R v Taskin [2015] NSWDC 61

District Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Taskin [2015] NSWDC 61 Hearing dates: 17/12/2014; 30/01/2015 Decision date: 04 February 2015 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Judge S Norrish QC Decision: 1st offence - Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years 10 months with a non-parole period of 1 year. 2nd offence - Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years 6 months with a non-parole period of 1 year 3 months Related offence - Sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 month. Catchwords: Criminal - Sentence Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Crimes Act 1900 Cases Cited: Browne v R [2013] NSW CCA 44 Cicekdag v R, [2007] NSWCCA 218 Clay v R [2007] NSWCCA 106 DPP (Commonwealth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSW CCA 194 R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 Jimmy v R [2010] NSWCCA 60 R v Lattouf (unreported) NSWCCA 12/12/1996 Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610 R v Hemsley [2004] NSW CCA 228 R v Renshaw [2012] NSWCCA 91 R v Thomson and Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383 Category: Sentence Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Talat Taskin - Offender Representation: Counsel: Director of Public Prosecutions Mr Brasch - Offender

File Number(s): 2013/241542 & 2013/261299

Sentence 1. HIS HONOUR: Talat Taskin appears today for sentence in relation to three offences, two indictable matters which are to be dealt with in this Court as such and a third matter on a s 166 Certificate. The two indictable offences are offences of demand property in company with menace and robbery whilst armed with an offensive weapon which offences were committed in the early hours of 7 August 2013. 2. The demand property in company with menace is an offence contrary to s 99(2) Crimes Act. It has a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. It has no standard non parole period I am informed. The armed robbery matter contrary to s 97(1) Crimes Act has a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Again it has no standard non parole period. 3. The related offence for which the offender is to be sentenced is an offence of possessing on 8 August 2013, the date as I understand it the prisoner was arrested, a prohibited drug, to wit cannabis leaf of something less than a gram consistent with personal use. I propose in relation to the related offence, bearing in mind the prisoner will be sentenced to a further term of custody, rather than fine him, which might otherwise be an appropriate penalty, to impose a relatively short term of imprisonment which will be concurrent with one of the terms of imprisonment that I am required to impose. 4. The prisoner is a co-accused of a man I sentenced on 18 December 2014, Mr Chaker. Mr Chaker pleaded guilty to the same offences with which this prisoner is concerned and to be sentenced for today. Mr Chaker was committed for sentence to the District Court and in respect to the sentences imposed upon him he received discounts of 25% upon the otherwise appropriate sentence in each case to recognise the utilitarian benefit of his pleas of guilty. 5. The remarks on sentence in relation to Mr Chaker were not ordered for the appearance of Mr Taskin. The reason Mr Taskin and Mr Chaker were separate was simply because, although they initially came before me together when proceedings were conducted in October this year in which the two offenders provided evidence, the proceedings were adjourned for further reports. Particularly relating to Mr Taskin's situation at Odyssey House where he had been resident since December last year. 6. When the matter came back before me, if my memory serves me correctly and I don't have a record of this in front of me, maybe four or five days before 18 December, Mr Chaker who had remained in custody throughout the period of time was ready to proceed but Mr Taskin was not. Thus, Mr Taskin's matter was adjourned to last Friday, 30 January 2015, and Mr Chaker's matter was concluded and I remanded him for a few days for sentence and imposed sentence on 18 December 2014. 7. In relation to Mr Chaker in respect of the armed robbery matter I sentenced him to a total sentence of 4 years imprisonment with a non parole period of 1 year and 6 months to commence 6 months into a sentence I imposed in relation to the demand property in company with menaces. In relation to that offence I sentenced him to a total sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non parole period of 12 months. Thus the effective sentence I imposed upon Mr Chaker was 4 years and 6 months with an effective non parole period of 2 years. 8. I made a finding of special circumstances in relation to each of the sentences I imposed. The reason I fixed a non parole period in relation to the demand property with menaces sentence was to permit his release to parole before the expiration of that sentence. He had no matters on a s 166 Certificate. 9. In respect of the remarks on sentence in relation to Mr Chaker I obviously canvased facts in relation to the matter that were common in all respects to both Mr Taskin and Chaker. Not that they necessarily played the same role in relation to each of the offences. Although the remarks on sentence that I gave in December have not been transcribed, as it transpired I had typed notes of my remarks on sentence that I had prepared myself and I can rely upon those typed notes to reiterate matters that arose in Mr Chaker's which are pertinent to the sentencing of Mr Taskin. 