District Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Ryan [2013] NSWDC 281 Decision date: 14 February 2013 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Judge S Norrish QC Decision: Count 1 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years. Count 2 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 8 months. Count 3 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4 years and 3 months with a non parole period of 3 years and 3 months. Count 4 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 9 months. Count 6 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years and 9 months with a non parole period of 7 years and 6 months. Count 7 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years and 6 months. Count 8 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 8 months. Count 9 Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 8 months. Catchwords: CRIMINAL - Sentencing, standard non parole period, special circumstances. Legislation Cited: Crimes act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Cases Cited: Makarian v The Queen (2005) 226 CLR 357 Hayes v The Queen (1984) 1 NSWLR 740 R v Ponfield & Ors (1999) 48 NSWLR 327 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 The Queen v King [2003] NSWCCA 352 Veen (No2) v The Queen (1988) 164 CLR 465 The Queen v R King [2009] NSWCCA 117 Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 R v Moffit (1990) 20 NSWLR 114 R v PGM (2008) 187 A Crim R 152 Category: Sentence Parties: Regina Trevor Ross Ryan - Offender Representation: Director of Public Prosecutions Mr King - Offender Director of Public Prosecutions Aboriginal Legal Service File Number(s): 2011/237890 SENTENCE 1HIS HONOUR: Trevor Ross Ryan appears today for sentence in relation to eight offences, in respect of which he entered pleas of guilty to having committed between 15 July 2011 and 17 July 2011, at various places in New South Wales, but particularly at Tumbarumba, Wagga Wagga and Lucknow, near Orange. 2The offences were committed when Mr Ryan was an escapee from a Corrective Services establishment near Tumbarumba. 3The offences to which he pleaded guilty in summary were, in order of their occurrence: Firstly, an offence of breaking, entering and stealing at Tumbarumba, where he broke and entered the dwelling house of Anne Cameron and stole certain property particularised in the charge, which included a set of car keys. That offence, contrary to s 112(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900, carries a maximum penalty of fourteen years imprisonment. 4Related to that offence is count 2, when the prisoner took and drove the car of Ms Cameron by the use of the car keys that he had stolen from inside her dwelling house, taking the car without her consent. This offence contrary to s 154A Crimes Act carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. 5Three offences were committed on 16 July in the early hours of the morning in Wagga Wagga as the prisoner was endeavouring to make his way from Tumbarumba, as I would understand it, to Dubbo possibly, to elude capture. 6These offences are in count 3 an offence of aggravated breaking and entering of a dwelling house and therein committing the indictable offence of stealing in circumstances of aggravation that he knew people were inside the dwelling. This offence, contrary to s 112(2) Crimes Act 1900, carries a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment and has a standard non-parole period of five years imprisonment. 7Count 4 on the indictment, to which he pleaded guilty, is an allegation that at the time of his presence inside the dwelling house he took a five year old girl, TB, without her consent, with the intention of obtaining an advantage, namely "psychological gratification". I am informed that this offence, contrary to s 86(1) Crimes Act, carries a maximum penalty of fourteen years imprisonment. 8He shortly after, whilst the young person was in his detention, committed the offence particularised in count 6 of sexual intercourse with TB, a child then under the age of ten years, namely five years of age. This offence contrary to s 66A(1) Crimes Act, carries a maximum penalty of twenty-five years imprisonment, with a standard non-parole period of fifteen years. 9Shortly after that he committed the offence particularised in count 7, contrary to s 148 Crimes Act carrying a maximum penalty of seven years, of stealing property belonging to a woman named Amy Paul in a dwelling house that she shared with another person at Crampton Street Wagga Wagga. Amongst the property he stole was a set of keys which he used to commit the offence in count 8 of taking and driving a motor vehicle that belonged to Amy Paul, without her consent, another offence contrary to s 154A Crimes Act 1900. 10Count 9 on the indictment is an offence of taking and driving a conveyance without the consent of the owner, again contrary to s 154A, as with counts 2 and 8, on 17 July 2011 at Lucknow, the car being taken after it would appear he had dumped the car of Amy Paul. 11Again this offence, as with all the other offences, with the exception it must be pointed out of counts 4 and 6, was committed in furtherance of his intention to elude or avoid apprehension. 12The statement of facts is an agreed statement of facts. It is quite lengthy but a body of it includes a great deal of detail that does not have to be repeated in these remarks on sentence, particularly in relation to aspects of the investigation of the matter concerning the detention and sexual and assault of TB. 13The prisoner, who was born on 18 June 1991, as I said earlier, was an escapee. He had been sentenced in the Campbelltown District Court on 6 May 2010 to a term of imprisonment of three years three months, with a non-parole period of two years, by a Judge of this court, for offences including an offence of aggravated breaking, entering and stealing, knowing people were in the premises. 14The prisoner was lawfully at the Mannus Correctional facility at Tumbarumba from October 2010. On 14 July 2011 he was found to be missing when a muster was conducted. 'Mannus', of course, is close by to Tumbarumba. 15The victim, Ms Cameron, in relation to count 1, had travelled from Tumbarumba to Wagga with her partner, Mr Goldspink, and secured the premises. Mr Goldspink returned to the premises at 5.15pm on the evening of 15 July. He noticed the vehicle, the subject of count 2, a Kia Rio sedan missing from the carport. He also found the property that is particularised in the indictment in Count 1 of ninety-six dollars that was in a plastic money jar was missing, along with of course the set of keys for the vehicle. It goes without saying that subsequent investigations, when the vehicle was recovered in Wagga Wagga, found the fingerprints of the prisoner on the rear vision mirror and on another item within the vehicle. The prisoner obviously drove to Wagga Wagga and was here at least in the early hours of the morning of 15 July 2011. 16The victim, TB, as I have pointed out, was five years of age. She lived in the premises with her parents and her older brother and sister. There was another person who was, as I understand it, an aunt of the victim of the sexual assault living in the premises and she shared a bedroom with TB. 17The facts set out the movements of the family up until the time that the victim was placed in her bed by her father, as I would understand it some time after 12.30am. The victim was placed in a low, or low level, bunk and her aunt slept in the top bunk. 18Some time later, it is estimated between 4am and 5am, the prisoner had broken into the premises to commit the offence in count 3. It is quite clear that in the middle of the night it would be expected that persons would be inside a dwelling house and inside the premises. Once in there, the prisoner stole a mobile phone charger, a Nokia mobile phone, USB cable, some gold rings belonging to CB and the mother JS, and then it would appear the prisoner entered the bedroom of the victim. 19The victim awoke to find the prisoner sitting beside the bed, that is where she first saw him, and he asked her "Would you like to come outside with me?" He helped her out of the bed and took her by the hand and left the house via the backdoor. Once outside the house he walked the victim down the side of the house and then onto what I understand to be a footpath on the street. He told her to be quiet by putting his fingers over his lips and saying "Shhh". 20He then pointed at a house and said to the victim "That's my house right there". The prisoner walked along the footpath to other premises then picked the victim up and carried her over his shoulder. 21In her interview on 1 November 2011 the victim said that the prisoner had licked her "private parts". He did this when he took her to an area between some houses, which are not described, and told her to lay down. He said to her that he would "kill her" if she did not listen to him. There was a tap nearby the grass area where she was laying. The prisoner pulled down her pants, that is her underpants and tights, spread her legs apart and began licking her vagina. This is described in the facts as occurring for a "very short time". 