Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Donaldson v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] NSWSC 423 Hearing dates: 7 February 2011 & 13 May 2011 Decision date: 13 May 2011 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Davies J Decision: (1) The Plaintiff's Notice of Motion filed 23 November 2010 is dismissed. (2) Judgment for the Defendant in the proceedings. (3) The Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant's costs of the proceedings. Catchwords: PROCEDURE - application for default judgment - defence not filed in time but filed before application made - no default - application for summary dismissal - plaintiff unrepresented - no material facts pleaded - no particulars of fraud - no duty of care identified - plaintiff permitted to re-plead - amended pleading does not correct defects - proceedings dismissed. Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 Civil Liability Act 2002 Disability Services Act 1986 Social Security Act 1991 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Cases Cited: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 Jones v Department of Employment [1989] QB 1 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 Texts Cited: Fleming, Law of Torts (LBC, 1998) 9th Ed Category: Principal judgment Parties: Kenneth Allan Donaldson (Plaintiff) Commonwealth of Australia (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff in person D J Duncan (Defendant) Solicitors: DLA Phillips Fox (Defendant) File Number(s): 2010/241346 Judgment 1On 20 July 2010 the Plaintiff filed a Statement of Claim against the Commonwealth seeking $30,000,000 said to be for breach of contract and statutory duty of care, fraud and incompetence. 2The Statement of Claim contains no pleading as such, but annexed to it is a page headed "Particulars" which says this: 1. On or about the 15th July of 1991 Kenneth A. Donaldson hereafter known as the Plaintiff entered into an employment contract or agreement with the Commonwealth of Australia Department of Human Services including legislation related to become a welfare claimant /recipient under a Centrelink system known as Newstart this was later changed to a grant on the 24th September 2002 making the Plaintiff a claimant/recipient of the Disability Support Pension and related legislation as written by the Commonwealth of Australia and agreed to by the State of New South Wales hereafter know as the DSP. 2. As a result of said DSP the Commonwealth of Australia hereafter known as the Defendant to wit under Department of Human Services legislated Centrelink Authority powers which failed to meet the Defendants obligations to the Plaintiff via acts of Negligence / Incompetence, Statuary Duty of Care, Fraud and or agreement breaches due to legislation of the DSP involving a filed document known as a "Mod C" reference no of said Mod C NO: C81097408Q hereafter known as Event resulting in the following to wit: i. Failed to provided re-assessments of plaintiffs health and current medical conditions ii. Failed to provided avenues/ support programs to Plaintiff for rehabilitation during said Event period. iii. Failed to act upon said Event iv. Failed to assess living standards or possible need to relocate to more suitable accommodation under DSP agreement or legislation. v. Failed to assess if any special needs were required by the plaintiff as a DSP recipient vi. Failed to inform Plaintiff of any social networking support options vii. Failed to act upon the problems of the Event with the introduction of the Act FaCSIA 2007 under Schedule 1,12, KP112.1 viii. Failed to protect the Plaintiffs rights as a DSP claimant/recipient during the creation of the Civil Liability Act 2002 3. As a consequence of the aforementioned breaches and or statue the Plaintiff as suffered and will continue to suffer loss and damages from: a. Potential future earning's under the Civil Liability Act 2002. b. Potential future medical expenses under the Civil Liability Act 2002. c. Entitlement of life style advancement. d. Entitlement of future community standing or statue. e. Limited abilities to earn due to incapacity caused by injury effects upon daily life style. f. Stress and feeling of self worth on a social level. g. Anxiety and stress in shopping situations - isle spacing and over head storage. h. Defendants insincerity towards plaintiff causing self esteem physiological issues i. Defendants misuse of the Social Security Act 1991 preclusion period j. Defendants fraudulent acquisition of monies having knowledge of case 295/08 Kenneth k. Donaldson v Woolworth Limited "typed copy" whereas court verdict detailed disbursement of said monies to recipients payable. 