10. I do not propose to repeat the facts as set out in Mr Chaker's sentencing proceedings. Those facts as they were outlined can be taken as read for the purposes of the sentencing of Mr Taskin. I pause to point out, as I will examine in a moment, Mr Taskin is approximately 20 years older than Mr Chaker. Mr Chaker was a person with a shorter criminal history than Mr Taskin but, at the time of the commission of the offences with what I am concerned, was on parole in relation to an armed robbery matter. Mr Taskin has no prior findings of guilt in relation to offences of this type and was not on parole, although he was subject to conditional liberty in that he was on bail in relation to offences that have subsequently been dealt with in the Local Court on 20 February 2014 by an order pursuant to s 9 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 herein after referred to as the Act and a fine. 11. The first issue, however, before dealing with the similarities and dissimilarities of the two offenders in terms of their antecedents and subjective circumstances is to note that whilst I acknowledge that this prisoner, Mr Taskin, was "considerably older" than Mr Chaker the facts make it abundantly clear that Mr Chaker played a leading role in each offence making relevant demands and when necessary undertaking transactions at the nearby ATM in respect of the armed robbery matter and the like, quoting my remarks in sentencing Mr Chaker. 12. There is little evidence in the facts that Mr Chaker was directly influenced by the co-accused, although I accept he was considerably less mature than Mr Taskin. The facts are clear that there is regular reference to the conduct of Mr Chaker in perpetrating the offences or executing the offences whilst Mr Taskin at various times stood or remained silently by. Thus, in terms of the comparison between the two prisoners concerning their respective roles, acknowledging of course that they were part of a joint criminal enterprise, Mr Taskin's pleas of guilty represent his acknowledgment of that fact, it can be fairly said that there is some slight difference between this prisoner and Mr Chaker in terms of their respective moral culpability, if that is the correct expression, on the objective facts so far as the demand money with menaces matter is concerned. But it is clear on the facts that there is greater culpability of Mr Chaker over Mr Taskin in respect of the offence of armed robbery given the observations I made in the sentencing of that prisoner on the previous occasion. 13. Of course I must then weigh up a number of other considerations. There are a number of similarities between the two offenders. Both prisoners had backgrounds of dependency upon prohibited drugs. Mr Chaker had a mental disability which amounted to an intellectual handicap. Mr Taskin has a long-standing mental disability which amounts to a mental illness. 14. I pause for a moment to note, as I have already pointed out, that Mr Chaker was entitled to a 25% discount upon the otherwise appropriate sentence for each offence having regard to his pleas of guilty at the Local Court and the utilitarian benefit of the pleas of guilty. 15. This offender pleaded guilty in respect of the armed robbery matter at the Local Court and was committed for sentence on 20 March 2014, but was committed for trial in relation to the demand property in company with menace. I do not wish to go into the appropriateness of him being committed for trial, that is neither here nor there. 16. I note the specific written submissions about this matter by learned counsel Mr Brasch for the prisoner Mr Taskin, who has skilfully represented his interests in these proceedings. But noting what was said about this matter in submission and the information helpfully provided by Mr Brasch it is my view in accordance with the discretion available pursuant to Thomson and Houlton that the appropriate discount for a plea of guilty entered on arraignment in respect of the demand property with menaces matter is 15%, as was essentially submitted by the Crown. 17. Ultimately, in the scheme of things, it has no effective disadvantage for this prisoner given the structure of the sentence. In that respect I would ask that the remarks I made to prisoner before I was interrupted by the jury's question before I commenced these remarks on sentence, in which I tried to explain to the prisoner that the sentences to be imposed should be included in my remarks on sentence on this occasion. 18. The prisoner gave evidence before me on two occasions. He gave evidence a number of months ago and then gave evidence again when the matter resumed last Friday. It is part of the fabric of the matter that this prisoner, when the matter first came before me when I was doing a sentence list, appeared in circumstances where he was then on Supreme Court bail undertaking a rehabilitation course at Odyssey House. I have evidence in the form of reports from Odyssey House, one particularly dated 14 October 2014 and various certificates of accomplishment which I have taken into account. 19. The report from Odyssey House noted that the prisoner had been in the program since release on bail by order of the Supreme Court since 11 December 2013. He had been through various levels or phases of the program and had been making considerable progress during that period of time. The report dated 14 October 2014 said that the prisoner had shown "significant growth during his time in the Odyssey House program" and that he had been compliant at all times and undertaken advice and undertaken various programs and "push(ed) himself for the best of his ability in order to progress throughout the program and achieve a healthy lifestyle." The report also said that he "demonstrated that he has developed empathy by working well with clients within the detoxification unit and new residents to the program" and he would benefit from completing the program. 20. Unfortunately things went array for Mr Taskin after he appeared before me that first time and he gave evidence that he had some difficulties after he first gave evidence before me. I accept that his lack of motivation, as it may have been described by him or in reports about the matter, is derived more from what he would describe as circumstances that may have been beyond his control. He had ear infections which although medically cleared affected his capacity to understand directions he was given and to respond. Ultimately he was discharged from the program in November 2014 before he returned to appear before me in December, at which time I was forced to revoke his bail respecting the orders made by the Supreme Court in December last year. 21. I accept from the evidence he gave on the last occasion that even though he had been out of the Odyssey House program since November up until the time that I remanded him in custody he had been drug free. He expressed the intention not to use any prohibited drugs again. He had been a user of prohibited drugs for over 20 years. 22. The evidence he gave before me back in October was concerned with a number of aspects of this sentencing proceeding. He expressed remorse for his actions saying that at the time he was "not in the right frame of mind". He had been taking his medication for his long standing mental illness of many years "on and off" and had been using methamphetamine. He said that he had been hearing voices and felt scared at the time and he was "all over the place". He understood the need for him to maintain his medication and gave some details of the living circumstances at the time of the offending and his parents circumstances. He gave evidence about the Odyssey House program. He said in his evidence to me that he "wanted to go back to the community as a changed person" and that Odyssey House had been "the hardest thing" he had ever had to do. His ultimate wish is to return to Turkey, the home of his father, and to participate in a family farm that exists there. He said his father had returned to live in Turkey, although his father is with us today and has been here over the last week visiting his son. 23. Although he conceded in cross-examination that he had not been on medication he said that he had been endeavouring to get a proper assessment from Caritas and he had also been taking methadone from a methadone clinic. He had used methadone over a number of years. The drug that he would normally take to abate the conditions of his mental illness was Seroquel and he said that he believed that taking methlyamphetamine had caused him to hear voices. He said that before he undertook the Odyssey House program he had never been on a residential program before. 24. The background of the prisoner about which he spoke is discussed in the report of Dr Nielssen and in reports from the Probation and Parole Service. All of this has to be seen of course in the context of his criminal history, or his criminal history may be seen in the context of this background of mental illness to which I will refer in a moment. 25. The prisoner was born in 1972. Mr Chaker, I hasten to say, was born in 1993. He has a number of findings of guilt at the Children's Court and then at the Local Court dating back to 1990. Many of his appearances in the Local Court are for summary offences, assaults, minor acts of dishonesty, driving matters, breaching apprehended domestic violence orders, malicious damage and the like. There is one finding of guilt in the Local Court for assaulting a person with intent to prevent apprehension for which he received what was then a good behaviour bond under the Crimes Act. 26. As I have earlier said he has a lengthy history, much lengthier than Mr Chaker, and a large number of findings of guilt, as I read his criminal history, up until now had been dealt with in the Local Court. He does have a finding of guilt for supplying a prohibited drug in 2000 but was given a s10 bond on condition that he undertake psychiatric treatment. It would appear from the record, that whilst he has a great body of antisocial behaviour, many findings of guilt could be seen to be related either to his mental illness or to his long term dependence on or use of prohibited drugs. 27. Dr Olav Nielssen prepared a report on 7 October 2014. Dr Nielssen is a well-respected forensic psychiatrist who is retained equally as I would understand it in my experience by both Crown and defence. He notes that so far as his treatment or his history is concerned in terms of psychiatric history and medical treatment that the offender had had contact with mental health services going back to the early 1990's when his criminal history started. The prisoner told Dr Nielssen that he had been treated by a psychiatrist, Dr Wong, in Macquarie Street for 8 years between 1992 and 2000 and had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and had been treated with a range of medications. 28. His symptoms through the 1990's included hearing voices, seeing things and feeling very depressed. He had been previously admitted to Caritas, the psychiatric ward of St Vincent's Hospital, on three occasions for around 2 weeks at a time, consistent with what would be I would expect substantial psychotic episodes. He had been detained as an involuntary patient. He could not remember being treated by long acting injections such as Modecate as a condition of a community treatment order. His current medication scheme when Dr Nielssen saw him was a potent antidepressant, as it was described, called Efexor and a moderate dose of a tranquilising drug to take at night. He was seeing a psychiatrist regularly at Odyssey House. 