Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Doe v Dowling [2017] NSWSC 202 Hearing dates: 1 March 2017 Date of orders: 15 March 2017 Decision date: 15 March 2017 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Harrison J Decision: I find the defendant Shane Dowling guilty of contempt. Catchwords: CONTEMPT – suppression order – where defendant acted in apparent contravention of suppression order made by judge of the Court – whether orders were valid and enforceable – whether publication wilful and in full knowledge of orders – whether defendant committed contumacious contempt – defendant guilty of contempt Legislation Cited: Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 Supreme Court Rules 1970 Cases Cited: Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98; [1986] HCA 46 Commissioner for Fair Trading v Rixon (No.2) [2014] NSWSC 431 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Salvato (No.4) [2014] NSWSC 321 Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; [2002] HCA 56 Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2012] NSWCCA 125 Hinch and Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15; [1987] HCA 56 McGuirk v University of NSW [2009] NSWSC 1058 Mosman Municipal Council v Kelly (No3) [2009] NSWLEC 92 News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel (2010) 30 VR 248 Pelechowski v The Registrar, Court of Appeal (1999) 198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19 R v Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208; [1951] HCA 3 Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal v Willesee [1984] 2 NSWLR 378 Seymour v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2006] FCA 965 The Queen v Hinch [2013] VSC 520 Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; [1995] HCA 3 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Jane Doe 1 (First plaintiff) Jane Doe 2 (Second plaintiff) Shane Dowling (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: K P Smark SC (Plaintiff) Solicitors: Addisons (Plaintiff) File Number(s): 2016/383575 Publication restriction: Nil Judgment 1. HIS HONOUR: These proceedings were commenced by statement of claim filed in court before Campbell J on 21 December 2016. On that day his Honour made the following orders: "1.That, on the undertaking of the plaintiffs' solicitor to pay the filing fee, leave be granted to file in Court: (a) The statement of claim; and (b) This notice of motion. 2. That this motion be returnable instanter. 3. That the plaintiffs be given leave to commence and continue these proceedings by the pseudonyms Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. 4. Pursuant to s 7 of the Courts (Suppression and Non-Publication Orders) Act, 2010 (NSW), the names of the plaintiffs are not to be published without the leave of the Court by reason of s 8(1)(e) of that Act in connection with these proceedings. 5. By 8pm, Wednesday 21 December 2016, the defendant remove the names of the women appearing in the fourth paragraph of the article entitled 'Seven CEO Tim Worner and Amber Harrison Sex Scandal Statement in Full' (21 December 2016 Article), which appears at pages 10-18 of Confidential Exhibit RMK-1 to the affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan sworn 21 December 2016. 6. The defendant be restrained, until further order, from publishing: (a) The imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim filed herein; (b) The 21 December 2016 Article in any form which includes the names of the plaintiffs. 7. Service of the plaintiffs' motion, affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan, statement of claim and a copy of these orders is to be effected by emailing them to the defendant's email address shanedowling@hotmail.com and shanedowling1@biqpond.com by 6pm, Wednesday 21 December 2016. 8. Nothing in these orders prevents the service or enforcement of them, or the defendant from obtaining legal advice in respect of the proceedings 9. The matter is listed before Campbell J at 10am on Friday 23 December 2016. 10. The sealed copy of these orders is to bear the notice referred to in UCPR 40.7(3)." 1. The form of these orders served upon Mr Dowling contained the following notation: "To Shane Dowling. If you disobey these orders you will be liable to sequestration of property and to imprisonment." 1. The plaintiffs now contend that the defendant breached his Honour's orders in several respects and that he has continued to do so. Accordingly, on 2 February 2017, the plaintiffs filed a notice of motion seeking the following orders: "1. A declaration that the defendant was in contempt of Court for breach of the orders of the Court made in these proceedings on Wednesday 21 December 2016, pursuant to the statement of charge subscribed to this motion and marked 'A'. 2. A declaration that the defendant has committed the offence provided for in s 16 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) by contravening the suppression order made by the Court in these proceedings on Wednesday 21 December 2016, pursuant to the statement of charge subscribed to this motion and marked 'A'. 3. That the defendant be punished for contempt (including as provided for in s 16 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW)). 4. An order that the defendant pay the plaintiffs' costs of this motion forthwith and on an indemnity basis. 5. Such further or other order as the Court thinks fit." 1. The Statement of Charge annexed to that motion was amended on 1 March 2017 on the plaintiffs' application, which was ultimately not opposed. The Amended Statement of Charge is now in the following complete terms: "1 On 21 December 2016, the Court made the following orders: (1) That, on the undertaking of the plaintiffs' solicitor to pay the filing fee, leave be granted to file in Court: (a) The statement of claim; and (b) This notice of motion. (2) That this motion be returnable instanter. (3) That the plaintiffs be given leave to commence and continue these proceedings by the pseudonyms Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. (4) Pursuant to s 7 of the Courts (Suppression and Non-Publication Orders) Act, 2010 (NSW), the names of the plaintiffs are not to be published without the leave of the Court by reason of s 8(1)(e) of that Act in connection with these proceedings. (5) By 8pm, Wednesday 21 December 2016, the defendant remove the names of the women appearing in the fourth paragraph of the article entitled 'Seven CEO Tim Worner and Amber Harrison Sex Scandal Statement in Full' (21 December 2016 Article), which appears at pages 10-18 of Confidential Exhibit RMK-1 to the affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan sworn 21 December 2016. (6) The defendant be restrained, until further order, from publishing: (a)The imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim filed herein; (b) The 21 December 2016 Article in any form which includes the names of the plaintiffs. (7) Service of the plaintiffs' motion, affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan, statement of claim and a copy of these orders is to be effected by emailing them to the defendant's email address shanedowling@hotmail.com and shanedowling1@bigpond.com by 6pm, Wednesday 21 December 2016. (8) Nothing in these orders prevents the service of enforcement of them, or the defendant from obtaining legal advice in respect of these proceedings. (9) The matter is listed before Campbell J at 10am on Friday 23 December 2016. (10) The sealed copy of these orders is to bear the notice referred to in UCPR 40.7(3). (the 21 December Orders). 2 The defendant is the sole owner and publisher of the website located at www.kangaroocourtofaustralia.com (the Website). 3 On 21 December 2016, the defendant was served with a sealed copy of the 21 December Orders by email in accordance with order 7. 