Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Health Care Complaints Commission v Chester [2017] NSWCATOD 97 Hearing dates: On the papers Date of orders: 23 June 2017 Decision date: 23 June 2017 Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Before: J Millbank, Senior Member Decision: (1) A non-publication order under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) prohibiting disclosure or publication of the name of the Patient A in the schedule to the complaint; (2) The Respondent's request to refer the matter to the Supreme Court of NSW on a matter of law is declined; (3)The Respondent's application to terminate the inquiry or dismiss the proceedings is denied; (4) This matter to be listed for directions to set a timetable for hearing; (5) Costs of this application are reserved until the matter is determined. Catchwords: Nursing – Mental Health Nurse – Complaint initiated by HCCC pursuant to investigation of another practitioner – Whether complaint valid – Application to refer a matter of law to the Supreme Court of NSW – Application to terminate inquiry – Public interest in proceeding with inquiry Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) ss 54, 55, 64; Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) ss 20A, 21A, 34A, 37A Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (NSW) ('The National Law') ss 3, 3A, 4, 141; cl 12 Sch 5D Cases Cited: Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280; Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; HCCC v BQB [2014] NSWCATOD 157; HCCC v Campbell [2014] NSWCATOD 107; HCCC v Do [2014] NSWCA 307; HCCC v Duggan [2015] NSWCATOD 142; HCCC v Harley [2014] NSWCATOD 110; HCCC v Khan [2014] NSWCATOD 83; HCCC v Manners [2014] NSWCATOD 156; HCCC v Perry [2015] NSWCATOD 76; HCCC v Sarfraz [2015] NSWCATOD 75 HCCC v Sharah [2015] NSWCATOD 99 HCCC v Torrinello [2015] NSWCATOD 90; Milner v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATOD 37 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Health Care Complaints Commission (Applicant) Juliet Sarah Chester (Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: Ms Neal (Applicant) Mr Anderson (Respondent) File Number(s): 2017/00043555 Publication restriction: A non-publication order under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) prohibiting disclosure or publication of the name of Patient A in the schedule to the complaint. REASONS FOR DECISION Background 1. Ms Chester is the respondent to a complaint of unsatisfactory conduct and professional misconduct filed by the HCCC on 10 February 2017. 2. Ms Chester was first registered as a nurse in Australia in 1982. In 2013 Ms Chester was a nurse at a private mental health facility where she met Patient A, who was a female in-patient. 3. Complaint 1 of unprofessional conduct concerns Ms Chester's failure to maintain personal boundaries with Patient A, in that she entered into a friendship with Patient A after her discharge from hospital, and engaged in a lengthy and personal correspondence with her, visited Patient A when she was re-admitted to the facility in 2014 (at a time the practitioner no longer worked there), and made a number of highly personal and inappropriate disclosures to Patient A. Complaint 2 of unprofessional conduct is that Ms Chester breached her obligations under s141(2) of the National Law by failing to make a mandatory notification after forming a reasonable belief that a male health practitioner at the facility (Nurse Practitioner A) had entered into a personal relationship with Patient A in 2014. Complaint 3 is of professional misconduct comprising both individual and cumulative elements of the complaints. 4. The conduct of Ms Chester came to light in the course of an investigation into Nurse Practitioner A. Nurse Practitioner A worked at the same private mental health facility where Ms Chester had treated Patient A. Nurse Practitioner A formed an intimate relationship with Patient A while she was an in-patient at the facility in 2014; he was ultimately found liable for professional misconduct and deregistered. 5. In her statements to the HCCC dated 16 March 2016 and 17 January 2016 the Respondent sought to characterise her personal relationship with Patient A as a 'mentoring' relationship offering professional advice and guidance, although she did concede in her 2016 statement that her personal revelations to Patient A were an inappropriate transgression of professional boundaries. 6. In her statements and submissions concerning the issue of mandatory notification, the Respondent denied wrongdoing. Ms Chester's position was that she had encouraged Patient A to report the conduct herself and so was therefore not obligated to make the notification because she was under the reasonable belief that someone else had done so, as per s 141(4)(e). The practitioner's representative also argued that she was under no obligation to make a notification under s 141 as she was not acting 'in the course of practising [her] health profession' but was a private citizen in her communications with Patient A at the time she formed her belief about the existence of an inappropriate relationship between Patient A and Nurse Practitioner A. Thus, the practitioner conceded complaint 1 but not complaint 2. 7. The practitioner submitted a statutory declaration dated 29 April 2017 stating that she had voluntarily surrendered her registration as a nurse in May 2016 and that due to 'ongoing and progressively deteriorating health issues' she had no intention of reapplying for registration in the future. This Application 1. The practitioner applied to have the inquiry terminated arguing that the complaint itself was invalid or unlawful or in the alternative that the Tribunal should refer a matter of law to the Supreme Court of NSW. 2. The practitioner also applied in the alternative for an order that the complaint be terminated under cl 12 Sch 5D of the National Law or dismissed under s 55 of the CAT Act. 3. The parties agreed to a determination of this application on the papers. 4. The application is dismissed and the matter will proceed to hearing for the reasons that follow. Submissions 1. The practitioner argued that the 'prosecution was invalid' because the material upon which the HCCC relied in its complaint had been obtained from the practitioner for a collateral purpose, and was therefore inadmissible, relying upon principles of common law concerning material obtained under subpoena or discovery in the course of litigation articulated in Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 and Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36. Although the material in question was in fact provided by the practitioner voluntarily, it was contended that the 'Harman undertaking' should still apply as it was information that could have been subpoenaed by the HCCC. 2. A further argument in support of 'invalidity' was that the HCCC was in breach of s 22 of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) because the pursuit of the complaint by the HCCC was excessively delayed, in that 14 months passed between the initial letter to the practitioner from the HCCC detailing the matters under investigation and the filing of the complaint in the Tribunal. 3. The practitioner submitted that the Tribunal should exercise it discretion to dismiss proceedings under s 55 of the CAT Act because the proceedings were 'otherwise misconceived' under s 55(1)(b) and should be characterised as failing for want of prosecution under s 55(1)(d). 4. In support of the alternative argument for terminating the inquiry under cl 12 Sch 5D of the National Law the practitioner submitted that it was not in the public interest to conduct an inquiry because she was no longer registered and had no intention of being registered again by reason of her age and poor health, she had an unblemished professional record, had prevented far more serious misconduct through her support of Patient A, and had not actually been the subject of a complaint by Patient A; such that it was 'not in anybody's interest that this matter should proceed'. 5. The practitioner relied upon previous decisions of the Tribunal that concerned applications to terminate proceedings that were made by, or consented to by, the HCCC: HCCC v Harley [2014] NSWCATOD 110; HCCC v Khan [2014] NSWCATOD 83 and HCCC v Campbell [2014] NSWCATOD 107. 6. In reply, the HCCC submitted that the practitioner's arguments about collateral purpose and delay were misconceived as they were based on common law jurisprudence inapplicable to these proceedings. The complaint was assessed and investigated in accordance with the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) (the HCC Act) which exhaustively regulates such procedures and provides wide powers of inquiry. 7. The HCCC noted that s 20A of the HCC Act provides that the HCCC may revise its assessment of a complaint at any time when dealing with the complaint, including to change the person whose conduct appears to the be the subject of the complaint, or add another person to the complaint under s 20A(2)(f). 8. Under ss 21A and 34A of the HCC the HCCC has power to obtain information, records and evidence that extend to any person deemed capable of assisting the assessment and investigate of the complaint. Section 37A of the HCC provides that a person is not excused from requirements under s 21A and 34A to provide information on the grounds that it may self-incriminate (although an objection on such grounds, or failure to warn of self-incrimination, prevents such evidence being admissible in civil or criminal proceedings except disciplinary proceedings). 9. The HCCC submitted that s 55(1)(a) of the CAT was not satisfied as it did not seek leave to withdraw proceedings. It did not address the other grounds under s 55. 10. Rather unhelpfully, the HCCC neither consented to, nor opposed, the exercise of the Tribunal's power to terminate the inquiry under cl 12 of Sch 5D of the National Law. The HCCC accepted that the Respondent was unlikely to return to the profession of nursing but then stated that it was 'concerned that the Respondent may provide other health services in the future.' The HCCC further submitted that the practitioner's claim to have prevented harm to Patient A was not supported by the evidence. 