29. The offender also reported a traumatic brain injury in 1992 which left him over a period of time confused with gaps in memory. He gave the history of his drug use. So far as his personal background is concerned he came from Turkey to Australia at the age of two. he said his mother had problems with health. He had a middle brother who worked as a software technician but his younger brother had a mental illness as well. He gave details of casual work and some education. He had some relationships over a period of time but it would appear, as he explained to Dr Nielssen, that a number of his criminal offences had an association with some paranoia, particularly in relation to police. 30. The assessment of Dr Nielssen was that he was primarily a diagnosis of schizophrenia based upon the history provided by the prisoner. He said there was little way of objective signs of residual illness at the time of interview. Factors contributing to the development of a chronic form of this mental illness include an inherited vulnerability to psychosis, serious head injury and the use of drugs that might trigger psychosis, particularly cannabis and methamphetamine. 31. He also diagnosed a "substance use disorder" made on the basis of a history of use of drugs and the harmful effects. The role of drug use in triggering episodes of mental illness was noted and its relationship to the recent offences with which I am concerned. He thought that disorder was in remission given the prisoner's treatment at Odyssey House. He noted that the prisoner reported that at the time of the offence he was affected by a combination of methamphetamine, alcohol and symptoms of mental illness triggered by drug use, insomnia and non-adherence to treatment and also his association with his co-accused. I have taken that report into account and it would appear entirely uncontroversial. 32. The prisoner was in Odyssey House, as I am informed from the information available to me, for 11 months and 10 days. He was discharged on 21 November 2014. One of the matters that was requested and ordered by me was an up to date presentence report, and I have a report dated 29 January 2015. This reports upon his discharge from Odyssey House because of his "failure to engage in the program". It was said that he actively failed to participate in daily functions. As I have pointed out there would appear to be a significant deterioration in his cooperation at Odyssey House between 14 October and 21 November consistent I would think with the matters identified by Mr Taskin in his evidence. He was given opportunities to address his poor attitude but Odyssey House felt he was unmotivated to continue and he was discharged. 33. It was noted so far as his association with the Community Corrections Service was concerned over a period of time, marked by a number of periods of supervision, that his engagement had been superficial, that he had a lack of insight into his offending behaviour and also his recent disengagement with the Odyssey House program had raised a question of his motivation. The reporter noted that "it was quite disappointing that he failed to complete Odyssey House which raises concern about his ability to commit to and complete a further program targeted to his offending behaviour." The Community Corrections Service said that although he was suitable for a period of supervision his engagement in case management in the community was doubtful and I have made those observations of the prisoner. 34. There are a number of issues that arise out of the evidence in the case. Of course the time spent in custody will be taken into account. I refused bail in December and he appears from custody now. The prisoner had been in custody for several months before being granted bail in the Supreme Court. I am informed by the parties that he spent 5 months and 21 days in full-time custody up until last Friday and I have made my calculations for backdating the sentence from last Friday. Also there is the period of time that he was at Odyssey House which totals just short of 12 months. 35. There are several decisions which deal with the question of recognition in appropriate cases of time spent in a quasi-custodial setting. One case I was referred to by learned counsel for the prisoner was R v Renshaw [2012] NSWCCA 91, a judgment of the learned Chief Judge of Common Law, Hoeben J where his Honour surveyed a number of authorities with which I am familiar beforehand, Campbell from 1999, Delaney from 2013 and Hughes from 2008. 36. Over many years, in New South Wales at least, courts have been prepared with the approval of the Court of Criminal Appeal to permit a percentage of a time spent in quasi-custody to be acknowledged as time spent in custody, subject to appropriate evidence or knowledge of the character of the rehabilitation centre in question, with discounts of up to 50% or even sometimes beyond recognised. In a recent decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Browne v R [2013] NSWCCA 44, her Honour, Fullerton J for the Court, expressed views, judging from the calculations she undertook quoting extensively from the judgment of Hoeben J to which I referred (see [21]), that a discretionary range of between 50% and 75% of the actual time spent in residential rehabilitation based on the circumstances of the individual case can be allowed. In this matter I believe a discount of 50% is sufficient in all of the circumstances and I understand there was no submission put to the contrary by learned counsel for the prisoner. 