Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Rahman v Dubs [2012] NSWSC 1065 Hearing dates: 27/07/20112 Decision date: 13 September 2012 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Garling J Decision: (1) Proceedings dismissed. (2) Plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs. Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - statement of claim manifestly an abuse of process and must be struck out - no reasonable cause of action disclosed - proceedings dismissed Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 Supreme Court Act 1970 Cases Cited: Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; (2000) 201 CLR 552 Burton v Shire of Bairnsdale [1908] HCA 57; (1908) 7 CLR 76 Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1; (1949) 78 CLR 62 Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited [1983] HCA 25; (1983) 154 CLR 87 General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273 Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 18 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Mohammad Tabibar Rahman (P) Rosalind Dubs (D1) John Hartigan (D2) Shirley Alexander (D3) Representation: Counsel: In person (P() T Maltz (D) File Number(s): 2009/298024 Judgment 1Mr Mohammad Tabibar Rahman commenced proceedings in this Court by filing a summons on 2 November 2009. 2He nominated, as the defendant, Ms Rosalind Dubs, whom he claimed was the Registrar of the University of Technology Sydney ("UTS"). 3So far as it is possible to tell from the terms of this first version of the summons, Mr Rahman claimed relief under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 against a decision of UTS, communicated to him by a letter from the Registrar to exclude him for a period of seven days form the use of the UTS On-line facilities. 4Mr Rahman was at that time, enrolled as a post-graduate student in the Faculty of Law at UTS, undertaking a juris doctor course in 2008. 5Its seems also that he seeks relief, in this summons, with respect to a further decision of the Deputy Vice Chancellor of UTS communicated to him by the Registrar, the effect of which was to impose a number of conditions upon him, in respect of his on-going attendance at the University. 6The relief claimed is stated in the following terms in the summons: "1. An order in the nature of a prohibition and/or an injunction restraining the Rosalind V Dubs, Registrar, University of Technology Sydney, of unlawful decision of 'alleged Non-academic misconduct by the Applicant which is without salutatory Legal provisions of any statutes of UTS Act or any other enactments made on 9 June 2009 on behalf of :Shirley Alexander, Deputy-vice Chancellor (Teaching and Learning Equity), from acting upon the impinge and infringe the applicant's dignity: under Art 19, Freedom of expression, Art 26 (1) and ((2) Right to education, Art 27 (1) & (2), Art 28 of Covenant Statute of Universal Declaration of Human Rights under UN Charters. 2. An order in the nature of certiorari quashing the: the Rosalind V Dubs, Registrar, University of Technology Sydney, unlawful decision of 'alleged Non-academic misconduct' by the applicant which is without salutatory Legal provisions of any statutes of UTS Act or any other enactments made on 9 June 2009 on behalf of: Shirley Alexander, Deputy-Vice Chancellor (Teaching and Learning Equity), from acting upon the impinge and infringed the applicant's dignity: under Art 19(1)&(2), Art 18 Freedom of thought, conscience &, Art 17 Arbitrary or unlawful on Civil and Political Rights. 3. An order to grant any relief or remedy or to do any things by the way of mandamus or of any other description under Art 13 Para 1, State Parties...recognize the right of every to education, Para 2, (c) Higher education ... equally accessible to all of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, restraining the Rosalind V Dubs, Registrar, University of Technology Sydney, of unlawful decision of 'alleged Non-academic misconduct by the Applicant which is without statutory Legal provisions of any statutes of UTS Act or any other enactments made on 9 June 2009 on behalf of: Shirley Alexander, Deputy-Vice Chancellor (Teaching and Learning Equity), from acting upon the impinge and infringed the applicant's dignity of educational life and the Professional Carrier of damage caused under such act. 4. An order for declaration of right for Procedural fairness - as are required by enactments in all legal disputes as well as under: 's17 UTS Act Register of Standing Delegations: s5. In exercising any delegation the delegate must have regard to any relevant principles of procedural fairness. 5. An order for the determination of any question or matter which may be determined by the Supreme Court of the applicant's submission. 6. An order for the recovery of damages or other money; and incidental costs as restrained and infringed and caused damage and harmful effect the applicant's learning achievement for the Juris Dictor, Post-Graduate awards in the stipulated time frame. 