4 The defendant was aware of the 21 December Orders: (a) Having been served as set out above; and (b) Because he published the 21 December Orders on the Website at the following URL: 'https://kangaroocourtofaustralia.files.wordpress.com/2016/12/2017396_1_jd-orders.pdf' . 5 On 21 December 2016, in contumacious disobedience and contravention of Order 4 of the 21 December Orders, and thereby committing the offence of contravention of suppression order provided for in s 16 of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), the defendant disclosed and published the matters referred to in Order 4 made on 21 December 2017, namely, the names of plaintiffs. 6 From 8pm on 21 December in contumacious disobedience of Order 5 of the 21 December Orders, and thereby committing a contempt of the court, the defendant failed to remove the names of the women appearing in the fourth paragraph of the article entitled 'Seven CEO Tim Worner and Amber Harrison Sex Scandal Statement in Full' (21 December 2016 Article), which appears at pages 10-18 of Confidential Exhibit RMK-1 to the affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan sworn 21 December 2016. 7 From 8pm on 21 December in contumacious disobedience of Order 6(a) of the 21 December Orders, and thereby committing a contempt of the court, the defendant published the imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim. 8 From 8pm on 21 December in contumacious disobedience of Order 6(b) of the 21 December Orders, and thereby committing a contempt of the court, the defendant published the 21 December 2016 Article in a form which includes the names of the plaintiffs. Particulars (a) From 8pm on 21 December 2016, the defendant continued to publish the 21 December 2016 Article on the Website which published and disclosed: a. The names of the plaintiffs; and b. The imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim. (b) On 21 December 2016 at approximately 11pm the defendant published an article on the Website, containing links to the following documents: a. The 21 December Orders; b. The statement of claim filed 21 December 2016; c. The confidential exhibit to the affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan dated 21 December 2016. (Second Article) (c) By publishing the Second Article, the defendant thereby disclosed and published: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim; and c. The 21 December 2016 Article. (d) On 27 December 2016, the defendant published an article on the Website entitled 'Kangaroo Court of Australia 2016 Christmas and New Year Post' which republished the Second Article, thereby disclosing and publishing: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in the statement of claim; and c. The 21 December 2016 Article. (Third Article) (e) On 2 January 2017, the defendant published an article on the Website which published and disclosed: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim; and c. The 21 December 2016 Article. (Fourth Article) (f) On 21 January 2017 the defendant published an article on the Website which published and disclosed: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim; and c. The 21 December 2016 Article. (Fifth Article) (g) The defendant on his Facebook account (https://www.facebook.com/kangaroocourtofaustralia) published the 21 December 2016 Article, the Second Article, the Third Article, the Fourth Article and the Fifth Article thereby disclosing and publishing: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in the statement of claim; and c. The 21 December 2016 Article. (h) The defendant on his Twitter account (https://twitter.com/Kangaroo_Court), published the 21 December 2016 Article, the Second Article, the Third Article, the Fourth Article and the Fifth Article thereby disclosing and publishing: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in the statement of claim; and c. The 21 December 2016 Article. (i) On 23 February 2017, the defendant published on his Twitter account (https://twitter.com/Kangaroo_Court), a document entitled 'Defence February 2017' which discloses: a. The names of the plaintiffs; b. The imputations particularised in the statement of claim." 1. The plaintiffs' notice of motion came before me on 1 March 2017 for hearing. Mr Smark SC appeared for the plaintiffs. The defendant appeared for himself without legal representation or assistance. The plaintiffs relied upon four affidavits sworn by Richard Michael Keegan on 21 December 2016, 9 February 2017, 20 February 2017 and 27 February 2017. These affidavits were read without objection. Mr Keegan was cross-examined by the defendant. The defendant did not tender any evidence and did not give oral evidence. 2. Mr Keegan's affidavits depose, among other things, to service of the notice of motion and Statement of Charge upon the defendant. The defendant appeared and did not suggest that he had not been properly served with the Statement of Charge or that the matter should not proceed before me for want of some or any compliance by the plaintiffs with any necessary procedural requirements. With the possible exception of his discursive cross-examination of Mr Keegan, the defendant did not seek to challenge or contradict that evidence. 3. Apart from indicating at the commencement of the hearing of the notice of motion that he needed to leave the court by no later than 11.30am, in order to go to his place of work, the defendant did not, with one exception, seek to adjourn the hearing of the plaintiffs' notice of motion for contempt. That exception is to be found in the defendant's written submissions (referred to in more detail later in these reasons). Relevantly for present purposes, the defendant's submissions in this respect were as follows: "The court should adjourn the hearing and issue orders that the applicants [Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2] file and serve outlining [sic] their claims and damages and why they believe they are justified having me charged with contempt. Orders should also be issued directing the applicants to show up to court for cross examination. Anyone being charged with contempt should have the right to cross examine their accusers. The contempt of court proceedings against me by [Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2], which is being paid for by Kerry Stokes' Seven West Media, are a clear and blatant conspiracy to have me falsely charged. [Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2] instituted defamation proceedings against me in December 2016 and had corruptly had a suppression order put on their names. An order that no one would get. Because I have not deleted their names they have instituted contempt proceedings which is going on Seven West Media's tab. … If the defamation proceedings are frivolous and vexatious then the contempt proceedings are based on a lie and are a clear attempt to conspire to have someone falsely charged." 1. I did not adjourn the proceedings in response to these contentions. In simple terms, the orders of Campbell J were never challenged by the defendant in any way suggesting that they were invalid or unenforceable or should be set aside. The defendant did not seek orders from the Court upon the basis that his Honour's orders were obtained irregularly or improperly or fraudulently or against good faith. The orders were made solemnly and entered in accordance with the Court's procedures. They have never been the subject of an appeal. It is therefore conspicuously beside the point to attack the plaintiffs' motives in commencing the proceedings if orders that have been made by the Court remain in force and are by definition enforceable. The defendant propounded no proper basis for the adjournment application contained in his written submissions. 2. The defendant did not otherwise seek any additional time to respond to the plaintiffs' evidence. He did not suggest that he was unprepared or for some other reason unable deal with the plaintiffs' allegations against him as described and particularised in the Amended Statement of Charge. 3. As the transcript of the proceedings will record, I suggested to the defendant that it might be advisable for him, having regard to the seriousness of the issues, the difficult legal questions involved and in particular the potentially very onerous consequences of a finding against him, to seek to engage a lawyer or obtain some legal assistance. The matter proceeded with the defendant remaining unrepresented notwithstanding my suggestions. 4. I reserved my decision at the conclusion of the hearing. Background 1. The defendant is the proprietor and significant contributor to a website that publishes a vast collection of miscellaneous and loosely connected articles and opinions. It is unnecessary for present purposes to refer to these articles or opinions in any detail, with the exception of those that are the subject of the present proceedings. The matters complained of by the plaintiffs were published in the first instance by the defendant on his website. As the evidence will reveal, he has published the same or similar allegedly offending material more widely since then, including on Facebook and Twitter. This is referred to in more detail below. 2. The statement of claim seeks the following relief: "1. An order permanently restraining the defendant from publishing the imputations as contained in this statement of claim. 2. Damages. 3. Costs and interest on costs. 4. Any further or other order as the Court thinks fit." 1. The statement of claim is pleaded and particularised in the following terms: "Plaintiffs 1. The first plaintiff is, and has been for at least 10 years, an actress who has appeared on programs produced and broadcast by the Seven Network. 2. The second plaintiff is, and has been for at least 13 years, employed by the Seven Network in an on air role. 3. The defendant is the registrant of the domain name kangaroocourtofaustralia.com and the publisher of a website connected to that domain name called Kangaroo Court of Australia (Website). 4. On or about 21 December 2016, the defendant published of and concerning the plaintiffs an article on the Website, a copy of which is set out at pages 10-18 of Exhibit RMK-1 to the affidavit of Richard Michael Keegan sworn 21 December 2016 (The 21 December 2016 Article). Particulars of publication The 21 December 2016 Article was downloaded and read by persons, including: i. Each of the persons who made comments on The 21 December 2016 Article under the respective user names Les Kelly, Diarmuid Hannigan, ohdeah, Bob. ii. Of the persons listed above, at least one, Les Kelly, is a resident of Tasmania. 5. The 21 December 2016 Article in its natural and ordinary meaning carried the following imputations, each of which is defamatory of the plaintiffs: First Plaintiff a. The first plaintiff, an actress, has been in an adulterous relationship with Tim Worner, CEO of Seven West Media. b. The first plaintiff behaved disgracefully in that she had an affair with a man she knew to be married. Second Plaintiff c. The second plaintiff, a media personality employed by Seven West Media, has been in an adulterous relationship with Tim Worner, CEO of Seven West Media. d. The second plaintiff behaved disgracefully in that she had an affair with a man she knew to be married. Particulars The plaintiffs rely on the following parts of The 21 December Article as giving rise to the imputations listed above: a. The whole of The 21 December Article and in particular lines 13-15, 117-119. 6. By reason of the publication of The 21 December 2016 Article, the plaintiffs have been brought into hatred, ridicule and contempt and have suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage to their reputation and injury to their feelings. 7. The plaintiffs claim the relief set out in this statement of claim. Particulars of aggravated damages i. The failure by the defendant to make any enquiry of the plaintiffs prior to publication; ii. The plaintiff's knowledge of the falsity of the imputations." 1. The 21 December 2016 article referred to in the statement of claim is in the following relevant terms: "SEVEN CEO TIM WORNER AND AMBER HARRISON SEX SCANDAL STATEMENT IN FULL The media release by former Seven employee Amber Harrison, which is below, detailing her sexual relationship with Seven West Media CEO Tim Worner is a powerful read on how some people abuse their positions of authority to satisfy their sexual needs. It is R-rated with some crude content attributed to Tim Worner which he has not denied. An example is one text that Seven West Media CEO Tim Worner sent to Amber Harrison which said: 'I want to f**k you so badly. And I want you to deal with my super hard c**k right now.' Fairfax Media are reporting: 'Maurice Backburn associate Kelly Thomas noted Mr Worner's alleged conduct could not be restricted to his private life, with claims of sex during work hours and text messages to Ms Harrison allegedly saying his performance was 'drug assisted'. Click here to read more There are reports that Tim Worner has had sexual relationships with at least 4 other staff members at Seven which include an actress and on-air-host. I am reliably told the actress is Jane Doe 1 and the on-air-host is Jane Doe 2." 1. The defendant has not denied, and readily concedes, that he published this article. So much is apparent from the terms of his defence filed on 23 February 2017. He has denied that the article or the imputations are defamatory. It is not necessary for me to resolve, or even to express a preliminary view upon, that issue. 2. The plaintiffs maintain that their names have not been removed from the 21 December 2016 article in breach of the order made by Campbell J on 21 December 2016 that the defendant should do so. 3. The plaintiffs maintain that the second article was published by the defendant and is in the following relevant terms: "JANE DOE 2 AND JANE DOE 1 INSTITUTE DEFAMATION CASE RE: SEX WITH CEO ALLEGATIONS Xxx Jane Doe 2 and actress Jane Doe 1 have instituted defamation proceedings against this website and myself (21/12/16) regarding allegations they had sexual relationships with Seven West Media CEO Tim Worner. They have also taken out an injunction to hide their names. On the court documents, they show up as Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. … I also wrote the paragraph: 'There are reports that Tim Worner has had sexual relationships with at least 4 other staff members at Seven which include an actress and on-air-host. I am reliably told the actress is Jane Doe 1 and the on-air-host is Jane Doe 2.' Their case is clearly being run and paid for by Seven West Media. The court orders only demand that I delete their names. So, I take it from the court orders that the rest of the article is true and correct as they have not sued me for it and that Tim Worner is a sex fiend and cocaine addict which the rest of Amber Harrison's media release implies. The allegations were not made by me but by Amber Harrison who blew the whistle on Sunday (18/12/16) regarding her sexual relationship with CEO Tim Worner and how Channel 7 payed off to keep her quiet but then reneged on the deal and played games in an attempt to destroy her. Given that I did not make any allegations against Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 their case against me is frivolous at best. Why haven't they sued Amber Harrison if they believe they have been defamed? Before anyone feels sorry for Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 remember they work for Seven West Media which owns Channel 7 and which smears people's reputations almost every week. Seven West Media also owns magazines like New Idea which smears Lleyton and Rebecca