RODNEY BRAGG v THE GREYHOUND RACING AUTHORITY (NSW) [2003] NSWSC 103

New South Wales Supreme Court

CITATION : RODNEY BRAGG v THE GREYHOUND RACING AUTHORITY (NSW) [2003] NSWSC 103 HEARING DATE(S) : 13/03/2002 JUDGMENT DATE : 27 February 2003

JUDGMENT OF : Dowd J DECISION : Declaration that Committee finding is void; Tribunal decision is quashed; defendant to pay plaintiff's costs.

CATCHWORDS : Appeal by way of certiorari from decision of tribunal - misdirection as to standard of proof. Evidence Act 1995 Greyhound Racing Authority Act 1985 LEGISLATION CITED : Greyhound Racing Control Board Act 1985 Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 Supreme Court Act 1970 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 CASES CITED : Comptroller-General Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 61 ACrimR 120 Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95 PARTIES : Rodney Bragg (Plaintiff) The Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) (Defendant) FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 30047/2001 COUNSEL : D Baran (Plaintiff) R J Webb (Defendant) SOLICITORS : Nick Marsden, Heard McEwan Lawyers (Plaintiff) T G Hartmann, Hartmann & Associates (Defendant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

DOWD J

Thursday 27 February 2003

30047/2001 RODNEY BRAGG v THE GREYHOUND RACING AUTHORITY (NSW)

JUDGMENT 1 HIS HONOUR: This application by the plaintiff, Rodney Bragg, sought a declaration that the Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) Regulatory Committee ("the Committee") failed to comply with rule 9(1) of the rules made under the Greyhound Racing Control Board Act 1985, being the rules of the Greyhound Racing Authority 1999, by failing to conduct an inquiry or due inquiry into the conduct of the plaintiff, which was the subject of an adverse decision by the Committee against the plaintiff on 14 June 2000. 2 The plaintiff further sought a declaration that he was denied procedural fairness on that day when the Committee purported to conduct an inquiry into his conduct, on the basis of self-incrimination and his right to silence. 3 The plaintiff further sought a declaration that all evidence admitted by way of transcript taken before the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("the ICAC") was inadmissible before the Committee and the Greyhound Racing Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") contrary to the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 ("the ICAC Act"). 4 The plaintiff further sought a declaration that the evidence of transcript taken before the ICAC was inadmissible before the Committee and the Tribunal on the basis that the plaintiff's submissions to the Committee constituted an objection within the meaning of s37(4) of the ICAC Act. 5 The plaintiff also sought the following orders, numbered as in the summons: