Vaughan v Australian Tyremarketers t/as Goodyear Auto Service Centre [1999] NSWSC 125

New South Wales Supreme Court CITATION : Vaughan v Australian Tyremarketers t/as Goodyear Auto Service Centre [1999] NSWSC 125 CURRENT JURISDICTION : Common Law FILE NUMBER(S) : N300091/96 HEARING DATE(S) : 18 February 1999 JUDGMENT DATE : 1 March 1999

ELLIS JAMES CHARLES VAUGHAN (Plaintiff) PARTIES : AUSTRALIAN TYREMARKETERS t/as GOODYEAR AUTO SERVICE CENTRE (Defendant) JUDGMENT OF : Master Harrison

Mr M Cahill (Plaintiff) COUNSEL : Mr W P Kearns (Defendant) Mr J E Isaken Geoffrey Edwards & Co, Penrith (Plaintiff) SOLICITORS : A O Ellison & Co Solicitors, Sydney (Defendant) CATCHWORDS : Extension of time - Sections 60G & I Limitation Act ACTS CITED : Limitation Act 1969 DECISION : See paragraph 30

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION

MASTER HARRISON

MONDAY, 1 MARCH 1999

N300091/96 - ELLIS JAMES CHARLES VAUGHAN V AUSTRALIAN TYREMARKETERS t/as GOODYEAR AUTO SERVICE CENTRE

JUDGMENT (Extension of time - Sections 60G & I Limitation Act)

1 MASTER: The plaintiff by notice of motion filed 30 August 1996 seeks an extension of time within which proceedings can be commenced pursuant to s 60G and s 60I of the Limitation Act 1969 and leave be granted to change the name of the defendant to Tyre Marketers (Australia) Limited t/as Goodyear Auto Service Centre. The plaintiff relied on the affidavits of Ellis James Charles Vaughan sworn 16 August 1996 and two affidavits of John Edwin Isaksen sworn 6 August 1998 and 8 October 1998. The defendant did not rely on any affidavit evidence. The defendant opposes the orders sought in relation to the extension of the limitation period but raises no objection to the order being made as to the change of the defendant's name. Accordingly I make an order in accordance with para 4 of the notice of motion. 2 The plaintiff was cross examined. I observed the plaintiff being cross examined and it is my view that the plaintiff was giving truthful evidence in a straight forward manner. 3 For the purposes of this application I find the following facts. (1) In 1984 the plaintiff was employed by the defendant. During the course of his employment he was required to lift heavy tyres including tractor tyres that were filled with water. There was no mechanical assistance provided to the plaintiff or other employees for the purpose of doing so.