7. An order for the compliance under s s6 Object and functions of University Sub rule (f) the provision of teaching and learning that engage with advanced knowledge and inquiry UT, Sydney, Act has been under seized by the employment of not functionally qualified lecturer and Tutor: Leanne Houston, Subject Coordinator, Greg Weeks, Tutor, Administrative law and Tracey Booth, Lecturer, Legal Method and 'remedial for the alleged unlawful low marking of: Awarded: Fail, Criminal law, by Ian Dobinson, Lecturer Awarded: Fail Contract law. By: Angella Dwyer, Lecturer and David Thrope, Lecturer Awarded: Pass, Administrative law, by: L Houston, Lecturer, R Fisher, A/Professor and G.Week. 8. Any other order (whether legal, equitable or otherwise) justiciable by the Hon Judges." 7This judgment deals with the following issues: (a)whether an order ought to be made pursuant to r 12.8(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 ("UCPR"), that the proceedings be dismissed as inactive proceedings; (b)whether an order ought to be made, pursuant to r 13.4 of the UCPR, that the proceedings be dismissed generally; or in the alternative (c)whether an order ought to be made pursuant to r 14.28 of the UCPR, that the statement of claim by Mr Rahman be struck out. Procedural history 8On 18 December 2009, McCallum J made a number of orders. Amongst those orders were these: "1. Order, pursuant to r 6.29 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules that Ms Dubs be removed as a party to the proceedings, and that pursuant to r 6.24 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, the University of Technology Sydney be joined as a defendant; 2. Order that the matter proceed on pleadings, and direct the plaintiff to file a statement of claim within 28 days. 3. Order that the plaintiff not be permitted to file any further notice of motion without the leave of a registrar or a Judge of the court." 9On 7 January 2010, Mr Rahman filed a summons in the Court of Appeal seeking leave to appeal against these interlocutory orders of McCallum J. On 28 May 2010, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed by Hodgson and Tobias JJA in the Court of Appeal with costs. The Court of Appeal ordered that the costs could be assessed forthwith. 10During 2011, contrary to the specific order made by McCallum J in December 2009, Mr Rahman filed three notices of motion dated 14 December 2010, 21 February 2011 and 15 April 2011. Each of these motions was dismissed with costs by Hidden J, Registrar Bradford and Johnson J, respectively. 11Notwithstanding this apparent industry prior to 20 July 2012, Mr Rahman had not taken any steps to comply with the orders of McCallum J about amending the parties to his proceedings and pleading all of his causes of action in a statement of claim. As a consequence, the matter was referred to me as the List Judge of the Common Law Division, for Mr Rahman to show cause why the proceeding should not be dismissed as inactive proceedings in accordance with r 12.8(2) of the UCPR. 12The matter came before me on 20 July 2012, when I drew Mr Rahman's attention to the orders of McCallum J of December 2009 with respect to filing a statement of claim, and ordered that he file and serve a statement of claim, which complied with McCallum J's order by 4pm on 26 July 2012. I ordered that the proceedings be stood over before me on 27 July 2012. 13I indicated that, if no statement of claim was filed, as had been ordered by McCallum J by that time, I would dismiss the proceedings. 14I also directed that if a statement of claim, or else what purported to be a statement of claim in compliance with the orders of McCallum J was filed, that I would entertain any application from UTS for the summary dismissal of the proceedings if UTS wished to pursue such an application. Otherwise, I indicated, I would make directions for the further conduct and management of the matter. Statement of Claim 15On 26 July 2012, a document entitled "Statement of Claim" was filed. 16Some features of that document may be noted. Mr Rahman remains as the plaintiff. Ms Dubs, notwithstanding the order of McCallum J in December 2009 that she be removed as a party, remains as the first defendant. Two other defendants have been added. Mr John Hartigan has been added as the second defendant. It is said in a footnote that Mr Hartigan replaced Ms Dubs as the Registrar of UTS and "made further order on 10 November 2009 and 15 January 2010". A third defendant, Ms Shirley Alexander, has been added. It seems that she is the Deputy Vice Chancellor who also made a further order on 10 November 2009, and 15 January 2010 described by Mr Rahman in the footnote as being "...for infringement of educational rights in the juris doctor course for one year". No leave had been granted by the Court to add any additional parties, in circumstances where leave was required: r 19.2 UCPR. 17Contrary to the order of McCallum J, Mr Rahman has not joined UTS as a party. 