Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council [2007] NSWSC 834

New South Wales Supreme Court

CITATION : Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council [2007] NSWSC 834

HEARING DATE(S) : 03/07/07, 04/07/07

JUDGMENT DATE : 9 August 2007

JUDGMENT OF : Whealy J at 1

DECISION : 1. The plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the Review Panel dated 16 February 2005 is dismissed. 2. The plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief is refused. 3. The summons is dismissed. 4. I order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs both in relation to the appeal and the claim for declaratory relief contained in the summons. 5 The Exhibits may be returned. 6. Grant liberty to apply re further costs argument, but only if necessary.

LEGISLATION CITED : Legal Profession Act 1987 Legal Profession Act 2004

Gundry v Sainsbury (1910) 1 KB 645 Wentworth v Rogers (2006) NSWCA 145 at paras 102-105 CASES CITED : Dyktynski v BHP Titanium Minerals Pty Ltd [2004] 60 NSWLR 203 New Pinnacle Group Silver Mining Co v Luhrig Coal (1902) 2 SR (NSW) 50; 19 WN (NSW) 9 Coshott v Schmierer (unreported 20 November 2002) Lord Napier's case (1993) AC 713

PARTIES : Robert Coshott v Woollahra Municipal Council

FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 10821/05

COUNSEL : Plaintiff in Person Mr M. Brabazon - Defendant

SOLICITORS : Plaintiff in Person Deacons Lawyers - Defendant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES COMMON LAW DIVISION

WHEALY J

THURSDAY 9 August 2007

10821/05 - Robert COSHOTT v WOOLLAHRA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: On 9 March 2005, Robert Coshott ("the plaintiff") commenced proceedings against Woollahra Municipal Council ("the defendant"). These proceedings were unusual in that they coupled together two very distinct and differing claims for relief. The first, as appears from paras 1 and 2 of the summons, is an appeal from a Cost Assessment of a Review Panel under Part XI of the Legal Profession Act 1987. The second, evidenced by the declaration sought in para 3 of the summons, a completely separate application for declaratory relief in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Despite this rather unusual situation, there was, it appears, a commonality of sorts between the two types of relief sought. In the ultimate, it was agreed that the Court could proceed to deal with both aspects of the summons provided that each was dealt with separately and distinctly.