Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: R v Pratten (No 12) [2014] NSWSC 396 Hearing dates: 06 July 2012, 27 July 2012, 10 September 2012, 18 September 2012, 03 October 2012, 08 October 2012, 19 November 2012, 22 November 2012, 28 November 2012, 27 March 2013, 28 March 2013, 21 May 2013, 31 March 2014 Date of orders: 31 March 2014 Decision date: 31 March 2014 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Rothman J Decision: 1. For count 1 and 2, sentenced to 500 hours of community service. 2. For count 3, sentenced to 250 hours of community service. 3. For count 4, 5, 6 and 7, sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years' and 6 months', commencing 31 March 2013, to be released after 18 months' on entering a recognizance of $1,000 to be of good behaviour for 24 months'. Catchwords: CRIMINAL - sentence - guilty verdict after trial - accused charged with obtaining financial advantage by deception contrary to s 134.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 - filing of deliberately understated tax return - determination of amounts understated and benefit obtained Legislation Cited: Criminal Code Act 1995 Crimes Act 1914 Cases Cited: DPP (Cth) v Goldberg (2001) VSCA 107 R v Boughen; R v Cameron (2012) NSW CCA 17 R v Glyn Morgan Jones; R v Anthony Joseph Luis Hili [2010] NSWCCA 108 R v Maslin (1995) 79 A Crim R 119; R v Yeung Lo [2004] NSWCCA 382 Renshaw v R [2012] NSWCCA 91 Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465 Vogel and Son Pty. Ltd v Anderson, Minister of State for Customs and Excise for the Commonwealth of Australia [1968] HCA 90; (1967) 120 CLR 157 Category: Sentence Parties: Regina (Crown) Timothy Charles Pratten (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Mr M A Wigney SC (Crown) Mr B Hatfield (Crown) Ms R L Seiden (Defendant) Mr P K Bruckner (Defendant) Ms T J Davy (Defendant) Solicitors: Sylvester & Browne Lawyers (Defendant) File Number(s): 2010/00315475 Publication restriction: None JUDGMENT 1. HIS HONOUR: Timothy Charles Pratten was charged, tried and convicted of seven counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage from the Commonwealth by deception, contrary to s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ("the Code"). Each charge relates to a taxation return filed for one of the seven years ending 30 June 2003 through to 30 June 2009. 2. The Crown case was that Mr Pratten obtained financial advantages by filing tax returns that he knew understated his taxable income and he did that by deceiving the Commonwealth as to his income for the purpose of receiving a financial advantage. 3. Mr Pratten pleaded not guilty to each charge. The jury trial was heard over a three-month period (not including interlocutory proceedings) and the jury returned its verdict on 13 June 2012. Prior to the hearing of the sentence proceedings, Mr Pratten launched a collateral attack ("the civil proceedings") on the initiating and investigative process, challenging the conduct of the Federal Commissioner of Taxation, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. The collateral attack was based predominantly on constitutional and administrative grounds. 4. The parties accepted that the civil proceedings may be affected if the Court would impose a sentence. Accordingly, the sentence proceedings were adjourned until after the civil proceedings concluded. The civil proceedings were dismissed by me on 21 May 2013. 5. The substantive hearing of the sentence proceedings commenced on 28 March 2013, and concluded with written submissions on delayed psychiatric reports, which written submissions of the Crown and Mr Pratten were dated 29 August 2013. There were some inconsequential submissions made by Mr Pratten thereafter (at which time, I understand, he was not legally represented in these proceedings). 6. An appeal against the judgment in the civil proceedings had been lodged. Because of the conceded effect any sentence imposed would have on the appeal, I held up the imposition of the sentence. There had been no application for expedition of the appeal. After six months, I caused an enquiry to be made of the Registry, at which point it came to my attention, for the first time, that the appeal had been discontinued in December 2013, just prior to its allocated hearing. 7. It is unfortunate that there is no requirement on the parties to inform a trial judge of the withdrawal of any such appeal. The foregoing is not a criticism of the parties. It is the process of the Court that should organise such notice. Nevertheless, the imposition of a sentence has been delayed. That delay is, as to one third of it, the result of the submission on behalf of Mr Pratten as to the relationship between the civil and sentencing proceedings, but the period between December 2013 and now, nor before May 2013, cannot be attributed to any conduct of Mr Pratten. In any event, Mr Pratten, during the whole period between being discharged and arrested (except 8 days) has been subject to quite stringent bail applications. 8. I turn then to the sentencing exercise. Each offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment and/or a fine of $66,000.00. Mr Pratten has spent eight days in custody and, apart from those eight days, been the subject of conditional liberty since being charged. 9. The Court is bound to apply the sentencing regime prescribed by the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ("the Act"), and in particular, when arriving at an appropriate sentence, to impose a sentence that is of a severity appropriate in all of the circumstances of the offence. In that regard, the Court is required to take into account, where relevant, the considerations prescribed by s 16A of the Act. 10. While it is necessary to have regard to and apply consistency in sentencing, such consistency is obtained through consistency in the application of legal principle (including the requirements of the Act, and to the extent applicable, the common law) not the mechanical or arithmetic application of other sentences imposed on other offenders. The nature and circumstance of the offence 1. The conduct that gives rise to these seven offences arises out of one continuing course of conduct (see s 16A(2)(c) of the Act), being the arrangements for business affairs and receipt of income of Mr Pratten. That this is one continuing course of conduct is evidenced by two prime examples. 2. First, apart from the identity of the trust accounts that were the source of payments to Mr Pratten, the Crown case depended on a consistent approach to the receipt (and payment) of money without regard to any suggested change from one year to another. 3. Secondly, Mr Pratten's tax returns, which form the basis for the Crown's allegations of dishonesty, deception and financial advantage, were lodged on three occasions: two of them in August 2005; one of them in June 2006; and four of them in September 2009. 4. The Crown case, and the criminal conduct, does not involve the forging of false invoices or the compilation of false books or the like. The payments to Mr Pratten were largely payments made from Vanuatu trust accounts, without any attempt to conceal payments made directly to him. Different issues arise as to certain third party payments, which I will shortly address. 5. It is necessary to set out the conduct and its effect. I will try to be brief. Nevertheless, apart from three months of oral testimony, there are over 200 exhibits, mostly consisting of volumes of documents or schedules of financial transactions. As a consequence, the following is necessarily general and a little simplistic. The issues associated with the following will be dealt with later. 6. As part of the investigation of Project Wickenby, alleged discrepancies were found in payments out of two trust account companies. The companies were Vanuatu International Trust Company (VITCO) and International Financial Trust Company (IFTCO). Each of those companies operated in relation to relevant transactions in different years. The details of the years of those operations are largely irrelevant in determining either objective culpability, or the seriousness of the offence, or the subjective circumstances of Mr Pratten. 7. Both IFTCO and VITCO were, it seems, operated by an accounting firm or firms, the principals of which included Mr Robert Agius. The evidence is that Mr Robert Agius was described as "a principal backer, a principal player" in the establishment of an insurance company in Vanuatu, and at other times as "its head". The company was initially called Rural and General International Insurance Limited (RGII) and later changed its name to Commercial Pacific Insurance Limited (CPI). I will refer to the company as CPI. 8. I do not accept as proved, either on the balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Pratten was a principal of CPI. Any evidence suggesting that proposition, whether directly or indirectly, is weak and is not accepted. Of course the evidence raises a significant suspicion of that fact, but it does not allow the Court to travel beyond suspicion. 9. Nevertheless, I do accept that Mr Pratten was to receive 25% of the profit of CPI on its winding up, which was to occur, absent extension, within 10 years of its formation. CPI was formed in 2002 after alterations to the minimum conditions that an Australian company was required to satisfy in order to offer insurance. The Crown did not adduce evidence, during sentencing proceedings, that Mr Pratten received 25% of the profit at any time during 2012. 10. Up until 2002, Mr Pratten was the major shareholder in an insurance company, Rural and General Insurance Limited (RGIL). Other than grandfathering prior policies, RGIL ceased operating in July 2002. After the requirements were altered, Mr Pratten established an insurance brokerage, Rural and General Insurance Broking Limited (RGIB). Mr Pratten was the major shareholder of RGIB through another company, of which he was sole director and shareholder, namely, 71 Cowper Street Holdings Pty Limited. 11. During the whole period relevant to these charges, Mr Pratten received a salary from either or both RGIL and/or RGIB. RGIB brokered insurance to CPI (and, during some of the period, other insurers). 12. The evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Pratten performed work from which CPI benefited. 13. RGIB collected premiums for CPI and remitted them to Vanuatu. There is no suggestion that RGIB did not withhold the appropriate level of tax before paying Australian source income to an overseas entity. Further, there is no suggestion that either RGIL or RGIB failed to deduct the appropriate amounts of tax from Mr Pratten's salary, and remit those amounts to the Australian Tax Office (ATO). 14. To complicate matters further, Mr Pratten owned or controlled various companies, and together with his daughters, was a beneficiary of a family trust. One of the companies was the trustee, of the family trust. Mr Pratten's business structure (or structures) was (or were) not uncomplicated. The overwhelming impression from the trial, and tracing the payments of money, is that Mr Pratten was insufficiently strict, or particular, in differentiating between transactions for each of the different entities, and also between the entities and his own personal affairs. 15. The Crown did not adduce evidence that any of the companies owned or controlled by Mr Pratten did not pay sufficient tax. Further, the Crown did not adduce any evidence that the Pratten Family Trust did not pay sufficient tax. Moreover, the Crown did not prove that the amounts by which it alleged Mr Pratten understated his income were not declared as income by, or otherwise on the books of, one or other of Mr Pratten's related entities (that is, the aforesaid companies or trust). If it were possible that all of the income was declared by one of those entities, or a combination of them, there would seem to be an hypothesis consistent with innocence of these charges. 16. Nevertheless, Mr Pratten has been found guilty of the offences, and I am bound by that finding. Therefore I am required to sentence on the basis that for each relevant year some amounts, known to be income, were deliberately omitted from the tax returns by Mr Pratten, thereby dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage from the Commonwealth by deception. 17. Mr Pratten had control of RGIB, and operated his Australian business through RGIB, which in turn had a business relationship with CPI. The Crown has proved, as earlier stated, that Mr Pratten performed work from which CPI benefited. This work included insurance broking, arranging reinsurance, performing training, and other ancillary functions. The Crown alleged at trial (and on sentence) that some of this work was rewarded by CPI from its accounts in Vanuatu, held at IFTCO and VITCO, to Mr Pratten or at his direction. 18. The Crown case was that the payments from IFTCO and VITCO were payments to Mr Pratten or for his benefit for the work done. I directed the jury in the summing-up that it would need to be sure that the money from IFTCO and VITCO was the money of CPI, and that no other reasonable hypothesis exists. The jury were also informed that, as the Crown put its case, they had to be sure that CPI paid the money to Mr Pratten, or at his direction, because he performed work for them. 19. In that regard, the jury had to be sure that Mr Pratten performed the work, or provided the services, in his personal capacity, and not in his capacity as a director of RGIB or the trustee company or any other entity. If hypotheses were available, on the evidence accepted, that either the money was not that of CPI, or was not paid for services provided by Mr Pratten in his personal capacity, or both, then the Crown has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 20. The jury convicted. At least some of the money, paid from the accounts in IFTCO and VITCO emanate, on the jury's finding, from CPI, and were paid for services by Mr Pratten in his personal capacity. 21. Early in the trial, the Court summarised the Crown case by seven fundamental propositions: 1. Moneys (including payments of expenses) "the disputed amounts" were paid to Mr Pratten, or for his benefit, by various entities at Mr Pratten's direction; 2. The disputed amounts were income in the ordinary meaning of that term, and Mr Pratten was required to declare the disputed amounts as income in his personal tax returns; 3. Mr Pratten did not declare the disputed amounts in his personal tax returns; 4. These disputed amounts were not declared in order to deceive the Commonwealth; 5. The ATO issued tax assessments on the basis of the declared lower income; 6. The tax assessments were lower than they otherwise would have been; 7. As a consequence, Mr Pratten gained a financial advantage, and he did so by deception. 1. At the time, the Court was informed only propositions (2) and (4) above were truly in issue. That information was not completely accurate. Proposition (1) was in issue, although not accurately, or clearly, identified on behalf of the accused, in that it was in issue that all of the disputed amounts were for the benefit of Mr Pratten in his personal capacity, and it was disputed that Mr Pratten gave the directions in his personal capacity. 2. Whatever the ultimate amount, the Crown has not proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Pratten did any more than implement a scheme, planned and organised by Vanuatu accountants. The amounts, however, are large. 3. The Crown claims that the income that was not declared totals $5,009,722.63 for which Mr Pratten received a financial advantage of $2,277,003.00 (being the tax shortfall). 4. The Crown did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the full extent of the foregoing amounts. It is necessary to break the foregoing into years. For 2003, the Crown alleges undeclared income of $1,068,706.00 and a tax benefit $518,322.00. 5. For 2004, the Crown alleged undeclared income of $275,367.00 and a tax benefit $133,513.00. For 2005, the undeclared income was $332,490.51 and the tax benefit was $160,865.00. For 2006, undeclared income equalled $995,401.59, for which the tax benefit was $475,987.00. For 2007, 2008 and 2009, the Crown alleged undeclared income of $1,381,207.11, $822,382.42, and $134,168.00 respectively, for which the tax benefit was $633,017.00, $330,305.00 and $24,993.00 respectively. 6. The Crown has not proved, to the requisite standard, that the foregoing amounts, which include third party payments and loans, were all income derived by Mr Pratten, and dishonestly and by deception not disclosed to the ATO. I have included a schedule of those transactions, which, notwithstanding the jury's verdict, were not proved by the Crown to the requisite standard to be Mr Pratten's personal income that he deliberately and dishonestly did not declare in order to deceive the Commonwealth to obtain a financial disadvantage. 7. The amounts represent transactions for which there exists a reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with guilt. The reasonable hypothesis goes to the nature of the transaction. The jury verdict, and the manner in which the issues were put to the jury, would prevent the Court, in this exercise, finding reasonable hypotheses going to the source of the income, or whether Mr Pratten personally performed services for CPI. 8. The net result is that the Crown allegations include payments to third parties and amounts that have not been proved to be anything other than loans. Neither category has been proved by the Crown to be income in the hands of Mr Pratten, that should have been (or, more accurately, that he knew should have been) declared as his income. 9. The amounts by which the income is to be reduced, therefore, totals $2,235,065.96, being $727,325.33 in 2003, $198,272.00 in 2004, $242,679.41 in 2005, $350,792.42 in 2006, $381,516.70 in 2007, $296,580.10 in 2008, and $37,900.00 in 2009. As a consequence, to the extent that the amounts involve assessment of culpability, I find for the purposes of sentencing that a total amount of $2,960,577.04 was income, of which $2,774,658.00 was undeclared, providing a financial advantage of approximately $1,252,324.00 being the tax that was not paid. I have not tried to calculate accurately the tax that would be payable on those amounts, as it is sufficient to have a general indication. 10. The foregoing does not take account of the deductions that may have been available, but I accept that while it may affect tax payable, it has little effect on the assessment of objective seriousness. It is the level of dishonesty that one is examining: R v Boughen; R v Cameron (2012) 215 A Crim R 476; [2012] NSWCCA 17 per Simpson J at [56] to [57]. 11. The Crown case created significant artificiality. I do not say that by way of criticism. It sought to include only income in the ordinary sense, without statutory enlargement of that term. I understand the reasons why the Crown would see that as appropriate, but as a consequence, some loans or distributions of trust that are statutorily included in taxable income, were not addressed on that basis. Instead, the Crown sought to prove that the payments were ordinary income, as that is understood. 12. As earlier stated, I do not consider that Mr Pratten was other than an implementer of a scheme presented to him. Certainly the contrary has not been proved by the Crown to the requisite standard. Nevertheless, the scheme was implemented over a number of years, requiring three separate episodes of dishonest acts. The nature and quality of the acts did not differ substantially, and again, as has been stated, this was one course of continuing conduct, implemented on three occasions for seven years' returns. 13. However, I accept that the scheme or arrangement was dishonest from its inception. 14. In dealing with the seriousness of the offences arising from deliberately lodging dishonest tax returns, in R v Glyn Morgan Jones; R v Anthony Joseph Luis Hili [2010] NSWCCA 108, I said (McClellan CJ at CL and Howie J agreeing): "[13] Of late, procedures for the filing of income tax returns have been relaxed and much greater emphasis has been placed upon self-assessment. Such a process reposes on the taxpayer a heavy duty of honesty. The practical restrictions on the capacity of government to apprehend offenders for every offence necessarily requires that the legislature and the courts ensure that deceitful conduct, in a commercial enterprise, once discovered, is appropriately punished. Deterrence looms large. [14] While the analogy is not always appropriate, there is much to be said for the applicability of statements relating to customs duty to offences of this kind. In that regard, I repeat the oft quoted passage from Kitto J in L. Vogel and Son Pty. Ltd. v Anderson, Minister of State for Customs and Excise for the Commonwealth of Australia [1968] HCA 90; (1967) 120 CLR 157 at 164: "The duty evaded has now been paid, and I understand that when the evasions were discovered the defendants gave the Customs every assistance in their investigations. But when all the considerations relied upon by the defendants have been given due attention the case still cannot be regarded as other than a serious one. Not only are the defendants guilty of a sustained course of conscious wrongdoing, but the offences are in a field in which punishments for deliberate offences must be severe. The Customs laws represent the judgment of Parliament upon an important aspect of the economic organization of the community, and the object of the penal provisions is to make that judgment as effective as possible. It is important to remember that Customs officers have of practical necessity to rely extensively upon the information supplied to them by importers, for the flow of commerce could not be maintained if every importation had to be fully investigated. Moreover, detection of frauds is not always easy. No doubt ordinary conceptions of honesty and of civic responsibility suffice to ensure a great deal of fair dealing with the Customs, but for some people little seems to matter but fear of the consequences of discovery. The Customs Act makes those consequences potentially drastic. It is for the courts to make them, in suitable cases, drastic in fact, for otherwise traders who are not saved by qualms of conscience from willingness to defraud their fellow citizens may weight the profits they hope for against the penalties they have cause to fear and find the gamble worthwhile." See also DPP (Cth) v Goldberg (2001) VSCA 107. 1. I do not accept, to the requisite standard, that the Crown has proved that Mr Pratten's change in accountants was for reasons of dishonesty. He informed his accountant of an interest in CPI, and he was provided advice that it did not require declarations to the ATO. There are numerous reasons, some raised during the course of the trial, for changing accountants. 2. Mr Pratten has shown no remorse for the offences in question. Further, there has been no co-operation with the Australian Federal Police or ATO in relation to these matters. 3. However, as may be obvious from earlier comments, the degree of "co-operation" by Mr Pratten at trial was extraordinary. There was little or no objection to any documents, and there was co-operation to minimise the issues. The length of the trial, and the number and complexity of exhibits, was the Crown's choice. Again, I make no criticism in that regard. Most of them were agreed, and Mr Pratten's conduct of the trial is a matter I take into account to his credit, albeit that the Court is not a "law enforcement agency", but not significantly to his credit. Sentencing 1. The principles of sentencing are well-known. In white-collar crimes more than most, general deterrence plays a significant role. Unlike crimes committed on the spur of the moment, most white-collar crimes are planned and embarked upon after weighing advantages and disadvantages. This is no exception. Nevertheless, the principles are clear. 2. Sentencing is an intuitive process. Sentencing involves the resolution of conflicting goals, protection of society, deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend, retribution and reform. These goals overlap and cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Often they point in different directions (see Veen v R (No 2) [1988] 164 CLR 465 at 476). 3. Nevertheless, sentencing must remain an intuitive process. 4. I have so far taken into account those relevant factors prescribed in s 16A of the Act, except the need for adequate punishment, and the subjective circumstances of the offender. The former is manifest. I deal with the latter below. Sentence Factors 1. Mr Pratten was born in Sydney in 1960. He has one sibling, his parents are both deceased. He was married in 1995 and separated in 2000, seemingly as a result of the effects of his wife's post-natal depression. Mr Pratten's two daughters are estranged from their mother, and Mr Pratten is their only available carer. 2. Their welfare and state of health was the subject of evidence. 3. There are reports of 25 March 2013 and 10 July 2013, from the psychologist, relating, amongst other things, to Mr Pratten and the effect of his potential incarceration on his daughters. Those reports are from Mr Watson Munro. I accept those reports, and I accept that hardship caused to Mr Pratten's two daughters is in this case an exceptional circumstance, warranting consideration in mitigation of sentence, and/or in determining the type of sentence to be imposed: R v Maslin (1995) 79 A Crim R 119; R v Yeung Lo [2004] NSWCCA 382. 4. Mr Pratten himself has high levels of depression and anxiety, and will find it very difficult to cope in a custodial environment. He requires intensive and regular psychiatric or psychological treatment of a kind that is generally unavailable in the prison system. 5. Mr Pratten has no criminal record other than offences arising from this conduct, or ancillary to it, namely, failure to file tax returns at a time during or after the conduct here in question. Conclusion 1. Notwithstanding the Crown's submission, I do not consider this case anywhere near the higher end of the range of objective seriousness for the offences he committed. The provisions under which Mr Pratten was charged is not a tax offence, and may involve very serious fraud. 2. Further, Mr Pratten did not engage in the falsifying of any documents, nor in my view did he plan this scheme. At least the Crown has not proved it to the requisite standard. In my view his culpability is at the lower end of the range of objective seriousness. 3. His subjective factors, in which I include his attitude at his trial to an insignificant degree, are important. His own health is precarious, the effects of incarceration on his daughters is significant, and the circumstances sufficiently exceptional to warrant their consideration. 4. There are three separate episodes of filing false returns. Further, Mr Pratten has been on conditional liberty just on three years, and spent eight days in custody. Taking account of the fact that some part of his conditional liberty was longer because of his civil action, I allow approximately one third of the time on bail as a period of incarceration: Renshaw v R [2012] NSWCCA 91. 5. I am mindful of the provisions of s 17A of the Act, and in particular, that imprisonment is the last option, to be imposed only when no other sentence is appropriate. I consider these offences sufficiently serious to warrant some custodial sentence. I pay particular regard to general deterrence. I do not consider specific deterrence to be a significant factor. 6. For Counts 1 and 2, committed in 2005, I fix 500 hours of community service. For Count 3, committed in 2006, I fix 250 hours of community service. For Counts, 4, 5, 6 and 7, I fix a sentence of 3 years' and six months' imprisonment. I adjust the starting date by 12 months' to take account of conditional liberty and prior incarceration. 7. I also take account of the exceptional subjective issues, to which I have referred, for which I allow an extended period on parole. Sentence Mr Pratten, 1. For the 1st and 2nd offence on the indictment, you are convicted and you are sentenced to 500 hours of community service. 2. For the 3rd offence on the indictment, you are convicted and you are sentenced to 250 hours of community service. 3. For the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th offences on the indictment you are convicted and you are sentenced to imprisonment for 3 years' and 6 months', commencing 31 March 2013, to be released after 18 months' on entering a recognizance of $1,000 to be of good behaviour for 24 months'. Annexure 1 Loans and Third Party Transfers 2003/2004 FINANCIAL YEAR 14/08/2003 VITCO to Rural and General Insurance Broking Loan STG - #777 114,522.00 27/08/2003 VITCO to STG Loan STG - #777 30,000.00 19/09/2003 VITCO to STG Reference - Loan STG - #939 20,000 26/09/2003 VITCO to STG Reference - Loan STG - #939 15,000 02/10/2003 VITCO to STG Reference - Loan STG - #939 12,500 13/04/2004 VITCO to ANZ Port Vila Third party Lot 2251 Creek Road Stroud. 5,000.00 Cheque made payable to B & J Wilmen for purchase 31/05/2004 VITCO to solicitor (Ray Martin) Third party Lot 2251 Creek Road Stroud 1,250.00 SUBTOTAL 198,272.00 2004/2005 FINANCIAL YEAR 03/08/2004 VITCO to solicitor (Ray Martin) Third party Farm 10,000.00 15/12/2004 VITCO to solicitor (Ray Martin) Third party Farm 3,800.00 26/01/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Wilson Family Trust Third party Farm 3,870.00 26/01/2005 VITCO to Barkus Edwards Doolan Third party Other 778.00 26/01/2005 VITCO to Gloucester Veterinary Hospital Third party Farm 312.55 26/01/2005 VITCO to Sheathers Machinery Sales and Services Third party Farm 657.95 26/01/2005 VITCO to Stroud Hardware and Produce Third party Stroud 2,000.00 25/02/2005 VITCO to Broken Bay Slipway Third party Boat 3,982.50 04/03/2005 VITCO to Ross Wilson Trust Third party Other 1,530.00 04/03/2005 VITCO to Reddam House Third party School fees 4,848.70 16/03/2005 VITCO to Broken Bay Slipway Third party Boat 3,657.97 23/05/2005 VITCO to Broken Bay Slipway Third party Boat 7,012.37 04/05/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Third party Farm 1,500.00 04/05/2005 VITCO to Magnum Marine Service Third party Boat 4,177.50 04/05/2005 VITCO to Broken Bay Slipway Third party Boat 7,241.37 04/05/2005 VITCO to Bluewater Sound Third party Boat 2,810.50 10/05/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Third party Farm 1,500.00 26/05/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Third party Farm 1,500.00 03/06/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Third party Farm 1,500.00 24/06/2005 VITCO to Sale Agreement for R44 Helicopter Loan/Third party Helicopter 180,000.00 SUBTOTAL 242,679.41 2005/2006 FINANCIAL YEAR 20/07/2005 VITCO to Reddam House Third party School fees 3,132.03 20/07/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Third party Farm 2,195.00 20/07/2005 VITCO to Kambala School Third party School fees 5,025.00 10/08/2005 VITCO to Harmen Heesen Third party Farm 385.75 18/08/2005 VITCO to Broken Bay Supplies Third party Boat 12,509.11 18/08/2005 VITCO to Tritab and Hunter Farm Irrigation Supplies Third party Farm 8,673.80 21/09/2005 VITCO to B J Ritter Third party Farm 2,490.00 21/09/2005 VITCO to Kambala School Third party School fees 7,494.68 21/09/2005 VITCO to Broken Bay Slipway Third party Boat 7,394.89 21/09/2005 VITCO to Wilson Landscaping Supplies Third party Farm 1,525.00 21/09/2005 VITCO to Reddam House Third party School fees 3,253.27 25/10/2005 VITCO to Macsif & Barberie Machinery Third party Farm 2,938.60 29/11/2005 VITCO to Comcove Pty Ltd Third party Boat 27,400.00 01/12/2005 VITCO to Kambala Third party School fees 5,430.01 07/12/2005 VITCO to Reddam House Third party School fees 3,348.00 07/12/2005 VITCO to Comcove Pty Ltd Third party Boat 5,019.00 29/12/2005 VITCO to Austall Pty Ltd Third party Farm 3,658.69 29/12/2005 VITCO to McGlynn & Partners Third party Other 3,519.00 20/01/2006 VITCO to Mclachlan Group Third party Farm 5,520.00 20/01/2006 VITCO to Sea Wasp Australia Third party Boat 10,270.00 20/01/2006 VITCO to Comcove Marine Diesel Third party Boat 14,320.00 07/02/2006 VITCO to Birdon Marine Third party Boat 9,418.55 07/02/2006 VITCO to Comcove Diesel Traders Third party Boat 4,969.00 07/02/2006 VITCO to Solicitors for settlement of Lot 51 Mill Creek Road Stroud Third party Lot 51 Mill Creek Road Stroud 141,687.00 09/03/2006 VITCO to Reddam House Third party School fees 3,699.00 09/03/2006 VITCO to Kambala School Third party School fees 5,906.00 21/03/2006 VITCO to Marine Direct Australia Third party Boat 450.00 28/03/2006 VITCO to Birdon Marine Third party Boat 10,019.00 19/04/2006 VITCO to Webb Bros Pty Ltd Third party Farm 12,581.00 09/06/2006 VITCO to Reddam House Third party School fees 5,036.00 15/06/2006 VITCO to Kambala School Third party School fees 6,268.55 15/06/2006 VITCO to Helicopter Transport and Training Third party Helicopter 5,019.00 15/06/2006 VITCO to Birdon Marine Pty Ltd Third party Boat 9,019.00 16/06/2006 VITCO to Skoczynska Travel Third party Other 1,217.49 SUBTOTAL 350,792.42 2006/2007 FINANCIAL YEAR 21/07/2006 IFTCO to Harrie Murrell Real Estate t/a Raine and Horne Realty - re 36 Yarranabbe Rd Third Party Rent 7,405.00 21/07/2006 IFTCO to Birdon Marine - ref M272 Third Party Boat 9,019.00 21/07/2006 IFTCO to Electronic Marine Solutions ref Inv Los Lobos Third Party Boat 9,279.90 22/08/2006 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 06/09/2006 IFTCO to Reddam House Third Party School fees 2,805.01 06/09/2006 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 3,321.00 22/09/2006 IFTCO to Gloucester Timber Third Party Farm 1,355.00 22/09/2006 IFTCO to Metro Built-In Wardrobe Third Party Farm 3,449.00 22/09/2006 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 22/09/2006 IFTCO to Birdon Marine - ref M272 02 Third Party Boat 10,019.00 28/09/2006 IFTCO to Peggy Wilson ref C Pratten Manure (Wilson Landscaping Supplies) Third Party Farm 1,519.00 11/10/2006 IFTCO to Birdon Marine - ref M272 Third Party Boat 10,019.00 11/10/2006 IFTCO to Dwyer Young and Co Third Party Farm 23,867.00 26/10/2006 IFTCO to Zacs Glass Service Third Party Farm 1,119.00 26/10/2006 IFTCO to B J Ritter Third Party Farm 1,520.50 26/10/2006 IFTCO to Barbarie Machinery Third Party Farm 1,916.40 26/10/2006 IFTCO to Kambala Third Party School fees 2,265.88 26/10/2006 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 26/10/2006 IFTCO to Cecil James Hyde and Paul Anthony Hyde Third Party Other 1,219.00 02/11/2006 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 6,412.75 28/11/2006 IFTCO to Kambala Third Party School fees 4,472.47 28/11/2006 IFTCO to Reddam House (school fees) Third Party School fees 4,682.00 28/11/2006 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 6,469.50 28/11/2006 IFTCO to Fieldquip Third Party Farm 6,729.00 28/11/2006 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 28/11/2006 IFTCO to Pollock and Cummins Third Party 38,266.00 11/12/2006 IFTCO to Glenwood Rural Build Third Party Farm 12,626.00 11/12/2006 IFTCO to Birdon Marine - ref M272 Third Party Boat 15,019.00 21/12/2006 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 16/01/2007 IFTCO to Birdon Marine Pty Ltd ref M272 Third Party Boat 71,049.00 02/02/2007 IFTCO to Metalcorp Steel Third Party Farm 6,351.10 01/03/2007 IFTCO to solicitor (Ray Martin) Third Party Solicitor 926.50 02/03/2007 IFTCO to Hugh Slatyer Architects re Stroud Supermarket Development Third Party Hardware 3,319.00 19/03/2007 IFTCO to Hugh Slatyer Architects re Stroud Supermarket Development Third Party Hardware 5,019.00 19/03/2007 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 7,370.70 26/03/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 12/04/2007 IFTCO to Peggy Wilson ref C Pratten Manure (Wilson Landscaping Supplies) Third Party Farm 4,800.00 26/04/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 02/05/2007 IFTCO to Hugh Slatyer Architects re Stroud Supermarket Development Third Party Hardware 9,909.00 16/05/2007 IFTCO to Reddam House Third Party School fees 8,319.00 16/05/2007 IFTCO to Kambala Third Party School fees 13,033.00 28/05/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 28/06/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,405.00 SUBTOTAL 381,516.70 2007/2008 FINANCIAL YEAR 13/07/2007 IFTCO to Heli-Centre Australia Third Party Helicopter 23,347.46 26/07/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,406.00 01/08/2007 IFTCO to George Macedo - ref Property Sale Third Party Purchase of land 25,020.00 31/08/2007 IFTCO to Reddam House Third Party School fees 3,887.00 31/08/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,406.00 31/08/2007 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 8,748.50 31/08/2007 IFTCO to George Macedo - ref Property Sale Third Party Purchase of land 25,020.00 03/09/2007 IFTCO to Kambala Third Party School fees 6,671.65 04/10/2007 IFTCO to Glenwood Rural Build re Byidaho Third Party Farm 3,388.00 04/10/2007 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 5,432.00 04/10/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,406.00 16/10/2007 IFTCO to Hugh Slater Architects re Austrac Third Party Hardware 4,684.00 23/11/2007 IFTCO to Heli-Centre Australia Third Party Helicopter 60,176.51 03/12/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,406.00 24/12/2007 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,386.00 16/01/2008 IFTCO to George Macedo - ref Property Sale Third Party Purchase of land 10,020.00 24/01/2008 IFTCO to Adam Joel Daniel and Angela Lee Daniel Third Party Farm 4,409.00 24/01/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,406.00 29/02/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 29/02/2008 IFTCO to George Macedo - ref Property Sale Third Party Purchase of land 10,020.00 03/04/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,406.00 07/04/2008 IFTCO to George Macedo - ref Property Sale Third Party Purchase of land 10,020.00 27/05/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 14,792.00 28/05/2008 IFTCO to George Macedo - ref Port Villa Vanuatu Final Payment Third Party Purchase of land 10,020.00 19/06/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 24/06/2008 IFTCO to Stacks Taree Trust re parcel of land purchased from George Macedo Third Party Purchase of land 4,250.00 SUBTOTAL 296,580.10 2008/2009 FINANCIAL YEAR 21/07/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 28/08/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 26/09/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 29/10/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 21/11/2008 IFTCO to Raine and Horne re 36 Yarranabbe Road Third Party Rent 7,426.00 12/02/2009 IFTCO to Stacks Taree Pty Ltd re proposed sale of property 20 Cowper Street Stroud Third Party Other 770.00 SUBTOTAL 37,900.00 TOTAL 2,235,065.96 ********** Amendments 29 April 2016 - amended case name in coversheet DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 April 2016