18The second feature to be identified from the Statement of Claim is that it does not follow any of the forms fixed by the Supreme Court Rules for a statement of claim, but rather seems, essentially by copying large slabs of the summons, to include features in it, which seem to derive from the form in use in the High Court of Australia for Applications for Special Leave to Appeal to that Court. For example, under the heading "Pleading and particulars" Mr Rahman includes the following: (a) PART 2 [a brief statement of factual grounds to the application]; (b) Part 3: a brief statement of applicant's argument; (c) PART 4: legal arguments of the claim by the applicant; (d) Part 5: judicial discretion, judicial positivism in applicant's process; (e) Part 6: stare decisis in applicant's process. (sic) 19As well, the Statement of Claim pays no attention to the requirements of Part 14 of the UCPR, including but not limited to the following: (a)a pleading with numbered paragraphs in which each matter is put in a separate paragraphs: r 14.6 UCPR; (b)a pleading must mention only a summary of material facts, and not evidence: r 14.7 UCPR; (c)a pleading must be as brief as the nature of the case allows: r 14.8 UCPR; (d)if a documents is referred to in a pleading, then its effect must be stated not its contents: r 14.9 UCPR. 20The Statement of Claim also infringes other more obvious requirements by including: (a)paragraphs which purport to set out the law, including a statement of legal principles, or reference to decided cases; (b)submissions of law and legal argument; (c)passages which seem to be attempts at describing or expounding legal theories or philosophies; (d)reference to extra judicial statement which have no relevance or material fact in the pleaded causes of action. 21In the first part of the document, Mr Rahman articulates the causes of action under the heading "Type of claim". He says that they are these: "1. Administrative law - Review decision arising under statute '(collective rights) under s69 Proceedings in lieu of writs (1) Where formerly: (a) the Court had jurisdiction to grant any relief or remedy or do any other thing by way of writ, whether of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari or of any other description, or (b) in any proceedings in the Court for any relief or remedy any writ might have issued out of the Court for the purpose of the commencement or conduct of the proceedings, or otherwise in relation to the proceedings, whether the writ might have issued pursuant to any rule or order of the Court, Supreme Court Act 1970. 2. Torts - Negligence - Other, a decision arising pursuant to s5 Definitions - "harm" means harm of any kind, including the following: (c) economic loss, as caused by the Defendant[s] Causations - as submitted documents of evidences:- - s5A Application of Part -(1) This Part applies to any claim for damages for harm resulting from negligence, regardless of whether the claim is brought in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise, and -s5F Meaning of "obvious risk" (1) For the purposes of this Division, an "obvious risk" to a person suffers harm is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person. (2) Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge., Civil Liability Act 2002 NSW. Under such provisions of claims as mentioned above the Judicature of NSW Supreme Court's - Hon. Judge[s] will must uphold the administrations of Justice 'Rule of law and natural justice for the remedial of the claim as sought as follows: A. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant any relief or remedy or do any other thing by way of writ, whether of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari or of any other description; B. A claim for the determination of any question or matter which may be determined by the Supreme Court; C. A claim for a declaration or right; D. A claim for the recovery of damages or other money; E. Any other claim (whether legal, equitable or otherwise) justiciable in the Supreme Court and F. Shall grant that relief or remedy or do that thing by way of judgment or order under this Act. Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; & Case Ref. San Sebastian Pty Ltd v The Ministering The EPA Act 1979 (1986) 162 CLR 340 at p.354 per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson Dawson JJ [Economic loss impose a duty of Care]" 22The relief claimed by Mr Rahman in the Statement of Claim is described in the following way: "1. An orders for immediate 'Enrolment in the Course C04236 Juris Doctor', in the Academic Year 2012, Spring Semester-2 for the completion of the 'left over' 'among' The Core Course C04236 of 2008 'for such award towards the 'Degree' 'Juris Doctor courts'-C04236 without any restrictions for such completions of the degree and without any further embargo as retribution. 2. An order that 'John Hartigan, Registrar [replacement person for the office, UTS] and Shirley Alexander, DVC, person(s) has in the performance of the functions of an Office-UTS 'made decision' in relation to which applicant's subsequent claims for relief sought in the NSW Supreme Court under statutory right s69(1)(a)(c) writs - and s66 (1)&(4) Injunctions Supreme Court Act 1970 and under civil Procedure Act 2005 and UCPR 2005 are the only two Defendants in these proceedings of: Case No. 2009/298024. 3. An order that Rosalind V Dubs 1&1A, the person no longer holds the office [As dismissed on or before 30 June 2009] is not performing the functions of the Office-as Registrar, UTS 'will be removed' as the Defendant, made a decision on 9 June 2009 in relation to which the applicant's subsequent proceedings of claims for relief in the NSW Supreme court under 'substantive statute law' under Acts-has been in effect 'as if the decision had been made by the 'replacement person'-John Hartigan, Registrar, for the office, UTS. 4. An order that 'in Criminal Law: 70218 Examination result, the applicant will be declared as 'Awarded Minimum Pass', having score of Marks:55-60% on the weight that as he has successfully completed the course, and in the other two parts of evaluation process achieved score in: (A.) Assignment -, Award Credit [When as indicated in the whole class report thirty percent (30%) of the student enrolled in that Subject has failed] and (B). Presentation" Awarded Pass [But that result was also asked for review]] with such moderations and standardizations of equal ranking as of with other students 'awarded Pass' if necessary and will be notified as amendment in the Gazette Notifications of UTS as recorded and published thereby. 