37. Of course touching upon this matter is the prisoner's mental illness, a significant matter in the case, as was the mental disability suffered by Mr Chaker a significant matter in the sentencing of that prisoner. Both the learned counsel for the prisoner cited in his written submissions the well known decision of Sperling J in R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228 particularly at [33]-[36]. I am very familiar with Hemsley, not only for the many times that I have been referred to it or had referred to it in judgments, but I actually sentenced Ms Hemsley subsequent to her appearance in the Court of Criminal Appeal and applied 'Hemsley principles' to Ms Hemsley. 38. A more detailed exposition upon the matters very skilfully identified by Sperling J is set out in the judgment of the former learned Chief Judge of Common Law, McClellan J in the decision of DPP (Commonwealth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSW CCA 194, at [177]. 39. His Honour referred to a range of authorities even more extensive than the authorities referred to by Sperling J and he stated that: "Where an offender is suffering from a mental illness, intellectual handicap or other mental problems the courts have developed principles to be applied when sentencing. They can be summarised in the follow manner: "Where the state of a person's mental health contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way the offender's moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in the sentence." 1. In my view I hasten to say that is one matter that applies here subject to some comments I need to make about some authorities helpfully referred to me by the Crown. 2. He went on to say further: "It may also have the consequence that the offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which may otherwise have been imposed." 1. In my view again that applies here, to some extent subject to the matters raised by the learned Crown. 2. Further his Honour said: "It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on the person because the sentence will be more onerous for that person. The length of the prison term or the conditions under which it is served may be reduced." 1. That certainly applies here notwithstanding anything that appears in the judgments referred to by the learned Crown. "Further it may reduce or eliminate the significance of special deterrence. Conversely it may be that because of the person's mental illness (that person) presents more of a danger to the community." 1. I do not believe this prisoner presents as a "danger to the community". It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding his mental illness, there is no suggestion in the facts that he exhibited paranoid or other symptoms such as consistent with psychosis such as to accentuate the threat that was made to the respective victims. 2. The learned then Chief Judge of the Common Law Division also went on to say at [178]: "I should stress that the mental health problems of an offender need not amount to a serious psychiatric illness before they will be relevant to the sentencing process. The circumstances may indicate that when an offender has a mental disorder of a modest severity it may nevertheless be appropriate to moderate the need for general or specific deterrence." 1. It might be fairly said when comparing what his Honour said to what Sperling J said that his Honour has in surveying a greater range of authority brought fresh nuances to bear and fresh matters to take into account in this difficult area of sentencing. 2. The issue of the circumstances of custody being more onerous as a consequence or because of the prisoner's mental illness was in my view demonstrated most admirably, or perhaps disconcertingly although I make no criticism of anyone, from the fact that this prisoner when I remanded him in custody last December was the subject of a request by me directly made to Corrective Services that he be immediately medically assessed when he returned to prison custody and receive all appropriate medication. The prisoner could not take medication with him as I would understand it. 3. Now in fairness to the situation as I understand it, and I appreciate I do not have any evidence from the doctors that assessed him on his admission to Corrective Services, he was assessed by Justice Health on admission to custody. The prisoner grumbled about the fact he was not getting the right levels of medication. These are matters of professional judgment and there is nothing really I can comment upon without hearing the other side of the story. But I accept, at least, that the prisoner felt that the medication he was receiving was not adequate to his needs. Be that as it may, what did emerge from his evidence was that through no fault of Corrective Services, I hasten to say, he was not taken directly to Corrective Services custody and thus put in the hands of Justice Health. He was taken to the Sydney Police Centre and kept there for a week with what I understand from the prisoner's account, and I have got no reason to doubt this, only cursory medical assessment and no medication. This is quite regrettable. It is interesting to note today in the Sydney Morning Herald a report says that there are now over 11,000 people in custody and police are complaining, and rightfully so, that they are being forced through overcrowding to "babysit" people on remand that they otherwise would not be responsible for. 4. Some of the prisoner's evidence I must approach with some circumspection, but the bald facts speak of the types of difficulties that arise for a person with a mental illness in custody. Usually through no fault of theirs, and sometimes through no fault of the authorities, which of course must be considered in accordance with what was said by Sperling J and by McClellan CJ at CL. 5. In this regard I hasten to say I read very closely the two judgments that the learned Crown Prosecutor referred to but, which were not available to hand up to me on Friday, one of the reasons I adjourned the matter to today. One of those judgments is the decision of Cicekdag v R, [2007] NSWCCA 218, I particularly noted the observations that are made by the Court at [38]-[42], and another judgment of Clay v R [2007] NSWCCA 106. 