Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Robinson Murray v Bargshoon and Anr [2015] NSWCATAP 19 Hearing dates: 7 October 2014 Date of orders: 09 January 2015 Decision date: 09 January 2015 Jurisdiction: Appeal Panel Before: Harrowell M, Principal Member D Goldstein, Senior Member Decision: 1. Appeal allowed; 2. Orders made by the Tribunal against the first respondent in application MV 14/01582 on 11 July 2014 are set aside; 3. The application by the appellant against the first respondent in proceedings MV 14/01582 is dismissed Catchwords: Jurisdiction of Tribunal to determine claim under the Australian Consumer Law (NSW) Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine a claim under the Consumer Claims Act against a person who is not a supplier Liability of director/ employee of a supplier in respect of a consumer claim Legislation Cited: Australian Consumer Law Consumer Claims Act, 1998 Fair Trading Act, 1987 Cases Cited: Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Steak Plains Olive Farm Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATCD 143 Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings ; Coulton v Holcombe 162 CLR 1 Elkateb v Lawindi R v Orcher ; Trust Company of Australia v Skiwing (2006) 66 NSWLR 77 Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 Texts Cited: Nil Category: Principal judgment Parties: J Robinson Murray (Appellant) S Bargshoon (First Respondent) SSS Best Cars Pty Ltd (Second Respondent) Representation: J Robinson Murray, in person (Appellant) S Bargshoon, in person (First Respondent) No appearance (Second Respondent) File Number(s): AP 14/46478 previously AP 14/0300 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Jurisdiction: Consumer and Commercial Division Date of Decision: 11 July 2014 Before: C Paull, Senior Member File Number(s): MV 14/01582 Judgment 1. This is an appeal against orders made by the Tribunal on 11 July 2014 in respect of the sale of a second-hand Mitsubishi Mirage motor vehicle in proceedings MV 14/01582. 2. The Tribunal made an award in favour of the appellant against both respondents in the sum of $77.00 being the costs of decommissioning a vehicle immobiliser system in the Mitsubishi Mirage and gave written reasons (July decision). The appellant claimed additional sums, details of which are set out below. However, these claims were not allowed by the Tribunal. 3. The appellant is the daughter of Ms Sarah Robinson. Sarah Robinson became the registered owner of a Mitsubishi Mirage which is the subject of this application. The vehicle was purchased from SSS Best Cars Pty Ltd, the second respondent in this appeal, on 1 September 2012. 4. The first respondent, Mr Bargshoon, was at all relevant times a director of the second respondent and the representative of the second respondent who dealt with the appellant and Ms Sarah Robinson in relation to the sale of the motor vehicle. 5. The second respondent was deregistered on 3 August 2014, after this appeal had been commenced. When the hearing of this appeal occurred on 7 October 2014, this fact was drawn to the attention of the appellant and on the application of the appellant the appeal against the second respondent was dismissed on 7 October 2014. 6. The appellant sought to continue the appeal in respect of the orders made against the first respondent. These reasons relate to the appeal in respect of orders made against the first respondent, Mr Bargshoon, only. Background 1. The proceedings have had a long history before the Tribunal. Prior to dealing with the substantive appeal it is appropriate to recount what has occurred before the Tribunal. 2. The appellant originally commenced proceedings in the Tribunal against the second respondent only. These proceedings were proceedings number MV 12/51721 (original proceedings). The original proceedings were commenced on 11 October 2012 and orders were made by the Tribunal on 14 February 2013. These orders required the second respondent to pay to the appellant the sum of $3250.00 and for the appellant to return to the second respondent the Mitsubishi Mirage. This sum was paid by the second respondent to the appellant and the appellant returned the Mitsubishi Mirage to the second respondent. 3. The orders in the original proceedings were the subject of proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Robinson-Murray v Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2013] NSWSC 1914). In those proceedings the court set aside the decision made 14 February 2013 and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be determined according to law. The appellant did not return the money received from the second respondent pursuant to the orders of the original decision nor did the second respondent return the Mitsubishi Mirage to the appellant. The orders of the Supreme Court were made on 20 December 2013. 4. Following the proceedings being remitted to the Tribunal they became proceedings number MV 14/01582 which is the subject of this appeal. 