4. Thus future opportunities resulting from said life style changes suffered by an incapacity to earn resulting in: 1. Potential opportunity for home ownership. 2. Potential job satisfaction from a working career. 3. Enjoyment from social outings such as carnival shows shopping trips and the like. 4. Social interaction due to said self esteem issues dating and forming friendships. 3There is no evidence when the Statement of Claim was served on the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth filed a Defence on 15 August 2010 and I was told by Mr Donaldson, without objection from counsel for the Commonwealth, that it was served immediately before a directions hearing in front of the Registrar on 25 October 2010. 4On 18 November 2010 the Commonwealth filed a Notice of Motion seeking that the proceedings be summarily dismissed pursuant to Pt 13 r 4 UCPR or, in the alternative, that the Statement of Claim be struck out pursuant to Pt 14 r 28. No affidavit was filed in support of that Notice of Motion. 5On 23 November 2010 Mr Donaldson filed a Notice of Motion entitled "Default judgment for unliquidated damages" and sought as its order: Award as per the 28 day rule in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant with damages paid as per the Amount of Claim Case Number 2010/241346. 6Both these Notices of Motion came on for hearing before me on 7 February 2011. I dealt first with Mr Donaldson's Notice of Motion which I took to be a claim for default judgment. Mr Donaldson said that the basis for the Motion was that the Defendant had not filed its defence within 28 days as was required by the Rules. As I have said, there was no proof of when the Statement of Claim was served but I proceeded on the assumption that the Commonwealth had not filed its defence within 28 days of the service of the Statement of Claim. Under Pt 16 r 6 a Defendant is in default if it does not file its defence within 28 days. However, sub-r (2)(c) provides that if a defence is later filed before a default judgment has been obtained the Defendant is no longer in default. 7Both at the time the Notice of Motion was heard by me and at the date of its filing the Defendant was not in default because its defence had been both filed and served. For those reasons I will dismiss Mr Donaldson's Notice of Motion. 8I turn then to consider the Commonwealth's Notice of Motion. 9A reading of what were described as the particulars that I have set out in para [2] above did not enable any real understanding of the case that Mr Donaldson was endeavouring to plead. Virtually no material facts were set out to give any context to what was said to be the Commonwealth's failures and the damage that Mr Donaldson was claiming. 10The factual context was best set out in paragraph 3 of the Commonwealth's Defence as follows: 3. In relation to the whole of the Statement of Claim says: 3.1 Centrelink was notified on 8 May 2009 that the Plaintiff obtained an award of damages of $76,006.85 against Woolworths Limited (the award) on 30 April 2009. 3.2 As a result of the award and pursuant to sections 1169 and 1170 of the Social Security Act (Cth), the Defendant through Centrelink decided that $7,817.74 in disability support pension was to be recovered from the Plaintiff and that a preclusion period (the period of time for which he could not receive a Centrelink payment) applied from 8 December 2005 to 12 July 2006. 3.3 Pursuant to section 1184 of the Social Security Act (Cth), Centrelink gave notice to Woolworths Limited that it intended to recover the $7,817.74. 3.4 On 19 May 2009 Centrelink notified the Plaintiff of the recovery amount of $7,817.74 and the preclusion period ("the Centrelink decision"). 3.5 The Plaintiff sought a review of Centrelink's decision. A review decision was made on 15 June 2009 affirming Centrelink's initial decision. The Plaintiff appealed the review decision to The Social Security Appeals Tribunal. The Social Security Appeal Tribunal affirmed the review decision. The Plaintiff appealed the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia (AAT). On 12 January 2010 the AAT affirmed the Social Security Appeals Tribunal decision. The Plaintiff has not sought to appeal the AAT decision. 3.6 The Plaintiff had, and exercised, rights of appeal from the Centrelink decision. 11Mr Donaldson did not dispute those facts. He had filed an affidavit entitled "Affidavit of Statement of Particulars" on 20 July 2010 and that affidavit annexed the supporting documents in relation to the matters the defence identified. 