6. In the decision of Clay, which was the first in time, Howie J in his usual erudite way but with not quite the precision subsequently revealed in De La Rosa, discussed the relevance of a mental illness or disorder in the sentencing process. I do not need to go through the discussion. He criticised the sentencing judge in that matter for not undertaking any analysis of the medical evidence before him. He made the observation, obviously that I take into account, that was referred to in the judgment of Engert in 1996 by Gleeson CJ that the fact that an offender is suffering from some form of mental illness or disorder does not necessarily mean that a lesser sentence will be imposed than if the offender had not been suffering from that mental disorder. Obviously, for example, where specific deterrence is to be given greater weight. A classic example of that is the situation of Robert Vincent Veen from 1998 in the decision of the High Court. 7. He also said: "The existence of a mental disorder may mean the culpability of the offender is reduced to whether the full measure of general deterrence is not appropriate or that imprisonment will be more harsh. It may also be that the offender presents as a danger to the community. Some measure of preventative detention is required." 1. Of course no element of preventative detention arises here. He went on to say at para [25] - [26] that: "The prisoner in that matter failed to take his medication, used illegal drugs and thus caused him to commit serious criminal offences. This was not the first occasion that the applicant's mental state had deteriorated under these circumstances. He had previously come under psychiatric care for that reason and had been told that he was to continue to take his medication and avoid drugs. The prisoner in that matter had "chosen" to stop taking medicine on this occasion and used illegal drugs. He must have known that this was likely to make him mentally unstable. The result is that he became irrational and aggressive and the offences were committed." 1. He was not persuaded thus that the prisoner's prospects of rehabilitation were strong and thus less weight would be given to his mental illness as reducing his criminal culpability and more weight should be given to personal deterrence. Whilst there are some features of what his Honour talked about in Clay here, it is not the same type of case. It is not suggested for a start that in the facts of the case the prisoner's conduct exhibited manifestations of his mental illness. Certainly his mental illness was a relevant matter to the offending, but in a far more subtle way than were the facts in Clay. Likewise in relation to the decision in Cicekdag where Clay was referred to and the Court referred to: "The mental disorder was caused to a significant degree by the applicant's drug addiction." 1. This is not that case. I am mindful of a caution that must be exercised, but there are distinctions between those cases and this. 2. I have taken into account the guideline judgement of Henry (1999) 46 NSW LR 346. I specifically refer to that in the other case and the observations I made are to be considered in this case. I am mindful of the guideline which appears at [162] - [165] and also the matters of aggravation that arise and are discussed by the learned Chief Justice at [170]. 3. I am also mindful of the relevance of drug dependency in offending of this type set out by Wood J, then the Chief Judge at Common Law at [273] of that judgment. The truth of the matter is of course that the guideline judgment is to be seen as providing structure and guidance to sentencing. The learned Chief Justice himself acknowledged at [10], the judgment of Acting Chief Justice Mahoney in Lattouf, an unreported judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal: "General principles must of their nature be of justice to the individual case if justice is to be achieved. For this reason it is in my opinion important in the public interest that the sentencing process recognise and maintain a residual discretion in the sentencing judge. There is a public interest in the adoption and articulation of sentencing principles that will deter the commission of serious crime and punish those who commit it. But there are other interests to which the sentencing process must have regard. These are other objectives which the sentencing process must seek to achieve, paramount amongst these is the achievement of justice in any individual case." 1. Of course in this matter there are many common features between this prisoner and the co-accused relating to aggravating factors as well as mitigating factors pursuant to s 21A(2)(3) of the Act. Both prisoners have common aggravating factors of being on conditional liberty, although the other offender was on parole, this prisoner was on bail. In the circumstances, and I emphasise the word "in the circumstances", this breach of conditional liberty by this prisoner is not as severe as that of the other offender, although he was very much less mature. 