and a document authorising the State Bank to deliver the title deeds to "Sussex" to Mr Cheney. Although the authority was correctly dated that day, the contract and transfer documents were later dated 20 March 1990, after "Sussex" had been coincidently valued at the exact purchase price already stated in the contract. 210 In his evidence, Mr Cheney said that, although his first instructions came from and his first advice was given to Trevor, he considered that he was acting for everyone involved in the transaction after he was informed that Mr and Mrs Archer had agreed to proceed. He said, and the trial judge accepted, that it is not unusual for one solicitor to act for all families in "inter-generational transfers." 211 While Mr Cheney did not consciously assist Trevor to take advantage of Mrs Archer, he acted foolishly. There was an obvious potential conflict of interests between mother and son, and the same solicitor could not diligently act for both. It does not seem to have even occurred to him to discuss the practical implications of the step which they were taking with Mr and Mrs Archer or even to inquire of them their reasons for agreeing to do what Trevor wanted or to ascertain whether they were enthusiastic or reluctant donors of "Sussex". He did not inquire as to their financial position, their health or future prospects or their plans, and he did not advise them that they should obtain independent legal or financial advice. 212 After they left Mr Cheney's office, Mr and Mrs Archer and Trevor and his wife went to Dr Winkworth's surgery, where Mr Archer had a consultation with another medical practitioner because Dr Winkworth was unavailable. 213 Mr Archer's health remained poor at all material times thereafter, and he was later again hospitalised with heart problems. 214 A few days later, Mrs Archer asked Trevor whether he was happy that "Sussex" had been transferred to him and he thanked her. 215 Shortly after 6 December 1989, Mr Archer and Mrs Archer received a letter from the National Australia Bank asking them to call to sign a document authorising the release of the certificates of title in respect of "Sussex" to Mr Cheney. 216 On 11 December 1989, there was a party in Orange to celebrate Mr Archer's 70th birthday. Mr and Mrs Archer and Trevor and his wife attended. 217 On 18 December 1989, a valuer inspected "Sussex" for the purpose of a valuation. 218 On 25 December 1989, there was a family Christmas celebration at "Glenroy" at which Mr and Mrs Archer and Trevor and his wife were present. 219 Mr Archer was still in poor health, and was hospitalised again in the new year. 220 On 2 March 1990, Mr and Mrs Archer signed an instruction to the National Australia Bank authorising it to hand over the title deeds to "Sussex" to Mr Cheney. Windeyer J rejected Mrs Archer's claim that she had no recollection of signing that document. 221 In the same month, Mrs Archer asked Trevor whether the transfer of "Sussex" had been completed. 222 On 12 September 1990, Mr and Mrs Archer made new wills, each appointing Trevor a co-executor, and each stating that no provision had been made for him in the will as he had been adequately provided for. The trial judge rejected Mrs Archer's claim that she then believed that she had transferred only a one third share of her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor, and that it was only after her other sons questioned her, and she obtained copies of documents, that she realised that she had transferred her entire interest in "Sussex" to Trevor. 223 In about April 1992, Mrs Archer collected a copy of the contract for the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor from Mr Cheney. 224 Sometime in 1992, when her other sons raised the ownership of "Sussex" with Mrs Archer, she told them that she had only wanted to transfer one third of her interest to Trevor but had been tricked into transferring her whole interest. Colin and Neville suggested that she act to correct the situation. 225 On 10 December 1992, another firm of solicitors, Timmins and Partners, wrote to Mr Cheney on behalf of Mr and Mrs Archer seeking information concerning the transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor. That letter was received by Mr Cheney on 21 December 1992, and he replied on the following day. 226 Following a threat by Mr and Mrs Archer to overturn their transfer of "Sussex" to Trevor, there were inconclusive discussions between the parties and their lawyers in 1993. 227 Trevor dissolved his partnership with Mr and Mrs Archer on 30 June 1994. 228 In 1995, Mr and Mrs Archer lodged caveats over "Sussex", and, in April that year, they commenced their Equity Division proceeding seeking the have the transfer of "Sussex" wholly set aside. 