Hewitt regularly and even falsely implying that Mrs Hewitt is having affairs. … So every week some of Jane Doe 2's and Jane Doe 1's pay comes from the deliberate smears by the likes of New Idea. Do Jane Doe 2 or Jane Doe 1 ever complain about that? Yet they think their actions or alleged actions which show up in witness statements should not be reported. Everyone else gets named and Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 can do what everyone else does and issue a denial if they wish. Or they can do what Seven West Media has forced the Hewitts to do and set up a website and write articles to deny rumours and allegations. Having secret court hearings to avoid media scrutiny is a joke and as corrupt as it gets. The allegations of Tim Worner having sexual relationships with four other women, including Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1, shows up in a statement by Amber Harrison that went before Australian Human Rights Commission in her complaint against Seven. It is more than fair to report it. … Related [articles]: Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 thrown under a bus in Tim Worner sex scandal Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 exposed as frivolous in 7 sex scandal defamation case … 49 COMMENTS ON 'JANE DOE 2 AND JANE DOE 1 INSTITUTE DEFAMATION CASE RE: SEX WITH CEO ALLEGATIONS'" 1. The plaintiffs maintain that the third article was published by the defendant on 2 January 2017 and is in the following relevant terms: "Over the last few days I have received a fair amount of media attention regarding the Channel Seven Scandal but apparently the media have been ordered by the court not to name me so I have been referred to as the 'rogue blogger'. This is on top of the suppression order banning the media naming the applicants which of course I have. This alone tells me we are fighting for a justifiable reason when an Australian media company, Kerry Stokes' Seven West Media, can silence all other Australian media companies in a frivolous and vexatious defamation matter. … Related [articles]: Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 thrown under a bus in Tim Worner sex scandal Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 institute defamation case re: sex with CEO allegations Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 thrown under a bus in Tim Worner sex scandal 1. The plaintiffs maintain that the fourth article was published by the defendant on 21 January 2017 and is in the following relevant terms: "JANE DOE 2 AND JANE DOE 1 THROWN UNDER A BUS IN TIM WORNER SEX SCANDAL Channel Seven owner Kerry Stokes has thrown xxx Jane Doe 2 and actress Jane Doe 1 under a bus in the sex scandal engulfing Channel 7 and their CEO Tim Worner. Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 1 and 2 other female employees at Seven West Media have been forced to sign a legal document saying they did not have a sexual relationship with Tim Worner. The women were clearly forced to sign the legal document because there is no other reason why they would sign given the only benefit is to protect Tim Worner, Kerry Stokes and Seven West Media and its Directors. Since the women signed the legal document Seven West Media's lawyers have instituted defamation proceedings against me (Wednesday 21/12/16) which their lawyers admitted in court on Friday (23/12/16) would fail to make me delete the names of Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 in an article I published. So why did they institute the defamation case in the first place? The defamation case is about protecting Tim Worner, Kerry Stokes and the Directors. Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 have been badly deceived by Seven West Media's lawyers representing them and the ones paying the lawyers which is Kerry Stokes and Seven West Media. The reason they knew I would not delete the names is because there is history between myself, Stokes and his lawyers. (Click here and here to read more) This article is a follow-up to the two articles I published last week: 'Seven CEO Tim Worner and Amber Harrison sex scandal statement in full' and 'Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 institute defamation case re: sex with CEO allegations'. The Australian reported Saturday (24/12/16): … 'Also on edge are the four women – from on-air talent to behind-the-scenes staff – who are named in the Australian Human Rights Commission claim against Seven by Worner's former mistress Amber Harrison.' … 'This week, after Harrison, a former executive assistant to Seven West's former magazine boss Nick Chan, dropped her bombshell revelations of her sexual relationship with Worner into the inboxes of Australia's media writers, Seven's hardball commercial director Bruce McWilliam arranged for the quartet to sign legal letters denying the allegations and threatening action if their identities were made public.' … Bruce McWilliam arranged for the quartet to sign legal letters denying the allegations Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 1 and the 2 other women need to get their own legal advice. Bruce McWilliam works for Kerry Stokes and his interests, not the women's interests. The fact that McWilliam had them sign the legal letter is proof of that. If the women had their own lawyers the advice they would have received would have been not to sign the letter whether it is true or not as there is no benefit for the women to sign it. If the women are stupid enough to think that Seven have their best interests at heart, then that is their fault given the publicity of what happened to the Taeuber sisters at Channel Seven in Adelaide. All the women have to do is issue a press release saying they were forced to sign the legal letter and it is all over for Tim Worner and then they at least have some protection. The other option for the four women is to stay quiet and wait for the hatchet to come down like it did for Harrison … [PHOTOGRAPH] Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 1 … … Neither Jane Doe 2 or Jane Doe 1 have filed an affidavit in the case nor has Justice Campbell published any written reasons justifying his grubby pre-determined decisions so how can he say that it is 'a flagrant and obvious case of defamation.' In my previous article, I said they had taken out a super-injunction which was a mistake as I read court documents quickly before publishing the article and because Stokes has previously taken out several super-injunctions against me so I thought they had again. I do not know Jane Doe 2 or Jane Doe 1 nor do I watch them on TV. I have never had an opinion of them or their careers but now they are suing me for defamation I do have an opinion on them and it is not high. While I know that Stokes is behind the scenes running the show it is being done in their names. If Jane Doe 2 or Jane Doe 1 genuinely believed they have been defamed they should come through the front door in open court and not through the backdoor trying to conceal their names and now my name. Australia has always had an open court system and that's for good reason to stop frivolous and vexatious defamation proceedings like theirs. Kerry Stokes is running the case and Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 are under his control now and that isn't a good place to be as he has a long history of using people then discarding them. … The defamation case against me by Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 is set down for a directions hearing on the 3rd of February 2017 in the NSW Supreme Court and I will be defending it so please read below and support. … Related [articles]: Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 institute defamation case re: sex with CEO allegations Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 exposed as frivolous in 7 sex scandal defamation case Tags: … Jane Doe 1 … Jane Doe 2." 