Regina v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 641

New South Wales Supreme Court

CITATION : Regina v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 641 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

JUDGMENT DATE : 27 April 2006

JUDGMENT OF : Whealy J at 1

DECISION : I decline to exclude the evidence

CATCHWORDS : Criminal law - application to exclude evidence - s 137 of Evidence Act (NSW) - risk of unfair prejudice - prejudice occasioned by intense media scrutiny

LEGISLATION CITED : Evidence Act (NSW) 1995

Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR at 93, 95 and 99 Masters, Richards & Wunderlich (1992) 59 A Crim R 445 at 454 CASES CITED : Smith v The Queen [2001] 206 CLR 650 at 653 Odgers Uniform Evidence Laws 5th Edition at page 114 Papakosmos v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at 307, 312 and 321-322

PARTIES : Regina v Faheem Khalid Lodhi

FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 2005/1094

COUNSEL : Mr R. Maidment SC; Mr G. Bellew - Crown Mr P. Boulten; Mr P. Lange - Accused

SOLICITORS : DPP (Commonwealth) - Crown Michael Doughty - Accused

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION CRIMINAL LIST

WHEALY J

THURSDAY 27 April 2006

2005/1094 - REGINA v Faheem Khalid LODHI

JUDGMENT - Application on behalf of the accused to exclude "Brigitte" evidence

1 HIS HONOUR: On Thursday 20 April 2006 Mr Boulten SC made an application that certain categories of evidence not be admitted at the trial. The essential nature of the application was that the evidence was not relevant within meaning the s 55 of the Evidence Act (NSW) 1995. Secondly, Mr Boulten argued that, even if the evidence were relevant and otherwise admissible, it should be excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act. 2 On 21 April 2006 I gave a ruling in the matter. I held that the evidence outlined by Mr Boulten was, in my view, relevant in the proceedings in that it was evidence, if it were accepted, that could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceedings. Secondly, I held that I would not exclude the evidence because I was satisfied that its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. These are my reasons for the decision I gave on that day.