Administrative Decisions Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Shoebridge v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 302 Hearing dates: 25 February 2013, 19 June 2013 Decision date: 31 December 2013 Jurisdiction: General Division Before: S Montgomery, Judicial Member Decision: 1. The decision under review is affirmed. 2. The application for a referral pursuant to section 111 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 is refused 3. The application for a referral pursuant to section 112 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 is refused Catchwords: Access to government information - access application - reasonable searches - section 111 referral - whether systemic issue in relation to the determination of access application - whether bad faith - section 112 referral Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 Cases Cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938) 60 CLR 336 Camilleri v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2012] NSWADT 5 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 46 FLR 409 Shepherd and Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning (1994) 1 QAR 464 Category: Principal judgment Parties: David Shoebridge (Applicant) Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (Respondent) Representation: Counsel J Lucy (Respondent) D Shoebridge (Applicant in person) Sparke Helmore Lawyers (Respondent) File Number(s): 123085 reasons for decision 1GENERAL DIVISION (S MONTGOMERY, (JUDICIAL MEMBER)): Mr Shoebridge ("the Applicant") made an access application ("the access application") to the Commissioner of Police ("the Respondent") under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 ("the GIPA Act"). The access application sought CCTV footage of an incident at Rose Bay Police station on the morning of Sunday 5 June 2011. He specifically requested footage from six CCTV for the period 2:20am and 4:00am on that day. 2The access application was made on 4 November 2011 and the Respondent received it on 8 November 2011. The Applicant's request was initially refused but a further Notice of Determination on 4 April 2012 granted access in full to the footage. 3The Applicant applied to this Tribunal for review of the determination. He expressed concern as to material missing from the footage that the Respondent had provided ("the missing footage"). He asserted that he had requested unedited CCTV footage and that the footage provided had been edited. 4The Applicant further asserted that Mr David Rook had viewed the CCTV footage at Rose Bay Police station on 20 September 2011 and made contemporaneous notes about what he had viewed. Inspector Chevonne Greene facilitated Mr Rook's viewing of the footage. The Respondent subsequently provided a DVD with footage and which Mr Rook viewed. Mr Rook said that when he watched the DVD provided by the Police it appeared to be edited and he believed that ten minutes had been cut from the footage. His evidence was that the footage did not have the editing when he viewed it on 20 September 2011. 5The matter came before me for hearing on 25 February 2013. Mr Rook gave evidence that the footage he had viewed on 20 September 2011 was different to the version provided to the Applicant. Inspector Greene did not give evidence. 6I accepted Mr Rook's evidence and determined to remit the matter for reconsideration by the Respondent pursuant to section 65 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 ("the ADT Act"). This gave the Respondent the opportunity to undertake further searches for the missing footage. 7Under section 65(2) of the ADT Act, where a decision is remitted to an administrator, the administrator may affirm the decision, vary the decision, or set aside the decision and make a new decision in substitution for the decision set aside. 8The Manager of the Respondent's Information Access and Subpoena Unit redetermined the matter on 27 March 2013. She concluded that the Respondent does not hold the missing footage, and did not hold the missing footage as at 8 November 2011. In arriving at that decision she stated: ... Sergeant Cameron Macraild of the State Electronic Evidence Branch was directed to examine the computer onto which the CCTV footage in question had been saved, as well as a DVD purporting to contain the CCTV footage provided to Mr Tanner on 18 October 2011. Specifically, Sergeant Macraild was instructed to examine the video file of the CCTV footage to determine whether it displayed any indications of modification using any applicable computer program(s) available at the State Electronic Evidence Branch. On 12 December 2011, Inspector Shane Woolbank at Rose Bay Police Station provided the following items to Sergeant Macraild for his examination: 1. A Lenovo Think Station computer tower, Model number MT-M 6483 DW5 (serial number L2ABE2F) containing: 2. A Seagate ST31000340AS 1TB 3.5" SATA hard disk drive (serial number 9QJ3BZXL); and 3. A Seagate ST31000340AS 1TB 3.5" SATA hard disk drive (serial number 9C/J3KJV1); plus 4 A DVD labelled LM1 1102926. Sergeant Macraild inspected the DVD (item 4) and found that it contained a folder titled "CCTV_rose_bay_police_sta.txr which contained two files, named: 1. 