11. Given that the HCCC brought the complaint to the Tribunal, and did not seek to withdraw it, it is not clear why they took no position as to the public interest in its ultimate determination. Relevant law 1. Section 20A of the HCC Act provides that: (1) The Commission is to keep under review its assessment of a complaint while it is dealing with the complaint. (2) At any time while dealing with a complaint (including during or at the end of the investigation of a complaint) and after consultation with the appropriate professional council, the Commission may revise its assessment of the complaint and take any of the following actions: (a) deal with the complaint under Division 9, (b) refer the complaint for conciliation, (c) investigate the complaint, (d) refer the complaint to the Health Secretary in accordance with section 25 or 25A, (e) refer the complaint to another person or body in accordance with section 25B or 26, (f) change the person whose conduct appears to be the subject of the complaint or include another person as a person whose conduct appears to be the subject of the complaint, (g) add to, substitute, amend or delete any of the specific allegations comprising the complaint (including add an allegation arising out of an investigation of the complaint that may not be the particular object of the complaint). (3) If the Commission revises its assessment of a complaint to include another person as referred to in subsection (2) (f), sections 16 and 28 apply to the giving of notice to that person as if a reference in those sections to the assessment of the complaint were a reference to the revision of the assessment under this section. 1. Section 54 of the CAT Act provides: (1) The Tribunal (including when constituted as an Appeal Panel) may, of its own motion or at the request of a party, refer a question of law arising in the proceedings to the Supreme Court for the opinion of the Court. (2) The Tribunal may refer a question of law under this section only if the President has consented in writing to the question being referred. (3) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine any question of law referred to it under this section, but may decline to exercise that jurisdiction if it considers it appropriate to do so. (4) If a question of law arising in proceedings has been referred to the Supreme Court under this section, the Tribunal is not: (a) to give a decision in the proceedings to which the question is relevant while the reference is pending, or (b) to proceed in a manner, or make a decision, that is inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court on the question. (5) Subsection (4) extends to the Tribunal when constituted as an Appeal Panel that is determining an internal appeal from a decision of the Tribunal in proceedings before which a question of law has been referred by the Tribunal at first instance to the Supreme Court under this section. 1. Section 55 of the CAT Act provides that: (1) The Tribunal may dismiss at any stage any proceedings before it in any of the following circumstances: (a) if the applicant or appellant (or, if there is more than one applicant or appellant, each applicant or appellant) withdraws the application or appeal to which the proceedings relate, (b) if the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance, (c) if the applicant or appellant (or, if there is more than one applicant or appellant, each applicant or appellant) has failed to appear in the proceedings, (d) if the Tribunal considers that there has been a want of prosecution of the proceedings. (2) The Tribunal may reinstate proceedings that have been dismissed under subsection (1) (c) if the Tribunal considers that there is a reasonable explanation for that failure. 1. Sch 5D cl 12 of the National Law provides that "Certain complaints may not be heard" as follows: (1) A Committee or the Tribunal may decide not to conduct an inquiry, or at any time to terminate an inquiry or appeal, if- (a) any of the following circumstances apply- (i) a complainant fails to comply with a requirement made of the complainant by the Committee or the Tribunal; (ii) the person about whom the complaint is made ceases to be a registered health practitioner or student; (iii) the complaint before the Committee or the Tribunal is withdrawn; and (b) in the opinion of the Committee or the Tribunal it is not in the public interest for the inquiry or appeal to continue. (2) A Committee or the Tribunal must not conduct or continue any inquiry or any appeal if the registered health practitioner or student concerned dies. (3) The power conferred on a Committee or the Tribunal by this clause may be exercised by the Chairperson of the Committee or the member of the Tribunal presiding and, if exercised by the Chairperson or member, is taken to have been exercised by the Committee or the Tribunal. 