12In the course of Mr Donaldson's submissions, it became clear that he was dissatisfied with the decisions of the reviewing officer and the tribunals to which he appealed. Part of the dissatisfaction was said to have arisen from an alleged failure by the Commonwealth to make documents and material available to the Tribunals. However, it became clear that Mr Donaldson's principal dissatisfaction was to the way the Social Security Act 1991 operated on a claim for damages and particularly with the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002. He claimed that the Social Security Act contained unfair provisions which interfered with his civil rights. He submitted that when the amendments to the Civil Liability Act dealing with damages were enacted the Commonwealth should have had input to ensure that his and others' rights were not affected by the way the Social Security Act worked on the recovery of damages under the Civil Liability Act . He appeared to be of the opinion that the Commonwealth could be made liable for what he saw as the failure of members of the Commonwealth Parliament, although whether the failures confirmed his allegation that the Commonwealth should have intervened when the Civil Liability Act was passed in New South Wales was not made clear. 13The Commonwealth submitted, and I accept, that it is possible to discern 4 possible causes of action in the Statement of Claim. These are: (1) fraud; (2) breach of contract; (3) negligence; (4) breach of statutory duty. 14The material concerning the claim for fraud in Mr Donaldson's affidavit of 20 July 2010 consisted of general particulars about misrepresentations the Commonwealth was said to have made in relation to Mr Donaldson's District Court proceedings, what was said to be a misuse of the Social Security Act 1991 to acquire monies from him and a fraudulent retaining of these monies. 15No facts are set out in any document filed by Mr Donaldson to justify the allegation of fraud. Part 15.3 UCPR requires the provision of particulars where fraud is pleaded. 16There is, in any event, no basis to the fraud claims. As Mr Donaldson appears to recognise the monies were taken from him pursuant to provisions of the legislation. It is the legislation itself that Mr Donaldson does not like, and it is because of his view about the legislation that he says the Commonwealth Parliament should have done things when the NSW Parliament was enacting the Civil Liability Act although he does not make clear what specific things he is referring to. He does not assert that the moneys were taken in contravention of any law that might, but would not necessarily, have amounted to a fraud. 17The claim based on breach of contract is said to arise because Mr Donaldson alleges he entered into an employment contract with the Commonwealth on or about 15 July 1991. That appears to be the time at which he first claimed some form of social security from the Commonwealth. 18He alleges that the arrangement he had with the Commonwealth is an employment contract because of the way in which the Commonwealth treats welfare payments made in relation to income tax. 19It does not seem to me that the relationship which exists between Mr Donaldson and the Commonwealth arises from any contractual arrangement. Rather, the Commonwealth has powers, discretions, responsibilities and obligations under the Social Security Act which, to the extent that they are enforceable, are not enforceable as contractual provisions but by rights of appeal provided for in the legislation. 20Mr Donaldson exercised rights of appeal up to the level of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. He was unsuccessful but did not seek to take the matter further whether pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or otherwise. 21At the conclusion of the hearing on 7 February 2011 I indicated to the parties that I considered that there was no basis for the pleading in contract and fraud against the Commonwealth. In the absence of any particulars of fraud and any underlying factual basis for an allegation of fraud, and where Mr Donaldson had exercised appeal rights unsuccessfully, no cause of action in fraud should be allowed to go forward. 22The claim for breach of contract is also doomed to fail bearing in mind the principles enunciated in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130. 23The other 2 causes of action that appeared to be buried in the material prepared by Mr Donaldson were causes of action in negligence and for breach of statutory duty against the Commonwealth. I endeavoured to ascertain from Mr Donaldson precisely what he was alleging in that regard against the Commonwealth. As best as I could understand it Mr Donaldson seemed to suggest that the Commonwealth parliament had been negligent in some way in relation to the Social Security Act at or after the time the New South Wales parliament passed the Civil Liability Act . Alternatively, Mr Donaldson seemed to say the Commonwealth was negligent in the way it construed the interaction of the Social Security Act and the NSW Civil Liability Act . 