5. An order that in the Contract Law 70211, Examination result, the applicant will be declared as Awarded Minimum Pass, having score of Marks: 55-62% on the weight that as he has successfully completed the course, and in other two parts of evaluation process achieved score in (A).Midterm examination; Awarded: Credit 20%, (B) Seminar Presentation of Assignment, Awarded-Pass [But that result was also asked for review] with moderations and standardizations of equal ranking if necessary as of with other students and will be notified as amendment in the Gazette Notifications of UTS as record and published thereby. 6. .An order in the Administrative Law, 70617 [Awarded Pass] Examination result, the applicant will be declared as Awarded Minimum Credit having score of Marks: 65-70% on the weight that as he has successfully completed the course, and in order two parts of evaluation process achieved score (A).Midterm examination; Awarded: Credit (B) Seminar Presentation: Awarded 'higher Distinction 5/5 Assignment, Awarded - Pass [But that result was also asked for review] with moderations and standardizations of equal ranking if necessary as of with other students and will be notified as amendment in the Gazette Notifications of UTS as record and published thereby. 7. An order to grant for the remedy of fixed amount of awards towards for the costs as your Honour please of such proceedings being considered such a 'per see', student enrolled for a trust to achieve for such respected professional Degree Juris Doctor in between 2010-2011. 8. An order to grant fixed award for the remedy for the recovery of damages or other money; and incidental costs as restrained and infringed and caused damage and harmful effect of the applicant's learning achievement for the Juris Doctor, Post-Graduate awards in the stipulated time frame. 9. Any other order (whether legal, equitable or otherwise) justiciable by your Honour..." The substance of the plaintiff's claims 23So far as I can identify the material facts contained within the plaintiff's statement of claim, they suggest these propositions: (1)Mr Rahman was enrolled in 2008 as a full-time, full fee paying student in the Juris Doctor course being conducted by UTS. (2)One of the teaching methods used in three of the subjects which he was obliged to study, Contract Law, Criminal Law and Administrative Law, was to have students provide a presentation in the course of a tutorial class to their fellow students. A mark was allocated to that presentation, as well as a class participation mark, which together amount to a maximum of 20 per cent of the total mark available for each course. (3)Particularly since some of Mr Rahman's fellow students were not post-graduate students, as he imagined they would be, but were undertaking an undergraduate degree (involving the same subject and assessment criteria), he regarded the teaching practices described in (2) above as "unfair: ... in relations of morality, ethics, justice, fairness and equity ...". (4)Mr Rahman, having received results in two subjects, which he regarded as unacceptable, lodged a protest (or challenge) to his marks based upon his perception of the inadequacy of the teaching method which he alleged was unfair. (5)His protest (or challenge) was apparently refused (or dismissed). Mr Rahman then sought a review from the "Faculty Student Assessment Review Committee". The review was dismissed in circumstances which Mr Rahman alleges were, at least legally wrong, and perhaps invalid and illegitimate. (6)When he enrolled in 2009, to continue with his degree and undertook study in two subjects: Administrative Law and Human Rights, Mr Rahman noticed that the same teaching method was being used. He complained to his tutor and also one of his teachers, an Associate Professor. (7)He then recounts, against each of these apparently contextual matters, that he received a letter dated 19 March 2009 in which a number of allegations of "non-academic misconduct" were made. He records that he received a further letter dated 25 March 2009, which contained an "...allegation of non-academic misconduct ... for the use of UTS On-line ...". (8)Mr Rahman apparently challenged these letters and the allegations in them: "...under the statutory provisions of 'Nomos and Logos' (Law and Reason) under Constitutional provisions and other enactments of NSW and Federal law for the establishment of prudence-justice and nullity of such claims ...". (9)Mr Rahman then notes the receipt of a number of letters informing him of the outcome of the allegations and the decision of UTS. (10)He pleads that his challenge to the lawfulness of these decisions was made, but either dismissed or else disregarded by UTS which imposed then, and has since apparently maintained, an "order" excluding him from enrolment for a period of 12 months. 