22The facts reveal that two citizens SJ, a nurse, and JG, a schoolteacher, were in their home in Cullen Road. At about 4.45am SJ heard a male voice and could hear a girl's voice. The voices were nearby. She went out to the toilet, looked around and could not see anything but could hear then a female "whimpering" and "becoming distressed". 23She became concerned. She and her partner went out to see what was going on. She heard a male voice during the course of these inquiries saying "Be quiet, lay down, be quiet", and instructed her partner to call the police. She says that she could hear "crying and wincing". 24Ultimately she saw what was obviously the prisoner standing holding a small child. The child's head appeared to be above the male, as if she was raised above him. He was walking towards Edward Street and ultimately was seen to have the child on his back. The prisoner was called to by JG calling out "Oi", and the facts state the prisoner immediately dropped the victim and began running away in the direction of Edward Street. The child was gathered up by JG and the facts reveal the circumstances in which she was ultimately reunited with her family. 25The prisoner was chased by JG for a period of time down to Dobney Avenue and ultimately JG lost sight of him, although he endeavoured to keep in visual sight of him. 26The police attended. The facts state that the victim appeared frightened and in shock when seen by the police, and ultimately the police made inquiries to locate her parents. I have been provided with a number of details of her reunion with her parents and the fact that her father found the property missing that is particularised in count 3. 27Both fingerprint evidence and what is described as "DNA evidence" linked the offender to his presence in the property. 28Some time during the morning of 16 July the offender entered the premises of Amy Paul. Inside those premises he took car keys and a wallet containing money and cards, I would take that to be credit cards, and then used the keys to take the vehicle that belonged to Ms Paul. That vehicle was located at Lucknow near Orange some time during the evening of 16 July. 29The prisoner whilst in Lucknow took the motor vehicle of Ms Haydon and that is the offence constituted by count 9. That vehicle was taken by the offender and travelled in by him to Sydney. It was seen by a witness in Shalvey in Western Sydney and ultimately recovered by the police. 30The prisoner was arrested on 22 July 2011 in an apartment in Pitt Street Redfern and taken to Redfern Police Station to be interviewed. 31That interview it is of some importance in the context of some of the history that the prisoner has given to medical professionals concerning matters relevant to the charges and the like. In the course of the interview the prisoner sought to distance himself from the events to which he has pleaded guilty, particularly the events in Wagga. He claimed that he had been in a car crash in 2009 that affected his memory. There is in fact, on examination of the evidence available to this Court from hospital notes and psychiatric and other examinations, no evidence of a lack of memory of the prisoner so far as relevant events are concerned by reason of a head injury. 32He told police that he had not been in Wagga since 2006, 2007, when he was in a Juvenile Detention Centre, although he admitted that he had escaped from lawful custody. That fact was self-evident. He said that when he escaped from Mannus he stole a car from Mannus, or near Tumbarumba, and used it to get to Dubbo, taking a route to Dubbo which took him through Albury, Leeton, Griffith and Condobolin. This was untrue. 33When asked about his fingerprints being located within the home of the victims in respect of counts 3, 4 and 6 he said that he was not talking, he had nothing to say. When it was put to him that he had committed the abduction of the child he said "Look I wouldn't have a clue if I did it or not, I didn't do it". 34He later in that interview denied again breaking into Cullen Road, the Cullen Road premises where count 3 was committed, as well as count 4. He made a claim of being affected by drugs at the time he escaped from Mannus, saying that he had smoked some cannabis and taken some pills "like eckies", which I take to be a reference to MDMA, or ecstasy, whilst he was in custody. At a later interview he said he had consumed some "ice" in Wagga. 35In this matter I have the Victim Impact Statement of the mother of the victim of the sexual assault. This statement is received pursuant to s 28 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. I have read that statement and it reflects upon the effect of the victim from the perspective of the mother since these events. There is objective evidence on the night in question that the victim was distressed and upset. The facts refer to her appearing in "shock". 36I have taken that statement into account as required to under s 28. One would not be surprised by the general import of the statement, having regard to the objective facts. 37With regard to the personal circumstances of the prisoner, and his criminal history, and his medical condition at the time of the commission of the offences and before and since, the Court has been provided with a body of material which provides some context for the circumstances in which the prisoner came to be in custody at Mannus, and perhaps some context for the commission of the offences with which the Court is concerned. 38I have been provided in the material that has been tendered with medical histories from Dubbo Base Hospital, and I have been provided with records of the Juvenile Justice Health Division and some "Kessler 10" Mental Health Self-assessments that have been taken from Justice Health records. 39As I would understand it, this material and a substantial body of material from Department of Community Service records have been considered by Dr Olav Nielssen, from whom I have received reports, firstly, of 11 October 2012, which was prepared before Dr Nielssen had the opportunity to read the DOCS' material, and a further report reflecting upon particularly the DOCS' material, prepared in early February of this year. 40I also have a medical report from Dr David Greenberg, who is consultant psychiatrist to the Department of Corrective Services Justice Health from time to time, whose report, as I understand it, was prepared for the matters that were dealt with by his Honour Judge Conlon SC, at the Campbelltown District Court. 41With regard to the Dubbo Health records, they are not comprehensive. They provide history of some head injury, causing a laceration, without fracture, or neurological deficit, after a head blow with a railway stone. There is also record in the Dubbo Hospital notes of an attempted self hanging by the prisoner. 42The Justice Health records are not exhaustive either. What is comprehensive, in this regard, however, are the Department of Community Service's records, which apparently amount up to six volumes, and detail the contact of the prisoner and members of his family with the Department of Community Services, between at least October 2001 and 2008. 43The records provide a comprehensive and contemporaneous account of the prisoner being the subject of, without any doubt, a great deal of physical and emotional abuse at the hands of family members over a period of time, and reflect upon a considerable degree of dysfunction, neglect and deprivation for the prisoner in a range of ways since he was at least ten years of age. 44The very first note in the material provided to me reflects notification of an incident relating to concerns about the welfare of the children of the prisoner's family in the context of being struck by an iron bar, wielded by their mother. 45I do not propose to go through that material in detail. As I say these contemporaneous records, which are very powerful evidence, present a very sorry picture of neglect and dysfunction in the life of the prisoner from the time he was a very small child. 46The material was subjected to scrutiny by Dr Nielssen as material that he may be able to comment upon in the context of the character of the allegations brought against the prisoner, particularly in respect of the sexual assault and the detention of the child, as well as other matters. 47In that regard, I note, amongst a myriad of family incidents that the Department of Community Service's report, the prisoner at one stage, admittedly when he was in his mid-teens, was the subject of protection by an apprehended domestic violence order, in which he was the person in need of protection and the person from whom he was in need of protection was his mother. 48I believe the material is summed up very fairly in Dr Nielssen's report of 6 February. He states: "The additional material indicates that Mr Ryan had an extremely unstable and insecure childhood, even by the standards reported by people from the more dysfunctional Aboriginal communities in recent decades. The DOCS' records show that he is brought up in an environment in which he was subjected to physical and emotional abuse as well as severe deprivation and neglect of his basic physical and psychological needs." 