Regina v Ronen & Ors [2005] NSWSC 319

New South Wales Supreme Court

Regina v Ronen & Ors [2005] NSWSC 319 CITATION : This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

JUDGMENT DATE : 20 January 2005

JUDGMENT OF : Whealy J at 1

DECISION : I discharge the Juror

CATCHWORDS : Jury Act s 22 - Discharge of Juror - Reasons continuation of trial with less than 12 Jurors

LEGISLATION CITED : Jury Act

CASES CITED : Regina v Wu (1999) 199 CLR 99 at 106

Regina v Ida Ronen PARTIES : Regina v Nitzen Ronen Regina v Izhar Ronen

FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 70222/03; 70032/03; 70223/03

Mr T. Game SC; Ms S. McNaughton - Crown Mr R. Richter QC; Mr N. Rosenbaum - Accused Ida Ronen COUNSEL : Mr I. Hill QC; Mr E. Power - Accused Nitzan Ronen Mr R. Van de Wiel QC; Mr P. Jones - Accused Izhar Ronen

Ms P. Musgrave - Cth DPP SOLICITORS : Watsons Solicitors - Accused

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION : Local Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION CRIMINAL LIST

WHEALY J

THURSDAY 20 January 2005

70222/03 - REGINA v Ida RONEN 70032/03 - REGINA v Nitzan RONEN 70223/03 - REGINA v Izhar RONEN

JUDGMENT - On application for discharge of juror (088) - see p 632 of summing-up transcript.

1 HIS HONOUR: There is before the Court an application for discharge of a juror under s 22 of the Jury Act. During the course of the discussions regarding the application I outlined briefly the circumstances I believe that have led to the application. 2 This is an extempore judgment so there is no need for me to state all the facts in detail. The factual circumstances include a number of problems that the juror has encountered. They go back a considerable time. An examination of the relevant documents marked for identification will show that a considerable time ago she drew these problems to the Court's attention. Notwithstanding her original understanding that the trial would finish in about four months, she found herself in the difficult position, that after some seven and a half months she realised that a booking she had made a considerable time ago for an overseas trip to Canada, in order to be with her fiancee and meet his family, would be jeopardised by her remaining as a jury member. She was originally to leave Australia in the first week of January 2005 and reciprocal arrangements had been made for her arrival in Canada. The juror was exhorted at the time to see whether other arrangements could be made and she very willingly undertook that task, and later informed the Court that she had made arrangements to change her flights. The new bookings involved the juror's departure on or about 14 January 2005. Contingent plans were also put in train for an alternative "last minute" departure on 22 January 2005 if the estimates again proved to be inaccurate. 3 There were further notes from the juror regarding difficulties she encountered with cancellation fees and the like, and the Court put into train through the Sheriff's Office an application for reimbursement from the Attorney-General's Department. 4 The next in this series of events occurred a short while ago, when it became apparent there was a possibility, although at that stage it was no more than an outside possibility, that the new travel arrangements the juror had made would be jeopardised if the trial were not to be concluded by 22 January 2005. This again was complicated by the fact that the various travel arrangements that had been made related not only to the juror but to other members of her family. In addition to that, a celebration had been arranged for her, as I understand it, in Canada for both the juror and her fiancée. That occasion was set for later this coming week-end, Canada time. 5 The juror quite properly raised with the Court the problem this would cause for her, and she indicated that if there were any real possibility of the trial not finishing by 22 January 2005, this would place her in a very difficult position with her family, friends and fiancee, and would involve further expense for all of them. In those circumstances she then asked whether she might be discharged. 6 With the consent of counsel for the accused and the Crown, and after consultation with those counsel, I sent a note to the juror. I asked her to see whether she could possibly postpone the 14 January departure date and make final arrangements for a flight on the 22nd, and also to examine whether it would be possible for her in those circumstances to remain as a juror in the trial. Again, I think commendably, the juror indicated that she had changed her tickets now until the 22nd. She had also put in train all her final arrangements but agreed to stay on as a juror on the basis that the trial would conclude by that date. 7 The final events in this history are that the juror, as the next few days went by, became quite concerned that the 22nd January 2005 was looming. She sent a note asking whether she might be discharged either shortly before or after the jury had commenced deliberations. Again, after consultation with counsel, I informed her that such a step would be possible, as I understood it, in terms of the requirements of the Jury Act or that, at least it would not be prohibited. So it is we arrive at today's date. I am still in the course of summing up, and as it is quite clear, I will not finish the summing up in the defence case until tomorrow, if I am able to finish tomorrow. In a practical sense, this reveals the position, although the jury will not go out until Monday for their deliberations in all likelihood, that the situation of this juror has now become, in my view, completely unsatisfactory in relation to all the commitments that she has made, altered and remade on a number of occasions. 8 The section of the Act under which the application for discharge is brought is s 22. 9 It is in the following terms: - "22. Where in the course of any trial or coronial inquest any member of the jury dies or is discharged by the Court or coroner whether as being through illness incapable of continuing to act or for any other reason, the jury shall be considered as remaining for all the purposes of that trial or inquest properly constituted if: