Children's Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Department of Family and Community Services re Kylie [2012] NSWChC 20 Hearing dates: 13/05/11 & 07/07/11 Decision date: 08 May 2012 Jurisdiction: Care and protection Before: Magistrate Ellis Decision: Leave to rescind refused Catchwords: Does self-placement to a parent of a Young Person constitute "Significant Change" sufficient to grant leave under s 90 Legislation Cited: Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 Cases Cited: In the matter of Campbell [2011] NSWSC 761 Darren Jones v Tenille [2006] CLN 7 Shercliff and another v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Limited (1978) 1 NSWLR 729 Saunders and Morgan & Anor v Department of Community Services [2008] CLN 10 Category: Principal judgment Parties: The Mother (KS) The Young Person (Kylie) Department of Family and Community Services Representation: Ms Shuwayhat for the Director-General Mr Mara for the Mother Mr Whelan for the Young Person File Number(s): 2010/168 Publication restriction: Pseudonyms have been used in order to anonymise the child and parties Judgment 115-year-old Kylie is the eldest of KS's four children. All were the subject of final orders in the Children's Court on 7 July 2011. Her mother conceded that there was no realistic possibility of restoration of the youngest three children to her. She sought restoration of Kylie to her care. 2On 13 May 2011 (the 2011 Court proceedings) I decided there was no realistic possibility of restoration of Kylie to KS. Kylie was placed with her brother, in the care of her maternal aunt. This placement quickly broke down. The official explanation was that the aunt believed she could not meet Kylie's needs as well as the brother's. As Kylie had always held the view she wanted to be returned to her mother's care, I query whether it was that factor that led to the breakdown. This suspicion is highlighted by the affidavit of Jennifer McDonald filed 29 March 2012. 3Referring to an earlier carer for Kylie, Exhibit 5 at Para 4 states: "I asked Adam McMahon a caseworker in the Carer Support Team whether there would be a realistic possibility of Kylie returning to her placement with Ms M with whom Kylie was placed prior to the permanency planning arrangement with the aunt. Adam advised the two younger children had been placed with the maternal aunt since Kylie left however the maternal aunt would be willing to provide the placement on the conditions of:" Relevant ones being: "(b), Ms M has requested to have her mobile phone removed." This was necessary as it has been reported that the placement was somewhat sabotaged by Kylie's communication with her family until all hours of the morning. (c) There was also reported issues of Kylie using her involvement with Hillsong as an opportunity to go and get drunk with friends and spend extra time with her mother." 4In addition, the maternal aunt said that Kylie was "dictating orders" in regards to her placement with her. 5No interventions were put in place immediately upon final orders of 7 July to support the maternal aunt. 6In disregard to the Court finding of No Realistic Possibility of Restoration, the Department allowed Kylie to self-place to her mother's care in October 2011. The first the Court was aware of this was in a s 82 report filed in February 2012. That report did not come before me. The Magistrate who released the report was unaware of the significance of that issue. Even if I had seen the report, the major factor of Kylie selfplacing into her mother's care may well have been missed. Instead of it being clearly flagged as a major factor the information is buried in page 5 of the seven-page report. 7The Solicitor for the mother, Mr Mara, has advised the Court that he was not aware of the report. Kylie's Solicitor was acting on direct instructions. He was not instructed to relist the case before the Court. It was not until 5 March 2012, eight months after Final Orders and ten months after the Court found no realistic possibility of restoration, that the Department informed the Court of this relocation. 8The application is one pursuant to s 90 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act. Section 90 of The Act specifies that if there has been a "significant change in relevant circumstances since the care order was made" leave to rescind those orders may be granted (s 90 subs (2)). The Director-General says the significant change has been, inter alia, Kylie's self-placement to her mother. 9The mother and Kylie support the Director-General's Application. 10In determining whether there has been a "significant change" I must revisit the reasons for determining that there was, in May 2011, no realistic possibility of restoration. Subs (2A) include several factors I "must" take into account. I incorporate with this ex tempore judgment my reasons as set out in the transcript of 13 May 2011 pp 1 to 10 inclusive. 11In summary there were three essential areas I delineated: 1. The mother's relationship with her children's fathers as it relates to domestic violence, identified as a major feature; 2. Whether the mother had dealt with her drug and alcohol issue; 3. The relationship between Kylie and her mother. 12Given that these are leave proceedings I would add a further three categories for the purposes of this application: 4. Does the failure of the Addendum Care Plan and Permanency Planning for Kylie provide evidence sufficient to grant leave? 5. The issues set out in s 90 including subs (1), (2), (2A) and (6) of The Act. 6. Does s 136 of itself play a part in determining that leave is appropriate? 