49He does express theories and possible occurrences reflecting the possibility if his mother abused alcohol when he was a child that this may have had an effect on the prisoner's neurological development. 50He goes on to say in relation to matters about which he can express opinions with some confidence: "The experience of physical abuse by his mother is likely to have contributed to impairment in his capacity to experience basic security in relationships as an adult, that is a pre-requisite for a stable lifestyle of long-term partnership and employment and has probably left him with an increased propensity to resort to violence to solve interpersonal problems. The lack of socialisation and basic education and vocational training is also likely to have left Mr Ryan with a limited capacity to adapt to independent life in the community as an adult." 51He says further: "The main effect of the conditions of Mr Ryan's upbringing would appear to be the increased propensity to abuse substances and to alleviate distressing emotional states, both by following the example of his parents and also as a well recognised way of ameliorating the chronic dysphoria that is often described in people who have suffered severe neglect and abuse in childhood." 52He notes there is no reference to sexual abuse in childhood, and in fact the prisoner does not claim such sexual abuse, for example, in the report prepared by Dr Greenberg, at any earlier time, when the 'courts' were concerned with less serious charges than those particularly set out in counts 4 and 6. The opinions expressed by the doctor, as was conceded by Mr King, are not of such a nature as to enable the Court to reach any firm findings in that regard. 53He concludes in supplementation of the opinions that he had expressed in October that: "Mr Ryan would appear to require a long-term programme of socialisation, including basic education, vocational training, counselling, et cetera, to improve his interpersonal skills and capacity for self-control and counselling, specifically directed at his propensity to abuse drugs. His prospects of long-term stability would be assisted by graded release into a supported environment in which all those needs are addressed." 54I have quoted that part of that report in full because as Judges are often told in discussions with representatives of the Department of Corrective Services and representatives of the Parole Authority, in seminars and the like, unbeknownst to the people that sit in court, even the legal representatives, a great deal of weight is placed upon consideration of the evidence that was available to the sentencing judge in regard to parole release and even for classification. 55The prisoner, as follows from what I have already pointed out, is an Aboriginal man born in Dubbo and one of a number of siblings. The history of his upbringing is largely to be found in the reports of Dr Nielssen and/or the report of Dr Greenberg. 56As I understand the matter, although there is no direct evidence on this, Mr Ryan believes that he is the third oldest of six children, although his eldest brother died at birth. He was, as I said earlier, generally raised by his parents, although there were many DOCS interventions for his welfare. His father apparently died in 2008. The accounts from the prisoner obtained by the two doctors that have prepared reports reflect upon the unwillingness of the prisoner to discuss matters relating to his history. He had education at primary school, and at high school, but was not a great achiever and he was ultimately expelled from school for fighting. He says that he did complete year 10 and is literate, but he, as his history reveals, had a connection with the court system from the age of fourteen years of age. I am not aware of any cautions that were administered to him of course before he first was brought to court. 57He has experience working as a mechanic, or a trainee mechanic at a motorcycle shop as part of the Ted Noffs' Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Programme. He had also worked at "Hungry Jack's", as I would understand it, in Dubbo and had some short employment in Canberra doing mechanical work, but this was unpaid work. 58He has not a great history of employment, reflective of his educational achievement, and of course there are very limited economic opportunities for a person in his situation. 59So far as it reflects upon his criminal history, in the context of this life of neglect and abuse, at least physical abuse, he began drinking alcohol at the age of thirteen and had alcoholic blackouts obviously from binge drinking. He also began smoking cannabis at thirteen and began using amphetamines, according to the history he gave Dr Greenberg, when he was about fifteen years of age, and has used prohibited drugs up until the time of his last incarceration in 2010. 60As I said he has undertaken some rehabilitation programmes. But as I would understand the history that has not assisted him in relation to his alcohol and substance abuse. 61The report of Dr Greenberg in its conclusions in 2010 states that the prisoner was not mentally ill, nor does he have a developmental disability. Dr Greenberg notes some history of being diagnosed with ADHD as a twelve year old and notes the lengthy history of drug and alcohol abuse and the deterioration of his behaviour. Clinically he says his primary diagnosis is that of a man with a significant antisocial personality disorder associated with alcohol and polysubstance dependence. At that time he had evidence of mild depression, which may have been due to an underlying dysthymic disorder, or drug induced mood disorder. He was of the view that the prisoner's needs had to include addressing his alcohol and drug dependence by counselling and review of his condition by an appropriate medical professional. 62Dr Nielssen in his assessment of the prisoner noted on mental state examination, some time before 11 October 2012, that the prisoner did not appear to be depressed. There was some clinical suggestion of impaired judgment, but there was no disorganisation of thinking suggesting the presence of underlying mental illness or brain damage affecting communication. 63His diagnosis was primarily that of a substance dependence and abuse disorder with a possible underlying psychotic illness. The first diagnosis was based upon the history he gave of drug and alcohol abuse. He said complications of substance abuse can include episodes of amnesia and the triggering of psychotic symptoms and possible impairment of cognitive function. He reflected upon some history of hallucinations relating to voices and some past treatment of antipsychotic medication. 64He noted, as it is relevant to the judgment of this matter in some respects, that the prisoner denied having any sexual attraction to children and could not offer an explanation for his reported behaviour. He said that the increased sexual interest and loss of inhibition from the combination of methylamphetamine and benzodyasapim medication were quite probably "factors" contributing to the offences. 65The difficulty with that analysis in the latter part is, of course, whilst the prisoner has raised this matter in interviews with the police and in the conference with Dr Nielssen, there is no direct evidence from the prisoner about this which could be challenged, or tested. The prisoner has not given evidence. There was not, in the investigation of the matter, as I understand it, any evidence found within the motor vehicles that he drove of recent ingestion of methylamphetamine, or other illicit or prescribed drugs. 66Certainly, I note the suggestion of the prisoner in this regard, but it is quite clear that the offences, with the exception of counts 4 and 6, as I earlier said, were offences committed by the prisoner in the course of him endeavouring to elude recapture, and of course the most serious offences with which I am concerned occurred in the course of one of the those offences, albeit in circumstances that speak of an absence of premeditation. 67Of course, as I will analyse in a moment, the fact that he committed the offence on a small child is a matter of deep concern and it could be categorised as "predatory behaviour". But to be fair, there is no evidence, as there is from time to time in sentencing offenders for offences of this type, of the prisoner having a paedophilic or other personality disorder, or condition, which might first of all explain his conduct in a rational way, or suggest that the prisoner is a danger to the community in a general and permanent sense. 