Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Veronica Eliana SALAS-COLLARD [2013] NSWSC 1188 Hearing dates: 6 - 7, 11 - 15, 18 - 27 March 2013, 2 - 5, 8 - 12 April 2013 and 5 July 2013 Decision date: 30 August 2013 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Adams J Decision: The offender is to enter into a good behaviour bond for a period of two years subject to the condition that, during the term of the bond the offender will be of good behaviour and will appear before the Court if called upon to do so at any time during the term of the bond. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - sentence - accessory after the fact to murder - principles - wide sentencing range available - lower category of seriousness - impact of the mental state of the offender Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Cases Cited: R v Hawken (1986) 27 A Crim R 32 R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104 Category: Sentence Parties: Regina Veronica Eliana Salas-Collard Representation: Counsel: G J Tabuteau (Crown) N S Carroll (Offender) Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) George Sten & Co Solicitors (Offender) File Number(s): 2010/417840 Judgment Introduction 1On 12 April 2013, following a trial the offender, Veronica Eliana Salas-Collard, was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to murder, an offence under s 349(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years. No standard non-parole period applies to this offence. The offender has asked the Court to take into account (and I do so) under a Form 1 another charge of being an accessory after the fact, in this case, to an offence of aggravated breaking and entering which, under the applicable section of the Crimes Act renders the offender liable to imprisonment for a maximum of 5 years. Again, such an offence is not one carrying a standard non-parole period. Each offence was allegedly committed between 1 December 2010 and 16 December 2010 and, essentially, involved assisting her then boyfriend (aged 17 at the time) to evade police, he having committed the offences in company with another young man. It is important to note that it is, and could not be, suggested that the offender was in any way at all involved in either the murder or the aggravated breaking and entering. However, it is of course necessary to briefly describe these offences. Background 2During the night of 30 November 2010 Corrie Loveridge (then aged 18) and AB (aged 17) had been with the offender and a number of others at an address in St Marys for some hours drinking and using drugs. Loveridge, with a knife, and AB, left together and walked to a nearby house where resided alone, as Loveridge knew, an elderly woman, Mrs Parrelli. The pair entered the house. Wakened by the noise they made Mrs Parelli, then in bed, got up, saw the back door was open and went to close it. She then saw Loveridge and AB inside the house. Loveridge grabbed the walking stick which she was holding at the time and hit her several times over the head and body with sufficient force to break the stick, knocking her to the ground. Loveridge and AB threatened Ms Parrelli and demanded money. Ultimately they took a television set and a wristwatch from the house, Loveridge dropping the knife on the driveway as they fled. Loveridge and AB carried the television back to the house from which they had come. Mrs Parrelli was taken to hospital by ambulance and found to have suffered serious bruising to her head, face and arm, remaining in hospital for some 22 days. 3When Loveridge and AB returned, they told the offender, in substance, that they had just committed a break and enter at the home of an elderly woman whom Loveridge had punched and hit with her walking stick on the head several times. They also said they had come back with a watch. 4The murder in question occurred when Loveridge and AB left the premises about two hours or so later and were on their way back from a nearby service station where they had withdrawn cash and purchased some food. They were armed with kitchen knives. They came across three young men, including the victim Alan Ray Gordon who was 17 years old. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that after Loveridge attacked one of the young men with a knife, he and another fled to get help but Mr Gordon did not manage to get away. He was set on by Loveridge and AB who punched, kicked and stabbed him many times, causing very serious injuries, leaving when he was unconscious and bleeding to death. The facts of the offence 5The pair ran back to the house where other occupants were still awake, whom they told of their attack. Essentially, the evidence relied on by the Crown comes from the offender's account told to police of her movements with AB after he returned with Loveridge from the attack. The offender said that she was sleeping and was awakened by their return. She said they were taking their clothes off putting them in a backpack. They then took her to an intersection, virtually across the road from where they told her the body lay but she could not see it. Whilst they were on their way, they told her briefly, in effect, that they thought they had killed him but she was not clear why they wanted her to go back with them and thought that they wanted her to see if he was alive or not. She said that police were there with a spotlight, so they remained concealed. Loveridge walked her back to the house. 6It is from this point that the actions of the offender rendered her liable to the offence of which she has been convicted. Both concern only what she did by way of assisting AB. It is not suggested that, in any way, she assisted Loveridge to evade the police. So far as assisting goes, merely remaining in the company of AB was, rightly, not put forward by the Crown as amounting to assisting him. 7Some hours later, about 10.30am in the morning, she and AB caught a taxi together, with a sports bag which contained bloody clothes and at least one of the knives, although this was not said to be known to the offender. They first went to the house of AB's sister and her boyfriend where they stayed for several days. It is not suggested that the offender had anything to do with this part of AB's attempt to abscond. The offender said that, at this time, she still did not believe that AB was telling the truth about killing someone. She had not actually seen the victim and said that she had not seen any blood. But everyone else told her that he had committed the murder. 8I accept that it is likely that the offender was aware of sufficient matters surrounding the killing of Mr Gordon at some time during their stay with AB's sister but there was uncertainty as to her presence during all of the conversations between AB, his sister and his sister's boyfriend, when undoubtedly sufficient of the details establishing his guilt of murder were disclosed. She was also drowsy during this period and nodding off to sleep. She told police that whilst they were still at AB's sister's place they had looked at news reports on the internet about the attack on the victim, who had died on the way to hospital. At this point, although any reasonable person, I think, would have realised that AB had been involved in a killing, I think there is a reasonable possibility that the offender did not appreciate that he had committed murder. At the same time, however, she was aware that he had committed a very serious criminal offence and, despite this, she was prepared to assist him to avoid arrest by arranging for accommodation at her cousin's place, where the pair stayed for two days. 9The offender and AB then went to her cousin's place, where her baby son was. At this point the offender still maintained that, although she had been told that AB had killed a boy, she still could not believe it. Whilst they were staying with her cousin, AB went out and she met him at a nearby sports oval. AB told her, "We've got to, we've got to get out of here, we've got to go" and told the offender, in effect, that he and Loveridge had killed the victim, describing briefly to her what had happened with details that informed the offender that there had been a fight involving a number of people including AB and Loveridge and that a boy had died from several stab wounds inflicted by one or other or both of Loveridge and AB in circumstances amounting to murder. 10The couple moved after two days to a home unit at Miller where a friend of the offender lived and was, it appears, prepared to let them stay. Quite what he was told or knew is not known and is irrelevant for present purposes. It is clear that the offender took AB to Miller with her because he told her they needed to move from where they were staying because of the presence of police, whom he thought were in the area. She accepted that the reason for taking him to Miller was to help him avoid police. On 16 December 2010 AB was arrested outside the home unit where they had been staying. 11Overall, the offender's assistance of AB to avoid police amounted to taking him to her cousin's home and then onto the Miller unit, all in all covering a period of perhaps three days or so, enabling him to remain at large for about two weeks. There is insufficient evidence as to what transpired when they came to the Miller address and I do not find beyond reasonable doubt that her assistance extended beyond finding that address and accompanying him there, and staying with him and her son and, perhaps, (but the evidence does not go so far) with her friend who was the occupier. 12The defence case, which depended upon evidence of AB's propensity for violence and the offender's psychological vulnerability, was that the jury could not be satisfied that the offender had assisted AB as a voluntary act but because her will was overborne by AB. The prosecution case in this respect was that, the offender had told police, in effect, that AB had never made any threats that he would hurt her if she were to go to the police and indeed she said that he had never been violent towards her. In short, she was not and did not feel threatened. The Crown also pointed out at least one and possibly more opportunities when, if she were so minded, she could have gone to the police and sought protection. In the result, of course, the jury must have accepted the Crown case on either of these bases. In my view, whilst the offender did not assist him because she was in fear of him, such was her relationship that it did not occur to her that she should act independently and not to what he asked her to do. The offender's mental state 13Dr Olav Nielssen was called in the defence case during the trial to give evidence about the offender's psychiatric condition at the relevant time. This evidence was relied on for the purpose of sentence. The offender has a strong family history of mental illness involving an uncle, two cousins and her mother. She, herself, has been involved with mental health units since she was 13, both for long and short admissions, with varying diagnoses. Following her arrest she had attempted suicide, requiring admission to hospital. Medical records show a prescription of medication for bipolar mood disorder and depression, this latter apparently involving chronic suicidal thoughts, exacerbated by early onset substance abuse, mainly cannabis, in the context of significant trauma, neglect and abuse in childhood and adolescence. 14Following her arrest on 16 December 2010 and consequential imprisonment until her release on bail on 23 December 2010 the offender was treated by Justice Health following self-reporting of hallucinations and paranoia which, on her release, required medication, perhaps indicative of a developing psychotic illness. At the time of the offence, the doctor thought it to be reasonably well established that she suffered from a personality disorder involving pervasive maladaptive personality traits having a significant impact on her social performance as evidenced by her frequent admissions to hospital with deliberate self-harm, severe mood swings and some severe depression and self-defeating behaviour including, for example, in forming abusive relationships (some six months before her arrest she had been stabbed in the hand by her previous partner, causing permanent injury). 15Dr Nielssen thought that the offender probably had an underlying or emerging schizophrenic illness combined with an anxiety disorder. These mental characteristics would have affected her judgment, contributing to poor and self-defeating decision-making. At the same time, the doctor noted that there was no empirical signs of any mental illness such as disorganised thinking or appearing distracted, demonstrated during her interview with police. For myself, although I thought she did not appreciate the serious position in which she found herself and her account was in some respect disorganised, her responses and general demeanour appeared reasonably normal. Whatever the detailed character of any diagnosis might be, I do not doubt that the offender was mentally and emotionally fragile, immature for her age and in thrall to AB. 16This evidence is relevant both to the objective seriousness of the offence and the subjective features to be taken into account on sentence. Subjective features 17The offender was 19 years of age as at the date of the offence with a conviction for shoplifting and contravening an apprehended violence order for which no penalty was imposed. A pre-sentence report was tendered giving details of her very compromised upbringing but also a good and supportive relationship with her mother and stepfather. She gave birth to her first child when she was but 16 years of age and fell pregnant again after these offences, having a second child in July of this year, the father of the child being about 30 years older than the offender but, it appears, a very significant support for her. The Probation and Parole officer thought that the offender appeared to be genuinely sorry about her involvement but, at the same time, (as I understand the officer) she felt powerless in the situation due to her own fears and previous experiences of violence and abuse. The offender was assessed as unlikely to require or benefit from supervision by the Probation and Parole Service for the reason that her mental health needs would be best addressed by community based mental health services. She was also unsuitable for a community service order because of her unstable mental health, the continuing effects of her hand injury and, at the time of the report, her pregnancy. I accept that she has now disassociated herself entirely from AB and, indeed, this occurred shortly after his arrest although there were communications between them after that date, involving serious threats made by AB because he thought she was being unfaithful to him. 18The offender now has the care of two children. She is supported by her mother and stepfather and the father of her newborn. I am satisfied that she is remorseful and that it is most unlikely that she will commit an offence of this kind or this seriousness again. Assessment 19An offence of being an accessory after the fact to murder is, obviously, serious, as is demonstrated by the maximum term of imprisonment of 25 years. As Thomas J stated in R v Hawken (1986) 27 A Crim R 32 at 38 - "... It is in the interests of the community that murderers should be completely isolated from support and deprived of assistance and that such crimes be not covered up." It is evident, however, that the offence can be committed in a wide range of varying circumstances, giving rise to sentences of full time imprisonment, periodic detention, release on entry to a good behaviour bond and suspension. Overall, the cases decided in this Court are far to few to suggest any range although it is clear that a non-custodial disposition is appropriate in some cases. If I may say so, Buddin J in R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104, set out (at paras [15] to [24]) a useful summary of a number of significant judgments of this Court concerning this offence, which I do not need to repeat here. Conclusion 20In this case, the assistance rendered by the offender was over a relatively short period at the insistence of AB and whilst she was compromised by her mental condition and though not overborne to the extent of being under duress, was in a situation where I am satisfied it did not occur to her that she could or should decline to assist him as he demanded. In all the circumstances I am not satisfied that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate: see s 5(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. 21Accordingly, I order the offender to enter into a good behaviour bond for a period of two years subject to the condition that, during the term of the bond the offender will be of good behaviour and will appear before the Court if called upon to do so at any time during the term of the bond. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 30 August 2013