24Although these were rather bizarre assertions I was conscious of the fact that Mr Donaldson was unrepresented and ought to be given every opportunity to plead a case if he really had one. For that reason I adjourned the matter and gave Mr Donaldson some further time to replead his case in negligence and breach of statutory duty and urged upon him the need to get legal assistance, perhaps through the pro bono schemes run by the Bar Association and the Law Society. 25After the matter was adjourned Mr Donaldson sought further time than I had allowed him to replead his case because he had not at that time managed to obtain legal assistance. Quite properly the Commonwealth did not oppose Mr Donaldson being given the extra time. 26He then filed an Amended Statement of Claim on 20 April 2011. He told me that it had been prepared with the assistance of a solicitor in Newcastle. I do not know the extent of the solicitor's input to the document but I am afraid to say that the new pleading suffers from the same vices as the original Statement of Claim. 27What might be thought to be the pleading appears under the heading "Particulars". It is necessary to set it out in its entirety: Particulars 1. The Commonwealth of Australia hereafter known as "the Defendant" has full knowledge of Social Security Act 1991 chapter 3 part 3.14 along with full knowledge of the Court verdict Reference 295/08 Donaldson Vs Woolworth . 1.1. Failed to correctly apply said Act at all times during assessment file reference C81097408Q Referee to Annexure B page 3. 1.2 The Defendant failed to apply Division 1 clause 1164 of said Act Referee to Annexure A page 1. (c) the lump sum was calculated by reference to a period; this part applies to a person as if: (d) the person had not received: (i) the lump sum 1.3. The Defendant at all times by Defendants own admissions wilfully applied sections 1160(1)&(2), 1169,1170 and 1178 of said Act Referee Annexure B page 1, Annexure A page 2 2. To wit the Defendant deceptively acquired monies from said verdict 295/08 2.1 Falsely applying Social Security Act 1991 Referee to Annexure B page 1 points 25, 26, 27. 2.2 Admitted to under section 1184 of said Act claim from the Insurer "Woolworths" monies owing to Kenneth Allan Donaldson hereafter known as "the Plaintiff" Referee to Annexure B page 3 & 6 Letter dated 19th May 2009 2.3 Defendant also informed the said Insurer under section 1184 of said Act pay directly to the Defendant on the 19th May 2009 Referee to Annexure B page 6 2.4 Although having full knowledge of Chapter 3 Part 3.14 Division 6 1184J Referee to Annexure B page 5 2.5. The Defendant now in breach of said Act section 1184J also sort to directly claim same said monies from the plaintiff whilst referencing Section 192 of said Act under Division 1 Part 5 sl96, Referee to Annexure B page 4 letter dated 20th May 2009 3. To wit the Defendant never at any time until after the close of court proceedings case 295/08 dated 30th April 2009 3.1 sort to act upon file reference C81097408Q prior to the 8th May 2009 Referee Annexure C page 1 fax cover sheet 8th May 2009 3.2 Notice was given by the plaintiff on the 30th April 2009 via phone on said date 3.3 In accordance with said Act section 1183 Potential compensation payer or insurer must notify Secretary of liability 1183(1) If a person ( the potential compensation payer ): (a) is given a notice under subsection 1182(1) in relation to a person; and (b) whether before or after receiving the notice, the potential compensation payer becomes liable to pay compensation to the person; the potential compensation payer must give written notice to the Secretary of the liability within 7 days after: (c) becoming liable; or (d) receiving the notice; whichever happens later. Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months. 4. The Defendant failed as set out by legislation to supply all records for use in assessment of case file number C81097408Q during Judicial procedures Referee to Affidavit Statement of Particulars Annexure C 4.1.1. No copy of the completed MOD C 4.1.2. No copy of phone conversations 4.1.3. No full copy of Social Security Act Chapter 3 part 3.14 4.1.4. No copy of letter to insurer Referee Annexure B page 2, 3.Facts 3.4 5. On or about the 21st May 2009 the Defendant produced another letter which was sent to the Plaintiff 5.1. Requesting the completion of a new MOD C form (included with letter) from the Plaintiff in accordance with said Act 5.2 Whilst having knowledge of file reference C81097408Q prior to said request now opens a new file to the said existing file. Referee to Annexure C page 2 5.3 The Actions of