New South Wales Supreme Court CITATION : Purcell & Anor v Cruising Yacht Club of Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2002] NSWSC 557 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 20473 of 2000 HEARING DATE(S) : 11 June 2002 JUDGMENT DATE : 25 June 2002 RICHARD GORDON PURCELL (First Plaintiff) ALLURE MARKETING PTY LTD (Second Plaintiff ) v PARTIES : CRUISING YACHT CLUB OF AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (First Defendant) JOHANNE CHRISTIAN HUGO VAN KRETSCHMAR (Second Defendant) PETER ALLAM BUSH (Third Defendant) JUDGMENT OF : Levine J T Tobin QC P Gray COUNSEL : (First and Second Plaintiffs) T Blackburn (First, Second and Third Defendants) Berne, Murray & Tout (First and Second Plaintiffs) SOLICITORS : Corrs Chambers Westgarth (First, Second and Third Defendants) CATCHWORDS : Defamation - contextual truth - defendant's imputations bad in form - incapable of being carried LEGISLATION CITED : Defamation Act 1974 Allen v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (NSWSC, unreported, 2 December 1988) Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine (1984) 1 NSWLR 386 CASES CITED : Jackson v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (1981) 1 NSWLR 36 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Blake [2001] NSWCA 434 McBride v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2000] NSWSC 747 Waterhouse & Anor v Hickie (1995) Aust Torts Rep 81-347 DECISION : See paragraph 16 - 6 - djl:1 [2002] NSWSC 557 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION DEFAMATION list JUSTICE DAVID LEVINE TUESDAY 25 JUNE 2002 20473 OF 2000 RICHARD GORDON PURCELL (First Plaintiff) ALLURE MARKETING PTY LTD (Second Plaintiff ) v cruising yacht club of Australia pty ltd (First Defendant) JOHANNE CHRISTIAN HUGO VAN KRETSCHMAR (Second Defendant) PETER ALLAM BUSH (Third Defendant) JUDGMENT (Defamation – contextual truth - defendant's imputations bad in form – incapable of being carried) 1 At the conclusion of the s7A jury trial on 17October 2001, the jury found that the relevant publication carried the following defamatory imputation: "Having interviewed the first plaintiff about his failure to stop when the crew of a disabled yacht let off flares to attract his attention, the committee investigating the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race suspected on reasonable grounds that the first plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct in that he failed to stop and render assistance to the crew of that yacht." 2 By paragraph 11 of the Amended Defence filed on 14 March 2002 the defendant pursuant to s 16 of the Defamation Act 1974 pleads the defence of contextual truth specifying two contextual imputations; "(a) there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the First Plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct in that he failed to stop and render assistance to the crew of a disabled yacht in the course of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race; (b) in the light of an interview with the First Plaintiff and other relevant matters, there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the First Plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct in that he failed to stop and render assistance to the crew of a disabled yacht in the course of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race". 3 Paragraphs 12 to 16 of the Amended Defence plead interstate defences. 4 By Notice of Motion filed on 10 May of this year the plaintiffs move to have the defence of contextual truth (paragraph 11) and the interstate defences (paragraphs 12-16) struck out. 5 The second order sought can easily be dealt with. It is the expressly stated position of the plaintiffs that there is no interstate component in their case. There is no reliance upon interstate publication or republication on the question of liability and, as was expressly stated during the course of submissions, no reliance is placed in relation to damages on any publication or republication outside of New South Wales. In these circumstances paragraphs 12 to 16 of the defence are otiose and will be struck out. 6 The publication upon which the plaintiffs sued was an oral publication. The evidence of that publication during the 7A jury trial (over which I presided) was a videotape of the relevant press conference of which a transcript was produced. That transcript is appended to these reasons. 7 The plaintiffs seek to have struck out the defence of contextual truth. The defendant is not justifying the imputation found by the jury. 8 The plaintiffs attack the defence on about every basis in the steps involved in the formulation of a contextual truth defence. In McBride v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2000] NSWSC 747 (4 August 2000) I reviewed the authorities in relation to those "steps". I do not propose to repeat what I there said. The most significant development in the law in relation to s16 is the decision of the Court of Appeal in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Blake [2001] NSWCA 434 especially in relation to s16 (2)(c) and the part particulars of truth play in the determination of whether the s16 (2)(c) "effect" reasonably can be found (see Spigelman CJ paragraphs [4], [5] and [6]). 