13The sole relevant order of 7 July 2011 for Kylie was Parental Responsibility to the Minister until she attained the age of eighteen years. 14Submissions of all parties touch upon the need to re-visit the 2011 Orders, not least because a Permanency Plan approved by the Court for the 2011 Orders is now in disarray. The Director-General must therefore satisfy the Court there has been a "significant change of relevant circumstances". The onus of proof is the balance of probabilities. If the Director-General satisfies the Court of this then leave would flow. If not, the application should be dismissed. Domestic Violence and whether it has been dealt with by the Mother 15I will deal, firstly, with the issues of domestic violence in the mother's relationships with her partners. 16According to the mother, she has not repartnered and has not re-commenced a domestic relationship with MK, the father of the youngest two children, the twins. 17In the reasons for no realistic possibility of restoration for Kylie, the transcript of 13 May 2011 at p 23 is as follows: "The mother has five children by four fathers. Domestic violence is featured in all but one of the major relationships. The mother has only touched upon the possibility of domestic violence counselling for herself. This is despite it being a highlighted requirement under the Scarborough report in August 2010. " 18If the mother's past relationships are indicative, she is one serially attracted to violent men. The mother is therefore in dire need of intensive re-training as to what makes a satisfactory relationship, violence not being an essential ingredient. She needs intense re-training as to appropriate dispute resolution. Verbally violent altercations are not appropriate. 19There was a Children's Court Clinic assessment conducted by Martin O'Grady, which was an exhibit in those first proceedings. He suggested that it was necessary for complete domestic violence reduction and parenting effectiveness programs as well as twelve sessions of counselling with a psychologist before there should be any restoration of any of the children. There was also a report from the Daly Women's and Children's Centre exhibited in those proceedings. That is a centre that provides family support specialising in domestic violence. The evidence was that as at 3 May 2011 the mother had attended three sessions. 20Again from the transcript of 13 May 2011, I noted the mother exposed Kylie to sustained domestic violence. Even on her version, the domestic violence was of a destructive verbal nature yet the mother cannot see the need for any domestic violence counselling let alone the intensive therapeutic interventions advocated by the Children's Court clinician. 21As to the mother's relationship with the father of the youngest children, it is unclear as to whether the question of the relationship has in fact ended and, if so, when. At the time of the earlier proceedings, that was important as Kylie put a caveat on her return to the mother's care that MK should not be living with the mother. 22For this Application, there is Exhibit 2, the affidavit of Jennifer McDonald filed 5 March 2012. Ms McDonald's Affidavit states, "MK continues to harass her in the form of MK being in the local area": page 9 of that exhibit. This was despite the mother changing her mobile phone number. She was looking for alternative accommodation out of the area. 23The mother also suggested she would apply for an apprehended violence order against him. Excuses have been proffered much in the same vein as that put forward prior to the first court orders in July 2011. Evidence for the 2011 Court proceedings included that the mother would not give evidence against MK sufficient for a court to order an apprehended violence order in her favour. There is no evidence of the mother seeking this protection now in any meaningful way. 24The mother says in Exhibit 6 that, "I'm currently engaged with a domestic violence course at the Daly Group which is an eight week course. I am also due to commence domestic violence individual counselling which will commence 1 May 2012 also at the Daly". 25Exhibit 7 says on 30 April she commenced the eight-week course mentioned in the previous exhibit. Given that the mother has completed three sessions in May 2011, the mother is actually behind where she was positioned twelve months ago. In addition, as quoted in the transcript, "The mother has completed nothing that was a prerequisite as outlined by the Children's Court clinician. She remains in that category of "I will do something maybe in the future." 26To this area of my determination of whether there has been a "significant change", I find there is no change in the position from twelve months ago, for the 2011 Court proceedings. Has the mother Dealt With her Drug Issues? 27The next heading is as to whether the mother has dealt with the issues of drug use. To quote the Court's finding of 13 May 2011, the transcript p 5 states: The mother said in her affidavit ... exhibit 9, "I admit that I was smoking up to four cones a day of marihuana at the time of the interview with the Department. I had found it was a way to relax as I was under a lot of pressure with having the twins to look after as well as my other two older children. As a single mother it was difficult and having marihuana only at night would assist in relaxing me". And at p 4, " I can only draw the conclusion that if Kylie morphs into a tantrumming teenager that the mother would see nothing wrong with reaching for the bong to calm herself enough to deal with Kylie". 