the Defendant on or about the 21st May 2009 now negligence arising from Chapter 3 part 3.14 Division 4 section 1183 Subdivision C 1183, the Defendant was in full knowledge receiving notice as noted 8th May 2009 by the said Insurer Referee to Annexure C page 1 6. The Defendant took no action upon file reference C81097408Q in accordance with the Social Security Act 1991 whilst 6.1 Refusing to acknowledge of said verdict in accordance with Chapter 3 part 3.14 Division 4 section 1183 Subdivision C 1182 upon notification given the 30th April 2009 from the Plaintiff 6.2 The Defendant was aware of court proceedings by Defendant's own admission State's having notified the Insurer upon the 4th November 2008 Referee to Annexure B page 2 3.Facts-3.4 6.3. Both the Defendant and the said Insurer now breached Chapter 3 part 3.14 Division 4 section 1183 Subdivision C 1183 (b) Referee to Annexure C page 1, Noting date upon Fax. 7. The Defendant has failed the Plaintiff who at all time has been and still is a client of the Defendant to provide services as set out in the Disability Services Act 1986 Referee Annexure D page 1, part l-Preliminary 3 Objects (b), (c) and (f) 7.1. No services have been offered to the Plaintiff in retraining as outlined in (b) to assist persons with disabilities to receive services necessary to enable them to work towards full participation as members of the community 7.2 The Defendant failed to promote services outlined in (c) (i) reintegration into the general community 7.3 The Defendant failed to promote services outlines in (c) (ii) redevelop independence and or employment opportunities 7.4 The Defendant failed to promote as outlined (c) (iii) services that rebuild self worth and or self-esteem 7.5 The Defendant failed to provide as outlined (f) for persons with disabilities who are of working age by the provision of comprehensive rehabilitation services. 8. The Defendant failed the Plaintiff whereas it is written within the Disability Services Act under part l-Preliminary Section 5 and 5A whilst legislative Amendments were written containing to the Civil Liability Act in 2002 -Referee to Annexure D pages 3 & 4 8.1 The Defendant who is responsible for legislation under Australian Prudential Regulation Authority governing Public Liability coverage failed to protect the Plaintiff's lifestyle needs whilst payable damage scales became award rates. 8.2 The Defendant failed the Plaintiff as set out under 5(1) formulate principles and objectives protecting services for the Plaintiff 8.3 The Defendant failed the Plaintiff as set out 5(2) produce guidelines and submit them before each house of Parliament within 15 sitting days 8.4 The Defendant failed the Plaintiff as set out 5A Standard 12: basic legal and human rights to be upheld including: 8.4.1.1 Respect for human dignity and freedom; 8.4.1.2 Equality before the law; 8.4.1.3 Protection against discrimination; and 8.4.1.4 Equal opportunity in employment. Statuary [sic] and or Common Law Duty Of Care On 8th December 2005 the Plaintiff a client of the Defendant suffered personal injury and disability thereafter in breach of the Defendant's Statuary and or Common Law Duty of Care A. The Defendant failed to provide the accruals and or retraining and or support for the Plaintiff as set out by legislation from the 8th December 2005 to date. B. The Defendant failed to provide as set out by legislation assessment of the Plaintiff's condition from the 8th December 2005 until the 23rd December 2009 Referee to Annexure E page 1 C. The Defendant as set out by legislation Disability Services Act 1986 part l-Preliminary Section 5A Standard 12 failed to treat the Plaintiff with respect during the processing of file reference C81097408Q Referee to Annexure D page 4, Annexure B page 4 D. The Defendant now proceeded to engage the Plaintiff in another long drawn out process with the Defendant's handling of file reference C81097408Q in breach of said duties. Resulting in more emotional trauma for the Plaintiff who just faced a long and stressful litigation ordeal as a result of said injury and disability E. The Defendant during proceedings pursuant attempt's to harass the Plaintiff on or about the or about the 20th May 2009 relating to monies the Defendant ordered the said Insurer to pay. In breach of Disability Services Act 1986 as set out by legislation under Sections 5, 5A and Standard 12 during the re-writing of the Public Liability Act in 2002 I. The Defendant showed little compassion over the future needs and or lifestyle changes facing the Plaintiff. II. The Defendant allowed an act of discrimination to occur against the Plaintiff during the rewriting of said legislation by the Defendant's lack of care. III. The Defendant allowed as a