Hopkins v Director General of Security [2014] NSWSC 281

Supreme Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Hopkins v Director General of Security [2014] NSWSC 281 Hearing dates: 07/02/2014 Decision date: 07 February 2014 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Garling J Decision: Pursuant to s 6(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross- Vesting) Act 1987 of the Commonwealth, I order that these proceedings brought by Mr Hopkins against the Director General of Security, be determined by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Catchwords: PROCEDURE - civil - jurisdiction - Federal - order proceedings brought be determined by Supreme Court of NSW; application for - Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth); s 6(3) - vested in State court Legislation Cited: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Jason Hopkins (P) Director General of Security (D) Representation: Solicitors: In person (P) A Markus (D) Solicitors: In person (P) A Markus (D) File Number(s): 2013/0377436

EX TEMPORE Judgment 1By a Summons filed on 16 December 2013, Jason Hopkins has commenced proceedings against the Director General of Security. The proceedings seek relief expressed in the following terms, "1. Order official to do his duty. 2. Injunction to stop official stopping subordinate officials from doing their duty. 3. Declare when self-defence can be claimed, with request to novel statutory power of official." 2In support of that Summons, a number of affidavits have been filed. One was filed on 16 December 2014, of which the plaintiff was the deponent; another of which the plaintiff was its deponent was filed on 20 January 2014; and a third described as an Affidavit of Expert Opinion was filed on 15 January 2014. A further three affidavits entitled "Affidavit of Expert Opinion" of which the plaintiff was the deponent, were filed respectively on 16 December 2013, and two others on the same day. There are other documents which have been filed which appear to me to relate to interlocutory proceedings. 3The proceedings constitute a special Federal matter, as that term is defined in s 3 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). That is, because they are proceedings which fall within the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia by virtue of s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and because apart from the Cross-Vesting Act, this Court would have no jurisdiction. Accordingly the provisions of s 6 of the Cross-Vesting Act apply. 4Speaking generally and in summary, s 6 requires this Court to transfer the proceedings to the Federal Court or another designated court. However, the provisions of s 6(3) of the Cross Vesting Act, entitle this Court to make an order having the effect that the proceedings are to be determined by this Court. 5Section 6(3) is in the following terms. "The Supreme Court may order the proceeding be determined by that court if it is satisfied that there are special reasons for doing so in the particular circumstances of the proceeding other than reasons relevant to the convenience of the parties." 6Both the plaintiff, Mr Hopkins, and Mr Markus who appears for the defendant, have submitted that there are special reasons for this Court to determine the proceedings. The existence of special reasons is not a matter which can rest, only, on the agreement of the parties. 7I note that I am satisfied that as required by s 6(4) of the Cross Vesting Act, written notice of the nature of the special Federal matter has been given to the Attorney General of the Commonwealth and the Attorney General of New South Wales and that neither Attorney General wishes to make submissions to the Court in relation to the proceeding. 8Having regard to the nature of the proceedings, the compliance (or non-compliance) of the documents filed in the proceedings to the requirements of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, and the allegations made in the proceedings against the Director General of Security, an in particular the need for the Director General to be able to go about discharging his statutory obligations, without any litigation remaining on foot which may hamper the discharge of the important public obligations of the Director General, I am satisfied that there are special reasons for this Court to order that the proceedings be determined here.