20110316.exe; and 2. a20110316.exe. In a Certificate of Expert Evidence dated 21 December 2011, Sergeant Macraild stated that both these files were self-executing video files and were an exact copy of the files located on the hard disk drives specified in items 2 and 3 above and had not been altered in any way. At the time of his examination, Sergeant Macraild "cloned" the hard disk drive of the Lenovo Think Station computer tower. I am advised that the cloned hard disk drive is currently retained by Sergeant Macraild as a "compressed" file that requires specific computer software, called Encase, to run. I am advised that this cloned hard disk drive is the same as the hard disk drive that was provided to Sergeant Macraild on 12 December 2011 and was the hard disk drive from which Mr Rook was shown the CCTV footage on 20 September 2011 (and from which a copy of the CCTV footage was made to provide to you in response to your Access Application). In order to complete my reconsideration, inquiries were also directed to Rose Bay Police Station and a request was made to search the hard disk drive of the Lenovo Think Station computer tower as well as a physical search of the premises at Rose Bay Police Station for any additional copies of the CCTV footage (for example, on DVD). In the annexed statement dated 26 April 2013, Inspector Greene of Rose Bay Police Station advised that she had examined the folders on the Lenovo Think Station computer tower (serial number L2ABE2F) located in the muster room of the Rose Bay Police Station. Inspector Greene was unable to locate any files named "20110316.exe" or "a20110316.exe" (or any similarly named files), in any folder on that computer. I am also advised that a physical search of the Rose Bay Police Station on 26 March 2013, by Inspector David Vidal, failed to locate any additional copies of the CCTV footage. Inspector Vidal also searched the folders on the computer network drive of Constable Simon Judge (who was the officer who originally downloaded the CCTV footage from the CCTV recorder, but who has since left the NSW Police Force). Inspector Vidal has advised that no files matching the above description were located in any of Constable Judge's folders. A physical copy of the CCTV footage, which is identical to that provided to you with the Notice of Decision dated 4 April 2012, is currently held by the legal representatives for the Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force, in relation to the current Administrative Decisions Tribunal proceedings. On balance, I do not think there are reasonable grounds for believing that the information which Mr Rook says is missing from the CCTV footage existed as at the time of your access application or afterwards, even though I accept that Mr Rook believes that he inspected a different version of the CCTV footage. ... I am satisfied that the searches conducted by Inspector Greene, Inspector Vidal and Sergeant Macraild for the video footage which Mr Rook gave evidence that he saw have been reasonable and were conducted using the most efficient means available to the NSW Police Force as is the standard set out in section 53 of the GIPA Act. 9The matter came before me for again on 19 June 2013. On that occasion I determined that the matter would be determined without further hearing and set a timetable for the filing of any further material. Each party has provided written submissions in support of its case. None of th eofficers who conducted further searches for the missing footage were required for cross-examination and it was agreed that the matter is to be determined without further hearing. 10The Applicant has requested the Tribunal to refer the matter of the missing footage to the Information Commissioner pursuant to section 111 of the GIPA Act and to bring the matter to the attention of the Police Minister pursuant to section 112 of the GIPA Act. Applicable legislation 11The objects of the GIPA Act are set out in section 3(1) - In order to maintain and advance a system of responsible and representative democratic Government that is open, accountable, fair and effective, the object of this Act is to open government information to the public by: (a) authorising and encouraging the proactive public release of government information by agencies, and (b) giving members of the public an enforceable right to access government information, and (c) providing that access to government information is restricted only when there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. 12'Government information' is given a wide meaning (section 4) being 'information contained in a record held by an agency.' 'Agency' is also defined in section 4. The Respondent is an agency to which the GIPA Act applies. The footage is 'government information' for the purposes of the GIPA Act. 13The GIPA Act establishes a presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (section 5). Applicants for access to government information have a legally enforceable right to be provided with access to that information, unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (section 9). 14With limited exceptions, the Act establishes a principle that there is pubic interest in favour of disclosure (section 12(1)). Section 12(2) says that public interest considerations in favour of disclosure are not limited. 