R v Vo [2001] NSWCCA 67

New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal

CITATION : R v Vo [2001] NSWCCA 67 revised - 23/03/2001 FILE NUMBER(S) : CCA 60553/00 HEARING DATE(S) : 14/03/01 JUDGMENT DATE : 14 March 2001

PARTIES : Regina Phuc Tan Vo JUDGMENT OF : Ipp AJA at 40; Wood CJatCL at 1; Simpson J at 39

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION : District Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 99/21/2221 LOWER COURT JUDICIAL Sides DCJ OFFICER :

COUNSEL : Crown: P.G. Berman SC Respondent: P.M. Strickland SOLICITORS : S E O'Connor D J Humphreys CATCHWORDS : CRIMINAL LAW - appeals - appeal against conviction - aggravated break and enter and commit robbery - robbery in company - evidence of fingerprints - credibility of witness - whether verdict unreasonable and supported by the evidence DECISION : Appeal dismissed; Conviction and sentence below confirmed

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

No. 60553 of 2000

IPP AJA WOOD CJ at CL SIMPSON J WEDNESDAY 14 MARCH 20001 Regina v PHUC TAN VO JUDGMENT

The appellant was convicted of one count of aggravated break and enter and commit a robbery and one count of robbery in company. He was sentenced to eight years imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years for the first count and to a concurrent fixed term of imprisonment for four years in relation to the second count.

The appellant appeals against the conviction under s 6(1) Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) on the ground that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence. Proof of finding the appellant's fingerprints and palmprint on the doors of the house and their recency was crucial to the Crown case. The appellant argued that the prints had been left there by him on the occasion of a lawful visit to the house more than nine months before the robbery. The evidence given by the owner of the house and by her son as to the regular cleaning of the doors, in a way that would have removed the appellant's fingerprints had they been deposited at the time he suggested, was lacking in credibility. On this basis the jury ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant.