R v Pratten (No 14) [2015] NSWSC 457

Supreme Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Pratten (No 14) [2015] NSWSC 457 Hearing dates: 02 April 2015 Date of orders: 02 April 2015 Decision date: 23 April 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Rothman J Decision: (1) Adjourn the motion that is before the Court; (2) Allow the motion to be relisted on 3 working days' notice at such time as the solicitors and counsel in the trial have been engaged; (3) Otherwise, the matter is listed for trial on 18 May 2015. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - application for stay of proceedings - Dietrich principles - adjournment of application until solicitors retained and counsel instructed for retrial Legislation Cited: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) Cases Cited: Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292 R v Souter (1997) 93 A Crim R 400 Sullivan v Department of Transport (1978) 20 ALR 323 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Regina (Crown) Timothy Charles Pratten (Accused) Representation: Counsel: D. Fagan SC/with K. Curry (Crown) G. Bashir SC (Accused)

Solicitors: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Dormer Stanhope Lawyers (Accused) File Number(s): 2010/00315475 Publication restriction: None

JUDGMENT 1. HIS HONOUR: The Court is required to deal with an application for a temporary stay of a pending criminal trial in relation to Mr Pratten, the accused in the trial and the applicant on the motion (hereinafter, "the applicant/accused"). Mr Pratten is the subject of seven charges of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception, contrary to s 134.2 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Code). Each charge relates to a different financial year between 30 June 2003 and 30 June 2009 and relates to knowingly understating income derived in the relevant financial year. 2. The applicant/accused was originally arrested on 22 September 2010 and on 21 November 2011 the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) sought restraining orders pursuant to s 17 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). Those orders were granted. 3. The applicant/accused was tried before a jury; the trial commencing 19 March 2012, and concluding on 13 June 2012, with guilty verdicts in relation to each charge. In addition to the length of the trial, there were a significant number of accounting records and other documents tendered during the course of the trial and it is fair to describe the trial, and the nature of the Crown case, as complex. 4. Apparently, the first trial was initially funded by the applicant/accused and, after a short period of time, was the subject of a grant of Legal Aid. It is said that the sentence proceedings were conducted on behalf of the applicant/accused on a pro bono basis, although, it seems, that the fees for the day of sentence were funded by another grant of Legal Aid. 5. The applicant/accused lodged an appeal against conviction and sentence. A cross-appeal was filed by the CDPP against sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeal heard the appeal, the application for leave to appeal and associated matters over three days in June 2014 and upheld the appeal against conviction on 1 July 2014. The appeal was also funded by the Legal Aid Commission. 6. Having succeeded on the conviction appeal, in the manner determined, the applicant/accused faces another trial, which is scheduled to commence on 18 May 2015, with an estimate of six weeks. 7. The applicant/accused applies for the trial (and proceedings) to "be stayed pending the provision of funding for its preparation and running". In the alternative to the primary orders sought, the applicant/accused seeks to have the commencement date of 18 May 2015 vacated. 8. The applicant/accused was represented throughout the first trial, as well as during substantial proceedings, being a collateral civil attack on the institution of the prosecution by attacking the conduct of the CDPP, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Taxation Office and/or officers thereof in relation to the investigation and was also represented for the prosecution of the appeal. 9. The applicant/accused, as stated, was represented by two senior counsel and junior counsel (instructed by solicitors) during the appeal. One of the bases upon which the appeal was prosecuted was that the verdict was unreasonable, as a consequence of which all of the evidence in the first trial was required to be read by the legal representatives and was the subject of full and thorough submissions to the Court of Criminal Appeal.