9 In the instant case the plaintiffs must succeed on at least two of the threshold considerations. The first is the form of the contextual imputations each of which in my view lacks the requisite precision. The imputation (cause of action) to which the purported plea under s 16 has been raised as a defence is that found by the jury which is clear in its terms. The jury found that the matter complained of meant that the plaintiff actually was suspected by a named body of being guilty of gross misconduct. The two contextual imputations advanced by the defendants, as counsel for the plaintiffs submitted, "backtrack" from the actual meaning and do so by attributing to the matter complained of meanings more abstract and more vague and lesser in their import. The defect in form arises in relation to (a) and (b) by the failure to identify who or what it was that had the reasonable grounds or what is said to provide the basis of suspicion. The use of such expressions as "in the light of" and especially "other relevant matters" in my view is the impermissible employment of what are described as "weasel" words. They are so vague as to be embarrassing and add nothing to what are in effect meanings "watered down" from that found to have been carried and have no substance independent of that captured by the plaintiff's imputations. 10 I am not persuaded that either of these two meanings is good in form. Nor am I persuaded that either or both is or are reasonably capable of being carried by the matter complained of at the same time and in addition to the found imputation. If they are capable of being carried at all they are so carried in subtraction from the imputation pleaded by the plaintiff and found by the jury. 11 The "steps" to which I have referred to above are well known and are set out in Jackson v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (1981) 1 NSWLR 36 at 39G-40, Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine (1984) 1 NSWLR 386 at 400; Allen v John Fairfax and Sons Pty Ltd (NSWSC, unreported, 2 December 1988 pp8-9); Waterhouse & Anor v Hickie (1995) Aust Torts Rep 81-347 at 62,488. 12 Those steps there referred to in each case commence with propositions about the defendant's contextual imputation vis-à-vis the plaintiff's imputation. One of the antecedent "steps" is the determination of whether the publication on which the plaintiff has sued is reasonably capable of carrying the imputation upon which the defendant relies. Another antecedent "step" is the question of the form of that imputation. (There is of course an additional antecedent "step" which does not relate to the defendant's contextual imputation but rather to the plaintiff's imputation. That is the step provided for in s 16(2)(a) – the plaintiffs imputation must relate to a matter of public interest or be published under qualified privilege). 13 I have found each imputation to be bad in form and to make it quite clear I find as a matter of law that the matter complained of is incapable of carrying meanings to the purport of the proposed contextual imputations, on a reasonable basis, in addition to the meaning found by the jury which candidly must be characterised as capturing the essential sting of the publication. Further of course when one considers the essence of each of the contextual imputations sought to be relied upon by the defendant it has to be observed that each has within it the essence of the plaintiff's imputation that on reasonable grounds the plaintiff was suspected of being guilty of gross misconduct. 14 There is no need for me to consider the observations of the Chief Justice in Blake referred to above. That point namely the s16 (2)(c) "effect", is simply not here reached. What the Court of Appeal said in Blake is of course binding on me. I will merely observe that it is my respectful view that to determine whether the contextual imputation (carried and proper in form) has the effect as provided for by s16 (2)(c), one does no more than "assume" that that contextual imputation or, if more than one, those contextual imputations are "substantially true". This is a question of law to be determined on that assumption. In my view it is inappropriate to determine that question by reference to what in reality could be the shifting sands of particulars of a case to be proved (which may or may not make good that assumption). In this respect I prefer the views of Hodgson JA at paragraph [61]: that is, when one considers the true nature of the defence of contextual truth it ends up being a matter of weighing imputation against imputation. 15 Accordingly I strike out paragraph 11 of the Amended Defence. 16 The formal orders are: 1. Paragraph 11 of the Amended Defence is struck out. 2. Paragraphs 12 to 16 of the Amended Defence are struck out. 3. The defendants are to pay the plaintiff's costs. 