24It seems from the further pleading of factual material added to the Statement of Claim, that Mr Rahman's exclusion from UTS remains in force. It appears from the pleading that any current exclusion is a result of a decision (or perhaps more than one decision) made in 2010 and 2011. The basis for this appears indirectly from an extract of a letter from the newly nominated second defendant, Mr Hartigan, which apparently read in part: "Your exclusion remains in force unless successfully set aside by a court order". 25The balance of the document seems to include legal argument, assertion, reference to authority and allegedly applicable principles of law. It includes quotations from cases. It includes assertions of what the proper interpretation of the Court's orders of 20 July 2012 are, and, as well, complaints about the decision of McCallum J on 18 December 2009, notwithstanding that an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. 26It includes a reference to an American decision in the following circumstances: "The applicant construe that in making decision by McCallum J, on 18 December 2009, have exceeds the law including substantive limits to the dispositions of authorities with the competency to creating binding norms of conduct as there is no 'stare decisis' 'bound by decision of prior panels unless en banc decision [but not], Supreme Court decision [USA, House of Lords, UK], or subsequent legislations undermines those decisions [Case Ref: United States v Washington, 872, F.2d, 874, 880(9th Cir.1989), ..." 27A paragraph makes reference to the provisions of s 18K of what seems to be the Civil Procedure Act 2005. Section 18K has not been commenced. 28In a further paragraph, the document contained this: "Finally, and not the least the applicant firmly believe your hon. Will establish 'rule of law', from the position of hon. Judge-Adjudicator from the principles of normative adjudication consists in the utilisation of law as a mechanism to resolve disputes and thereby relief sought to your hon. for most judicious comfort." 29As a reading of the document as a whole, demonstrates, there is no compliance with the requirements of the UCPR with respect to pleadings. 30The document does not identify with clarity the causes of action upon which Mr Rahman sues and with clarity the relief which he seeks. Nor does the document identify the material facts, but not the evidence, upon which he relies to make out the causes of action which he identifies. 31It is not in a satisfactory state and is not a document, which can adequately enable the defendant to understand the claims being made against it. 32I have concluded that the document is embarrassing and has a tendency to cause prejudice and delay in the proceedings. It is manifestly an abuse of the Court's process. It must be struck out. Summary dismissal 33However, the mere fact that a pleading is to be struck out, pursuant to r 14.28 of the UCPR, does not always mean that the proceedings should also be summarily dismissed under r 13.4 of the UCPR. 34In order to make such an order, the Court needs to be satisfied that: (a)the proceedings are vexatious or frivolous; or (b)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or (c)the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court. 35Generally, summary dismissal of proceedings is inappropriate unless the court is satisfied that a plaintiff's claim or claims can be described as "so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed". Authorities by which I am bound make this abundantly clear. I shall briefly discuss the principal ones. 36Over 100 years ago, in the High Court of Australia, O'Connor J in Burton v Shire of Bairnsdale [1908] HCA 57; (1908) 7 CLR 76 at 92 said: "Prima facie every litigant has a right to have matters of law as well of fact decided according to the ordinary rules of procedure which give him full time and opportunity for the presentation of his case to the ordinary tribunals, and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to protect its process from abuse by depriving a litigant of these rights and summarily disposing an action as frivolous and vexatious will never be exercised unless the plaintiff's claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed." 37Over 60 years ago, in the High Court of Australia, Dixon J said in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at [13]: "The application is really made in the inherent jurisdiction of the court to stop the abuse of its process when it is employed for groundless claims. The principles upon which that jurisdiction is exercisable are well settled. A case must be very clear indeed to justify the summary intervention of the court to prevent a plaintiff submitting his case for determination in the appointed manner by the Court with or without a jury. The fact that a transaction is intricate may not disentitle the court to examine a cause of action alleged to grow out of it for the purpose of seeing whether the proceeding amounts to an abuse of process or is vexatious. But once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and that the rights of the parties depend upon it, then it is not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process." 