1. The plaintiffs maintain that the fifth article was published by the defendant on 21 January 2017 and is in the following relevant terms: "JANE DOE 2 AND JANE DOE 1 EXPOSED AS FRIVOLOUS IN 7 SEX SCANDAL DEFAMATION CASE The likelihood that xxx Jane Doe 2 and actress Jane Doe 1 had sexual relationships with Seven West Media CEO Tim Worner is almost certain given their frivolous and vexatious defamation claim against me. Otherwise they would have just denied the claim and that would have been the end of it. I filed my defence on Tuesday (17/1/17) and it is not me who has serious questions to answer but the applicants Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 … There has been no affidavits filed by either applicant, Jane Doe 2 or Jane Doe 1, and there is no doubt that these proceedings are being paid for and driven by Kerry Stokes and Seven West Media. (Click here to read the defence) … [PHOTOGRAPH] … Jane Doe 2 Email To: K Stokes and others at Seven West Media … Can you please confirm that besides Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 the other 2 women named by Amber Harrison in her evidence to the Australian Human Rights Commission are xxx and xxx. If that is correct can you please explain why Seven West Media shareholders are paying legal fees to represent xxx when she no longer works for the company? … (Click here to read the defence) … Related [articles]: Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 1 institute defamation case re: sex with CEO allegations Tags: … Jane Doe 1 … Jane Doe 2." 1. In the case of each of the second, third, fourth and fifth articles, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant published their names, the imputations particularised in the statement of claim and the 21 December 2016 article in contumacious disobedience of the orders made by Campbell J on 21 December 2016. The plaintiffs submit that the defendant has committed a contempt for which he is accordingly liable to be punished. The defendant's response 1. As I have previously discussed, the defendant admitted that he published the several articles in question. Apart from the terms of his defence, this admission also emerged during the proceedings before me. It was referred to by Mr Smark in the course of his submissions as follows: "SMARK: Your Honour, I can indicate that one matter which is that the admission in which I understood the defendant to make from the bar table a moment ago, does enable me to proceed in a slightly faster fashion. I understood him to admit the publication of the relevant alleged publications, but to say that he's not guilty by reason of other matters." 1. The admission to which Mr Smark was referring appears in the defendant's words in the following passage: "DEFENDANT: There is no value me giving evidence. It is [sic, isn't] denied that I published articles or the tweets or the Facebook I don't know if they've gone to Facebook, but they've gone to tweets as we know. What do I [sic, I do] deny is that I'm guilty. There is a specific law, in Federal Law at least, conspiracy to have someone falsely charged. That happened in 2014 and that's why the Justice Department refused to enforce the $2,000 fine." 1. It is clear from that passage that it was originally incorrectly recorded. My recollection is that the defendant said what appears in the square brackets that I have inserted. (The Reporting Services Branch has since confirmed this). The defendant did not contradict Mr Smark's later reference to his admission, which was entirely consistent with the (corrected) passage of his evidence to which I have referred. Moreover, as appears below, the defendant's singular and repeated theme was one of confession and avoidance rather than denial. 2. As I have already indicated, the defendant neither tendered nor called any evidence. This was despite my express and pointed reference to his right to do so. This appears in the following extract from the transcript: "SMARK: Your Honour, just as an abundance of caution, forgive me if I'm trespassing. I just indicate through your Honour that the defendant, in light of what is at stake in these proceedings, ought to be aware that he has the right to give evidence should he choose to do so. He's probably aware of that right. Of course he has no obligation whatsoever to do so. It is important that he's aware of that right. HIS HONOUR: I raised with him before whether he had any evidence. I accept your suggestion that it might be a good idea to make it clear that he could give oral evidence if he wished to. SMARK: That is all. With great respect, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Mr Dowling, you heard that. I've assumed that you knew that, but if you wanted to give oral evidence, even notwithstanding that you've not tendered any documents or sworn any affidavits, you can do so. I say that the significance of that may well be if you have a response as to why the charges of contempt cannot be made out, should not be made out, or have some other difficulty or flaw, you can give evidence about that if you wish. Anything you say from where you're now standing is just a submission. If you want to treat something as a piece of evidence upon which I can rely and take into account in deciding the matter, you would have to give it from the witness box and be subject to cross examination." 1. The defendant did provide me with written submissions which he sought to tender, or to which he occasionally referred as the evidence upon which he proposed to rely. I indicated that I would receive his written submissions and give them consideration in the disposition of this application. 2. I have already set forth a portion of those written submissions. It is unfortunate and extremely regrettable that these submissions do not address the principal issue in this application. The defendant chose not to engage with my invitation to direct his attention to this issue in what passed between him and me during his oral presentation. For example, the following extract from the transcript gives an indication of my attempts to elicit the defendant's attitude to the claims that are being levelled against him: "HIS HONOUR: I have an application by the plaintiffs in these proceedings that relate to an alleged breach or series of breaches by you of current standing orders that you haven't sought to set aside on appeal or in any other way. I would really be assisted if we could put aside the broader submissions you are making, which I well understand from previous experience listening to you, and ask you to tell me how I should deal with the allegation that the orders are in place and you have published material in breach of them. Do you have an excuse for that or do you say it did not happen? ….. HIS HONOUR: Can I just raise this? I suspect very strongly that if you had competent legal advice appearing for you today, she or he would be directing significant attention to explaining to me or attempting to explain to me why your publication of these articles was not a breach of Justice Campbell's orders. They would be doing that in great detail and persuasively and at great length." 