4. The matter is stood over to the Registrar's Defamation Directions List on 12 July 2002. Schedule A Transcript of Videotape of press conference at CYCA on 1 June 1999 – handing down the Report of the 1998 Sydney Hobart Race Review Committee May 1999 1. Peter Bush: The Committee investigated a report from the Sword of Orion that a yacht 2. failed to respond to distress signals. The Committee has passed full details of this incident on to 3. the New South Wales Coroner and the Commodore of the Cruising Yacht Club for further 4. investigation. One yacht, Business Post Naiad, did not meet eligibility requirements. The CYCA 5. has referred this matter to the New South Wales State Coroner. And finally, the manner of death 6. of the six sailors that lost their lives will be determined by the New South Wales State Coroner in 7. a Coronial inquest on a date to be announced. I'd now like to move ah, to talk about the 8. recommendations. The recommendations were developed by the Committee um in two sections. 9. The first section deals with actions that can be taken to have yachts appraised of conditions and 10. their ability to meet them and the second details that actions that can better prepare yachts and 11. crews to deal with extreme conditions. The recommendations have been drafted by the 12. Committee as on the basis of the evidence presented and were classified as compulsory or 13. recommended. It is my intention now to take you through the summary of the compulsory recommendations only at this stage. 14. First of all in the first section dealing with weather the CYCA needs to develop a weather strategy which includes it working with its nominated 15. forecaster to do a number of things. To generate close to real-time forecasting to educate yachtsmen on 16. forecasting and interpretation to provide easily understood or layman forecasts and to ah to look 17. at developing assets in the Eastern Bass Strait including attempting to access weather 18. information of the Bass Strait oil rigs. The CYCA must provide yachts with a practical 19. interpretation of the weather forecast, and this should include um a provision for a member of its 20. chosen forecaster to be an on-going member of the race management team. In winds of 40 knots 21. true or more yachts will be required to report wind strengths and directions and wave heights at 22. the radio skeds if asked to do so by the radio relay vessel. The second major recommendation in um 23. Section A is that skippers must be encouraged to um to consider their particular circumstances 24. and whether their yacht, their equipment and their crew are in satisfactory condition to enter and 25. cross Bass Strait and complete the race to Hobart. To achieve this the Sailing Instructions should 26. prescribe a line of latitude at 37.15 degrees south which is Green Cape just a little bit south of Eden. 27. Ah as yachts cross this line, it will be compulsory for skippers to make a declaration to the Race 28. Committee confirming that their HF radio is in working order, that their life rafts are on board, 29. that their yacht and crew are in a satisfactory condition to continue and that their engine and 30. batteries are fully operational. Failure to report or to meet any one of these stipulated 31. requirements should result in the yacht's disqualification. On Section B on eligibility the first 32. issue is stability. All yachts should conform with IMS stability recommendations for 33. category one of a 115 degrees for all classes be it IMS, CHS or PHS, with no further 34. grandfathering of boats ah, that were previously excepted. On crew experience, the number 35. of experienced crew should be increased to 50% of the total crew as per the Racing Rules of 36. Sailing. It's currently required by ah the Club that only three members of a crew ah have the high 37. level of experience. Um each application for entry must be reviewed by a subcommittee of the 38. Cruising Yacht Club um and be approved. An age limit of 18 years should be set and no crew 39. under that age be eligible for the Sydney Hobart Yacht Race. Crew experience, education and 40. training. The CYCA should conduct training seminars prior to the Sydney Hobart Yacht Race on 41. weather forecasting interpretation, life raft deployment and survival techniques, search and 42. rescue techniques including flight patterns, communications and rescue techniques, man 43. overboard strategies, heavy weather sailing techniques and strategies. At least 30% of their crew 44. have attended these to meet eligibility requirements. In addition, the CYCA should provide as 45. appendix to the Sailing Instructions terms of the yacht's safety equipment safety harnesses um 46. (inaudible) of seven years from date of manufacture and each yacht should be required (inaudible) the AYF 47. should be requested to review the requirements of stowage of life rafts, and a review should 48. be (inaudible) developed for on-deck stowage. The AYF should also be requested to review the (inaudible) above should 49. be of a highly visible nature on all parts where it will assist detection. The diameter of drogues 50. employed in lifeboats secured more effectively. On other safety equipment um open devices or 51. life jackets should not be accepted in future Sydney Hobarts. The yachts primary EPIRB that's an 52. emergency position (inaudible) identifies the yacht by name in addition one EPIRB ah is to be 53. carried per life raft on board which may be packed on the life raft or carried on the boat and a 54. protocol for the use of EPIRBs needs to be developed in conjunction with AMSA. In terms of 55. personal safe (inaudible) the Cruising Yacht Club should brief the manufacturers of PFDs um in an 56. effort to develop an Australian Standard PFD1 that enables the crew to move (inaudible) need to wear safety 57. harnesses. On yacht's safety inspections yachts will be required or should be required to deploy 58. their storm jib and tri-sail for recognition and (inaudible). On yacht construction the detail ah sorry 59. the design (inaudible) should be referred to the international technical committee of the ORC for review. 