5. Prior to application MV 14/01582 being fixed for hearing the first respondent was joined as a party by order of the Tribunal made 12 March 2014. The basis of the claim against the first respondent was not identified in the orders made and basis upon which the first respondent was joined to the application, the subject of the present appeal, has not been identified. Notice of appeal 1. The appellant identified the grounds of appeal as follows: "The appellant lost $23,000 after buying a car that was a dangerous car that should never have been on the road. Applicant does not want an unsafe dangerous and dangerous car and is unable to work full time and had to get a loan to get a car that actually went, the applicant is in debt because of the dangerous car sold her, she has no money whatsoever and the wrong decision today made her have a breakdown. The member made many mistakes on her decisions, clearly she did not read the evidence in front of her. The member states that the NRMA report only has two items as requiring immediate attention, look again it states 22 defects needing immediate attention and three defect that are illegal and dangerous. I state the car is not roadworthy and poorly fixed accident damage, this alone warrants a new hearing, the member clearly has not read the document in front of her." 1. The orders sought on appeal are, in effect, that the appellant receive a full refund for the motor vehicle which she purchased and says was not roadworthy and that all money she has expended be returned. The total amount claimed is approximately $23,000. 2. Provided as part of the appeal and which became Exhibit A in the proceedings is the audio recordings of the hearing before the Tribunal on 11 July 2014. The audio recording identifies that the $23,000 claimed is made up of the following items: 1. A refund of $4250.00 being the cash paid for the Mitsubishi Mirage; 2. An amount of $6000 which the appellant contends was the true value of a Mitsubishi Magna which the appellant says belonged to her mother and for which a trade-in allowance of $250 was allowed against the purchase price of the Mitsubishi Mirage; 3. An amount of $77.00 paid to Star Auto Electrics on 18 September 2012 being the cost of disconnecting a vehicle immobiliser system installed in the Mitsubishi Mirage which did not operate after the vehicle was purchased; 4. An amount of $542.20 paid to Terry Ryan Automotive Services on 8 November 2012 being works required and a vehicle inspection undertaken for the purpose of reregistration of the Mitsubishi Mirage which had been sold with three-month registration only, which registration expired in November 2012; 5. An amount of $250 paid to NRMA for a vehicle inspection report of the Mitsubishi Mirage, which report was relied upon in support of the appellant's claim; 6. $1524.00 being the cost of driving lessons which the appellant said she would not have had to spend because she asserts that the Mitsubishi Mirage was purchased for the purpose of enabling the appellant's mother, Ms Sarah Robinson, to provide driving lessons, a matter made known to the first and second respondent when the motor vehicle was purchased; and 7. An amount of $13,000.00 claimed as interest on an alternative car subsequently purchased by the appellant. 1. The amounts claimed are identified at various paragraphs of the July decision. 2. In relation to items (a) and (b), namely the claim for return of $4250.00 paid as cash for the Mitsubishi Mirage and the claim of $6000.00 the being the amount said to be payable for the alleged loss relating to the Mitsubishi Magna which was provided as a trade-in, it is relevant to note that the appellant contended in the appeal that a trade-in allowance of $250 was given in respect of the Mitsubishi Magna against a purchase price of $4500 payable for the Mitsubishi Mirage. The balance of the purchase price was paid in cash consisting of two payments of $3500.00 and $750.00. The first respondent agreed that payments totalling $4250 had been received having initially suggested in the appeal that the second respondent had only received cash totalling $3500.00. 3. The appellant asserted that she was entitled to compensation for the Mitsubishi Magna beyond the amount agreed for the trade-in allowance because her mother had spent a considerable amount of money on repairs to the Mitsubishi Magna and, so the appellant contended, the vehicle had a value in excess of the trade-in allowance which had been agreed. Issues for determination on Appeal 1. At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal the appellant was asked by the appeal panel to identify the legal basis of the claims made against the first respondent as well as the factual matters. 2. It is common ground in this appeal that the motor vehicle dealer was the second respondent and at all times the first respondent was a director of the first respondent and the representative of the first respondent who sold the motor vehicle. 3. No suggestion was made in the appeal that the first respondent was a party to a contract with the appellant. Therefore, any claim against the first respondent could not be a claim for breach of contract by the first respondent. 4. The appellant suggests that the award in her favour against the first respondent was in error and that she was entitled to recover against the first respondent the amounts totalling approximately $23,000 outlined above. 5. A determination of this appeal requires an identification of the legal and factual issues that were required to be addressed by the Tribunal in the July decision, a consideration of whether or not those issues were addressed, whether the orders made were appropriate and whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the claim against the first respondent. 6. The orders made in the July decision were as follows: 1. I note the orders made in MV 12/5172 (sic) (the prior orders) 2. I note that pursuant to the prior orders the applicant has received from the respondent the sum of $3250 and has returned the subject motor vehicle to the respondent. 