28The Children's Court Clinic provided an Assessment for the 2011 Court proceedings. It underlined the need for the mother to have provided evidence of six months' abstinence from drugs. 29In Exhibit 6 in the current proceedings the mother says she is engaged with the Langton Clinic each Tuesday. There is, however, no supporting documentation filed. In support of the Leave Application, Exhibit 2, the affidavit of Ms McDonald states: "On 12 December 2011 I made a home visit to the mother with a caseworker from the Benevolent Society. I advised the mother that her last urinalysis results were positive for cannabis. The mother informed she had not smoked cannabis for approximately eight to nine weeks, that is from approximately late September to mid October." 30Continuing with Exhibit 2: "On 11 January 2012 I made a telephone call to the mother to ask her to attend for urinalysis. I asked the mother if she had been smoking cannabis and the mother informed she had ceased smoking on Christmas Day, as she wanted to focus on Kylie. Urinalysis was conducted after Kylie was returned to her mother's care". 31Annexure E of Exhibit 2 shows the results from 6 December to 8 February 2012. There are various ratios from 52 up to a high of 369 on 5 January 2012. That in itself shows that the mother must have been on a real bender from or about the time of first saying she hadn't had any since eight to nine weeks from the beginning of December. It did go down by 8 February. 32Ms McDonald sought the opinion of Kelly Sutton, a Clinical Consultant of the Department of Family and Community Services. Her reply includes the following: "The increases in the ratio amount suggested that the mother has continued to smoke across the testing period. Her cannabis use (continued between) 6 December ... and 12 December (up to) 5 January. This does not support the mother's statement on 12 December that she had not used cannabis for a period of approximately seven weeks or her statement on 11 January that she had last smoked cannabis on Christmas day. Despite this, in exhibit 6, the mother affirmed on 18 April 2012 "I have not consumed marihuana since Christmas/New Year". Paragraph 36. 33As to this head of determination in the 2011 Court proceedings that there was no realistic possibility of restoration, I find no change sufficient to grant leave. The relationship between Kylie and the mother 34In the judgment for the 2011 Court proceedings, a Community Service assessment on 17 May 2010 noted "a genuine attachment and affection" between mother and daughter. It was also noted that Kylie "wants to return to the mother's care". (Transcript 13 May 2011 page 7 and 8.) 35This has not changed since the 2011 Court proceedings. A close relationship was noted between Kylie and her Year 9 adviser, AE. Kylie is now in Year 10. The transcript of 13 May 2011, page 6 states, "AE, being Kylie's year adviser said Kylie has come to school in the incorrect uniform and has had some difficulties in class, talking to other students during class time. AE also noted that Kylie does not show emotion, does not cry or seek support or help if she is struggling and can sometimes be moody. She also noted a barrier between Kylie and her mother". 36I put on the record my concern that Kylie's noted non-response is, in my understanding of this topic, that her demands to be given attention have not been met over a considerable period of time. She therefore doesn't make any demands. 37Attending the same school is put up as a positive constant for Kylie. The mother says that Kylie is not late as the mother drives her to school dropping her between 8.30 and 8.45am. The Department says due to the mother's car being off the road for some reason, the mother takes Kylie to the bus stop. School reports show Kylie is often late. A positive spin is put on this on the basis that it is in preference to the mother failing to take Kylie. This leads to the probability of one of two scenarios. 38Firstly, that Kylie dallies unbeknown to the mother after she drops her at school. Or, secondly as the mother is only taking her to the bus stop, the mother is therefore unaware of what Kylie actually does thereafter. 39In an internal case transfer form 25 November 2011 Annexed to Exhibit 3, is noted the following: "Kylie attends J J Cahill Memorial High School, Mascot where she is very much connected socially to the school community. Kylie's attendance at school for the majority of the year has been consistent, however, since her self-placement with her mother, Kylie's school reports that she is often late to school and her attendance is now less regular". 40Kylie has recently been described as attending school looking unkempt and wearing clothes that appear unclean. Kylie is also reported to complete very little work at school and has not completed major assessment tasks in most subject areas. There has been some speculation that Kylie may need to repeat Year 9, however, the school believes that she will most probably be allowed to progress to Year 10. The assessment summary includes Kylie's attendance at school not being good enough and "Her unwillingness to complete set tasks at school". 41The mother's affidavit, Exhibit 7, says, "Kylie is doing well in her studies". This optimistic view doesn't gel with the more conservative ones expressed above. It also raises the issue of what level of interest, awareness and insight the mother actually has to her daughter's education. 