60. Communications. The Committee has recommended a number of changes to race 61. communications including 24 hours listening watch on VHF and all yachts will be required to 62. include a waterproof hand-held VHF as part of their yacht's safety equipment. Communications 63. procedures. The CYCA and the Royal Yacht Club of Tasmania must develop a robust system for 64. responding to enquiries from relatives and friends of crews and other interested parties, ah with 65. up-to-date information on the position of yachts and crews. I'd now like to ah hand back to ah the 66. Commodore. 67. Commodore: Thanks Peter. The CYC stands behind this report as a frank and honest 68. objective practical analysis of those areas where problems occurred and what can be 69. sensibly done to minimise the risk of reoccurrence. We have openly, professionally and 70. diligently identified every aspect of the race where there is opportunity to do to do better and 71. identified practical changes to improve safety. The CYC is committed to ensuring that all 72. the recommendations made by the Review Committee and detailed in their report are 73. considered fully that they are referred to third parties and authorities where appropriate. 74. That they are implemented to the extent that we are able to do so and that they are 75. administered rigorously. There are two issues that remain open-ended at this stage. 76. They are the Business Post Naiad's stability non-compliance issue and the Sword of 77. Orion/Margaret Rintoul issue. Both matters, as Peter has mentioned, have been brought to the 78. attention of the Coroner. In the case of the Business Post Naiad there is nothing more that the 79. Club can do at this stage other than what has been incorporated by way of changes to the 80. administration of the event to ensure that all boats meet the stated eligibility requirements in 81. future. We anticipate that the Coroner will determine whether there is a case to answer by any 82. party with respect to this matter. The Sword of Orion/Margaret Rintoul incident has been 83. referred to the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race Protest Committee for investigation under Rule 69 84. of the Racing Rules of Sailing. We believe this to be the most responsible course of action 85. available to the CYC. Whilst it would be unreasonable to expect that the changes recommended 86. in our report, or anything else for that matter, could ensure the ultimate safety of every 87. participant in future Sydney Hobart races, there is no doubt that the safety of all competitors will 88. be improved as a result. Boat owners, skippers, crews and the CYCA as race organiser will all 89. need to embrace the changes that have been recommended. Many changes will be made 90. mandatory by the CYCA and prescribed as such in a Notice of Race and Sailing Instructions. 91. Other changes will be introduced as recommendations to be adopted by boat owners and crews. 92. In fact most of the changes have already been implemented and in some cases standards set by 93. The Review Committee have been exceeded. At this time the Notice of Race and Sailing 94. Instructions for this year's event are already in final draft form, and all of the new requirements 95. that skippers and crews must comply with are included. Development of training seminar 96. curriculums is well advanced with the first of these to be held prior to our Sydney 97. Gold Coast race in August. The Australian Navy, the Bureau of Meteorology, and the Australian 98. Maritime Safety Authority are providing invaluable assistance in this regard. The CYCA's race 99. management manual and crisis management plan is in early draft form and will be completed by 100. September, and a detailed action plan with timelines and individual responsibilities identified 101. has been prepared to manage the implementation of remaining items which require more 102. detailed analysis or input by third parties. Overall I think the Hobart Report finds that the 103. race organisation, safety requirements, eligibility requirements and the attitudes of skippers 104. and crews is not fundamentally flawed in any area. Our report deliberately does not seek to 105. attribute blame to any party. The CYCA does not believe that it is a that is its role to attribute blame 106. nor that it is productive to do so. The CYCA has conducted this event for 53 years prior to 107. 