1. Section 4 of the National Law provides that, "An entity that has functions under this Law is to exercise its functions having regard to the objectives and guiding principles of the national registration and accreditation scheme set out in section 3." 2. Section 3(2)(a) of the National Law provides that one objective of the national registration and accreditation scheme is "protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered." 3. Section 3A, particular to NSW, adds that, "In the exercise of functions under a NSW provision, the protection of the health and safety of the public must be the paramount consideration." Reasons Invalidity 1. The bringing of the complaint to the Tribunal by the HCCC is not invalid or unlawful by virtue of having been precipitated through an investigation into another practitioner (Nurse Practitioner A). The HCC Act confers wide powers of investigation upon the HCCC and overtly contemplates the addition of other persons (s 20A(2)(f)) and allegations to a complaint; including 'allegation arising out of an investigation of the complaint that may not be the particular object of the complaint' (s 20A(3)(g). The HCC Act also makes clear provision for the disclosure and use in disciplinary proceedings of self-incriminating material (s 37A). 2. While Patient A did not make a complaint against Ms Chester, the conduct of Ms Chester was involved in the factual matrix of the complaint investigated by the HCCC concerning Patient A. The HCCC added the practitioner to the complaint as it is empowered to do under the HCC Act. 3. Ms Chester provided the HCCC with a statement on 16 March 2015 as part of its initial investigation. There is nothing on the face of the material before me to suggest that the HCCC subpoenaed any material from Ms Chester, nor that any subpoenaed or voluntarily provided material was used for a collateral purpose. Even if Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36 were found applicable to disciplinary proceedings such as these, the ratio is plainly inapplicable to this matter, as the disciplinary proceedings concerning Patient A and involving Ms Chester were not a collateral purpose to the disciplinary investigation of Nurse Practitioner A. 4. While the matter of law sought to be referred to the Supreme Court is not explicitly stated in the submissions of the practitioner, it is to be inferred that it relates to the fundamental objection that these proceedings arose from the investigation of another practitioner. 5. A referral to the Supreme Court under s 54 of the CAT Act can only take place with the consent in writing of the President of NCAT. The Tribunal has not sought such consent as there is no indication that a referral is merited in this case. The recent decision of Milner v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATOD 37 helpfully summarises the Tribunal's approach in addressing relevant factors in making referrals and I adopt paras [14]-[24] of those reasons here. 6. These proceedings are not invalidated by reason of delay. Section 22 of the HCC Act relied upon by the practitioner sets a 60 day period for the initial assessment of a complaint, not for its investigation and formal referral. The HCCC notified Ms Chester on 17 December 2015 that it had re-assessed the complaint and determined that her conduct warranted investigation. On 23 May 2016 the HCCC notified Ms Chester that it was at the end of its investigation, enclosed an expert report, and invited the practitioner to make a submission under s 40 of the HCC Act. The HCCC filed the complaint with the Tribunal on 10 February 2017. The practitioner notes that the filing of the complaint in the Tribunal followed the determination in the Tribunal of the proceedings concerning Nurse Practitioner A. This is not an unreasonable course, and the time taken does not constitute an unreasonable delay. Dismissing Proceedings or Terminating the Inquiry 1. Both s 55 of CAT and Sch 5D cl 12(1) of the National Law confer a discretion to be exercised only if certain conditions are satisfied. 2. Under s 55(1) of the CAT Act the Tribunal may dismiss proceedings in which the complaint has been withdrawn (a); is frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance (b); in which a party has failed to appear (c); or for want of prosecution (d); without an express requirement to consider the public interest. 3. There is no basis to dismiss proceedings by virtue of s 55(1) of the CAT. The HCCC has not withdrawn the complaint. Even on the limited material filed it is clear that the complaint is not frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance. The practitioner has conceded that her conduct under complaint 1 amounted to misconduct, and there are important matters in dispute concerning complaint 2. The delay of 14 months between the commencement of initial investigation and the complaint being filed with the Tribunal is not undue, and there could not be said to be a want of prosecution of the matter, in particular because the case concerning Nurse Practitioner A was determined during that time. 4. Under cl 12 Sch 5D of the National Law the Tribunal may decide not to conduct an inquiry, or to terminate an inquiry or appeal, if, the complaint is non-compliant or withdrawn, or the respondent ceases to be a registered health practitioner and in the opinion of the Tribunal it is not in the public interest to continue. 