Gamilaroi Boomerangs Sports Aboriginal Corporation v Members of New England Group 19 Rugby League General Committee [1999] NSWSC 293

New South Wales Supreme Court CITATION : Gamilaroi Boomerangs Sports Aboriginal Corporation v Members of New England Group 19 Rugby League General Committee [1999] NSWSC 293 CURRENT JURISDICTION : Equity Division FILE NUMBER(S) : 1836/99 HEARING DATE(S) : 29 March 1999 JUDGMENT DATE : 29 March 1999

PARTIES : Gamilaroi Boomerangs Sports Aboriginal Corporation (Plaintiff) Members of New England Group 19 Rugby League General Committee (Defendant) JUDGMENT OF : Young J

COUNSEL : SOLICITORS : Solicitor for plaintiff: J Sutton (Stuart Percy & Associates, Moree) Solicitor for defendant: J Riordan (Colin W Love & Co) CATCHWORDS : Associations & Clubs [15]; Meetings for disciplinary purposes; Freedom of association; When court might restrain meeting; Flexibility of natural justice principles DECISION : See para 15

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES EQUITY DIVISION

YOUNG, J

MONDAY 29 MARCH 1999

1836/99 - GAMILAROI BOOMERANGS SPORTS ABORIGINAL CORPORATION V MEMBERS OF NEW ENGLAND GROUP 19 RUGBY LEAGUE GENERAL COMMITTEE

JUDGMENT 1 HIS HONOUR : This is an application to restrain the holding of an enquiry by the members of New England Group 19 of the rugby league. 2 The plaintiff has received a letter indicating that the general committee of the New England Group 19 will be meeting at the Glen Innes RSL Club tonight at 7.45 to enquire into allegations of misconduct by the plaintiff through its players and/or supporters during the 1998 season, being matters which are said to affect the control and welfare of the Group and rugby league football. 3 The plaintiff says that such an enquiry, if held tonight, would be a travesty. The foregone conclusion it says will be reached is a denial of natural justice, and thus the meeting should be restrained. 4 In particular the plaintiff says that first, the enquiry has not been properly convened. Secondly, that it has sought particulars of the allegations and it has not been given adequate particulars. Thirdly, the people who apparently intend to participate in the meeting have, by their previous actions, shown actual bias towards the plaintiff, or would reasonably be perceived to be biased against the plaintiff; and fourthly, in the light of two previous sets of court proceedings, in which the plaintiff succeeded on similar issues, this would be a case of triple jeopardy. 5 The allegations that are contained in exhibit PX01, which is at least an attempt to supply particulars, do raise some matters which, if established, one could see would be of genuine concern to those wishing to uphold rugby league players as role models in the community. The previous proceedings, as I understand them, did not actually deal with the truth or otherwise of those allegations, but were victories for the plaintiff because of procedural and other irregularities. Accordingly, what has gone before does not necessarily make me consider that this is a special case outside the way in which this Court generally approaches this sort of issue. 6 There are perhaps six basic principles that have to be borne in mind. 7 (a) Bodies such as Group 19, which exist to promote sport in a locality, must generally be free to conduct their affairs informally, and the court will only become involved as, more or less, a last resort, otherwise the right of freedom of association held so dear by Australians would be thwarted. 8 (b) As a general rule people who want to hold meetings should be allowed to hold them, otherwise the right of freedom of speech and association would be impinged. 9 However, (c) meetings must be properly convened. If a meeting has not been properly convened then, even though it might look like a meeting, it is not in law a meeting and is valueless. 10 (d) Meetings, especially when they affect the proprietary rights, or the right to work, of individuals, must be conducted so that there is no denial of natural justice. 11 (e) What constitutes natural justice in any particular set of facts will be infinitely various, as shown by the decision of Needham J in McNab v Auburn Soccer Sports Club Ltd [1975] 1 NSWLR 54. 12 (f) It is not necessarily the case that a person is entitled to particulars or to legal representation at a meeting. Questions as to procedure are a matter for the meeting itself, and it is only when there is an actual denial of natural justice that the court will interfere. 13 In the instant case, it may be that some of the questions that Mr Sutton, for the plaintiff, raises are matters which the court would in due course consider might nullify the making of any decision. On the other hand, the defendants have been very clearly warned that unless they do afford natural justice at the meeting then their decision will be called into question. Experience in the past has shown that under such circumstances, properly advised by competent lawyers, the chances of natural justice rules being infringed diminish considerably. 14 I cannot see how this is a special case where the court should stop people holding an enquiry or a meeting if they wish to do so. I appreciate that this means that the plaintiff and its members may have to make some awkward tactical decisions as to what they do at the meeting. It may also be that the members of the general committee may need to adjourn after they have given a fair and reasonable outline of the case against the plaintiff, at least if the plaintiff requires a reasonably short adjournment to deal with those matters. However, I cannot see why the court should at this stage prohibit the meeting from being held or, alternatively, declare that it has not properly been convened. 15 Accordingly, I decline to make any order at this stage. I give leave to the plaintiff to amend the summons generally. The plaintiff is to pay the costs of today. I stand the matter over for mention before me on 7 April 1999 at 9.50am. The exhibits can be retained. oOo