3. I note the Supreme Court proceedings of 20 December 2013 setting aside the prior orders. 4. In the proceedings before me I dismissed the application other than to award the applicant $77. 5. Accordingly I ordered the respondents to return the subject motor vehicle, at their own expense to the applicant on or before 25 July 2014. 6. Within seven days of receipt of the subject vehicle and no later than 1 August 2014 I order the applicant to pay the respondent $3173." 1. In making these orders the Tribunal gave the following reasons: "The crux of the applicant's claim is that the car was not of merchantable quality or fit for purpose. To succeed in this she must show this was the position at the time she purchased the vehicle under the contract. In finding the applicant has failed to establish a case I am particularly persuaded by the following: (1) the vehicle was sold without a warranty as is provided under the motor dealers act 1974. While this does not have the effect of overriding the applicant's rights to purchase a car of merchantable and (sic) quality and one that is fit for purpose I am of the view that it does have some bearing in considering what those terms mean within the context of this contract and it is too that I now turn. (2) The vehicle was manufactured in 1998 and had mileage of 142,526 at the time of sale. (3) What is more it was sold for around $4999. Incoming to this finding I have taken account of the 4999 written as the cash price in the Motor Dealers Form (A7). Although the applicant's mother disputed this and denied it was her signature on that document, there was no evidence to corroborate this very serious allegation. What is more the applicant's own banking records show payments of $3500 and $750, totalling $4250. While I accept that the applicant's mother may have also provided her own car as a trade-in (and this may explain the difference between the $4250 cash payments recorded at A4 and the $4999 in A7) there was no substantiating evidence as to the value of the trade-in. The $6000 put forward by the applicant in her oral evidence based on her internet searches was no more than speculative. (4) Further, when the applicant went to register the vehicle in November 2011 she was able to do so for another six months - albeit that she was required to pay $542 for service and repair work. (5) During the time from purchase to the time of the NRMA Inspection report-some 4 months-at which time the applicant stated she stopped driving the car, she had driven over 2000 km (the mileage at purchase was 142,526k -see A7-and at the date of the NRMA inspection-A 3-144,850k. (6) What is more the NRMA reported daily rates the air-conditioning (one of the applicant's main grievances) as minor; two items as requiring immediate attention and the rest of needing early repair-and this is after as I have stated, the this (sic) 14 year old car which was purchased for $4999 had travelled over 2000k within 4 months of purchase. I do however accept the applicant's uncontested evidence that she relied on the respondents' representation that the alarm system was satisfactory and that this did not prove to be the case thus requiring her to incur a cost of $77 almost immediately after purchase. Given my findings and the circumstances arising from the previous Tribunal orders I will take account of the $77 in my orders which need to address the situation of the respondent having the vehicle and the applicant the benefit of the money under the previous orders which have now been set aside following the Supreme Court proceedings." 1. It would seem from these reasons that the basis for the orders made against the first respondent was that a representation had been made in connection with the alarm system of the Mitsubishi Mirage being satisfactory for which the first respondent was responsible. In addition, although the first respondent was not a party to the original proceedings it would appear by order 5 the first respondent was required to return the Mitsubishi Mirage to the appellant despite the fact the Mitsubishi Mirage had in fact been returned to the second respondent pursuant to orders made in the original proceedings. 2. In reaching this conclusion the member identified that there was an issue about whether the appellant's mother, Ms Sarah Robinson should have been an applicant in the proceedings. It would appear from the audio recording that the evidence before the Tribunal was that Ms Sarah Robinson became registered owner of the Mitsubishi Mirage and that she was a contributor to the purchase price because she was the owner of the Mitsubishi Magna which was provided as a trade-in for the purchase of the Mitsubishi Mirage. 3. In relation to this matter, the Tribunal said in its reasons for the July decision that: "Before concluding I will note briefly that there may be some issue of the applicant's mother also being an applicant to these proceedings. Given, however, the applicant's uncontested evidence that she was the recipient of the subject vehicle, contributed to the purchase price, the wide definition of a "consumer" under the Consumer Claims Act and my findings I have not taken this matter any further." Decision 1. The only mater for determination is the appeal in respect of orders concerning the first respondent. 2. As is evident from the last paragraph of the July decision, the Tribunal made an order against the first respondent on the basis that the appellant's claim was a consumer claim within the meaning of the Consumer Claims Act, 1998 (CC Act). 3. Section 3A of the CC Act provides that a consumer claim is a claim by a consumer "that arises from a supply of goods and services by a supplier to a consumer". A supplier means "a person who, in the course of carrying on, or purporting to carry on, a business, supplies goods or services". 4. No suggestion was made by either party in the present appeal that the appellant was not the contracting party to purchase the goods nor is a suggestion made in the present appeal that the appellant is not a consumer within the meaning of the CC Act. It was also not in dispute that the motor dealer selling the car to the appellant was the second respondent, SSS Best Cars Pty Ltd. 5. The claim against the second respondent related to a contract between the second respondent and the appellant. As indicated in the July decision this claim included the Tribunal considering a claim relating to breach of contract (including breaches of terms implied into that contract by legislation such as the Australian Consumer Law (ACL). 6. The first respondent was not a party to this contract as supplier or otherwise. The first respondent was not a supplier within the meaning of the CC Act, the supplier in the present case being the second respondent against whom the appeal has been dismissed. 7. Consequently, absent any other enabling legislation, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim against the first respondent. 8. Further, it appears to the Appeal Panel that even if the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to determine the claim made against the first respondent, an order should not have been made against the first respondent requiring him to return the Mitsubishi Mirage. 9. The first respondent was not a party to the original proceedings and was not the subject of any order in the original proceedings. The Mitsubishi Mirage was not delivered to him pursuant to orders made in the original proceedings. The Mitsubishi Mirage was delivered to the second respondent and having regard to the deregistration of the second respondent and in the absence of evidence to satisfy the Tribunal that the Mitsubishi Mirage is in fact in the possession and control of the first respondent order 5 is not an order with which the first respondent could comply. 10. In relation to the question of whether the Tribunal otherwise had jurisdiction to determine the claim against the first respondent, as indicated above it would appear that the orders made against the first respondent were on the basis of a representation made by the first respondent to the appellant. 11. During the course of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant suggested that the relevant representation related to whether or not the vehicle had multiple owners. As is evident from the reasons above, the issue of multiple owners was not a matter addressed by the Tribunal in reaching its conclusions. Further, from listening to Exhibit A it is clear that the issue of multiple owners was not an issue of fact raised at the hearing on 11 July 2014. As this issue was not raised at the hearing on 11 July 2014, it is not a matter that can be raised on appeal: see Coulton v Holcombe 162 CLR 1. 12. However, it would seem from the reasons for decision that the Tribunal considered that a representation had been made concerning the merchantable quality or fitness for purpose of the Mitsubishi Mirage. A claim in relation to this matter could be cast in a number of ways such as a claim for breach of contract (including terms implied by applicable legislation) or alternatively a claim for misrepresentation (negligent or otherwise) or misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of the ACL. 13. The July decision does not suggest the claim against the first respondent was considered in terms of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. In any event, if it had been cast in this matter, it would have failed because the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to determining a claim within the meaning of the CC Act. As indicated above, the first respondent is not a supplier and the claim against the first respondent is not a consumer claim within the meaning of the CC Act. 14. Another possible way that the claim could have been put against the first respondent was on the basis that the first respondent had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in contravention of section 18 of the ACL, found in Chapter 2 of the ACL. 15. The ACL is federal legislation and claims brought pursuant to the provisions of the ACL for orders under Part 5 of the ACL must be brought in a court. The Tribunal is not a court for the purpose of federal legislation: see Trust Company of Australia v Skiwing (2006) 66 NSWLR 77 and Australian Executor Trustees Ltd v Steak Plains Olive Farm Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATCD 143. 16. However, the ACL also applies as a law of New South Wales pursuant to section 28 of the Fair Trading Act, 1987 (FT Act). In this regard the ACL is referred to as the Australian Consumer Law (NSW) 17. While the Tribunal is not a court for the purpose of making orders under Part 5 of the Australian Consumer Law (NSW): see section 30 of the FT Act, section 74 (3) of the FT Act provides as follows: "(3) The Tribunal may decide the matter of whether a person has suffered loss or damage because of the conduct of another person that constitutes a contravention of Chapter 2 or 3 of the ACL if the matter arises in connection with another matter the subject of proceedings in the Tribunal. In deciding the matter of loss or damage, the Tribunal may award such sum, and make such ancillary orders, as it thinks fit." 1. Therefore, the issue is whether or not the present claim is a matter that "arises in connection with another matter the subject of proceedings in the Tribunal" and whether the FT Act otherwise grants jurisdiction to the Tribunal to determine claims by a consumer against a person who is not a "supplier" within the meaning of the CC Act. 2. In our view section 74 (3) does not grant jurisdiction to the Tribunal to determine a matter of whether a party has suffered loss or damage suffered because of the contravention of Chapters 2 and 3 of the ACL unless: 1. the person seeking to make that claim was otherwise entitled to bring proceedings in the Tribunal against the other party in respect of another matter for which the Tribunal has jurisdiction; and 2. the contravening conduct arises in connection with the proceedings before the Tribunal. 1. In broad terms jurisdiction arises where: 1. There is an entitlement to make an application to the Tribunal; 2. In respect of defined disputes; and 3. The Tribunal has power to make orders relevant and/or necessary to the adjudication and disposition of the dispute (whether by monetary award or otherwise) 1. The dispute for which jurisdiction is granted can be defined in various ways including by reference to particular parties, particular transactions, particular types of claims or a combination of these factors. The CC Act and the Home Building Act, 1989 provide examples of how the legislature has provided jurisdiction to the Tribunal. 2. In addition, disputes which might be determined by the Tribunal can be defined by reference to other disputes which have a connection with a dispute the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine. 3. Jurisdiction is not divorced from the powers of the Tribunal, and the legislative scheme regulating the making of an application. In Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514 , at page 561, Toohey J said, in construing the powers of the Federal Court to grant an amendment: "but the reasoning blurs notions of jurisdiction and power; importantly, it fails to accord due weight to limitation provisions expressed in the Act itself. "Jurisdiction", it has been said, means "the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way or its decision". In the exercise of its jurisdiction, a court has powers expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislation governing it. …". That authority is given to the Tribunal by the legislation enabling an application to be made, defining the claim for which an application can be made and giving power to the Tribunal to make orders to resolve the controversy. 1. Section 74(3) seeks to provide a connection between claims under the ACL and claims the subject of proceedings in the Tribunal by use of the expression "arises in connection with" so as to allow the Tribunal to decide a relevant matter under the ACL. The expression "arises in connection with" has a wide meaning. 2. In Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings [1992] FCA 446; (1992) 110 ALR 239: Wilcox J stated: "The phrase 'in connection with' is one of wide import, as I had occasion to observe in a different context in Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1987] FCA 301; (1987) 16 FCR 465 at 479-80; [1987] FCA 301; 77 ALR 577 at 591-2: The words 'in connexion with' ... do not necessarily require a causal relationship between the two things: see Commissioner for Superannuation v Miller [1985] FCA 445; (1985) 8 FCR 153 at 154, 160, 163; [1985] FCA 445; 63 ALR 237 at 238, 244, 247. They may be used to describe a relationship with a contemplated future event: see Koppen v Commissioner for Community Relations (1986) 11 FCR 360 at 364, Johnson v Johnson [1952] P 47 at 50-1. In the latter case the United Kingdom Court of Appeal applied a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, Re Nanaimo Community Hotel Ltd [1945] 3 DLR 25, in which the question was whether a particular court, which was given 'jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions that may arise in connection with any assessment made under this Act', had jurisdiction to deal with a matter which preceded the issue of an assessment. The trial judge held that it did, that the phrase 'in connection with' covered matters leading up to, or which might lead up to an assessment. He said ...: 'One of the very generally accepted meanings of 'connection' is 'relation between things one of which is bound up with or involved in another'; or, again 'having to do with'. The words include matters occurring prior to as well as subsequent to or consequent upon so long as they related to the principal thing. The phrase 'having to do with' perhaps gives as good a suggestion of the meaning as could be had.' This statement was upheld on appeal". 