229 Windeyer J held that Mrs Archer was an untruthful witness. His Honour found that she had fabricated a document which she said was a note which she had written at about 11.00 p.m. on the day when the documents were signed, which she asserted was not 24 November but 1 December 1989. His Honour also referred to inconsistencies in Mrs Archer's evidence, which included conflicting assertions that she had not understood that she had signed documents to transfer her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor, that she had intended to transfer only one third of her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor, and that she had understood that she had transferred her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor but she had done so only because of circumstances involving undue influence or unconscionable conduct by Trevor. Mrs Archer's evidence that she was surprised when she and Mr Archer were taken to Mr Cheney's office on 24 November 1989 but decided to sign and say nothing because she was so worried about Mr Archer's health was rejected. His Honour found that, when she transferred the whole of her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor, Mrs Archer "well knew what she was doing and did it freely", that "she was never shown not to have acted as she wished to act..", and that she "did what she did because she had agreed to so but later changed her mind and concocted a story..". His Honour also found that "[n]one of the pleaded claims of disability stated to arise from the illness of Mr Archer; inexperience; inequality of bargaining power and inability to protect her own interests [was] made out". 230 Subject to what follows, those findings were open. Mrs Archer cannot succeed on the ground of undue influence if she cannot succeed on the ground of unconscionable conduct. 231 The issue raised by Mrs Archer's claim of unconscionable conduct is whether Trevor obtained a gift of her interest in "Sussex" by unconscionable conduct. If that issue is determined in Mrs Archer's favour, Trevor does not dispute that she is entitled to the part of the proceeds of sale of "Sussex" which is held in trust. Events subsequent to Mrs Archer's gift of her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor were relied on by him for any assistance which they provided in understanding the circumstances of that gift, but were as disentitling Mrs Archer to any relief to which she would otherwise be entitled by reason of the circumstances of that gift, properly understood. 232 Windeyer J found that the "only evidence which could possibly support the claim based on unconscientious behaviour" was Trevor's statement that he intended "to thwart [Mrs Archer's] desires for [his] own advantage", which was the "natural progression" of events after he saw Mr Cheney "having been told to do so by his father". On the basis of his findings, his Honour held that the "claim based on unconscionability must be dismissed." 233 However, the desire of Mrs Archer which Trevor intended "to thwart", and succeeding in thwarting, was her desire to retain her interest in "Sussex", not give it to Trevor. In deciding whether he acted unconscionably in obtaining a gift of Mrs Archer's interest in "Sussex" in those circumstances, it is necessary to consider Mrs Archer's position, which was known to Trevor, including the reasons for her to retain her interest in "Sussex", and the means which Trevor used to obtain a gift of her interest in "Sussex". 234 Trevor's attitude was understandable. "Sussex" was his family's home, and he derived his income from the partnership conducted on "Glenroy" and "Sussex". If Trevor obtained "Sussex", he would own his own property, and would no longer be dependent on the partnership with his parents and the use of their properties for partnership purposes. Unless he obtained "Sussex" while his father was alive, Trevor's family would probably have to leave "Sussex" at some time, and he would have to find another source of income. He would probably eventually inherit only a third share of whatever Mrs Archer owned at the end of her life, which might not be much. 235 Mrs Archer was about 69 or 70 years old, would probably survive Mr Archer and might live for many years. She would probably inherit "Glenroy" from Mr Archer, and, as matters stood, she would be the sole owner of "Sussex" after Mr Archer's death. If she chose to do so and Trevor agreed, she might be able to operate "Glenroy" and "Sussex" with Trevor's assistance. If that was not possible, or she chose not to do so, the sale of the properties would provide her with money for another home and for investments to obtain an income for living expenses. Mrs Archer would probably not be able to operate "Glenroy" and live on the income after Mr Archer died without Trevor's assistance, which might not be forthcoming if he owned "Sussex". While "Glenroy" was larger and probably more valuable than "Sussex", it was mortgaged, and its sale might not provide Mrs Archer with sufficient money to buy another home and obtain an adequate investment income. Mr Archer's transfer of his interest in "Sussex" to Trevor involved a considerable detriment to Mrs Archer and her transfer of her interest in "Sussex" to him might leave her without adequate assets for a secure future. Trevor also knew that Mrs Archer was displeased that her other sons would receive less from their parents if he was given "Sussex". He was aware that, although she understood what she was doing, Mrs Archer did not want to give him her interest in "Sussex" but was anxious about Mr Archer's health and desirous of complying with his wishes about their properties. 