1. Consistently with the burden of his written submissions, the defendant chose not to address the relationship between the scope of Campbell J's orders and his several allegedly offending publications referred to by the plaintiffs. Instead, the defendant persisted with submissions such as these: "DEFENDANT: What I am saying is their initial defamation claim is frivolous and vexatious. It is defendable and they haven't filed affidavits and they haven't sued the person who they claim defamed them, why should they get the benefit by having someone charged with contempt based on a lie? And before you move to find me guilty of contempt or innocent or whatever. Well, you've flagged it. You are going to find me guilty I'm sure. … Before you make any decision, you should be making sure there is at least a very rock solid prima facie case for the defamation because if there isn't, that means they've gone to Court, lied and deceived the Court and here you are finding someone guilty of contempt. I have stood my ground, as I did with Capilano Honey, where they've run scared because it is in the public interest to do so. There is no justification for the suppression order. Kerry Stokes got a suppression order against Amber Harrison two weeks ago. After they got a suppression order, they threatened her with contempt proceedings if she responded or said anything and as soon as they got the suppression order, Jeff Kennett went on Twitter on line, on radio, in the paper, started attacking her defaming her. It was like pack rape. They tied her down with a suppression order, threatened her with contempt and then they jumped on board. Jeff Kennett, Kerry Stokes he started bagging her too, jumped on board and attacked this woman. The Australian public have had a gut full of these wide ranging suppression orders by Stokes time and time again. You are telling me that how many ex parte hearings have we got there over the last years one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine." 1. The flavour of the defendant's theme is similarly reflected in the following exchange: "HIS HONOUR: Let me ask you this. The orders made by Justice Campbell that said it is said you breached, was any application made by you to set those orders aside? DEFENDANT: No. HIS HONOUR: No? DEFENDANT: I am not a lawyer. I wouldn't even know. HIS HONOUR: Please, Mr Dowling. I am really directing attention to the significant issues in this case. DEFENDANT: I will ask you now, can you set those orders aside? HIS HONOUR: You have breached orders that were current, in other words on the plaintiff's claim. You say the claim is frivolous and vexatious in the way you have outlined in detail. But the orders that it is said you breached were never the subject, as I understand it, of an appeal by you or of an application to set them aside or vary them or anything of that nature. If that is the case, and I understand it to be, they remain orders of the Court. If they remain orders of the Court and you breach them, there is a potential for you to be charged with contempt and that is what has happened. What of that have I got wrong? DEFENDANT: The problem you have your Honour, if their initial proceedings which they haven't filed affidavits in, the defamation proceedings, if they are based on a lie, you have charged me with contempt based on their lie and that is what happened in 2014 and that is why the New South Wales Justice Department refused to enforce the $2,000 fine." 1. It is therefore abundantly clear that the defendant's single and consistent approach to the plaintiffs' charges is to say that the orders he is alleged to have breached were made in a proceeding that was for some reason fatally flawed, thus rendering the effect of orders made in the context of that allegedly invalid proceeding also invalid. Although the defendant did not say so in terms, the thrust of his submission is that he will successfully defend the defamation proceedings against him, thereby rendering the litigious platform upon which Campbell J's orders were made vulnerable to collapse. He argued that if the proceedings against him were to fail, the orders in question ought necessarily, if only retrospectively, to suffer a cognate fate. 2. In the light of what I perceived to be the difficulties inherent with Mr Dowling's submissions, I gave him the opportunity to provide me with further written submissions if he wished to do so. I made arrangements for a copy of the transcript of the day's proceedings to be provided to him as well. In the events that have occurred, Mr Dowling took advantage of the opportunity to provide further submissions. These arrived by email on the evening of Sunday 12 March 2017. I have read these further submissions closely. 3. Mr Dowling's latest submissions also fail to address the critical issue. He has not come to terms with the contention that he has breached an existing and enforceable order of the Court. I take Mr Dowling's several references in his latest submissions to orders that might be made by McCallum J later this week to refer to the prospect that he may be able to satisfy her Honour that the original suppression orders should never have been made. Mr Dowling has referred in this context to s 13 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act. In the event that the orders that Mr Dowling is said to have breached were later held to be invalid, or were set aside for some reason, I accept that that fact could be a matter potentially relevant to assessment of the proper penalty for contempt. It is obvious, however, that the present inquiry is of a different order. 4. Mr Dowling has also expressed concern that during the hearing I drew his attention to the fact that the penalty for contempt could be as serious as a term of imprisonment. Mr Dowling appears to take exception to that reference as a possible indication of what will be the ultimate result in these proceedings, or that it is a suggestion of pre-judgment by me. Out of deference to that submission I should indicate that my reference to imprisonment was as contained in the following extract from the transcript: "HIS HONOUR: I'll check [sic, treat] these as submissions only. Can I raise one matter with you Mr Dowling before we proceed? I think I recall having a conversation of this type with you on one earlier occasion. I'm assuming you don't propose, whether because you choose not or you can't afford to, employ any legal representatives in these contempt proceedings. DEFENDANT: No, it wasn't my plan, your Honour. HIS HONOUR: Do I understand that you understand that the possible consequences of a finding of contempt, if the plaintiff succeeds, that one of the possible consequences is that you could be imprisoned. Do you understand that? DEFENDANT: Your Honour, my viewpoint is if you're going to jailed for doing nothing more than journalism, well, so be it. I'll have to do it. HIS HONOUR: All I'm saying is, I haven't heard the proceedings, I don't know what Mr Smark will want to say in due course. All I'm attempting to do at this stage is draw to your attention the seriousness of these proceedings. A possible consequences, not an inevitable consequence but one on the table as a possibility, is that if the charge is made out, subject to some application by you if it is to plead [sic, purge] your contempt, one of the possibilities is that you could be sent to gaol." 1. I can imagine that referring Mr Dowling only to the lightest penalty that he might face could have been misleading. On the contrary, I do not accept that indicating what could be the least pleasant outcome could have the same effect. Contempt is a serious charge and there is no set or specified maximum penalty. In referring to imprisonment I did not want Mr Dowling to be in any doubt about the potential seriousness of the charge that he faced. 2. It is unnecessary further to refer to Mr Dowling's latest submissions. Supreme Court Rules – Part 55 1. Part 55 of the Supreme Court Rules deal with contempt. The following rules should be noted as applying in the present case: 55.6 Procedure generally (1) Where contempt is committed in connection with proceedings in the Court, an application for punishment for the contempt must be made by motion on notice in the proceedings, but, if separate proceedings for punishment of the contempt are commenced, the proceedings so commenced may be continued unless the Court otherwise orders. (2) Where contempt is committed, but not in connection with proceedings in the Court, proceedings for punishment of the contempt must be commenced by summons, but, if an application for punishment of the contempt is made by motion on notice in any proceedings, the application may be heard and disposed of in the latter proceedings, unless the Court otherwise orders. 