2. Also, in relation to the second offence in term, the armed robbery, was an offence committed "in company" which is not a pleaded aggravation and that must be taken into account. 3. Mitigating matters in relation to both offenders were few. The prospects of rehabilitation must be guarded. There were the pleas of guilty. I accept the prisoner's remorse as genuine. 4. One of the dominating matters to take into account is of course the purposes of sentencing under s 3A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. There are a number of the purposes there identified that are important subject to of course consideration of the principles set out in De La Rosa, including weight and general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation, punishment, adequate punishment and also of course promoting the rehabilitation of the offender. 5. Particularly one matter of importance is the issue of parity or disparity of sentencing. The matter was very neatly summarised by his Honour Rothman J in the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Jimmy v R in which his Honour, one of three judges who each discussed parity principles, cited Aristotlean principles of "equality", noting that the very essence of equal justice and the parity of sentencing was that alike shall be treated alike and unalike shall be treated unalike to the extent of any un-alikeness. Thus, the likeness or un-alikeness of the two offenders are very closely examined to ensure an appropriate sentence for each. 6. I have taken into account all the matters that were put in submission by the respective parties and that is self-evident by the matters I have cited. Written submissions were very helpful from the learned counsel for the accused. Those and the oral submissions particularly identified the mental condition of the prisoner, his prospects of rehabilitation, the time spent in custody and the issue of special circumstances pursuant to s 44 of the Act. The Crown was helpful in its identification of the aggravating factors and of course taking me to the two authorities that I have cited. I have obviously had regard to them in these reasons. 7. Dealing with the issue of special circumstances I need to address the issue of Pearce v R (1998) 194 CLR 610 [45] where the majority of the High Court dealing with a conviction appeal noted that in sentencing an offender for multiple offences it is appropriate to sentence the offender, not in a global way but by fixing an appropriate sentence for each offence and then by regard to the totality of the criminality reflect that with appropriate accumulation and concurrency. 8. That is the way I approached Mr Chaker and that is the way I approached this prisoner. It seems to me given the very significant commonality of features of the objective offending that there should be some partial accumulation. The two offences, as I pointed out in the facts I stated in Chaker, were very close in time and were in the same area of Woolloomooloo/East Sydney and have a very close relationship to one another given their respective mental states of the two offenders. But there must be some partial accumulation. Thus coming back to s 44 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act that is a "special circumstance". 9. I have noted what the Community Corrections Services report has said in its most recent report but I believe in the context of the prisoner's criminal history and his history of mental illness that there still is a substantial need for an extended period of supervision and guidance to assist the prisoner to adjust to community living and to ensure that he maintains the use of the appropriate medication when he is in the community. I accept the general proposition that when the prisoner is on his medication and not using prohibited drugs he is capable of a law abiding lifestyle to a considerable extent. 10. Coming back to the issue of the prospects of rehabilitation, the reason I am circumspect about those is because given his mental illness and his background of the use of drugs. Noting what he said of course when he gave evidence before me last week, his prospects of rehabilitation are very much dependent upon the use of appropriate medication and avoidance of cannabis and amphetamine type substances. 11. Thus, hopefully having taken everything into account, I turn to the issue of making the appropriate orders. Would you mind standing up Mr Taskin. 12. In relation to the offence of demanding property with menaces in company you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment by way of a non parole period of 12 months to date from 17 February 2014, expiring on 16 February 2015. In relation to that sentence I fix a balance of sentence of 1 year and 10 months which will date obviously 17 February 2015 and that would expire on my calculation on 16 December 2016. 13. In relation to the armed robbery matter you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of imprisonment by way of a non parole period of 1 year and 3 months. That sentence will date from 17 August 2014 and the non parole period will expire on 16 November 2015. In relation to that sentence I fix a balance of sentence of 2 years and 3 months. That balance of sentence will expire, on my calculation, on 16 February 2018. 14. You can take a seat sir. That means you will be eligible for release to parole on 16 November 2015, but that will be a matter for the Parole Authority. In relation to the later offence of possession of a very small amount of cannabis you are convicted. You are sentenced to a term of 1 month imprisonment. That term of imprisonment will date from 17 February 2014 and will have expired on 16 March 2014. 15. I order that the cannabis be destroyed.