38Over 40 years ago, in the High Court of Australia, Barwick CJ said in General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at [8]: "... the jurisdiction summarily to terminate an action is to be sparingly employed and is not to be used except in a clear case where the Court is satisfied that it has the requisite material and the necessary assistance from the parties to reach a definite and certain conclusion. ... ... the plaintiff ought not to be denied access to the customary tribunal which deals with actions of the kind he brings, unless his lack of a cause of action ... is clearly demonstrated. The test to be applied has been variously expressed; 'so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed'; 'manifestly groundless'; 'so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument' ...". 39Over 25 years ago, the High Court of Australia said in Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited [1983] HCA 25; (1983) 154 CLR 87 at [27]: "The power to order summary or final judgment is one that should be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried." 40About 10 years ago, in the High Court of Australia, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; (2000) 201 CLR 552 at [57]: "Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way." 41Most recently, in the High Court of Australia, French CJ and Gummow J in Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 18 said at [24]: "The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution. That is so whether such disposition is sought on the basis that the pleadings fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action or on the basis that the action is frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process. The same applies where such a disposition is sought in a summary judgment application supported by evidence. ..." 42In light of these authorities, a careful examination of the claim is necessary. 43In support of the Statement of Claim's standing, and of his being entitled to continue with the litigation, Mr Rahman filed 17 pages of additional submissions accompanied by a bundle of documents. He also made oral submissions. It will be necessary to return to one of those documents in due course. 44However, It is appropriate to tease out from the document entitled "Additional Submissions", the submissions which Mr Rahman appears to be making. It has to be said that the document entitled "Additional Submissions" in large part copies, word for word, what appears in the Statement of Claim. 45Curiously, one change in the parties to the proceedings between the statement of claim, which I have described above, and these documents entitled "Additional Submissions" is that the three named individual defendants are not referred to, but the title of the document names as the first defendant, University of Technology Sydney. 46Leaving aside those parts of the Statement of Claim which have simply been copied across to the Additional Submissions, it appears that paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Statement of Claim have been replaced by paragraphs 44 through to 47 of the "Additional Submissions". Of importance in these paragraphs is assertions, proved by the documents which accompanied these submissions, that there have been, in 2011, two decisions which are the relevant decisions for the purposes of Mr Rahman's inability to attend at UTS. 47It is best if the essence of these two decisions of UTS is described here. 48In a letter dated 20 July 2011, from the Associate Dean (Teaching and Learning) of the Faculty of Law, Mr Rahman is informed: "I refer to your application for readmission to the University of Technology Sydney commencing in Spring 2011. Your application for readmission has been considered by the Faculty of Law on the basis of the documentation provided by you. The Faculty considered your application for readmission in accordance with r 5.11 of the Student and Related Rules which requires that you show cause as to why you should be readmitted. The Faculty concluded that the documentation submitted provided no reasonable basis for it to allow readmission." 49The letter goes on to inform Mr Rahman of the address for any request for a review. 50Clearly, there was then a request for a review. The terms of that request is not before me, but the response from the Vice Chancellor of UTS is. On 9 August 2011, the Vice Chancellor of UTS, Professor Ross Milbourne, wrote to Mr Rahman in these terms: "The Associate Dean (Teaching and Learning), Faculty of Law, wrote to you on 20 July 2011 advising that the Faculty had declined your application for readmission. On 30 July 2011, you emailed the Senior Deputy Vice Chancellor requesting a review of the Faculty's decision. In accordance with r 5.11.6 of the University Rules, and in the absence of the Senior Deputy Vice Chancellor, I have reviewed the Faculty of Law's decision and the arguments you provided in your email of 30 July 2011 requesting a review of that decision. I confirm that the decision stands. Your application for readmission therefore remains as declined." 