Regina v Matheson [2001] NSWSC 332

New South Wales Supreme Court

CITATION : Regina v Matheson [2001] NSWSC 332 FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 070032/00 HEARING DATE(S) : 4/5/01, 11/5/01 JUDGMENT DATE : 11 May 2001

PARTIES : Regina v Danny Raymond George Matheson JUDGMENT OF : Howie J at 1

COUNSEL : P. Barnett (Crown) J. Stratton (Accused) SOLICITORS : S.E. O'Connor (Crown) B. Duchen (Accused) LEGISLATION CITED : Crimes Act 1900 - s 23A Crimes (Sentencing) Procedure Act 1999 DECISION : The prisoner is sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years. The sentence is to commence on 2 October 1999 and the non-parole period will expire on 1 October 2014, the date upon which he is eligible to be considered for release.

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES CRIMINAL DIVISION

HOWIE J

FRIDAY 11 MAY 2001

070032/00 REGINA v DANNY RAYMOND GEORGE MATHESON

SENTENCE 1 HIS HONOUR: On 20 March 2001 the prisoner was indicted on a charge of murdering Janene Frances Greenaway on 2 October 1999. The prisoner pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder but guilty to manslaughter. The Crown did not accept that plea and, therefore, the trial of the prisoner on the charge of murder proceeded before a jury. 2 On 5 April 2001 the jury convicted the prisoner of murder. He was then remanded in custody until 4 May for sentence. On that day I received evidence on sentence, heard submissions from both counsel, and then adjourned the matter until today. 3 Much of the evidence before the jury was not in dispute. In my view there is little difficulty in determining the facts upon which the jury relied to convict the accused of murder because in effect they must have rejected the version proffered by the accused in his evidence before them. The prisoner maintained that he did not intend to kill the deceased, his former de facto partner, but that the rifle he was holding at the time accidentally discharged during the struggle. The Crown submitted to the jury that the prisoner deliberately shot the deceased in the head at a time when she was helpless on the ground. 4 The prisoner and the deceased met while they were at school, and commenced a de facto relationship in 1989. They had three daughters of this relationship, the youngest child being born in 1997. Throughout their relationship there were periods of separation when the deceased left the prisoner, taking the children with her. However, after a short period living apart from the prisoner, the deceased would re-establish the relationship and return to his home with the children. It seems that these separations were generally the result of disputes arising from acts of infidelity by the prisoner, or because of assaults by him upon the deceased. 5 In April 1988 the deceased again separated from the prisoner. She believed that he had been having a sexual relationship with a neighbour, who was a married woman. The deceased and the children lived with her mother until early 1999, then with the deceased's sister for a short period, and eventually moved into a flat rented by the deceased. 6 Although they were no longer living together, the deceased and the prisoner maintained regular contact with one another. There were occasions when they went on holidays together, either with or without the children, and the prisoner would often babysit the children so that the deceased could go out at night socialising. From time to time the deceased stayed with the prisoner over night, and they occasionally had sexual relations with one another. However, the deceased showed no signs of re-establishing the relationship, or moving back to live with the prisoner. 7 There is little doubt that the prisoner was anxious that the deceased should return to live with him, and was particularly unhappy because he had limited access to the children. He wrote letters to the deceased in an effort to persuade her to re-establish their relationship, and in effect assured her that he would never again assault her or engage in acts of infidelity. These entreaties and promises were to no avail. The prisoner, who was extremely jealous of the deceased, became increasingly concerned that she might commence a relationship with another man. 8 It was the Crown's case that, in the months before the shooting of the deceased, the prisoner became more desperate as his fears that she would not return to live with him increased. There was evidence that during the period of their separation the prisoner made threats to take his own life, and there was an occasion when he slashed his wrists. There was also evidence of statements made by the prisoner to various persons that he should or would kill the deceased. It may well be the case that initially these threats were not very serious and amounted more to evidence of his frustration than evidence of his intention. However, I believe that as his anxieties about his relationship with the deceased became stronger, so he became angrier with her and these thoughts of harming her took on more substance. 