R v Medich (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 1841

Supreme Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Medich (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 1841 Hearing dates: 25 July 2014 Date of orders: 25 July 2014 Decision date: 25 July 2014 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Bellew J Decision: The trial date of 25 August 2014 is vacated. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – trial – necessity to vacate proposed trial date on account of applicant to permanently stay the application Legislation Cited: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Regina – Crown Ronald Edward Medich – Accused Representation: Counsel: Ms G O'Rourke / Ms S Harris - Crown Mr W Terracini SC / Ms A Francis - Accused

Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions – Crown Colin Daley Quinn – Accused File Number(s): 2010/356916 Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment 1. In this matter an application for a permanent stay of the trial has been made on behalf of the accused. I heard evidence and submissions in relation to that application last week and earlier this week. My judgment on that application is presently reserved. 2. At the conclusion of the hearing of the stay application, Mr Williams SC, who appeared for the applicant on that application but not in the trial, indicated that the parties had engaged in some correspondence concerning the issue of whether or not, in the light of that application and in the light of what might follow it, the trial date ought be vacated. 3. I listed the matter this morning for the purposes of hearing the parties in relation to that issue. The reality is that it can be reasonably assumed that the party who is unsuccessful on the stay application will bring proceedings pursuant to s 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 before the Court of Criminal Appeal. I have explained to the parties that the nature of the issues raised on the stay application, together with the short period between now and the proposed trial date, are such that it would be virtually impossible for the Court of Criminal Appeal to convene a bench, conduct a hearing and then deliver judgment prior to the scheduled commencement of the trial on 25 August 2014. 4. In those circumstances the parties have submitted, and I concur, that regrettably, there is no alternative other than to vacate the proposed trial date. 5. That is obviously not a decision which I take lightly. Quite apart from the administrative arrangements which are attendant upon a trial of such length, I recognise the fact that there are a number of witnesses who are on notice to be called by the Crown. I also recognise the fact that the deceased's family would no doubt want a trial to take place at the earliest possible time so as to have some closure of the matter. I also recognise that the accused wishes to have his trial at the earliest possible time. Notwithstanding all of those matters, the practicalities of the situation are that there is no alternative other than to vacate the trial date. 6. As far as the future conduct of the matter is concerned, it is obviously difficult to determine when any appellate process arising out of any judgment on the stay application might be completed. Rather than adjourning the trial for further mention to some specified date, I will leave it to the parties to determine when the matter should come back before me. The listing of the matter can be facilitated by either party contacting my associate for that purpose. 7. I have previously made a suppression order in relation to any matter which might, amongst other things, identify the fact that the accused has made an application for a permanent stay of his trial. Because of the fact that such application has necessarily had a bearing on my decision to vacate the trial date, the suppression order that I have previously made should be understood to continue to apply to these reasons. However, that suppression order does not extend to the fact of the vacation of the trial date. The practical effect of that is that there is no prohibition upon publication of the fact that the trial has been vacated, but there, is in the terms that I have previously outlined, a suppression order applying to my reasons for doing so. 8. The formal order that I make is: 1. The trial date of 25 August 2014 is vacated.