236 No attempt was made to find a solution which would be reasonably satisfactory to Trevor and Mrs Archer; for example, consideration was never given to possible agreements which would guarantee Trevor's ultimate ownership of "Sussex" but ensure that he continued to work both properties in partnership with Mr and Mrs Archer during their respective lifetimes. 237 When Mrs Archer signed the documents which Mr Cheney had prepared and returned them to him on 24 November 1989, she was in a position of disadvantage relative to Trevor. The trial judge said that "Mrs Archer was not a person who could be dominated". However, Trevor effectively acknowledged that he was able "to thwart [Mrs Archer's] desires for [his] own advantage", and he did so. 238 Quite possibly, Mrs Archer did not need to retain her interest in "Sussex" in order to be financially secure after Mr Archer's death. Perhaps that was Mr Archer's opinion, although he might simply have had a father's optimistic view of Trevor's future attitude to his mother's well-being. Nonetheless, it is significant that Trevor enlisted Mr Archer to influence Mrs Archer to abandon her own wish and give Trevor her interest in "Sussex". Trevor also obtained advice and assistance from Mr Cheney and took Mr and Mrs Archer to Mr Cheney's office to sign the documents. Importantly, although he knew that Mrs Archer did not want to give him her interest in "Sussex", Trevor did not suggest that Mr and Mrs Archer, or Mrs Archer, should obtain independent assistance and advice. I consider that the methods used by Trevor to obtain Mrs Archer's signature of the documents on 24 November 1989 were unconscionable in the circumstances. 239 However, the gift of her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor which Mrs Archer impugns was not completed when she signed the documents which Mr Cheney had prepared on 24 November 1989 or until some months later. Further, the gift could not have been completed without Mrs Archer's cooperation, which was forthcoming. 240 During the period taken to complete Mrs Archer's gift of her interest in "Sussex", Trevor still did not suggest that she obtain independent advice and assistance, she was still susceptible to Mr Archer's influence and the documents which she had signed complicated her position and probably made her withdrawal from the gift more difficult, or at least appear so. Nonetheless, even if it should be concluded that Mrs Archer remained in a position of disadvantage relative to Trevor, I do not consider that his conduct in that period, including his continuing omission to suggest to Mrs Archer that she obtain independent advice and assistance, constituted operative unconscientious conduct at that point. 241 Despite the attempt made in supplementary written submissions to explain Mrs Archer's cooperation in the completion of the transaction, I am persuaded that she decided to proceed with the gift of her interest in "Sussex" to Trevor, implicitly affirming her earlier signature and delivery of the relevant documents, and that her decision at that time was unaffected by any position of special disadvantage relative to Trevor or any unconscionable conduct in which he had engaged. The trial judge's finding that "Mrs Archer was not a person who could be dominated" is material to her cooperation at that time. If she had remained an unwilling participant in the gift of "Sussex" to Trevor, it is probable that she would have raised it with Mr Archer and, if necessary, her other sons, and would have sought advice and assistance. 242 The conclusion that I have reached, namely, that Mrs Archer became a willing participant in the decision to give "Sussex" to Trevor, unaffected by any special disadvantage relative to Trevor or any unconscionable conduct by him, by the time when her gift was completed is supported by Mrs Archer's subsequent attitude and conduct until her other sons raised the ownership of "Sussex" with her more than a year later. 243 Mrs Archer's appeal against the trial judge's dismissal of her claim against Trevor should be dismissed with costs. *********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. 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