5. Determining what is in the public interest in continuing an inquiry is guided by the objects and guiding principles of the National Law. While the CAT Act and the National Law operate in conjunction in these proceedings, the National Law objectives are overriding. 6. The Tribunal's role in protecting the health and safety of the public is not limited to consideration of the direct protection of individual members of the public from the incompetent or unethical practice of the relevant practitioner in proceedings, but rather extends to an interest in protecting the public more broadly by maintaining and communicating professional standards, signalling disapproval of unethical and incompetent conduct and thereby enhancing both professional standards and the public's trust in the health professions: HCCC v Do [2014] NSWCA 307 [35]. 7. In HCCC v Duggan [2015] NSWCATOD 142 the Tribunal noted a number of cases in which an application to exercise its discretion to terminate proceeding without an inquiry were granted: HCCC v Harley [2014] NSWCATOD 110; HCCC v Khan [2014] NSWCATOD 83; HCCC v Perry [2015] NSWCATOD 76; HCCC v Campbell [2014] NSWCATOD 107; HCCC v BQB [2014] NSWCATOD 157; HCCC v Manners [2014] NSWCATOD 156; HCCC v Torrinello [2015] NSWCATOD 90; HCCC v Sarfraz [2015] NSWCATOD 75. The Tribunal noted a number of features common in such cases; namely: 1. The HCCC made the application to terminate, or consented to the practitioner's application to terminate; 2. the practitioner undertook not to re-apply for registration in the future, 3. the practitioner admitted the misconduct or impairment, and 4. the practitioner was often in poor health and aged 60 or over and had, or would, retire from work altogether. 1. In the above matters these factors were influential in finding that the practitioner posed no risk to the public, and a formal inquiry and determination offered little, if any benefit to professional standards such that, on balance, it was in the public interest not to proceed. 2. Such factors are finely balanced in this case. The HCCC did not consent to the application, but nor did it oppose it. The practitioner stated that she did not intend to re-apply for registration, but did not actually undertake not to do so. The practitioner admitted complaint 1 but contested complaint 2. While the practitioner is now 62 and submitted that she was in poor health, the evidence concerning her health was limited to a medical certificate from a General Practitioner dated 13 December 2016 listing three health conditions (ischemic heart disease, neuropathy and palindromic seronegative inflammatory arthritis), all under medical management, and a referral letter dated 13 March 2017 for an opinion and management for acute anxiety and depression related to these proceedings. On the face of the limited documentation it would appear that the practitioner is, or could be, fit to work in the future. 3. In HCCC v Sharah [2015] NSWCATOD 99 an application under Sch 5D cl 12 to terminate the inquiry was dismissed. That application was made by the practitioner and opposed by the HCCC. Although the medical practitioner was aged 79, admitted all four complaints of unprofessional conduct, misconduct and impairment, and undertook not to re-register in the future, the Tribunal noted [at 32-33]: "While the respondent conceded [the complaints], he disputed a number of the particulars relied upon. This was not a case of full and frank admissions of the particulars as seen in some of the cases where the discretion not to proceed has been exercised favourably to the respondent. Further, there was the contest that remained over the allegations [of touching] made by Patient A. The allegations were very serious, and it was in the public interest, in our opinion, for those allegations to be ventilated and dealt with." 1. In that case the Tribunal also noted that, because a prohibition order was being sought, and there was evidence that the practitioner remained active in the wider community, "There was, on the face of it, a risk to the public in this case that needed to be addressed": [34]. 2. In this case it is not clear whether a prohibition order will be sought if the proceedings continued. The originating complaint identifies the entire range of orders under s 149A, 149B and 149C. The HCCC submissions express 'concern' that the Respondent may provide 'health services in the nature of counselling in the future', but do not indicate whether the HCCC would, if the complaints were proved, seek orders to prevent this occurring. 