51In the "Additional Submissions" to the Court, Mr Rahman refers to these documents and quotes from a part of the letter of the Vice Chancellor of UTS. He then makes this assertion: "And, thus in doing such acts by the Officials, UTS the applicant construes are of violations of: UNHR - Human Rights Article 26 Right to education - ICCPR - article 14, 1966 [entry into force 1976], International Covenant on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights [Australia is a Signatory and ratified State] Article 13(1) Right of everyone to education (c) Higher education ... of free education) and Anti-Discrimination Act NSW ..." 52The next paragraph seems to encapsulate the case that Mr Rahman really wishes to make. It is in these terms: "Throughout the proceedings the applicant submits with evidences of documents in court will testify that the defendant - University of Technology, Sydney - UTS has not submitted any defence for the legitimacy of such acts of 'infringement of educational right' since 2009 to 2012. And thus validates the applicant's relief claims for such acts by the University of Technology - UTS [Officials] in the submitted documents of such legitimate claims and for justice for the cause of UTS decisions that are not legitimate under substantive law of NSW but are of: discretion not obedient to the 'rule of law' since on 19 June 2009." 53In short, it seems that Mr Rahman wishes to contend that the conduct of UTS, by its various officers, contravened a right, personal to him, of education, created by one or other or all of: (a)Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights which provides: "Everyone has the right to education ... Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to al on the basis of merit"; (b)Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which does not refer to education but rather equality before the Courts and standards which relate to the conduct of criminal proceedings; and (c)Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which reads: "(i) The States parties to the present Covenant recognize (sic) the right of everyone to education ... [and that] ... (c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means ..." 54The balance of the submissions seems to make assertions covering allegations involving: (a)counsel for all of the defendants having committed some unspecified crimes; (b)allegations that decisions of McCallum J and Registrar Bradford were an abuse of judicial discretion; (c)allegations that justice has been perverted, obstructed, prevented and disobeyed by both counsel for the defendants and by Judges or other judicial officers of the Court; and (d)there have been breaches, unspecified in nature, or by whom, of Article 70 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth). 55The causes of action based upon breaches of various international covenants and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are not justiciable in this Court. There is no domestic legislation, either of the Commonwealth Government, or the NSW Government, which make these international laws part of the domestic law of NSW. A breach of the international covenants, and laws, is not of itself justiciable, unless and until a domestic law adopts these international covenants and makes them a law of the State: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273. 56But even if they were laws of the State, they are not able to be used in the way in which Mr Rahman seeks to use them. They are statements of ambition, broad rights within a community and perhaps, aspirational goals. They do not create a private cause of action lying in the individual against a State, or any other body, which can be sued upon. 57There is no basis at all for any cause of action asserting that counsel for the defendants has committed an unspecified crime nor that there have been breaches of the International Criminal Court Act or Article 70 of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (assuming that it applies directly in Australia). It is unnecessary to determine this question. 58There is no basis for an allegation that the decisions of McCallum J and Registrar Bradford were an abuse of judicial discretion, nor is there any basis for allegations that justice has be "perverted, obstructed, prevented and disobeyed". 59All of these allegations, to my mind, are vexatious and an abuse of the process of court. There is no reason why the allegations should be allowed to stand, or to be made. 60The proceedings as presently constituted insofar as they seek to challenge earlier decisions of UTS are moot. That is because, as the evidence demonstrates, and as the additional submissions of Mr Rahman appear to accept, the decisions which are preventing Mr Rahman attending as a student of UTS are not those sued upon, but rather much later decisions. 61If Mr Rahman has any claim for administrative law relief, and it is far from certain that he does, then it is those decisions which, logically, must be the subject of the proceedings. But they are not. 62In all of the circumstances, it is clear, beyond argument, that the causes of action relied upon are doomed to fail and it is appropriate for the Court, having regard to the terms in which they are alleged, and the absence of any support them, to exercise its discretion and summarily dismiss the proceedings, because no reasonable cause of action is disclosed and, as a result, the proceedings are an abuse of process of the Court. Orders 63I make the following orders: (1)Proceedings dismissed. (2)Plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 25 September 2012