result of changes to said rewritten Act an unrealistic wholesaling valuation of Human body parts so as to victimize injuries received by the Plaintiff 28Paragraph 2 of the Particulars must be struck out. This is a further pleading of fraud which I had determined at the conclusion of the first day of hearing that Mr Donaldson was not permitted to plead. Even if I had not so determined what appears in paragraph 2 does not amount to particulars in a claim in fraud but mere allegation. Mr Donaldson said that the paragraph was not intended to plead fraud but was in support of his claim in negligence. However, where allegations include words like "deceptively" and "falsely" it is difficult to see them as otherwise than fraud allegations. 29The allegations in paragraphs 1, 3 and 6 appear to challenge the construction of legislation, in particular the Social Security Act , that Centrelink adopted. Those are matters in respect of which appeal rights are given and, in this case, were exercised by Mr Donaldson, but unsuccessfully. Mr Donaldson may have had further rights to appeal to the Federal Court under the ADJR Act if he was dissatisfied with the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal about the way Centrelink and the Commonwealth had applied the legislation. He did not do so. These matters do not give rise to any causes of action against the Commonwealth. 30Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Amended Statement of Claim appear to be an allegation that the Commonwealth failed to provide certain material to the Tribunals that considered Mr Donaldson's appeals. Assuming that that is so for present purposes that does not give rise to any cause of action for negligence or breach of statutory duty. This was a matter which could have been dealt with during the appeal process or, if Mr Donaldson only became aware of that after the process had concluded, he may have had rights to take the matter further under the ADJR Act. He has not done so. I shall return to the question of the existence of a duty of care later in this judgment. 31Paragraphs 7 and 8, and what appears under the heading "Statuary [sic] and or Common Law Duty Of Care" in the Amended Statement of Claim allege failures on the part of the Commonwealth to do things which Mr Donaldson says ought to have been done under the legislation. There are a number of difficulties with these parts of the Amended Statement of Claim. 32First, the material facts which might give rise to a cause of action are not set out coherently or at all in the Amended Statement of Claim. Every now and then a fact appears in the midst of allegations which assume that the reader has knowledge about the events derived from outside the document. As I mentioned earlier, had it not been for the Defence filed by the Commonwealth I would not have any understanding of the factual matrix and background that gave rise to the present proceedings. For that reason alone the further pleading should be struck out. 33Secondly, all but 2 of what appear to be particulars under the heading "Statuary [sic] and or Common Law Duty Of Care" are not particulars of any cause of action known to the law. 2 of the particulars (A & B) allege failures to act in accordance with the legislation. Such failures, if proved, are matters with which the appeal process is concerned. 34Thirdly, there is a need for Mr Donaldson to show how the relationship between him and the Commonwealth relevantly gave rise to a duty of care. In Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 the High Court said: [42] The argument was conducted upon the basis that it was foreseeable that harm of the kind allegedly suffered by the appellants might result from want of care on the part of those who investigated the possibility that the children had been sexually abused. But the fact that it is foreseeable, in the sense of being a real and not far-fetched possibility, that a careless act or omission on the part of one person may cause harm to another does not mean that the first person is subject to a legal liability to compensate the second by way of damages for negligence if there is such carelessness, and harm results. If it were otherwise, at least two consequences would follow. First, the law would subject citizens to an intolerable burden of potential liability, and constrain their freedom of action in a gross manner. Secondly, the tort of negligence would subvert many other principles of law, and statutory provisions, which strike a balance of rights and obligations, duties and freedoms. A defendant will only be liable, in negligence, for failure to take reasonable care to prevent a certain kind of foreseeable harm to a plaintiff, in circumstances where the law imposes a duty to