1. In Elkateb v Lawindi (1997) 42 NSWLR 396 Giles CJ Comm D (as his Honour then was) said: "The phrase 'in connection with' has on many occasions been said to be of considerable width, satisfied by a link or an association ( Commissioner for Superannuation v Miller [1985] FCA 445; (1985) 8 FCR 153) or a relationship ( Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [No 1] [1987] FCA 301; (1987) 16 FCR 465; Drayton v Martin (1996) 137 ALR 145) and summed-up in the phrase 'having to do with': see the same cases and Nanaimo Community Hotel Ltd v Board of Referees [1945] 3 DLR 225. As with the phrase 'in relation to', no doubt the context or the purpose may require that the link, association or relationship be of a particular kind, sometimes described as an appropriate or relevant relationship ( Perlman v Perlman [1984] HCA 4; (1984) 155 CLR 474; R v Ross-Jones; Ex parte Green [1984] HCA 82; (1984) 156 CLR 185 and O'Grady v Northern Queensland Co Ltd [1990] HCA 16; (1989) 169 CLR 356), but it should not be read down unless there be compelling reason to do so ( Fountain v Alexander [1982] HCA 16; (1982) 150 CLR 615). This approach to the phrases 'in relation to' and 'in connection with' has been recognised in the context of arbitration clauses (see IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 466), and in Dowell Australia Ltd v Triden Contractors Pty Ltd [1982] 1 NSWLR 508 it was said (at 515) that the latter phrase 'should ... exclude only claims entirely unrelated to the commercial transaction covered by the contract' and extended to a claim to rectification. IBM Australia Ltd v National Distribution Services Ltd is also authority for the more general proposition that an arbitration clause expressed in language of this kind is not to be narrowly construed" (at 402). 1. In R v Orcher [1999] NSWCCA 356; (1999) 48 NSWLR 273 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal was concerned with an offence under s 326(1) Crimes Act 1900 of threatening, "to do or cause ... any injury or detriment to any person on account of anything lawfully done by a person: `(c) as a public justice official in or in connection with any judicial proceeding". 1. Spigelman CJ (with whom Grove and Sully JJ agreed) referred to the following statement that the Full Federal Court made in a statutory context in Burswood Management Ltd v Attorney General (Cth) [1990] FCA 203; (1990) 23 FCR 144 at 146: '[I]n connection with' are words of wide import: and the meaning to be attributed to them depends on their context and the purpose of the statute in which they appear". 1. His Honour also referred to the observation (quoted with approval in Burswood ) of Davies J in Hatfield v Health Insurance Commission [1998] FCA 1340; (1987) 15 FCR 487 that words such as "in connection with" are "subject to the context in which they are used, to the words with which they are associated and to the object or purpose of the statutory provision in which they appear" (at 491). 2. Section 74(3) requires that the connection must be with "another matter the subject of proceedings in the Tribunal". That is the "connection" is not only with the "matter" but also with "proceedings in the Tribunal". 3. The expression "matter" in section 74(3) is referring to a "cause of action" or issue to be determined, not proceedings. Thus s74(3) authorises the Tribunal to decide a cause of action or issue relating to a contravention of Parts 2 and 3 of the ACL and make an award of money or ancillary orders if appropriate. 4. However, the language of the section does not authorise the making of an application. The section contemplates there is already in existence a dispute concerning "another matter the subject of proceedings in the Tribunal". There is no express power in section 74(3) or otherwise in the FT Act to authorise the making of an application to the Tribunal; 1. to determine a claim under the ACL by one person against another person absent other proceedings in the Tribunal; or 2. to join that other person as a respondent to an existing proceeding brought by the applicant against a third party. 1. Therefore any entitlement to apply to the Tribunal for orders under the ACL against a person who is not already a party to proceedings before the Tribunal depends on a power to make such an application under enabling legislation other than the FT Act. 2. In the present case the only possible source of power is the CC Act. 3. As the first respondent is not a person against whom the appellant could otherwise bring an action under the CC Act and the CC Act does not otherwise authorise the making of this claim, a cause of action under the ACL for an award of a sum of money and/or the making of ancillary orders under the FT Act is not a matter the Tribunal was able to determine in the present case. This is because the grant of jurisdiction to the Tribunal under the CC Act is in respect of "consumer claims". Consumer claims are defined by a type of transaction between defined classes of people, respectively called "consumers" and suppliers" and the first respondent is not a supplier under the CC Act. 4. Whether or not such a claim could have been brought in a court of competent jurisdiction under the ACL, it is sufficient to record that there was no jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and determine the claim against the first respondent in the present case. 5. Accordingly, the Tribunal was in error in making orders against the first respondent, the appeal should be allowed, those orders against the first respondent should be set aside and the application before the Tribunal by the appellant against the first respondent should be dismissed. 6. The orders of the Appeal Panel are as follows: 1. Appeal allowed; 2. Orders made by the Tribunal against the first respondent in application MV 14/01582 on 11 July 2014 are set aside; 3. The application by the appellant against the first respondent in proceedings MV 14/01582 is dismissed. I hereby certify this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal Principal Registrar ******** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 24 February 2015