42Referring again to the assessment summary annexed to Exhibit 3, under the Assessment Summary Risk of Harm, I note the mother's drug use, domestic violence, lack of supervision of Kylie, the lack of boundaries in place for Kylie, the mother's parenting capacity, Kylie's alcohol use, Kylie's attendance and her unwillingness to complete set tasks at school. The key issues are noted as including attendances and lack of work completed at school and her alcohol use. 43On this point, there has been a continued negative engagement by the mother. The deterioration in Kylie's behaviour has escalated since being with the mother. It has its foundations in the mother's poor parenting. 44There has therefore not been any significant change on this ground from the original final orders. Does the failure of the addendum to the care plan and permanency planning for Kylie provides evidence sufficient to grant Leave? 45 The Director-General submits that at the time of Final Orders, Permanency Planning was satisfied by an Addendum to the Care Plan. This was required as Kylie was in short term out-of-home care. It was proposed that Kylie live with her maternal aunt. For reasons referred to above, this has not worked out. In the Director-General's submissions "the breakdown of the placement with the maternal aunt is significant as the final orders do not meet permanency planning principles at present". Page 6 of Exhibit 4. 46Permanency as stated in s 78A of the Act intertwines several essential principles embodied elsewhere in the Act. (1) "Permanency Planning" means the making of a plan that aims to provide a child or young person with a stable placement that offers long term security and that; (a) has regard, in particular, to the principles set out in s 9(2)(e) and (b) meets the needs of the child and (c) avoids the instability and uncertainty arising through a succession of different placements or temporary care arrangements. (2) Permanency Planning recognises that long term security will be assisted by a permanent placement. Section 9 (2) (e) says that: "If a child is placed in out-of-home care, arrangements should be made in a timely manner to ensure the provision of a safe, nurturing, stable and secure environment recognising the young person's circumstances". 47For the 2011 proceedings, the Director-General formed the view there was no realistic possibility of restoration of Kylie to her mother's care, pursuant to s 83(3) of the Act. This assessment was accepted in the Judgment of 13 May 2011. Section 83 (7) states: "The Children's Court must not make a final care order unless it expressly finds that permanency planning has been adequately addressed". 48This occurred with the Addendum being filed. Final orders were therefore made on 7 July 2011. 49All sections referred to above are in the future tense. None are in the past tense. By raising this point, the Director-General is in effect saying the quoted provisions must be met for all times until a child reaches eighteen. In my opinion, this is not the intention of the drafters of the Act. It would otherwise make the practical administration of parental control of the child extremely difficult for the Director-General or the Minister. 50In addition, I note the orders of 7 July 2011 where parental responsibility to the minister simpliciter. 51The permanency planning that was presented prior to the 2011 Final Orders being made having now failed, does not derogate from those Order's legal efficacy and ability to continue. 52I therefore do not find this as a significant ground. Relevant Sub-sections of section 90 of the Act. 53The Director-General brings this Application for Rescission of the 2011 Orders. He says that as Kylie has self-placed with the mother. S 90 subs (2A) subsections (a) to (d) come to play. 54As stated by the Supreme Court In the matter of Campbell (2011) NSW SC 761 this also brings into play s 90 subs (1) and subs (2). 55Kylie has been with the mother for seven months. The Benevolent Society is engaged in providing support. Exhibit 2 paragraph 45 onwards, touches upon evasiveness by the mother to engage. Paragraphs 72 to 76 further attests to this evasiveness. I have no doubt the Benevolent Society has dedicated workers who would encourage the mother to appropriately engage to finally learn how to parent Kylie. 56It is the mother I have reservations about. She is at worst lying and at best not being forthcoming about her drug use and her ongoing contact with a partner who engaged in domestic violence with her. She has not completed any courses for issues of drug use, domestic violence or parenting. She lacks supervisory control over Kylie. Whatever services are put in place can only be as successful as the recipient engages. The recipient being the mother has failed to engage consistently over two years of proceedings in the evidence before me. In essence, there is only one aspect of the mother's parenting and this is her failure to engage. 57Much has been made of Kylie's self-placement being a significant change in relevant circumstances. Ms Shuwayhat picked up on my use of the words in earlier mentions for this case of it being an "illegal act". Ms Shuwayhat prefers the term "improper placement". Ms Shuwayhat quotes and I adopt the finding of Senior Children's Magistrate as he then was, Mitchell in Darren Jones vs Tenille [2006] CLN 7. 