15There will only be an overriding public interest against disclosure when the public interest test in section 13 is satisfied. It provides - There is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information for the purposes of this Act if (and only if) there are public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure. 16The public interest considerations against disclosure are limited to those set out in the Table to section 14. 17Section 53 of the GIPA Act provides: 53 Searches for information held by agency (1) The obligation of an agency to provide access to government information in response to an access application is limited to information held by the agency when the application is received. (2) An agency must undertake such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find any of the government information applied for that was held by the agency when the application was received. The agency's searches must be conducted using the most efficient means reasonably available to the agency. (3) The obligation of an agency to undertake reasonable searches extends to searches using any resources reasonably available to the agency including resources that facilitate the retrieval of information stored electronically. (4) An agency is not required to search for information in records held by the agency in an electronic backup system unless a record containing the information has been lost to the agency as a result of having been destroyed, transferred, or otherwise dealt with, in contravention of the State Records Act 1998 or contrary to the agency's established record management procedures. (5) An agency is not required to undertake any search for information that would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the agency's resources. 18Persons aggrieved by a reviewable decision may seek a review by the Tribunal (section 100). When this provision is read with section 38 of the ADT Act, they confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to review reviewable decisions under the GIPA Act. 19The Tribunal's function on review under section 63 of the ADT Act is to make the correct and preferable decisions having regard to the material before it, and any applicable written or unwritten law. It is well established that in considering an application for review the Tribunal is not constrained to have regard only to the material that was before the agency, but may have regard to any relevant material before it at the time of the review: Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 46 FLR 409. I am therefore able to take account of material that is now available but which was not available at the hearing on 25 February 2013. 20In any review of a reviewable decision, section 105 places the burden of justifying the decision on the agency concerned. In this particular matter, the Applicant has raised the issue of the sufficiency of the search undertaken by the Respondent. It is for the Respondent to show what steps were taken in the search for information falling within the scope of the Access Application and to satisfy the Tribunal that those steps were sufficient. 21The issue of what constitutes an adequate search has been considered in numerous decisions under both the GIPA Act and the repealed Freedom of Information Act 1989. 22In Shepherd and Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning (1994) 1 QAR 464, the Information Commissioner of Queensland identified a two limb approach to the question of what constitutes an adequate search (at [19]): (a) whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the requested documents exist and are documents of the agency and, if so, (b) whether the search efforts made by the agency to locate such documents have been reasonable in all the circumstances of a particular case. 23The decision in Shepherd has been affirmed in subsequent decisions of the Tribunal on a number of occasions. In Camilleri v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2012] NSWADT 5, Judicial Member Isenberg discussed the approach to be taken in determining whether the search undertaken by an agency is sufficient. In doing so she referred to a number of authorities that considered that issue for the purposes of the now repealed Freedom Of Information Act 1989 ("the FOI Act"). She stated: 10 In deciding whether a sufficient search has been carried out, the ultimate issue for the Tribunal is whether the agency's conclusion, that it does not hold the documents sought by the applicant, is sound. 