9 There was evidence in the trial of threats made by the prisoner that he would kill the deceased if she entered into another relationship. On one occasion the prisoner confronted the deceased about a letter he had found from another man and addressed to her. There was evidence that the prisoner on this occasion said to her, "I could just kill you". James Edmonds, a good friend of the prisoner, gave evidence of a conversation with the prisoner some time before the shooting in which the prisoner said he planned to purchase a hand gun from a farmer at his work place, and to use the weapon to shoot both the deceased and himself. In his evidence the prisoner denied that this conversation took place, but I believe it did. 10 On the Monday before the deceased was shot, the prisoner inquired of a fellow employee as to the possibility of obtaining a hand gun, and what it might cost. He was told that such a weapon would probably be available for about $500. I have no doubt that by this time, at least, the prisoner was seriously contemplating taking the life of the deceased if he discovered that she was seeing another man. 11 On the day of the shooting, that is 2 October 1999, the deceased cancelled plans that the prisoner had made to take the children shopping. Instead, the deceased and the children remained at the home of a friend at 9 Coromandel Street, Tamworth. The deceased had gone to those premises the night before with a man named Adam Storch, with whom she was then keeping company. The prisoner visited those premises on three occasions between about 4pm and 7pm. On each occasion the deceased came out of the house to speak to him. 12 The prisoner gave evidence that on his first visit to those premises he learned that Mr Storch and the deceased were seeing each other, and that they had stayed together the previous night. The deceased refused the prisoner's request that he be permitted to spend time with the children that evening, stating that they were to attend a barbecue with her. The prisoner returned home and consumed cannabis, as he had been doing throughout the day. The prisoner admitted in cross-examination that he became angry when he discovered that Mr Storch had stayed the night with the deceased. 13 The prisoner told the jury that on the second visit to those premises the deceased again refused his request to have the children that evening, whereupon he had threatened to commit suicide. There was evidence in the Crown case that the deceased herself had been concerned that the prisoner might carry out that threat because of his unusually affectionate behaviour to the children during that conversation. However, the prisoner told the jury that when he looked into the eyes of his children he realised that he could not kill himself. 14 The prisoner then returned to his home and consumed more cannabis. He took a rifle, which was in the house, and drove to the premises where he worked. There he used an industrial saw to shorten the firearm by cutting off a substantial part of the barrel and a large section of the stock. Although the accused told the jury that when he performed that task the rifle must have been loaded, I do not believe that it was. 15 While at those premises the prisoner rang Mr Edmonds, who lived in Coffs Harbour. There was a dispute between Mr Edmonds and the prisoner as to the contents of that telephone conversation. Mr Edmonds was clearly an unsatisfactory witness and made inconsistent statements about this conversation and other matters. I believe that Mr Edmonds was uncomfortable about giving evidence which was so damaging to the prisoner, and was trying his best to minimise the effect of his testimony. But I have no doubt that during this conversation the prisoner told Mr Edmonds that he was going to obtain a hand gun, shoot the deceased in the head, and then shoot himself. That account is supported by the fact that after the shooting Mr Edmonds rang a workmate of the prisoner and accused him of supplying the gun to the prisoner. 16 After this conversation the prisoner drove back to 9 Coromandel Street for the third time, taking the shortened firearm with him. The deceased again left the premises to speak to the prisoner, but when she had not returned after a short period, the residents became alarmed and went to look for her. She was found in the driveway of the premises opposite, bleeding profusely from the head. She died before she arrived at hospital. 17 The prisoner told the jury that he had taken the rifle with him to Coromandel Street intending to scare the deceased into going back to him. He said that he cut down the rifle to make it appear more frightening. He stated that he had not turned his mind to whether the rifle was loaded or whether the safety catch was off or on, but the previous night he had loaded the weapon in order to commit suicide, but changed his mind at the last minute. 18 The prisoner said that during the conversation with the deceased on the third occasion he attended those premises, she again refused his request to have the children that night. She told the prisoner that she still loved him, but she did not know if they had a chance of reconciling. The deceased also said that she had been considering moving with the children to Sydney, and that they would have to work out arrangements for the children through the court system. The prisoner said that it was then that he produced the weapon, holding it towards the deceased through the window of the` motor vehicle in which he was sitting at the time. 19 The prisoner gave the jury an account of the circumstances in which the deceased came to be shot in the head. In essence the prisoner said that the rifle accidentally discharged during a struggle while he was attempting to calm the deceased so that he could talk to her. It was on the basis of this version of events that the prisoner had pleaded guilty to manslaughter. It is unnecessary to further detail the prisoner's account of the shooting because, as I have already indicated, the jury must have rejected it and found beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally shot the deceased. 20 The prisoner returned to his home immediately after the shooting and phoned his parents, telling them that he had shot the deceased and was intending to shoot himself. While the prisoner was talking to his father, two police officers arrived at his parents' home seeking information as to the prisoner's whereabouts. When the officers became aware that the prisoner was on the telephone, they commenced to talk to him in an effort to dissuade him from committing suicide. Over a period of some four hours Senior Constable Hamlin spoke with the prisoner in a number of telephone conversations, some of which were recorded, and eventually convinced him to surrender himself to the police. 