55.7 Statement of charge A statement of charge, that is, a statement specifying the contempt of which the contemnor is alleged to be guilty, shall be subscribed to, or filed with, the notice of motion or summons. 55.8 Evidence (1) Subject to subrule (2), the evidence in support of the charge shall be by affidavit. (2) The Court may, on terms, permit evidence in support of the charge to be given otherwise than by affidavit. 55.9 Service The notice of motion or summons, the statement of charge, and the affidavits shall be served personally on the contemnor. 55.13 Punishment (1) Where the contemnor is not a corporation, the Court may punish contempt by committal to a correctional centre or fine or both. (2) Where the contemnor is a corporation, the Court may punish contempt by sequestration or fine or both. (3) The Court may make an order for punishment on terms, including a suspension of punishment or a suspension of punishment in case the contemnor gives security in such manner and in such sum as the Court may approve for good behaviour and performs the terms of the security. 1. There is no issue in these proceedings that these rules have been followed in all respects. Applicable law 1. Disobedience of a court order which constitutes a contempt of court is a matter which affects the administration of justice generally. 2. The underlying rationale for the power of a court to punish for contempt is that it is necessary to uphold and protect the administration of justice. The administration of justice is brought into disrepute if disobedience to a court's order goes unpunished: Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98; [1986] HCA 46 at [106]–[107]. 3. Contempt is a summary charge brought in the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, summary procedure is the normal manner for the determination of the prosecution: Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal v Willesee [1984] 2 NSWLR 378. The primary difference between a proceeding on indictment and a summary proceeding is that the former is a trial by judge and jury whereas the latter is a trial by judge alone. 4. Chapter 4, Part 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 deals with procedure for the prosecution of summary offences, including in the Supreme Court: s 170(3). Section 257 of the Act provides that rules may be made for the exercise of the summary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Criminal Procedure Rules do not contain any procedural requirements for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The relevant rules of Court are found in Part 55 of the Supreme Court Rules. 5. In contempt proceedings it is usual to have two hearings: a liability hearing and then, if the defendant is found guilty, a penalty hearing: per James J in McGuirk v University of NSW [2009] NSWSC 1058 at [189]. However, in an appropriate case, there is no reason why sentencing cannot follow immediately upon a conviction. 6. Both criminal and civil contempt charges must be proved to the criminal standard beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; [1995] HCA 3 at [529]; Hinch and Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15; [1987] HCA 56 at [49]-[50]. It is for the plaintiffs to prove the allegations to this standard. 7. Contempt in the form of disobedience to a court order may be regarded as criminal. 8. In Seymour v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2006] FCA 965, Rares J held that a conviction imposed earlier by another judge on Mr Seymour for contempt for disobeying an injunction to cease practising as a solicitor was a conviction of criminal contempt. His Honour said at [105]: "A 'civil' contempt can become 'criminal' where the act charged is contumacious in the sense that in doing it there was a direct intention to disobey the order … A breach of an injunction or undertaking to the Court can also be criminal if it is ... 'an obstinate disregard' of the obligation imposed by or owed to the Court … The hallmark of a classification of 'criminal' contempt of this nature is contumacy or defiance." 1. In Mosman Municipal Council v Kelly (No3) [2009] NSWLEC 92, a decision of Biscoe J sitting in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, his Honour stated that there are three classes of contempt: technical, wilful and contumacious. Having dealt with technical and wilful contempt, his Honour said at [72]: "Contumacious contempt is where there is a specific intention to disobey a court order or undertaking to the court, which evidences a conscious defiance of the court's authority." 1. The principles were recently set out by Garling J in the context of an undertaking in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Salvato (No.4) [2014] NSWSC 321 at [126]-[130] and again in the context of an order said to have been breached in Commissioner for Fair Trading v Rixon (No.2) [2014] NSWSC 431, where his Honour, having referred to his decision in Salvato, summarised the principles as follows: "[38] The first principle is that the charge of contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: Witham v Holloway [1995] HCA 3; (1995) 183 CLR 525 at 529 per Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. It is for the Commissioner to satisfy the court beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Rixon has committed a contempt of court. [39] Secondly, a contempt of court can be constituted by the breach of an order of the court: Trade Practices Commission v C G Smith Pty Ltd (1978) 30 FLR 368 at 375; Spindler v Balog (1959) 76 WN (NSW) 391; Circuit Finance Australia v Sobbi [2010] NSWSC 789 at [10]. [40] Thirdly, a person cannot be found guilty of a contempt of court for breach of an order, where the terms of the order are ambiguous: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21; (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 515-6 per Owen J. The ambiguity must be such that it cannot be said what it was that required compliance: Pang v Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 69 at [56]-[57] per Beazley JA. [41] Fourthly, where the contempt of court consists of a failure to comply with an order of the court, it must be demonstrated that the contempt was wilful, and not merely casual, accidental or unintentional: Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd [1986] HCA 46; (1986) 161 CLR 98. However, it is not necessary for an applicant to prove that the contemnor intended to breach an order of the court: see Anderson v Hassett [2007] NSWSC 1310; Mudginberri at 111; Matthews v Australian Securities Investment Commission [2009] NSWCA 155 at [16] per Tobias JA. [42] As Brereton J said in Anderson at [6]: 'The statement in Mudginberri (at 113) that a deliberate commission or omission which is in breach of an injunctive order or an undertaking will constitute such wilful disobedience unless it be casual, accidental or unintentional, does not require proof of a specific intent, but permits an alleged contemnor to show by way of exculpation that the default was "casual, accidental or unintentional"..' [43] Finally, it is not necessary for an applicant to prove that the contemnor was aware that his or her conduct constituted a breach of the court's order: Microsoft Corporation v Marks (No1) (1996) 69 FCR 117 at 143 per Lindgren J; Metcash Trading Ltd v Bunn (No 5)[2009] FCA 16 at [9] per Finn J." 1. Relevantly, "publish" is defined in s 3 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act as follows: "Publish means disseminate or provide access to the public or a section of the public by any means, including by: … (d) broadcast or publication by means of the Internet." 