take such care. ... [60] The circumstance that a defendant owes a duty of care to a third party, or is subject to statutory obligations which constrain the manner in which powers or discretions may be exercised, does not of itself rule out the possibility that a duty of care is owed to a plaintiff. People may be subject to a number of duties, at least provided they are not irreconcilable. A medical practitioner who examines, and reports upon the condition of, an individual, might owe a duty of care to more than one person. But if a suggested duty of care would give rise to inconsistent obligations, that would ordinarily be a reason for denying that the duty exists. Similarly, when public authorities, or their officers, are charged with the responsibility of conducting investigations, or exercising powers, in the public interest, or in the interests of a specified class of persons, the law would not ordinarily subject them to a duty to have regard to the interests of another class of persons where that would impose upon them conflicting claims or obligations. 35The administration of the Social Security Act is a good example of a situation where a body like CentreLink must exercise powers and perform duties given to it under Acts of Parliament in a way that will affect people like Mr Donaldson. The imposition of a duty of care in a way that Mr Donaldson wants to assert is likely to conflict with powers and duties in the legislation being administered. That is no doubt why there is provision for a series of appeals against decisions taken by CentreLink and the Commonwealth in administering the legislation. 36Fourthly, Mr Donaldson said of his claim in negligence during the course of argument that "the Commonwealth should have seen to it that certain structures were in place to make sure that its clients were not disadvantaged by the construction of the Act". Apart from the difficulty of determining what amounts to being disadvantaged it is clear that the provisions of the Social Security Act and other legislation derive from political decisions taken by the Parliament that are not amenable to any form of review by a Court unless some invalidity is demonstrated. It is clear from that statement and others he made that his complaint is with the Parliament. Parliament owes no duty of care and the Commonwealth has no liability at law for what Parliament legislates in the absence of constitutional invalidity of legislation. 37Mr Donaldson does not show that a duty of care was owed to him by CentreLink or the Commonwealth. He does not show that the provisions of the Social Security legislation give rise to a cause of action by an aggrieved person even if it is assumed there was a breach of provisions of the legislation when Mr Donaldson was dealt with. As Fleming, Law of Torts , (LBC 1998) 9th Ed says (at 207): Much more rarely has tort liability been ascribed to statutes which impose duties where the common law does not require it...To do so, it has been argued, is improper because it would create new rights under colour of a statute which has stopped short of authorising them. In respect of a statute directing the payment of social welfare benefits, see Jones v Department of Employment [1989] QB 1. 38One particular reason the legislation is unlikely to give rise to a breach of statutory duty is the provision of the appeal process. 39Ultimately, as I have said, Mr Donaldson exercised his rights of appeal up to a certain level and was entirely unsuccessful. It would now be entirely inappropriate for this Court to attempt to go behind the decisions of the various Tribunals to suggest that some common law rights, not clearly articulated by Mr Donaldson, should override the provisions of the Commonwealth legislation as interpreted by the Tribunals. 40Making every allowance for the fact that Mr Donaldson is unrepresented, the present pleading cannot be allowed to stand. Further, Mr Donaldson has been given a chance to put his pleading into order if he was able to identify appropriate causes of action to plead against the Commonwealth. He has not been able to do so. 41For the reasons I have given Mr Donaldson has no causes of action against the Commonwealth arising out of the injury he sustained and as a result of the damages he received because of that injury. The descriptions in General Steel Industries apply to both the pleading and the causes of action he wishes to maintain. 42Accordingly, I make the following orders: (1) The Plaintiff's Notice of Motion filed 23 November 2010 is dismissed. (2) Judgment for the Defendant in the proceedings. (3) The Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant's costs of the proceedings. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 May 2011