68Dr Nielssen said that the prisoner would seem to have a guarded prognosis based upon the impulsive nature of his offences, and the pattern of his substance abuse despite previous drug rehabilitation programmes. He said the impression for him of the prisoner from a single interview was that the prisoner had a limited capacity for participation in counselling aimed at improving his self-awareness and that his best chance for a successful rehabilitation would be a carefully structured preimposed release plan that included stable accommodation, some form of occupation or training, and close supervision and support. 69He was quite "still young" according to Dr Nielssen and that is self-evidently true, being twenty at the time of the commission of the offences, and in the doctor's opinion should "mature over time". 70This brings me back to the details of his criminal history understood in the context of what I have just outlined. According to his criminal history he first appeared in the Children's Court in December 2005, and has a series of findings of guilt over the next three or so years for which he received various orders, including probation and community service, suspended control orders and the like. Those offences were generally offences of dishonesty, breaking and entering dwellings, larceny, having goods in custody. The are some offences of violence, but predominantly his offences were offences of dishonesty. 71He does not have a significant record as an adult, albeit of course by the time he was sentenced in 2010 in the District Court he would have been eighteen years of age. However, he was convicted in the Local Court of breaking, entering and stealing in June 2010 and sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment, commencing on 9 January 2010. This conviction followed upon his appearance at the Campbelltown District Court, when he was sentenced for the aggravated breaking, entering and stealing matter that I referred to and had two offences taken into account of taking a vehicle without consent and driving whilst unlicensed. 72For the aggravated breaking, entering and stealing matter, as I have earlier said, he was sentenced to three years three months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years, on 6 May 2010. The non-parole period would have expired or be required to expire, bearing in mind the sentence commenced on 9 February 2010, on 8 February 2012. 73I should point out, as was self-evident from what I said earlier, that amongst, the orders made in relation to him in the Children's Court, there were included 'control orders' and he had been in various Juvenile Justice institutions. I also note that he has other findings of guilt in the Local Court, apart from the ones that I have identified. The record obviously has no mention of sexual assaults, or offences relating to children. 74In the submissions made by learned counsel for the accused, it was not submitted in the context of all the material available that the prisoner had any mental health issue that could be assessed as contributing to his offending, or being regarded as a matter that might be a mitigating consideration, for example, in the way in which mental health may influence or affect sentencing, as set out in summary cases such as Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 or R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228. 75In relation to the issue of his Aboriginality, I have gone to some length to outline the social context in which he grew up and made some observation of its relevance to the circumstances that at least brought him into custody at the time of his escape. 76Clearly, on the basis of the facts available to this court, there is no direct relationship to the offending with which I am concerned to his Aboriginality beyond the relationship of that to the circumstances of him coming to custody in 2010 and the social circumstances that led to a propensity to commit acts of dishonesty. 77It was submitted in this court that his deprived background could be taken into account as being a matter that was relevant to the assessment of his development and relevant to explaining aspects of his escape from custody. 78Of course, as the facts made clear, when he escaped from custody he acted purposefully, as any person, Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal, may have done if they had sought to elude capture. But I accept that his Aboriginality is still a relevant matter to be taken into account. 79The Crown itself acknowledges this, indirectly at least, based upon the material available to it at the time of preparing the written submissions, by reference to the decision of Wood J in The Queen v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58. 80Of course Wood J in that judgment was sentencing a man in relation to inter-communal violence in the Brewarrina area and many of the matters that were developed by his Honour as "Fernando principles" which have been the subject of much comment by subsequent judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal, have no direct relationship to this. 81However, out of that judgment one might fairly identify the fact that some of the propositions that his Honour put forward have salience in these proceedings: "Firstly and fundamentally, the same sentencing principles are to be applied in every case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender, or his membership of an ethnic or other group, but that does not mean that the sentencing court should ignore those facts which exist only by reason of the offender's membership of such a group. Further, in sentencing an Aboriginal person, the court must avoid any hint of racism, paternalism or collective guilt. It must nevertheless assess realistically the objective seriousness of the crime within its local setting, and by reference to the particular subjective circumstances of the offender. In sentencing an Aboriginal person who has come from a deprived background, or is otherwise disadvantaged by his social or economic factors, a lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly, or even unduly harsh when served in an environment which is foreign to him and in circumstances where it may be dominated by persons from different cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, in every sentencing exercise, whilst it is important to ensure that the punishment fits the crime and not to lose sight of the objective seriousness of the offence in the midst of what might otherwise be attractive subjective circumstances, full weight must be given to the competing public interest to rehabilitation of the prisoner and the avoidance of recidivism on his part". 82I have somewhat paraphrased his Honour's words, but I do note that his Honour, nine years later in Blackman and Walters [2001] NSWCCA 121, in a context of dealing with one of the early suspended sentences the subject of a Crown appeal, reflected upon the observations of King CJ in Yardley v Betts and by the South Australian Full Court again in Osenkowski, concerning the interests of sentencing being not just of punishment and retribution, noting the need for courts in sentencing to reflect upon the fact that ultimately when people are returned to the community the sentencing process should contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders. Because that was not just in the interests of the offender, but it was in the interests of the community. Clearly that is so of an offender with this prisoner's background, including his criminal background, because there can be no doubt, allowing for the course of conduct with which I am concerned, that the prisoner is to be regarded as a person who could be characterised as becoming a recidivist. 83In passing from this part of the sentencing exercise I also note the words of Hidden J in the sentencing of Mr Welch, in the Supreme Court, where his Honour said: "Only the most myopic in this community would deny that much of the contact with Aboriginal people with the criminal law can be traced to their dispossession and the breakdown of their culture. The high incidence of Aboriginal people and the often deleterious and sometimes tragic effects it has upon them are of justifiable concern to the community to recognise that background in an appropriate case for the purpose of sentencing is neither discriminatory, nor paternalistic". 84As I understand it, with the agreement of all parties in Parliament yesterday, a Bill was passed by the House of Representatives, short of constitutional recognition of Aboriginal people, noting and recognising in legislative form the place of Aboriginal people as the first occupants of this country. I noted the Prime Minister in her speech, supported by members of the Opposition, said that whilst there should be no guilt for the past, and past mistakes, there was much work to do in the future to make good the damage that has been done to Aboriginal communities. It could be fairly said that this prisoner's background reflects much of a very sad picture of damage that has been done to Aboriginal communities over a number of decades, through forces beyond the control of the Aboriginal people living in those communities, particularly in western New South Wales. 85In sentencing the prisoner of course, at this point I come back to submissions that were made particularly by the Crown, but also accepted in the submissions of the accused's counsel, relating to the essence of the sentencing exercise with which I am concerned. 86First of all I am to have regard to s 3A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The Crown Prosecutor in this matter, as he has done in a number of matters in which I have presided in this Court, has at length, and very helpfully, outlined much of the discussion about the 'purposes of sentencing' which in part emanate from the judgment of the majority in Veen (No 2) v The Queen in 1988. 87He correctly points out, as the Court of Criminal Appeal has said, in the context of the consideration of s 3A being a codification and elaboration of the purposes of sentencing set out in Veen (No 2), that deterrence, retribution and protection of the community are not to take precedence to the exclusion of rehabilitation. But neither is rehabilitation to take precedence over deterrence, retribution and punishment. All must be balanced in the overall synthesising of the sentence. 88It was pointed out in the decision of MA, and as the Court of Criminal Appeal said in The Queen v Way, quoting from the Crown's submissions: "The ultimate objective remains one of imposing a sentence that is just and appropriate having regard to all the circumstances of the offence. It is imperative that the offender's objective circumstances do not cause inadequate weight to be given to the objective circumstances of the case." 89Of course, each of the individual charges create their own individual consideration and it could not be fairly said that all of the purposes of sentencing, so far as they are relevant, are equally applicable to all of the offences to the same extent. But it must be fairly acknowledged, and I believe it has been in the submissions made, that in this matter the requirements of punishment, or adequate punishment, deterrence of the prisoner and others from committing similar offences, and protection of the community are important purposes of sentencing. The prisoner is required to be made accountable for his actions. He is to be denounced for his course of conduct, reflected in each of the matters with which I am concerned, and there must be due recognition of the harm done to the various victims and the community by his course of conduct over the three days, or two days, covered by the matters in the indictment. But also there is a need to reflect upon, as I said earlier, the long-term promotion of the rehabilitation of the prisoner. There is no need to dilate upon those matters any further. 90There is one matter concerning the protection of the community that needs to be considered, however, when weighing up the various purposes of sentencing. I could not conclude beyond reasonable doubt that so far as sexual predatory behaviour is concerned that the prisoner is proven to be a danger to the community. 91Of course, the facts speak for themselves in terms of their seriousness. The fact that the prisoner has acted in the particular way shown in counts 4 and 6 reflects of course the possibility that he may act that way in the future. But as I pointed out in the context of the medical evidence made available to the Court, and these matters are capable of assessment from a medical perspective, particularly in the hands of a very experienced psychiatrist like Drs Nielssen and Greenberg, there is at this point no evidence of an existing sexual predilection, or psychiatric, or psychological condition that would compel the prisoner to commit offences of this type. 92I note the Crown's submissions in relation to matters that are to be taken into account in assessing the objective seriousness of the offending in each matter, by reference to both the maximum penalties that apply and where applicable as it is in two of the counts of the indictment, the standard non-parole period. 93I also accept the very detailed written submissions of the Crown about the seriousness of offences of sexual assault, particularly upon children. These matters are self-evident by the legislature's fixing of a maximum penalty of twenty-five years in relation to the s 66A offence, and the standard non-parole period of fifteen years. The courts have been consistent in that regard. 94In relation to 'breaking and entering matters' I am also aware of what Lee J said in Hayes v The Queen, (1984) 1 NSWLR 740 but particularly I take into account Groves J observations in R v Ponfield and ors, (1999) 48 NSWLR 327, one of the early guideline judgments, in respect of break and enter matters. 95It is worthy of note that the various matters that are quoted by the Crown as being features of breaking, entering matters that might be circumstances of aggravation were in part picked up in somewhat different language by the subsequently enacted s 21A, which obviously still applies. 96However, for the purposes of this sentencing exercise, the matter that I wish to dwell on just for a moment is the consequences of Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, as it relates to the offences which have standard non-parole periods. Amongst other reasons there are general statements by Muldrock v The Queen that might be said to be generally applicable in sentencing, and they pick up of course some of the matters that the Crown has identified in its written submissions. 97By reference to Pt 4, Div 1A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, I first of all note that the Court concluded, particularly at [25], that it was an error to characterise the relevant provision in the Part as "framed in mandatory terms". It pointed out that a Court is not required when sentencing for a 'Div 1A' offence to commence by asking whether there are reasons for not imposing the standard non-parole period, nor to proceed to an assessment of whether the offence is within the mid-range of objective seriousness. 98From that judgment the following matters may be seen as determined. Firstly, that it is essential to recognise that fixing the non-parole period in a case involving a standard non-parole period is only one part of the larger task of passing sentencing. Fixing the appropriate non-parole period is not to be treated as if it were the necessary starting point, or the only important end point in framing a sentence. Further, the Part requires, in conjunction with s 21A, an approach to sentencing that is consistent with the approach to sentencing described by McHugh J in Makarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, particularly at [51], whereby the judge endeavours to identify all the relevant factors, including those at common law, to the sentencing exercise, discusses their significance and makes a value judgment as to what is an appropriate sentence. 99The Court went on to say (at [27]) that: "The court must be mindful of two legislative guideposts, the maximum sentence and the standard non-parole period, the latter requires the content be given to its specification, meaningful content cannot be given to the concept of taking into account characteristics of the offender, what is required is a consideration of the objective seriousness of the offence without reference to matters personal to a particular offender, or class of offenders. It is to be determined solely by reference to the nature of the offending, in the context of the consideration of the non-parole period that is a standard non-parole period for an offence in the middle range of objective seriousness. The court is not required to commence with an assessment of whether the offence falls in the middle range of objective seriousness (by reference to a hypothesised offence) and then to ask whether there are matters which warrant a longer or shorter period [28] and of course, in making a record for its determination of the appropriate non-parole period, this does not require the court to 'attribute particular mathematical values to matters regarded as significant for the formation of a sentence that differs from the standard non-parole period, or the need to classify the objective seriousness of the offending'." (29). 100What the judge is required to do is fully identify the facts, matters and circumstances which the judge concludes bear upon the judgment that is reached for the appropriate sentence to be imposed. 101I note in passing an article Hulme J in the November issue of the Judicial Officers' Bulletin, surveying many of the authorities of the Court of Criminal Appeal since Muldrock, discussing the appropriate approach to sentencing for matters that have a standard non-parole period. That article is quite a chilling reminder for Judges at first instance of the fact that even amongst the learned Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal there are various disagreements and conflicts as to the appropriate approach. 102With regard to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending and other matters though noting what I have said about both Ponfield as it relates to the breaking, entering and stealing matters, and the observations of Muldrock, first of all in relation to all the offences it is the case that the prisoner committed the offences whilst an escapee, as I have pointed out, and it was conceded in the submissions of the accused that offences committed by a person who otherwise should be in lawful custody aggravates the matter for the purposes of fixing an appropriate sentence and this is to be regarded as being a greater aggravation than if each of the offences was committed while subject to "conditional liberty", citing The Queen v King [2003] NSWCCA 352. 103Intimately related to that proposition is, as I have earlier pointed out, the fact that all of the offences, save for counts 4 and 6, were offences committed by the prisoner in furtherance of his desire to continue his freedom and elude detention and/or recapture. 104The sexual assault and detain person with intent offences were not in furtherance of his attempts to elude detection, or were directly related to his status as an escapee, but they were committed in the course of, or immediately after the commission of count 3, which is one such offence. 105It goes without saying, having regard to their facts and other aspects of aggravation arising from the matter that the seriousness of the offences in count 4 and count 6 are self-evident, as a matter of commonsense, without necessarily having to dilate upon s 21A(2) of the Act. 106In relation to counts 1 and 2, the offences in Tumbarumba, noting the above, are to be seen in this light. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt having regard to the prisoner's background and the character of his criminal history, that notwithstanding having previously been dealt with in the District Court and other courts for like offences, that his criminal history "aggravates the seriousness of (those) offence(s)", pursuant to s 21A(2). 107I take this view on the basis of his relatively young age the time of the commission of the offence. 108I do accept that his criminal history clearly is relevant. It does not entitle him to any leniency in relation to any of the offences that I am concerned with and the fact that he was an escapee serving sentences of a similar type stands, even from a commonsense common law perspective, an independent aggravating feature. I do not believe, however in proper context, that the observations of the majority in Veen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 (at 477), have been reached at this point. 109I note in relation to count 1, count 3, and, so far as it may be relevant bearing in mind it is an "enter dwelling" offence; count 7, that there was no professional planning, no vandalism, there was a single entry, there was a modest amount of personal property stolen, certainly no items of sentimentality, save of course there were some gold rings taken from the residence of the victim of counts 4 and 6, the property of a victims father and no aggravations were pleaded under the legislation, save for count 3, which I will deal with separately. In relation to count 1 and in relation to count 7 of course the prisoner stole a pair of keys to give him the opportunity to commit counts 2 and 8, the taking of the motor vehicles. 110Although count 3 is in many respects intimately related to counts 4 and 6 in terms of the aggravations that are pleaded, it is the aggravation of knowing people to be inside. I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that knowledge of the fact that people are inside was a matter that motivated the prisoner to commit the offence. His motivation, I am quite satisfied, was to obtain property that might assist him in his endeavour to elude recapture. It has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that he had a particular intention of abducting a child, or committing a sexual assault. He had no knowledge of the occupants of the premises, as far as I am aware it was just sad happenchance. 111Of course, this offence has to be seen in the context of what followed from it in counts 4 and 6, and I have already pointed to the absence of any predilection for sexual assault of children. 112Whilst Count 3 was an offence occurring at night, he clearly committed the offence with the intention of stealing property that he could carry away. He had no knowledge of vulnerable occupants, the choosing of the particular house would appear to be random and opportunistic. There was no vandalism, no professional planning, one entry to the premises. 113In the context of the matters arising in relation to the standard non-parole period, that provides a guidepost, or some indication, in relation to the matter, as discussed in Muldrock. 114Count 4 was pleaded as an offence of detention for the purposes of psychological gratification. Although the prisoner sexually assaulted the complainant after she came into his detention I cannot not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he had formed an intention to sexually assault her at the time that he took her into his detention. 115It is quite clear that counts 4 and 6 were crimes committed without planning or premeditation, although he does not shed much light on the circumstances of the taking of the child. He came across her in the course of stealing property. 116Of course, what period he intended to detain her before the detention was interrupted by the courageous intervention of citizens, who are to be commended it is impossible to say. The prisoner was taking her away from the premises and thus the detention was not transient. 117Aggravating factors that relate to this charge arising under s 21A(2) include the threatened use of violence during the course of the detention, admittedly also at the time of, or close to the sexual assault; the fact that the offence was committed in the home of the victim, or at least commenced in the home of the victim; the fact that the victim was clearly vulnerable by reason of her age alone, but also, effectively, not having anyone there to protect her. 118The Crown does not submit that this offence, as well as count 6, involved the infliction of substantial injury or harm. Whilst the Court cannot find that the prisoner did not have significant criminal history, given the character of his previous offending, the fact is that the matters in count 4 and count 6 are of an uncharacteristic nature, having regard to his criminal history. 119As I said earlier, in relation ultimately to all the matters, I could not conclude that his prior criminal history was a relevant aggravating factor, although I note what was said about this matter is reflected in the Crown's submissions, particularly by reference to the decision of McNaughton. 120The issue of the age of the child, in the context of the charge pleaded, was discussed in the decision of The Queen v King [2009] NSWCCA 117. Obviously the very young age of the child, noting what the learned Judges in that Court said, is a relevant factor for consideration of the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence reflected in count 6, as it must be in relation to count 4, where age is not pleaded. 121In this matter again, there was, as in the case of the detention offence, the threatened use of violence to the child of a serious kind. 122It was submitted that the threat was a "qualified" one, or some such thing. , But the words must have been frightening to the child and were clearly designed to compel her to bend to his will. 123Of course, in light of subsequent events, even though he was interrupted in his detention, I could not conclude that he in fact had an intention to kill her. He clearly had an intention to frighten her. 124The Crown, in relation to count 6, as with count 4, does not submit there was relevant emotional harm, there is no evidence of that. The limits of the Victim Impact Statement which no doubt have been explained to the mother, are defined by the legislation and the case law. 125It is to be borne in mind of course that the sexual assault was committed whilst the child was unlawfully detained by the prisoner. Noting s 21A(2)(m), literally interpreted the fact that there were related offences committed is of itself not pursuant to s 21A(2) an aggravating factor in the sense. However, the fact the child was detained is a separate criminal act, albeit that it was for a short period of time, it is a matter that must be reflected in the consideration of the totality of the criminality. Furthermore, it sheds light on the circumstances of the sexual assault. 126Both the Crown and the defence, in their written submissions, endeavoured to rely upon various decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal and the District Court, to provide instances of comparative sentencing and principles that should be applied. 127It is quite obvious the most helpful judgment was the decision of King, to which I earlier made reference. 128I have had regard to the various authorities referred to by the Crown. I have had regard of course to the judgment of her Honour Judge English in this Court, and the sentence imposed on a person who abducted a child. That person of course had, as I understand it, no prior criminal convictions. But the character of that detention, the length of it, the manner of it, and the character of the penetration and the sexual assault of the victim were substantially different from the circumstances of this case, albeit absent the general aggravation of the prisoner in this matter being an escapee. 129With regard to the judgment of King, I appreciate that he was only to be sentenced for one count contrary to s 66A Crimes Act. But there were three offences on a Form 1, including committing a related act of indecency; stealing from the dwelling, as I understood it, in which he committed that offence; and an attempt to take a motor vehicle. However, the character of the offending, pursuant to s 66A in this matter is very similar. The consideration of Pt 4 Div 1A in a practical sense, that is in a factual sense, bears parallels with this case. Admittedly, of course, King is decided before Muldrock was decided. In King the child sexually assaulted was four; here the child was five. In King the child was assaulted in her grandmother's house. The Court said that the mere fact that it was committed in the home of a place where the child would expect to feel safe would deny the offence falling into the low range of criminality as the sentencing Judge had concluded. 130In this matter of course the victim had been taken from her house and then was sexually assaulted. This of itself reflects at the very least a greater criminality at least in the totality sense when the two offences are taken together in this matter. 131Here, as with King, the sexual assault was for a brief period of time. Here I am satisfied the prisoner knew that the conduct was wrong and in each case the victim found the conduct distressing. 132Each crime, that is the crime of sexually assaulting the victim in this matter, and in the matter of King, was committed by a stranger. 133Of course, as with King there was no evidence of psychological injury, or emotional injury, apart from, as I have acknowledged, what was in the Victim Impact Statement. However, as with King I must conclude in this matter that it can properly be assumed that there would be a real risk of some harm, of more than a transitory nature occurring in such a case. In fact the Court of Criminal Appeal said in King, which it can be equally applied here: "It is an inherent part of what makes the offence so serious" [40]. 134In King and in this matter, the sexual assault offences involve no real planning. There is no basis for concluding beyond reasonable doubt, as I said earlier, that the prisoner's intention in taking the child from the house was to sexually assault her. Like Mr King, the prisoner could not be found to be in character a "sexual predator" by way of criminal history or proven disposition. 135But as the Court of Criminal Appeal said in King: "Planning or premeditation is not a factor that has any great significance in the evaluation of child sexual assault offences". 136It was pointed out that in most instances even within the family they are "usually opportunistic". 137As with the matter of King and this offence, the offence of sexual assault was "not an instantaneous reaction to seeing the child". 138As with Mr King, this prisoner has no prior record of such offending, but here, as with Mr King, the prisoner's record is still relevant and obviously could not mitigate the otherwise appropriate sentence. 139As with King, the offences of detention with intent and sexual assault were committed during the course, or as a result of, an unlawful entry to a house in order to steal property. 140Mr King, of course, was twenty-four years of age, and could "no longer rely upon youth". This prisoner is four years younger. Mr King was a person who had been given "ample opportunity for reform". I am not sure that this has occurred in this prisoner's case. Certainly the sentence I impose will delay that process of course. 141Mr King was intoxicated, which is not a mitigating factor in any event. I could not be satisfied by whatever test one applied that the prisoner was intoxicated. 142I have referred to the prisoner's claim of the use of amphetamines. Even if he had been affected by amphetamines, or other drugs, and even if this did disinhibit, him this could not be in any way seen as a mitigating factor for any of the offences, but particularly the offences involving the child. 143I note in this matter that the character of the penetration required by the law to prove sexual intercourse is conceded by the Crown in accordance with authorities such as PGM (2008) 187 A Crim R 152, and of course the High Court judgment in Ibbs v The Queen, as being not as serious as other forms of that penetration. 144The sexual assault occurred thankfully for a short period of time. Of course, there is a wide range of conduct contemplated as sexual intercourse. Given in this matter, as opposed to King, the intercourse did not cause any physical injury to the victim, this is a distinction that may be made. 145Of course, all acts of sexual intercourse are serious and I appreciate that what the prisoner did would fill ordinary people with revulsion. But the fact that the community would be filled with revulsion is not the final determinant, nor an appropriate scientific measure, of the assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence in the context of the range of conduct contemplated by the section. 146I am mindful of the fact that the detention of the child was interrupted. As to what the prisoner would have done with the child had he not been interrupted would be a matter of speculation. Clearly he was taking her away, but I could not conclude beyond reasonable doubt that he was taking her away for a further sexual assault. Of course, the fact that he had done it once leaves that suspicion as a realistic one. Nevertheless, to conclude otherwise requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. 147I appreciate, as the Crown points out, the prisoner did not voluntarily cease the detention but it is to be fairly said that when first challenged at least verbally he did not continue with the detention, but abandoned the child in circumstances where he knew he was being followed. 148There was no actual violence or physical hurt inflicted on the victim. As with Mr King, the prisoner was not in a position of trust, but the absence of that aggravating factor is offset to a significant degree by the fact that the prisoner was a person who had broken into the home of the victim as a burglar, had no right to be in the house, and of course had no right to be at liberty, given he as an escapee (See King at [38]). 149Of course with regard to counts 7, 8 and 9, these offences have much the same characteristic as the offences disclosed in counts 1 and 2, and to some extent count 3, albeit that count 3 is pleated with the circumstance of aggravation. 150The various features of the matters arising from the observations of Grove J in Ponfield have been taken into account in respect of count 7, albeit that it is not a breaking, entering and stealing matter. 151With regard to relevant mitigating factors that arise under s 21A(3) of course the pleas of guilty are mitigating factors in each case. They were given on arraignment and I have concluded that the prisoner, in accordance with the guideline judgment of Thomson and Houlton should receive a discount of fifteen per cent upon the other wise appropriate sentences. Of course the discount would have been less had the pleas been entered closer to, or at the time, that the trial was to commence. The submission was made by the defence that the discount should be fifteen per cent and I accept that that is so. 152Ultimately in relation to the various offences I could not conclude that the loss, injury, damage and the like was "substantial". I appreciate personal property was taken from the victims in money and small items of jewellery and the like. The most valuable items that were taken in two of the offences involving the entry to premises, the premises at Crampton Street in Wagga and the premises at Tumbarumba, were the motor vehicles that were driven away. But those vehicles were recovered and I was not told there was any damage in those vehicles. Thus, no finding could be made that there was substantial injury. 153None of the offences was part of a planned or organised criminal activity, as is self-evident. Obviously, with regard to other matters identified in the mitigating factors under s 21A(3) I could not conclude that the prisoner has good prospects of rehabilitation. This is a matter for resolution and consideration by the Parole Authority at some future time. I could not conclude that the prisoner is unlikely to re-offend without proper guidance within the correctional system. 154I have had regard of course to all the oral submissions, although they are relatively brief, and the written submissions. Most of the matters that have been raised in the written submissions have been directly addressed in these remarks. I could not do justice to everything that has been written. 