11 What constitutes a sufficient search has been considered by the Tribunal in a number of cases. In Hemeon v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 201 at [18], the President said that the approach of the Information Commissioner of Queensland in Shepherd and Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning (1994) 1 QAR 464, should be adopted in addressing sufficiency of search issues. In Shepherd the Information Commissioner said at [19] that there were two questions for consideration were: '(a) whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the requested documents exist and are documents of the agency; and if so, (b) whether the search efforts made by the agency to locate such documents have been reasonable in all the circumstances of a particular case.' 12 This approach has been followed by the Tribunal in a number of cases such as DQ v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2002] NSWADT 215; Patsalis v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Service [2003] NSWADT 213 (Patsalis); Chapman v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2004] NSWADT 35; O'Hara v North Sydney Council [2005] NSWADT 100 (O'Hara); and, Curtin v Vice-Chancellor, University of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 56. 13 It is not enough for the applicant to merely assert non-compliance on the basis of a general distrust of the agency: Cianfrano v Director General Department of Commerce and anor (No 2) [2006] NSWADT 195 at [69]. 14 With regard to the second part of the test set out in Shepherd, President O'Connor considered the key factors in assessing whether a sufficient search had been carried out in Miriani v Commissioner of New South Wales Police [2005] NSWADT 187 at [30]. These factors included, relevantly, the ability to retrieve any documents that are the subject of the request. What constitutes a sufficient search will vary with the circumstances. 15 In Patsalis at [63], President O'Connor said that the standard of search which an agency is obliged to conduct is simply whether reasonable searches have occurred. The fact that there may be weaknesses in an agency's searches, or that there may be failures in its recordkeeping processes, did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the search had not been reasonable, or sufficient, or adequate: see also O'Hara. In Patsalis, the documents to which the applicant sought access had existed but were subsequently lost. Numerous searches were conducted but failed to find them and, ultimately, his Honour concluded at [59] that 'it would be a waste of time to ask the agency to do any more searches'. 24The Tribunal must come to a view whether there are reasonable grounds to believe there is some further footage relevant to the access application and, if so, whether, in all the circumstances, the Respondent has made reasonable search efforts to locate it. 25Section 111 of the GIPA Act provides: 111 Referral of systemic issues to Information Commissioner The ADT may refer any matter to the Information Commissioner that the ADT considers is indicative of a systemic issue in relation to the determination of access applications by a particular agency or by agencies generally. 26Section 112 of the GIPA Act provides: 112 Report on improper conduct If the ADT is of the opinion as a result of an ADT review that an officer of an agency has failed to exercise in good faith a function conferred on the officer by or under this Act, the ADT may bring the matter to the attention of the Minister who appears to the ADT to have responsibility for the agency. The Respondent's case 27The Respondent contends that there is no evidence that it held the missing footage, when the Applicant applied for that information on 8 November 2011. It further contends that it has conducted reasonable searches for the missing footage. 28Dr Lucy submitted that in effect the original decision to release the complete footage was also implicitly a decision that the Commissioner did not hold other footage and that that decision has been affirmed in the Reconsideration Decision. 29Dr Lucy also submitted that the Applicant's requests for the Tribunal to issue a report to the Police Minister and a referral to the Information Commissioner are without merit and should be refused. Did the Respondent hold the missing footage on 8 November 2011? 30The Tribunal's task is now to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material before it. Dr Lucy submitted that this material includes the Reconsideration Decision and the evidence relied upon to make that decision. 31The parties accept that the Respondent does not now hold the missing footage. Dr Lucy submitted that there is no evidence that the Commissioner held the missing footage on 8 November 2011. She says that there is evidence to support the findings of fact set out in the Reconsideration Decision and referred to above. 32The Applicant's expert queried whether the CCTV footage provided to Sergeant Macraild was what was originally recorded by the system. Sergeant Macraild gave evidence that it is not possible to confirm whether or not the CCTV footage had been altered prior to his receiving it. 33In a statement dated 26 April 2013, Inspector Greene stated that on 25 March 2013 she examined the computer on which the CCTV footage was previously stored, and which was used to show Mr Rook the footage on 20 September 2011 and that she found no footage. She stated that she was familiar with the footage because she had facilitated Mr Rook in viewing it. 34As noted above, the Reconsideration Decision indicates that Inspector Vidal also conducted a physical search of the Rose Bay Police Station, including a search of the folders on the computer network drive of the officer who originally downloaded the CCTV footage, and did not locate any additional copies of the CCTV footage. 