58His Honour found at Para 10: "The fact is that he cannot rely on that self placement as a change of circumstances" (He referring to the young person) "and neither can his parents because that self placement is in breach of an order of the District Court and is an attack on the parental responsibility vested in the minister. I will not say it is an illegal act but it is an improper act and I do not believe that s 90 when speaking of significant change in relevant circumstances has in mind that sort of act." 59This case does not turn on whether the Department's acquiescence to Kylie's self-placement is "illegal" or "improper". I merely note the Macquarie Concise Dictionary defines illegal as unauthorised. 60The Director-General refers to Darren's case in two ways. On the one hand, the current case is distinguished, as in Darren's case it was the parents of the thirteen year old who lodged the s 90. In this case, it is the Director-General. Secondly, that the decision is not binding. That may be true but nevertheless I adopt and approve Senior Children's Magistrate Mitchell's above quote. 61Kylie illegally or improperly placed herself with her mother. The Director-General has allowed an improper act that contravenes court orders. This cannot constitute a ground of significant change of circumstances. 62Section 90 subs (2) (e) refer to an arguable case. Again, referring to the matter of In the matter of Campbell. At Para 39 of that case, "A Children's Court considering a grant of leave under s 90 subs (1) must consider whether the applicant has an arguable case. The arguable case in question is an arguable case for the making of an order to vary or rescind a care order, an order in which when it is applied for must be made or refused taking into account s 90 subs (6) considerations." 63Thus when considering granting leave pursuant to s 90(1), the Children's Court needs to look at relevant s 90(6) considerations when analysing the arguable case issue. 64In the Matter of Campbell: 52 "Arguable case was also considered in the matter of and OM, ZM, BM PM. There, Senior Children's Magistrate Mitchell held the expression to mean the same as reasonable prospects or probability but something less than a prima facie case. In Shercliff and another v Engadine Acceptance Corp Pty Limited (1978) 1 NSWLR 729 was not a case seeking to interpret a similar statutory formula and I prefer in that case the application of the statement identified (above)". 53 "The arguable case in s 90 (2)(a)-(e) relates to the case for an order of rescission or variation, an order which the court must decide upon taking into account the matters in s 90(6). The particular present relevance are consideration mainly the risk to the child or the young person of psychological harm if the present care arrangements are varied or rescinded". 65This causes me concern because I have identified that Kylie remains in grave danger for as long as she is placed with her mother, as acquiesced to by the Director-General and/or the Minister. I cannot make an order that allows a young person to be placed in danger. 66Ms Shuwayhat's submission is that there is an "arguable case" as the mother is suitable to care for Kylie as Kylie has self-placed with the mother. The Director-General relies on the significant change in Kylie's circumstances that requires or deserves further consideration in a substantive hearing. 67The Director-General submits that on the balance of probabilities there has been significant change in any relevant circumstance due to the following, (a) Self-placement of Kylie. (b) The family being accepted into the short term care orders pilot. (c) The NGO, the benevolent society in conjunction with the STCO pilot proving intensive family support with an active case plan in place. (d) On 6 October 2011 a safety assessment was conducted by caseworkers with the outcome being that Kylie was assessed as safe with a plan. (e) The final orders of 7 July are no longer workable and not in line with permanency planning principles as they are not being met. 68I have dealt with (a), the self-placement, (c) the involvement with the Benevolent Society and (e), that Final Orders made are unworkable. 69Sub paragraph (b) being the acceptance into the short-term care orders is a circular argument. While Kylie's matter may have been accepted on to that Pilot, leave must be granted prior to the matter being able to proceed with any efficacy. 70As to sub-paragraph (d), being a safety assessment, I note on 6 October 2011, that evidence is tendered that the mother denied knowing where Kylie was. I had doubts as to the believability of the mother. It in any event appears to have been a time when the Minister, being Kylie's parent, did not know where she was. How it could therefore be deemed that she was safe with a plan is beyond my comprehension. 71The Director-General says those matters are indicia of "significant change in relevant circumstances". Children's Magistrate Crawford in Re JK and C [2002] 2CLN1 considered that term. Magistrate Crawford was of the view that the change was of significance if it was established, it would cause the Court to wish to alter the existing order. That is in line with the Court of Appeal's formula in S v Department of Community Services. This invokes the idea of whether there is a realistic possibility of restoration to the mother. 