1. It is unnecessary to prove that any third party in fact read the offending publication. This approach to publication is consistent with authority: See The Queen v Hinch [2013] VSC 520 at [53]-[54] and the authorities referred to by Kaye J: News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel (2010) 30 VR 248 and Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2012] NSWCCA 125. This may be contrasted with the requirements to establish publication in the law of defamation: Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575; [2002] HCA 56 at [44]). Consideration 1. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant published each of the offending articles. Quite apart from his admissions to that effect, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he did so from the evidence given by Mr Keegan. His cross-examination by the defendant did not attempt in any respect to challenge his evidence concerning publication of the relevant articles by the defendant. The confidential exhibits that extract and reproduce these articles are uncontroversially taken from the website of which the defendant is the registrant. The defendant otherwise did not contend to the contrary. 2. I do not accept the defendant's submission that he could not be found guilty of contempt of Campbell J's orders because they were made in proceedings that are actually or potentially flawed, in the sense that they have been commenced wrongfully or maliciously or for some collateral or ulterior motive, or that they are otherwise frivolous, vexatious or oppressive and liable to be struck out or summarily dismissed. I reject the defendant's contention that the validity or enforceability of these orders is somehow a function of the plaintiffs' success in the principal proceedings and that in this case the plaintiffs have not succeeded in their respective claims against him. In my opinion, the orders made by Campbell J on 21 December 2016 are valid and enforceable and are not amenable to some form of jurisdictional assault of the type propounded by the defendant: see, for example R v Metal Trades Employers' Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208; [1951] HCA 3; Pelechowski v The Registrar, Court of Appeal (1999) 198 CLR 435; [1999] HCA 19. 3. At [27] in Pelechowski, the majority said this: "In United Telecasters Sydney Ltd v Hardy, Samuels AP (with whom Clarke and Meagher JJA agreed), in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, applied to the District Court the principle which, in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Mayas Pty Ltd, McHugh JA had explained as follows: 'If an inferior tribunal exercising judicial power has no authority to make an order of the kind in question, the failure to obey it cannot be a contempt. Such an order is a nullity. Any person may disregard it. Different considerations arise, however, if the order is of a kind within the tribunal's power but which was improperly made. In that class of case, the order is good until it is set aside by a superior tribunal. While it exists it must be obeyed.'" [Emphasis added] 1. The position in the present case is even stronger. The orders of Campbell J were not improperly made. 2. The defendant has clearly breached the orders of the Court. Campbell J's orders prohibited the publication by the defendant of the names of the plaintiffs on his website without the leave of the Court, which leave was neither sought nor given. The defendant did not remove the names of the plaintiffs from the first article in breach of order 5 and proceeded to republish their names in succeeding articles in breach of order 4. The defendant ignored the restraint lawfully imposed upon him by the terms of order 6. 3. The defendant has not sought to argue that his Honour's orders were unclear or ambiguous or somehow incapable of understanding or that he did not in fact understand them. As with all references by me to the defendant's submissions, or to his failure to contest evidence tendered by the plaintiffs or submissions made on their behalf, I have borne in mind at all times that he bears no onus of proof, and that it remains the plaintiffs' obligation to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. My references to the defendant's responses are intended to indicate that my attention was not drawn by him to any matters that might cause me to have doubt about whether or not the plaintiffs had established or proved the necessary elements of the charges to the requisite criminal standard. For the avoidance of doubt I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the orders made by Campbell J on 21 December 2016 are not ambiguous or otherwise attended by any doubt about their operation, meaning or effect. 4. I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's failures to comply with the orders of the Court were intentional, wilful and deliberate. They were certainly not casual, accidental or unintentional. The repetition of the publication of the names of the plaintiffs is sufficient to demonstrate this. It is also sufficient in this respect to observe that the offending publications themselves refer to the orders of the Court. It seems reasonably clear, although I am not required to find, that the defendant apparently rejoiced in his own defiance of the orders. Be that as it may, it is clear on their face that the defendant's publications were made with full knowledge of the orders and were made wilfully. For example, the second article contains the defendant's observation that "[t]he court orders only demand that I delete their names". That article reproduces the plaintiffs' names. Similarly, the third article contains the defendant's concession, "[t]his is on top of the suppression order banning the media naming the applicants which of course I have". That article also reproduces the plaintiffs' names. 5. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware at the time of each of the publications that his conduct in reproducing the names of the plaintiffs (at the very least) constituted conduct in breach of Campbell J's orders. The orders contained the notation that if he disobeyed the orders he would be liable to imprisonment. Nothing could have been clearer. The articles variously contain scattered references to injunctions or what the defendant is prone to call super injunctions. It is obvious that he understood that such orders of a court operated to enjoin or to restrain him, in this case, from publishing the names of the plaintiffs or required him to remove their names from his website. In the second article the defendant wrote, referring to the plaintiffs, "[t]hey have also taken out an injunction to hide their names". Properly understood, that reference clearly demonstrates that the orders in question were directed at removing the plaintiffs' names from the public domain in the particular context of the defendant's other comments about them. The orders gave effect to that purpose. The defendant nevertheless acted so as to frustrate that purpose. I am satisfied to the criminal standard that the defendant knew and understood that his conduct in doing so constituted a breach of the relevant order. 6. Finally, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant's contempt is contumacious. I am unable to reach any conclusion other than that the defendant deliberately set out to disobey and to flaunt what he knew and understood to be the solemn orders of the Court. Conclusions and orders 1. It follows that I find the defendant guilty of contempt as charged in the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Charge. 2. It will be necessary to appoint a further date to hear submissions from the parties on penalty. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 17 March 2017