21 Although on a number of occasions during the telephone conversations the prisoner told police that he had shot the deceased, police received information that a medical examination of the deceased was unable to locate a gunshot wound. The police had also been informed by a resident of Coromandel Street that the accused had been seen with a baseball bat. As a result of this information Senior Constable Hamlin told the prisoner that it was believed that he must have struck the deceased with some object, rather than having shot her. 22 Although initially the prisoner met this information with disbelief, after his arrest he took advantage of this error on the part of the police, and told them that he had hit the deceased with a piece of wood or a stick which he had in his motor car at the time, and which he had thrown away as he drove back to his home. The prisoner went so far as to take police to various places where he said that he might have thrown this object. He maintained this account during the course of his first recorded interview, although he said that he had no recollection of injuring the deceased. 23 The existence of a gunshot wound to the head of the deceased was not discovered until an x-ray was conducted some days later. A search of the prisoner's home thereafter revealed the shortened firearm hidden in the ceiling, part of the barrel amongst the ashes in the fireplace, and the cut down stock in a folded air mattress. A single unfired cartridge was found on the front passenger seat of the motor vehicle in which the prisoner had driven to Coromandel Street on the night of the shooting. 24 Armed with this new information the police re-interviewed the prisoner on 8 October 1999. In this second recorded interview the prisoner admitted to having shortened the firearm and taken it with him to Coromandel Street, but he told the police that he had no recollection of the circumstances surrounding the shooting. The prisoner admitted to secreting the barrel and the stock of the firearm where they had been found by the police. When asked why he had shortened the firearm, the prisoner said that he was thinking of going hunting and that it would permit him to hold the rifle in one hand and a knife in the other. The prisoner denied any conversations about the purchase of a hand gun, and denied telling Mr Edmonds that he had intended to shoot the deceased. 25 Dr Duflou, the forensic pathologist, found that the deceased had died from a gun shot wound to the top of the head, and that this had resulted in an extensive haemorrhage in the brain. A small fragment of the bullet was found in the brain stem, making it very probable that the deceased instantly lost consciousness or even died at the time that the fragment entered the brain. Dr Duflou gave evidence that the barrel of the gun was in contact with the deceased's head at the time that the weapon was discharged, and the muzzle would have been partially up against and at a slight angle to the head of the deceased. The firearm would have been held in the same plane as the head, in other words if a person were standing upright the gun would have been pointing down on top of the head. 26 Dr Duflou stated that an abrasion on the deceased's face in the area immediately above and between the eyebrows was consistent with the deceased having fallen down head first on to a concrete driveway. He thought that the other injuries found on the deceased, including abrasions on her hands and her left knee, were more likely to have been caused by a degree of movement across the concrete rather than merely a simple contact with the driveway. The Crown contended that the distinction between the nature of the injury to the deceased's face and those to her limbs was consistent with the fact that she was on her hands and knees before she was shot. 27 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that on the evening of 2 October 1999, the prisoner cut down the rifle, loaded it, and went to 9 Coromandel Street with the specific intention of killing the deceased if she did not satisfy his demands. As a result of what the deceased said to him, the prisoner produced the sawn off shotgun. The deceased screamed and ran to the other side of the road in an attempt to escape from him. The prisoner followed her across the road and into the driveway of 10 Coromandel Street. The deceased found herself cornered outside the garage of those premises and it was there that the accused caught up with her. 28 The Crown submitted to the jury that the deceased was shot in the head when she was defenceless on the ground. The Crown, in his address to the jury, described her killing as an execution. In my view that is the likely scenario, given the nature of the injuries to the deceased. However, Mr Stratton for the prisoner submitted that I could not find that fact beyond reasonable doubt. Whether or not that is so, Mr Stratton conceded that I could be satisfied to the appropriate degree that the deceased was crouched over in a defensive position at the time when which she was shot. It seems to me to make little difference whether she was on the ground or not. She was certainly at the mercy of the prisoner when he put the rifle to her head and pulled the trigger. 29 The offence is objectively a serious case of murder. This was conceded by Mr Stratton. There is no doubt that the prisoner must have intended to kill the deceased, because he deliberately shot her in the head. The murder was premeditated, at least to the extent that the prisoner prepared the weapon, loaded it, and drove to Coromandel Street to confront the deceased, intending to shoot her if necessary. The fact that the murder occurred in the context of a breakdown of a domestic relationship does not in any way suggest the offence should be considered to be less serious than other types of murder. 