1998 without a serious incident of the scale experienced last year. The standards under 108. which the Race is run have developed enormously over the years that it has been run by the 109. CYCA. Communications, safety equipment, and weather information are all indisputably 110. higher and more sophisticated than in earlier years. The report clearly indicates that the form 111. or construction of modern yachts is at least the equal of boats of earlier years; in many 112. aspects they are superior. Crew experience is also identified as being of an exceptionally 113. high standard, with more than 60% of all crews having competed in more than two Hobart 114. races and having more than six years open racing experience. In fact, more than 20 percent of 115. crews have competed in more than ten Hobart races with offshore sailing experience of more 116. than 15 years. What then went wrong? Quite simply in my view part of the fleet sailed into 117. unexpectedly extreme conditions. The most extreme conditions were very localised. Some 118. yachts encountered those conditions while still heading to Hobart; others encountered them 119. after having turned back. Many yachts encountered significantly less extreme conditions 120. than others, and either completed or retired from the race without incident. Some sailed 121. through the most extreme conditions, had fate on their side, and completed or retired from the 122. race without incident. Others were not so fortunate. The Bureau of Meteorology by their 123. own assessment did a reasonable job and have demonstrated that the conditions encountered 124. fell within a statistical range of conditions forecast. Clearly also, however, the Bureau's 125. forecasts were misleading or misinterpreted by competitors and organisers because they failed 126. to give a clear impression of the extreme conditions to be excepted expected. This has partly to do 127. with the meteorological language of the Bureau, and partly to do with the sailors' lack of 128. understanding of that meteorological language. Also, as Peter has mentioned, the Bureau and 129. the CYCA is constrained by the lack of meteorological assets in the race area. Clearly there 130. is room for improvement by all parties in this regard. And all of these areas are addressed in 131. the report recommendations. There is no simple answer to preventing this from ever 132. happening again. I believe, however, that the experiences of 1998 will be recalled forever by 133. all future competitors as a stark reminder of the unpredictable and awesome force of the sea. 134. It will lead to greater caution and discretion being exercised by all those involved in the 135. event. The changes recommended in our report are all about ensuring that greater caution is 136. exercised. Personally I think the report is harsher on the CYCA than any other stake-holder 137. in the event, notwithstanding that it is our own report. I have no argument with this because 138. it was dealt with in a constructive manner. The report does not identify the Club as having 139. been lacking in any significant areas, but does identify many areas where with the benefit of 140. hindsight and the experiences of 1998, significant improvements can be made. The board of 141. the CYC is fully committed to implementing these identified areas of improvement and 142. aspires to taking the standards of our racing organisation to the next possible highest level. 143. Thank you. 144. Question: Can we talk through the process of the stability test and how, where, you 145. Detected that, er, that was open to (inaudible) race (inaudible). 146. Peter Bush: We've determined that we won't discuss the Business Post Naiad issue with 147. you any further, um, it is a matter that has been referred to the Coroner and that is really 148. actually all that we are prepared to say about Business Post. 149. Question: Just another matter that has been referred to the Coroner. You speak about 150. Rule 69 and the Rules of Racing and the Sword of Orion. Can you just outline what that Rule 151. is that may have possibly been breached. 152. Peter Bush: I might refer that to the Coron.. Commodore, if I may? 153. 154. 155. Commodore: Rule 69 of the Racing Rules deals with an area called Gross Misconduct 156. under the Racing Rules. It is historically the rule that has been used in the administration of 157. our sport for resolving, among other things, allegations of not rendering assistance to yachts 158. that are in distress. 159. Question: Can you put that in a context of the culture of yacht racing? What is it within 160. that, the obligation to render assistance? 161. Commodore: The rules of yacht racing and maritime law are quite specific in terms of 162. the obligations to render whatever assistance they can safely provide to a yacht that is in 163. distress. Not dissimilar at all to not stopping after a car accident. 164. Question: So essentially we are talking about an allegation of ignoring a Mayday call. 165. Commodore: Um, no, I don't' think that's actually correct. 