New South Wales Supreme Court CITATION : Denis Valassis v The Council of The City of Sydney & Anor [2002] NSWSC 559 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 10675 of 2002 HEARING DATE(S) : 3 June 2002 JUDGMENT DATE : 3 June 2002 DENNIS VALASSIS (Plaintiff) v PARTIES : THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SYDNEY (First Defendant) PAUL JAMES SCHOFIELD (Second Defendant) JUDGMENT OF : Levine J Plaintiff - in person COUNSEL : M Walsh (Defendant) Plaintiff - in person SOLICITORS : Pike Pike & Fenwick (First and Second Defendants) CATCHWORDS : Summary dismissal CASES CITED : Valassis v South Sydney Local Council (1996) 92 LGERA 275 DECISION : See paragraphs 12, 15 and 16 - 4 - DJL:1 (Ex Tempore- Revised) [2002] NSWSC 559 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION JUSTICE DAVID LEVINE MONDAY 3 JUNE 2002 10675 OF 2002 DENNIS VALASSIS (Plaintiff) v THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SYDNEY (First Defendant) PAUL JAMES SCHOFIELD (Second Defendant) JUDGMENT (Summary dismissal) 1 HIS HONOUR: On 12 March 2002 Mr Valassis filed a statement of claim in this Court against the Council of the City of South Sydney and a second defendant, Mr Paul John Schofield. Each of those defendants on 8 April 2002 filed a notice of motion seeking relief which might shortly be stated as bringing to an end forthwith the case Mr Valassis seeks to make in his statement of claim. 2 That they should do so historically is not surprising. That they are entitled to cannot be doubted when consideration is given to the statement of claim. 3 In support of the motion affidavits of Mr G. D. Dupree, solicitor, of 17 and 19 April 2002 are relied upon, together with annexed and exhibited material which points to a history of dispute between Mr Valassis and what I would describe as local government authorities in relation to the core of his claim in the current statement of claim, 304A Chalmers Street, Redfern. 4 One focal point as to a history of decades of dispute is the decision of Stein J as he then was in the Land and Environment Court of 19 November 1996 in Valassis v South Sydney Local Council (1996) 92 LGERA 275, where the declaration of vexatious litigant was made. 5 I will not rehearse his Honour's rehearsal of history, but will presently flag the second order he made, namely that the applicant shall not without the leave of the court, being the Land and Environment court, institute proceedings against the council in relation to the question of existing use of the property at 304A Chalmers Street, Redfern. 6 Otherwise, as exhibited and annexed to the affidavit of Mr Dupree, the history of this matter in the Land and Environment Court and the Court of Appeal of this State, and the High Court, is articulated in the perfected orders of those courts. 7 I have had the benefit of a chronology of four pages (which I will initial and date today) which, I accept for the purposes of the present motions, satisfactorily relates the history if not from 1966 then from 1970, to the present time. 8 The statement of claim in respect of which relief is sought, on any reading of it as a document in terms of the history referred to in the affidavit material, can only be understood as an attempt further to agitate in this court matters affecting the core property, which have been dealt with to finality hitherto, that is, that component of the statement of claim as between Mr Valassis and the Council, being principally paragraphs 1 to 5. 9 Paragraph 6 of the document described as a statement of claim purports to make allegations against the second defendant of slander, breach of duty, and conspiracy. Mr Valassis has sought to persuade me, not so much in answer to the submissions made for the applicants but in general terms, that he all he seeks is an opportunity to bring evidence and argue his case in a way which he contends the orders of Stein J and the proceedings leading to them prevented. 10 It is in the context of that particular submission by Mr Valassis that I refer back to order 2 made by Stein J in September 1996. Mr Valassis cannot be, with respect to him, regarded as a litigant in person without experience of the judicial system. Rather, such has been his experience that in one jurisdiction he has, as he acknowledges in his document in this court, being declared vexatious. 11 Leaving aside fine technical points in relation to the second defendant in the statement of claim relating to non compliance with rules of court as to pleading slander, conspiracy, articulating a duty of care, particularising its breach, the conclusion inevitably must be reached that this initiating process is no more than a mechanism further to litigate that which has been declared to be at an end. That this is so is reinforced in my view by the words in proper and strict pleading terms in the document where further time is sought to get the case together. 12 Relief by the applicants is sought through various mechanisms and rules of this court, and clearly is available on two fundamental bases. First, under SCR Pt 13 r 5; in the light of the history to which I have referred, evidenced so clearly in the material to which I have referred, the proceedings should be dismissed generally as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of this court. If further basis was required, secondly, the proceedings would also be amenable to be struck out under Pt 15 r 26 where the gross non-compliance would amount to an abuse of process, cause prejudice, embarrassment and delay, as well as, it is quite clear to me, disclosing no reasonable cause of action. 13 In coming to the conclusion which I have and which I have just exposed in the sense of the two rules of court under which the orders will be made, I have not, as I have indicated, attended to the minutiae of any failure on the part of the plaintiff to comply with the rules of court in relation to pleading. One would not have to go far on that path to realise that the applicants could only succeed. 14 It has been further suggested that an alternative remedy in relation to the first defendant would be to transfer the matters to the Land and Environment Court, a step that would only perpetuate the melancholy history that has attended this litigation for decades. 15 In respect of the notice of motion filed for the first defendant I make order 1, that it be heard at the same time as the notice of motion for the second defendant. I make order 2. In respect of the notice of motion filed on behalf of the second defendant I made order 1 and order 2. I note that otherwise pursuant to Part 15 r 26, par 6 of the statement of claim in relation to the second defendant would have been amenable to being struck out in any event. 16 The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of the motion and of the proceedings instituted by its statement of claim. ********** Last Modified: 06/28/2002 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.