30 This was not a momentary aberration in which the prisoner was driven to kill the deceased by an unfortunate combination of events and circumstances. The prisoner had been flirting with the idea of killing her for some months before the shooting, although it appears that he fluctuated between ideas of killing her or taking his own life, or doing both. Certainly by the Monday before the shooting the prisoner was seriously considering putting these thoughts into action, and was contemplating obtaining a hand gun for this purpose. 31 The motivation for the offence was that the prisoner believed that he had some proprietary interest in the deceased, and that she had no right to determine her own life in a way which might conflict with his wishes. Taking her life was a selfish act on his part. He intended that she should have no life if it was not to be with him. This was so, even though it was to deprive the children, whom he loved, of their mother. 32 Mr Stratton submitted that the culpability of the prisoner was mitigated to some degree by the fact that he was also intending to take his own life. The prisoner's evidence, however, was that although he was contemplating suicide during the second visit, he changed his mind when he looked into the eyes of his children. Thereafter, there is no suggestion that he contemplated suicide until after he had killed the deceased. But in any event I do not believe that there is any significant mitigation arising from the fact that the prisoner might have been intending to kill himself at the time he murdered the deceased. The only relevance of the fact that the prisoner was seriously considering suicide, at least after he had killed the deceased, was what it reveals of his mental state at the time, and perhaps the evidence of his remorse for what he had done. 33 The prisoner raised the defence of diminished responsibility before the jury and there was uncontradicted evidence that the prisoner was suffering from a mental impairment within the terms of s 23A of the Crimes Act. The jury, having convicted the prisoner of murder, must have found that the impairment was not so substantial as to warrant his liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter. However, I believe that I should take into account the psychiatric evidence that was before the jury in assessing his culpability for killing the deceased, bearing in mind, of course, that he is to be sentenced for murder and not manslaughter. 34 The two psychiatrists who gave evidence before the jury, one on behalf of the defence and one for the Crown, agreed that the prisoner was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the killing, and they differed only in their assessment of the severity of that disorder. Paradoxically perhaps, the psychiatrist called by the Crown was of the view that the prisoner was suffering from a more severe disorder than that which the psychiatrist called by the defence was able to diagnose. The reason for that difference may have been the unreliability of the prisoner in the accounts he gave to the two psychiatrists. 35 Fundamentally the diagnoses were the same. The prisoner was found to be suffering from a number of personality disorders which affected his capacity to understand events, his capacity to control himself and, perhaps, his capacity to judge whether his actions were right or wrong. 36 The psychiatrist called by the Crown, Dr Delaforce, thought that the prisoner had suffered from a major depressive illness from June or July 1999 associated with his continued loneliness and separation from the deceased and his children. This manifested itself in his loss of appetite, thoughts of death and suicide, and an inability to concentrate. He also believed that the prisoner's personality disorders resulted in an inclination to anger and violence, a predisposition to self harm, impulsive behaviour, and a lack of empathy. These disorders also resulted in his attempts to control the deceased by instilling in her a fear of violence to herself or the children. 37 Dr Delaforce gave evidence that the antisocial personality disorder suffered by the prisoner would have resulted in irritability and aggression towards the deceased. It also made him prone to impulsive reckless behaviour that he would later regret. The prisoner's borderline personality disorder would have resulted in his inability to cope with the fear of separation from the deceased, and impulsivity in relation to both attempts at self harm and sexual activities outside his relationship with the deceased. 38 Dr Nielssen, who gave evidence on behalf of the defence, diagnosed that the prisoner was suffering from a personality disorder with antisocial and borderline traits. He also found that the prisoner had an adjustment disorder which was a mental condition similar to the depressive illness diagnosed by Dr Delaforce, but of less severity. Dr Nielssen's evidence was that by reason of his mental condition at the time of the offence, the prisoner would have been unable to calmly consider the effects of his behaviour on other people, and he would act in an impulsive and catastrophic way. 39 While in custody after his arrest on the charge of murder, the prisoner was diagnosed as suffering from major depression and an adjustment disorder. He received some treatment by way of medication, and by the time he was interviewed by the two psychiatrists who gave evidence before the jury, he had responded to the medication and his depressive illness was in remission. 