166. Question: Can you tell us what the allegation is. 167. Commodore: Um not even sure whether it's an allegation as such. There is a report or there are 168. reports that have been received through interviews with um both Sword of Orion and Margaret Rintoul, 169. that indicate that at some stage Sword of Orion sighted a yacht that passed fairly close by. 170. That they let off various signalling flares to try and attract their attention. Our understanding is 171. that at that stage they were not in radio communication. They were not sure whether the other 172. boat had actually seen their flares or not. Conditions were atrocious. Visibility was very 173. poor and the Margaret Rintoul did not stop or acknowledge that those signals had been seen. 174. Question: So for this matter to have gone this far, you must have quite substantial 175. evidence that may perhaps a wrongdoing has happened. 176. Commodore: There is sufficient evidence there for us to refer it to the Protest Committee to 177. consider under that rule and determine more fully whether there is in fact a basis to the 178. evidence or not. 179. Question: Hugo if the owner of Margaret Rintoul II is found guilty of gross misconduct, what 180. might be the consequences? 181. Commodore: Again I believe that is up to the under the rules of racing, it is up to the Protest Committee 182. to assign a penalty with respect to that. Historically, where similar situations have been found 183. by Protest Committees, it has led to a ban from competing in yachting events for a period of 184. time. 185. Question: Is it a criminal offence? 186. Commodore: Don't know the answer to that. 187. Question: Could it potentially be that in light of the Coroner's Inquiry? 188. Commodore: Don't know the answer to that. [numerous inaudible voices] 189. Question: The Protest Committee which will hear this protest – when is it going to 190. happen? 191. Commodore: The Protest Committee, it was initially referred to the Protest Committee that 192. was in place for the Sydney-Hobart race, part of that Protest Committee comprised internationally 193. accredited jurors from overseas who have indicated that they were unavailable to attend, so a 194. the Protest Committee now comprises some of the original members of the Protest Committee and others, but all the members of the 195. Protest Committee presently are international jurors (accredited) by the AYF. 196. Question: Can you put it in the context of the conditions that the two boats were in at the 197. time? One was, I understand that one was coming back and the other was still going forward. 198. But the weather conditions as well. 199. Commodore: Sword of Orion at the time had lost its mast and sometime earlier, a 200. crew member over the side and was essentially disabled. The other yacht was still sailing and 201. headed in the direction of Hobart. 202. Question: And the weather conditions at that particular time? 203. Commodore: At the peak of the storm. Atrocious. 204. Question: So would it have been safe and would it have been advisable to go round at a 205. time like that to try and get close to a boat that was in distress? 206. Commodore: I would be speculating in terms of what the conditions where on Margaret 207. Rintoul or the other boat as to whether that was an option that was available or in fact a safe or 208. prudent option that was available to them. 209. [Numerous inaudible voices. There was a subsequent question from Bob Ross on when the protest be heard then?] 210. Commodore: I believe the protest has been set down for Wednesday 8 June. Next 211. Wednesday. 212. Question: Has Margaret Rintoul been given an opportunity of putting a defence? 213. Commodore: That is the purpose of the Protest Committee, to give both parties the 214. opportunity to present evidence formally before the Protest Committee. 215. Question: Has Margaret Rintoul made a statement so far? (inaudible) 216. Commodore: They were involved in an interview with members of the Race Committee. 217. Yes. 218. Question: And what have they said about their actions on the day? 219. Commodore: I don't believe it's appropriate for me to comment on that, in an offhand 220. manner, without seeing the actual documentation as to what 221. was said. 222. Question: The owner of Margaret Rintoul II has admitted that he did speak at length with 223. officials after the event when he got to Hobart. Did he speak to you? And did he 224. confirm to anyone that he did see the yacht, and did he explain why he may not have turned 225. back? 226. Commodore: Yes to some of the questions, no to others. Yes, he did speak to me briefly at 227. one stage in Hobart. He had mentioned that there was some agitation with respect to the issue 228. and had asked me to endeavour to mediate with respect to it. Which I did, and I put the two parties 229. in contact with each other, and I believe that at that stage they resolved to let the matter 230. take their proper course. 231. Question: Did he admit to you that he did see the yacht, and did he explain to you why 232. they didn't turn back? 233. Commodore: No, I didn't have the discussion with him at that time. 234. Question: If there is a ban, is that only in Australian waters, or also in international 235. waters? 236. Commodore: I believe that the International Sailing Federation has the power to make that 237. an internationally imposed ban. 238. Question: Has that been the case historically? 239. Commodore: I don't know the answer to that. ********** Last Modified: 06/25/2002 DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.