35Dr Lucy submitted that the only evidence suggesting that the Respondent held a copy of the missing footage is Mr Rook's oral evidence. She argues that even if the Tribunal accepts Mr Rook's evidence that he saw the missing footage on 20 September 2011, this does not establish that the Respondent held that information when the Applicant made his GIPA application on 8 November 2011. 36Dr Lucy further submitted that the Respondent's obligation to provide access to government information is limited to information it held when the access application was received: section 53(1) of the GIPA Act. She submits that the Respondent has complied with the obligation in section 53(2) of the GIPA Act to conduct "such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find any of the government information applied for that was held ... when the application was received". 37The ultimate issue for the Tribunal is whether the Respondent's conclusion, that it does not hold the information sought by the Applicant, is sound: Camilleri v Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force [2012] NSWADT 5 at paragraph [10]. 38Dr Lucy contends that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the requested information existed as at the time of the Applicant's GIPA application. Further, the Respondent's staff have made reasonable search efforts to locate the information. In these circumstances, the correct and preferable decision is that the Respondent did not hold the missing footage when the Applicant lodged his GIPA application. The Tribunal should therefore decide, pursuant to section 63(2)(a) of the ADT Act, to affirm the decision that the Respondent does not hold the missing footage. Section 111 Application 39Dr Lucy submitted that even if the Tribunal finds that the missing footage was recorded but is now missing, there is no evidence on which the Tribunal could reach the view that this is "indicative of a systemic issue". The evidence only relates to the Respondent's handling of a single CCTV file. 40Dr Lucy further submitted that if loss of the footage occurred at all, it may have occurred when the footage was downloaded from the CCTV camera or at some later point in the handling of the electronic information, before the Applicant's access application was made. There is nothing to suggest that the Respondent's staff lost or deleted the information when determining an access application. The alleged loss of footage is therefore not an "issue in relation to the determination of access applications". 41Dr Lucy contends that for these reasons, the Tribunal has no power to refer the matter under section 111 of the GIPA Act and it would not be desirable to do so in any event. In these circumstances, the Applicant's request should be declined. Section 112 Application 42Dr Lucy submitted that there is no evidence that any officer in the Respondent has failed to exercise any function in good faith. 43She argued that if the Tribunal finds that the missing footage was recorded and is now missing, there are various possible explanations for this, including a computer malfunction or virus. In the absence of evidence as to how this occurred, the Tribunal could not reach a state of "reasonable satisfaction" that a police officer has not acted in good faith, a state which may not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences: Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938) 60 CLR 336. 44Dr Lucy further submitted that the function must be one that was conferred under the GIPA Act. In this case, there is nothing to indicate that any of the Respondent's officers exercising functions conferred under the GIPA Act exercised their functions other than in good faith. For these reasons, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to exercise the power in section 112 of the GIPA Act and the Applicant's request should be declined. The Applicant's case 45The Applicant accepts that, as at the date of the Reconsideration Decision, the Respondent did not have any further material to produce to him. However, he does not concede that the Respondent produced all the material it held that responded to the access application as at 8 November 2011. 46He notes that the Tribunal concluded that there was material held by the Respondent as at 20 September 2011 that was not produced. He submits that the issue is now simply what if any orders are appropriate as a result of the earlier findings and the Reconsideration Decision. 47The Applicant submitted that the Statement from Inspector Greene fails to address the evidence given by Mr Rook and that the factual determination should not be permitted to be reviewed, or if reviewed it should be confirmed. 48It is the Applicant's submission that as at 20 September 2011 the Respondent had CCTV footage that was relevant to the Applicant's GIPA but not produced to the Applicant at any time. At some time between 20 September 2011 and 27 March 2013 the material was deleted or removed from the Respondent's system. 