40 Although the prisoner had been consuming cannabis on the day of the killing, I am not satisfied that his use of the drug had any significant bearing upon the commission of the offence. The evidence at the trial was that the prisoner's use of that drug over a prolonged period and in large amounts would have given him a tolerance to the drug so that its effects upon him would have been markedly reduced. Certainly, when compared with any loss of capacity of the prisoner to reason and control his behaviour caused by his mental impairment, the effects of the drug would have been insignificant. The relevance of the use of cannabis was that it could be attributed to his antisocial personality disorder and its use might have exacerbated the effects of his mental disorders. 41 I am satisfied that the prisoner's culpability is reduced by reason of his mental disorder as found by the psychiatrists. It was a substantial impairment in the real sense of that term and directly contributed to the prisoner's action over the period from his separation from the deceased in April until the shooting. The disorder was clearly one which had been existing for some significant period of time and it may account for the prisoner's conduct toward the deceased throughout their relationship. 42 For these reasons I should also give less weight to general deterrence than I would normally do in a case of murder resulting from the use of violence after the breakdown in a domestic relationship. However, Mr Stratton conceded that general deterrence was still a significant matter to be considered in the present case, given the increasing concern about the prevalence and effect of domestic violence in our community. 43 There was significant debate before me as to the extent and the significance of the prisoner's contrition for the killing of the deceased. In this regard there is, of course, a difference between regret on the part of the prisoner that the deceased died, and regret that he killed her. The Crown's submission was that there was substantially more of the former than the latter. Mr Stratton, while conceding that the prisoner could not obtain the full measure of contrition that might have flowed from the plea of guilty to murder, submitted that nevertheless the prisoner should be taken to be truly contrite for his actions and their consequences. 44 The prisoner, of course, has never accepted that he intentionally killed the deceased. The extent of his criminal responsibility for her death, which he was willing to admit before the jury, was that he had taken a loaded firearm with him and presented it to her. He described this as an act of stupidity on his part. He denied that he knew the firearm was loaded, and placed the direct responsibility for the death of the deceased upon her own actions. According to the prisoner, she was only shot because she grabbed the rifle when he was trying to calm her down and reason with her. The effect of the prisoner's evidence was that he had exited from the vehicle to follow the deceased without being conscious that he still had the rifle with him. He asserted that at the time the deceased grabbed the rifle he was not intentionally threatening her with it. 45 In my view the prisoner was willing to accept only so much responsibility for the death of the deceased as would be sufficient to justify a plea to manslaughter on the basis of unlawful and dangerous act and nothing more. His statements to the jury accepting responsibility for his actions were unconvincing to me, and probably to the jury as well, given their verdict. 46 Further, there is an aspect of the prisoner's conduct after the shooting which I find disturbing. The adoption by the prisoner of the misconception by the police as to the cause of the deceased's death seems clearly to me to have been a calculated attempt by him to mitigate what he had done. This version suggested that the attack on the deceased occurred on the spur of the moment using a weapon that just happened to be at hand, whereas the truth was that the shooting of the deceased was a premeditated act with a weapon prepared for that purpose. I believe that the prisoner had decided to embrace and capitalise on the misapprehension of the police before surrendering himself. That is why he concealed the rifle in the roof of the house. It was also the reason he hid the sawn-off barrel and the stock. Further, it was in order to continue this deception that he later tried to have his brother-in-law recover those parts of the rifle and bury them. 47 The prisoner is not to receive a harsher sentence because of this conduct, but it seems to me to add a new complexion to his outpourings of grief and despair following the shooting of the deceased and displayed throughout the first record of interview. It tends to my mind to imply that genuine remorse for what he had done was relatively short lived and very soon the prisoner was considering how best he might use the opportunity presented to him to serve his own interests. It suggests that the emotion he displayed on learning of the deceased's death and throughout the first interview arose more from an appreciation of the loss that he would suffer rather than genuine heart-felt remorse for taking the life of another human being. 48 What appears to me to be self-centredness on the part of the prisoner may be merely a manifestation of the mental disorder from which he suffered at the time. That does not mean that his lack of contrition for the effect of his criminal acts on others can be overlooked or discounted. However, there is some evidence that of late he has appreciated the impact of what he did on persons other than himself. He told Dr Delaforce and also his mother that he was sorry for the number of lives his actions had affected. If these feelings are genuine, there is some sign that he has now a real insight and appreciation of the enormity of what he did. 49 Although a lack of full contrition and remorse may be an indication that specific deterrence is appropriate or may cast some doubt upon the prospects of the prisoner's rehabilitation, I do not believe that they are concerns in the present case. Dr Nielssen gave evidence at the sentencing hearing that personality disorders such as those from which the prisoner suffers ameliorate over time with maturity. The length of time that the prisoner must serve in prison before he is eligible for release must be such that there is a good chance that his emotional and behavioural problems will diminish simply as a result of the effluxion of time. Counselling can also assist him to find ways of dealing with his difficulties other than by threats and violence. Further, the prisoner's mental impairment seems only to have brought him into serious contact with the criminal law because of his difficulty with relationships, and this is a particular problem that can be addressed by counselling. 50 The prisoner is 27 years of age. Generally he can be considered to be a person of good character, apart from his use of cannabis. He has little criminal record and has no convictions of any type since 1994. The only matter of relevance in his antecedents is a finding of guilt in the Children's Court for an offence of assault occasioning bodily harm in 1991. The matter is not without significance, however, because it was an assault on a person as a result of jealousy in relation to the deceased with whom he was in a relationship at the time. 51 It is also clear that over the course of the relationship with the deceased the prisoner was frequently violent to her, although it appears that he did not inflict any serious injury upon her. But the prisoner appears to have been attempting to change his ways and there was little evidence of any acts of violence after their separation in April 1998. There was one matter in which some sort of altercation occurred in the prisoner's vehicle, but it does not appear to have been a serious matter, and when the police arrived, having been summoned by the deceased's mother, the deceased was unwilling to take any action against the prisoner. It does not appear that the deceased was ever sufficiently concerned about the prisoner's violence or threats to seek protection from him by the courts. 52 The prisoner's past history with the deceased has to be seen in the context of the mental impairment from which he was suffering at the time of the death of the deceased. Although it cannot be said that the offence before me was an aberration, except in the degree of violence used by him, it can be considered to be yet another manifestation of his mental disorder which continually disrupted his relationship with the deceased. 53 There is little else in the prisoner's background that is either remarkable or appears to me to be relevant to the sentencing exercise before me. Although the prisoner has always been a hard worker, that does not seem to me to be a matter which has any impact at all on the determination of the appropriate sentence for the murder of his ex de facto partner. Nor can the fact that the prisoner has by reason of his offence and his imprisonment lost contact with his children be given any great weight, however distressing that separation might be for him. 54 There has been placed before me a victim impact statement by the deceased's mother. The material consists of a letter written by her in which she describes the effect upon her of the death of the deceased, not only because she has lost a daughter, but also because she must now again assume the role of a mother with all the responsibilities, disappointments and frustrations that this entails. She also recounts the effects upon the children of the loss of their mother. I cannot, of course, use this evidence in any way in assessing the punishment that should be imposed upon the prisoner, and it was not placed before me for this purpose. It does, however, allow the deceased's mother to participate in the proceedings by expressing her grief and loss. The Court acknowledges the effects of the murder upon her and the children and expresses its sympathy. 55 I have been supplied with statistical and other material from which a range of the appropriate sentence for a murder of this nature might be ascertained. Those figures and other cases have only a limited value, but they can indicate whether the sentence which the Court believes is appropriate is generally in accordance with sentences handed down by other judges of this Court. Were it not for the severity of the prisoner's mental condition, the sentence would have been significantly greater than that which I intend to impose, so serious was the objective seriousness of this offence. 56 I have been asked to find that there are special circumstances which would justify the reduction in the non-parole period from that which would follow by an application of the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing) Procedure Act. The special circumstances are said to be the prisoner's age, his mental condition, and the need for counselling when released from gaol and before entering into another intimate relationship. In my view while these matters may have justified a finding of special circumstances in a case of less seriousness where the overall sentence would have been considerably less than that which I intend to impose, they do not require a reduction in the non-parole period in the present case. The parole period which results from the application of the Act is itself of sufficient length to permit the prisoner to obtain the assistance he might require when and if he is released at the end of the non-parole period. There is no other reason put forward to justify a reduction in the non-parole period and I can see none. 57 The prisoner is sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years. The sentence is to commence on 2 October 1999 and the non-parole period will expire on 1 October 2014, the date upon which the prisoner is eligible to be considered for release. ************