72In the decision of Re Saunders and Morgan and Another v Department of Community Services unreported New South Wales District Court decision on 12 December 2008 Johnston DCJ noted: "The Children's Court does not confuse realistic possibility of restoration with the mere hope that a parent's situation may improve. The body of decisions established by the court over the years requires that usually a realistic possibility be evidenced at the time of the hearing by a coherent program already commenced." And continuing, "The court needs to be able to see that a parent has already commenced a process of improving his or her parenting but there has already been significant success and that continuing success can confidently be predicted. For these required can be likened to a prima facie case where absent some unforseen and unexpected circumstance a safe and appropriate restoration will be possible in the near future." 73In relation to realistic possibility of restoration I refer to my redetermination of the issues that led to the court finding no realistic possibility of restoration in the 2011 Court proceedings. 74The current evidence may therefore be summarised as follows: (1) The mother has ongoing drug issues, including ongoing use, (2) The mother has failed to address domestic violence issues, (3) The mother exhibits an inability to supervise Kylie even though Kylie is the only child currently in the mother's care, (4) Kylie is exhibiting an escalation of dangerous behaviours including alcohol use, (5) The mother has exhibited an inability to honestly provide information to case workers in engaging processes as to a degree, has Kylie, (6) There is an underlying lack of insight by the mother. 75These have singularly and collectively pointed to there being no "significant change" as required by Statute and Case law. Section 136 Restriction on who may provide statutory out-of-home care. 76On behalf of the mother, it was argued that as Kylie is living with her mother, s 136 of the Act is breached. 77That Section cannot be read in isolation, but needs to be considered in light of sections 135 and 137. Those sections state, 135 Definition of "out-of-home-care" (1) For the purposes of this Act, "out-of-home care" means residential care and control of a child or young person that is provided: (a) by a person other than a parent of the child or young person, and (b) at a place other than the usual home of the child or young person, 136 Restriction on who may provide statutory out-of-home care. 1. Statutory out-of-home care may be provided in respect of a child or young person only by an authorised carer. 2. A person other than an authorised carer who provides out of home care in respect of the child is guilty of an offence. 3. This section does not prevent a child or young person who, (a) has been placed in a statutory out-of-home care, and (b) is the subject of permanency plan involving restoration from living with his or her parents in accordance with the arrangements under a care plan approved by the Children's Court at any time during the period of six months before the date on which the child is to be restored to her parent, in accordance with the permanency plan. 137 Authorised Carers 1A) If, in relation to a child or young person who is the subject of a care order, the Children's Court has accepted that there is no realistic possibility of the child or young person being restored to his or her parents, a parent of the child or young person cannot: (a) be given care responsibility for the child or young person, or (b) be authorised by a designated agency as an authorised carer in respect of the child or young person, unless the decision of the Court is that there is no possibility of restoration is rescinded under s 90. 78It is trite but necessary to confirm that Kylie living with her mother is not "out-of-home care" as defined. As the mother is not an authorised carer, for Kylie to be with her makes the mother guilty of an offence under s 136(2). 79My interpretation of s 136 is as follows. It controls the person with whom a Child or Young Person can live. When a Young Person is to be restored to a parent as outlined in permanency planning, the Court is to approve the plan. The section then ensures the Director-General restores the Young Person in a timely manner. If restoration is advocated, the Young Person may live with the parents any time from the Court approval, up to 6 months before the actual date of restoration. 80The evidence of the Director-General is that there has been no decision of the Minister (who now has parental responsibility of Kylie), to restore Kylie to the mother's care. I have been constantly reminded that Kylie has self-placed. The Minister has not rectified that. It was not a new permanency plan presented by the Director-General approved by a Court. It was not a redetermination by the Minister that the mother was now an "authorised carer" and therefore someone to whose care Kylie should be restored; it was Kylie's decision alone. 81The Director-General argues that, because Kylie has self-placed to her mother, the Director-General should bring an application for Rescission. 82With respect, this is the opposite of what is envisaged by s 137. That requires any determination that there is No Realistic Possibility of Restoration of Kylie to her mother, to be dealt with by a Rescission Application and determination. Then, the mother may be considered as an "authorised carer". 83There has been no determination sufficient to invoke s 136 and therefore I am of the opinion that does not apply to the current proceedings. 84In summary there has been, in my opinion, no significant change of relevant circumstances sufficient to warrant the granting of the Application to Rescind the Court Orders of 7 July 2011. 85The order of Parental Responsibility of Kylie to the Minister therefore continues. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 January 2013