49He further submitted that the evidence in this case is that there are systematic failures in the police CCTV records at the Rose Bay Police Station. Failings that fundamentally undermine its utility as a reliable record of events at the Station. Failings that lead to many of the produced images giving false records of movements and on other occasion the failure to record movements. Despite being given multiple opportunities to explain these failures, the two Police experts were entirely at a loss to explain the deficiencies. The Applicant contends that in these circumstances a referral under section 111 of the GIPA Act is both appropriate and essential. 50It is the Applicant's submission that these systemic failings make it impossible for the Tribunal to have any confidence in the responses by the Respondent to either this access application, or any other GIPA Act access application seeking CCTV footage. This is a systemic issue that the Applicant seeks referred to the Information Commissioner pursuant to section 111 of the GIPA Act. 51The Applicant also seeks the Tribunal to issue a report on improper conduct by the Respondent to the Minister for Police pursuant to section 112 of the Act. The basis for this submission is that sometime between 20 September 2011 and 8 November 2012 an officer or agent of the Respondent appears to have acted to edit the CCTV footage held by the Respondent such that the missing footage was not available to the Police Information Access and Subpoena Unit at the time those officers produced all the documents they had to the Applicant. Discussion 52As noted above, the onus lies with the Respondent to satisfy the Tribunal that there has been compliance with the Act. 53Also as previously stated I accepted Mr Rook's evidence with respect to his observations when he viewed the CCTV footage at Rose Bay Police station on 20 September 2011 and made contemporaneous notes about what he had viewed. I do not propose to revisit that issue. 54It is common ground that the Respondent no longer holds the missing footage. There is no evidence on which I could reasonably conclude how the missing footage was lost. However, it appears that it was no longer available on 12 December 2011 when Inspector Woolbank provided the computer onto which the CCTV footage in question had been saved to Sergeant Macraild for his examination. 55In my view it is also probable that the missing footage had been lost prior to 18 October 2011 when a DVD purporting to contain the CCTV footage was provided to Mr Tanner 56That being the case, I am satisfied that it is also probable that the Respondent did not hold the missing footage when it received the Applicant's access application on 8 November 2011. 57Section 53(1) of the GIPA Act limits the Respondent's obligation to provide access to information to information it held when the access application was received. It must conduct such reasonable searches as may be necessary to find any information that was held at that time. 58Having had regard to the material that is now before me, I am satisfied that the Respondent's searches were reasonable. 59I find that the Respondent did not hold the missing footage when it received the Applicant's access application on 8 November 2011. It follows, in my view, that the decision that the Respondent does not hold the missing footage should be affirmed. 60I accept the Applicant's contention that the evidence in this matter identifies an issue in relation to the recording and maintenance of CCTV footage at the Rose Bay Police Station. While the evidence only relates to the Respondent's handling of a single CCTV file, it would be prudent for the Respondent to review its system in an effort to prevent similar issues arising in the future. 61Nevertheless, I agree with the Respondent's argument that the evidence in this matter does not support the view that this is indicative of a systemic issue 'in relation to the determination of access applications'. Any issues identified relate to the recording and maintenance of CCTV footage, not to the determination of the access application. In the circumstances, I do not agree that referral of the matter under section 111 of the GIPA Act is warranted. The Applicant's request that I make the referral is therefore declined. 62I also agree with the Respondent's argument that there is no evidence that any officer in the Respondent has failed to exercise in good faith any function conferred on them by or under the GIPA Act. If in fact the missing footage was lost between 20 September 2011 and 8 November 2011, it is improbable that any officer with a function conferred on them by or under the GIPA Act would have dealt with the CCTV footage. If they did, it would not have been in relation to this access application. 63I am unable to identify any officer who could be said to have has failed to exercise in good faith a function conferred on them. That being the case, I do not agree that a report to the Minister under section 112 of the GIPA Act is warranted. The Applicant's request that I make the referral is therefore declined. Order 1. The decision under review is affirmed. 2. The application for a referral pursuant to section 111 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 is refused. 3. The application for a referral pursuant to section 112 of the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 is refused. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 24 December 2014