155With regard to the commencement of the sentence, I have already foreshadowed that the sentence should commence at the expiry of the non-parole period fixed by His Honour Judge Conlon SC. 156The Crown submitted that I should impose sentences that commence at the expiry of the total sentence imposed by Judge Conlon. With respect, in the proper exercise of discretion and in accordance with general sentencing policy of Judges since the fixing of non-parole periods, particularly in the context of the decisions that have been brought to my attention, such as Callaghan and the like, the consideration of totality of criminality and the need to avoid "double dipping" in this matter, dictate the fixing of sentences that effectively commence at the expiry of the non-parole period. 157The prisoner, I note, was at large for a period of something in the order of ten days, or slightly less. I am not sentencing for the escape matter. I do not understand why that matter is not before the District Court. If I was sentencing him for the escape matter there are specific considerations I have to take into account in accordance with both legislation and common law principles developed over a long period of time. 158But that having been said, as I earlier indicated, I have had very close attention to the authorities that were drawn to my attention, particularly, although it is concerned with sentencing an offender upon a breach of parole, the decision of Callaghan and the analysis of Simpson J of the competing considerations that affect the Court's discretion, which is, as everybody concedes, relatively wide. 159With regard to the issue of special circumstances, ultimately the calculation of the appropriate sentence has turned in part upon the particular 'special circumstances' which mandates the adjustment of a relevant non-parole period, that the sentences I impose will in various respects be partially accumulative, not only upon the non-parole period fixed by Judge Conlon, but in respect of the sentences that I must impose. 160That is so because of the need to have proper regard to the totality of the criminality involved in accordance with the principles laid down by the High Court in Pearce v The Queen (1988) 194CLR 610, particularly at [45]. 161There has been a recognition of those principles in the internal organisation of the sentences. For example, I have imposed the sentences that involve a slight partial accumulation of the much greater sentence for the sexual assault upon the detention. As I pointed out in my earlier remarks , they were offences committed at the same time. Taken in combination and just standing alone, they reflect a totality of criminality greater than their constituent parts. Of course, those offences are required to be partially accumulative upon the offences committed in Tumbarumba and in Wagga and Lucknow, other than counts 3, 5 and 6. 162The truth of the matter is ultimately when the prisoner is considered for release to parole, assuming that occurs at the expiry of the non-parole period, the balance of sentence that I have identified represents in the context of the sentencing exercise I am undertaking the appropriate period of time that the prisoner would require for parole supervision to have the opportunity, if it be presented to him by the Parole Authority, of undertaking the steps that would enable him to take his place in the community without fear of committing further offences, or presenting a danger to the community. He needs an extended period of supervision to adjust to community living (R v Moffit (1990) 20 NSWLR 114, (at 120-121) per Wood J). 163The facts of the matter are though in summary, that the prisoner on escape from Mannus, went upon a course of criminal conduct that was purely for the purposes of his own interests, without any regard to the interests of his victims. I have made the point that these offences were opportunistic, unplanned and unpremeditated. But it must also be said by, in effect, abducting the little girl and sexually assaulting her he added a completely new, and far more serious dimension, to the character of his offending, which must be reflected in the sentences imposed by this court. 164Mr Ryan, I have to now move to the sentencing of you. Would you kindly stand thanks and I will have to work my way through the counts. It will take a little bit of time, but it is the procedure of the court that prisoners stand when they are sentenced. 165In relation to count 1, and all these sentences have been calculated with a fifteen per cent discount, although in some instances without deleterious effect to you I have rounded some up and rounded some down by a matter of a few months. 166In relation to count 1 you are sentenced to three years imprisonment. 167Now Mr Crown, just one thing you need to assist me with. I said in my judgment that the relevant commencement date should be 9 February, but I also noted the custody record talked in terms of a non-parole period expiring on 17 February 2012. Is that right? 168QUEENAN: I think the reason for that your Honour is that it was adjusted to take into account that period upon which-- 169HIS HONOUR: That he was at large? 170QUEENAN: That he was at large. 171HIS HONOUR: Yes of course, yes. Right so it does make sense. 172I am sorry Mr Ryan. In relation to count 1, you are sentenced to three years imprisonment. That will date from 17 February 2012 and expire on 16 February 2015. I decline to fix a non-parole period for that offence, because I am not required to by law, and secondly, it is subsumed into other sentences I imposed. 173In relation to count 2, you are sentenced to a term of twenty months imprisonment. That will date from 17 February 2012 and on my calculation expire on 16 October 2013. 174In relation to count 7, that is the steal from the dwelling offence, you are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years six months. You are convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years six months. That will date from 17 August 2013 and on my calculation will expire on 16 February 2016. 175In relation to count 8 you are convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of twenty months. That will date from 17 August 2013 and expire on 16 April 2015. 176In relation to count 9 you are convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty months and that will commence also from 17 August 2013 and on my calculation expire on 16 April 2015. 177In relation to count 3, because it has a standard non-parole period, I am required by law to fix a non-parole period. The non-parole period I fix for this matter of course is of no effect, because it is subsumed by other orders, but in relation to count 3 you are convicted, you are sentenced to a term of imprisonment by way of non-parole period for a period of three years three months. This will date from 17 February 2015 and on my calculation expire on 16 May 2018. 178I fix in respect to that sentence a balance of sentence of one year. That will expire on 16 May 2019. 179In respect of count 4, that is the detention, or abduction offence, you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six years nine months. That will date from 17 February 2015 and will expire, on my calculation, on 16 November 2021. I decline to fix a non-parole period for that matter. It is not required to by law, and it is covered by the sentence I will impose in relation to count 6. 180In relation to count 6 you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment by way of non-parole period for seven years six months. That will date from 17 February 2016 and expire on 16 August 2023. In relation to that sentence I fix a balance of sentence of five years three months which will expire on 16 November 2028. 181Now the total sentence I have imposed on my calculation is a sentence of sixteen years and nine months, with a non-parole period of eleven years six months. 182The special circumstances that I have been identified have been reflected in the adjustment of the non-parole period in relation to count 6. 183You can take a seat, thanks very much. 184Now Mr Crown, any matters-- 185What about you Mr King? 186186KING: No your Honour, I haven't identified any matters. 187HIS HONOUR: You understand the effect of the sentence in terms of the structure of it and the totality of the sentence? 188KING: Yes your Honour. 189HIS HONOUR: Mr Ryan, it is a stressful time for you I know, but do you understand the effect of the sentence I have imposed? 190OFFENDER: Yes your Honour. 191HIS HONOUR: It is an effective non-parole period, as I calculate it, of twelve years imprisonment, to date from the expiry of the non-parole period fixed by his Honour Judge Conlon, plus the time that you were at large, which has been adjusted in the Corrective Services' records. 192The balance of sentence I have calculated is four years nine months. 193Thank you very much Mr Crown for your assistance in this matter. Thank you Mr King. Thank you Mr Ryan, you can go with the officers. Mr King will speak to you in the cells I am sure about the sentences I have imposed. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 20 February 2014