3. On balance the Tribunal is unable to find that it is in the public interest to terminate these proceedings. In particular, the issues relating to complaint 2, concerning the failure to make a notification under the National Law, are very serious, and contested. 4. The practitioner submits, variously, that s141(1) of the National Law did not apply to her as she was not acting in the course of her profession at the time she formed a reasonable belief, and that she is excused from her obligation under s 141(2) by virtue of the operation of s 141(4) because she knew or reasonably believed that a notification had been made of the conduct that formed the basis of the reasonable belief. 5. The scope of the mandatory reporting duty under s 141 is arguably an important question for determination. Moreover the practitioner's steadfast assertion that it was the role of Patient A – whom she believed to be very unwell, and at the time an in-patient at the very same a mental health facility where Nurse Practitioner A was working and regularly rostered – to make the complaint about Nurse Practitioner A, may well bear inquiry. 6. There also appear on the face of the papers to be factual discrepancies that require resolution. Complaint 2 particularises the practitioner forming a reasonable belief 'either on or at any time after 27 August 2014' but Ms Chester's accounts appear to address two distinct periods in August and September 2014. 7. In her statement of 16 March 2015 the practitioner states that she became aware of the inappropriate relationship when visiting Patient A at the facility in August 2014, that she sent an email to Patient A when she arrived home from that visit confirming that Nurse Practitioner A was the man Patient A was involved with, and then 'told [Patient A] that she needed to report the situation' and that 'if she was not going to report it, then, as a health professional, I had a professional obligation to inform the Director of Nursing.' In her statement of 17 January 2017 the practitioner reiterates that she became aware of the relationship 'via emails and meeting with [Patient A] at the facility, and states that 'over a period of approximately 3 days' she then 'strenuously encouraged' Patient A to report it to staff at the facility. 8. The materials filed by the HCCC include a series of emails apparently between Patient A and the practitioner provided to the HCCC by Patient A, as well as a screenshot of some text messages said to be exchanged between Patient A and Nurse Practitioner A. 9. Patient A made a report to staff at the facility concerning Nurse Practitioner A on or around 18 September 2014. 10. A number of emails apparently exchanged between Patient A and Ms Chester in the 3 day period covering 15 September 2014 to 17 September 2014 reference Nurse Practitioner A by his first name and address the issue of a personal relationship between him and Patient A as well as the question of reporting his conduct. 11. A number of emails apparently exchanged between Patient A and Ms Chester on 29 and 30 August 2014 also reference Nurse Practitioner A by his first name and address the issue of a personal relationship between him and Patient A. There is no apparent discussion of reporting the conduct. 12. The materials filed by the HCCC also include a screenshot of three text messages purported to be sent by Patient A to Nurse Practitioner A on 2 September 2014 as follows: I tilt [sic] Juliet that we have been honest with each other and had a talk. This is what she said. Don't tell me any more. its a serious issue and my registration as a pysch means i hv 2 report such boundary crossings or i wld b disciplined – take care x So I said all we did was be honest with each other and nothing has happened. 1. The apparent discrepancies in the practitioner's account as it appears at this application leave me unable to find, at this stage, that she has made a full or frank admission of the kind that has in some other cases contributed to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion to terminate an inquiry. 2. I am very conscious that none of the material submitted in relation to this application has been tested. The material above is not referenced in order to draw any conclusion about the substantive complaints or to pre-judge the issues in dispute. Any apparent discrepancies may well be resolved at hearing; a consideration which gives force to the finding that an inquiry is required. Orders 1. A non-publication order under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) prohibiting disclosure or publication of the name of the Patient A in the schedule to the complaint; 2. The Respondent's request to refer the matter to the Supreme Court of NSW on a matter of law is declined; 3. The Respondent's application to terminate the inquiry or dismiss the proceedings is denied; 4. This matter to be listed for directions to set a timetable for hearing; 5. Costs of this application are reserved until the matter is determined. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 June 2017