Court of Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Sullivan v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2017] NSWCA 244 Hearing dates: 14 August 2017 Date of orders: 26 September 2017 Decision date: 26 September 2017 Before: Beazley ACJ at [1]; Meagher JA at [2]; Emmett AJA at [3] Decision: 1. Appeal dismissed. 2. Appellant to pay the Respondent's costs. Catchwords: DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – professional misconduct – failure to comply with a notice under s 660 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), Sch 5 Pt 4 cll 23, 29 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), ss 551, 552, 566, Ch 4 Pt 4.2, Ch 4 Pt 4.4, Ch 6 Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), ss 266, 300, Sch 4 cl 26 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW), s 137 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 48, 51 Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth), s 116 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Terrence Anthony Sullivan (Appellant) Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: A J McQuillen (Appellant) C A Webster SC (Respondent) Solicitors: Sullivan Fernan Lawyers (Appellant) Law Society of New South Wales (Respondent) File Number(s): 2017/119469 Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Civil and Administrative Tribunal, New South Wales Jurisdiction: Occupational Division Citation: [2017] NSWCATOD 2 Date of Decision: 4 January 2017 Before: Principal Member B Tamberlin; Senior Member C Ludlow and General Member E Hayes File Number(s): 1620142 [Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.] HEADNOTE [This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] The appellant, Mr Sullivan, holds a practising certificate issued by the Law Society of New South Wales (the Society). In October 2012, the appellant's ex-wife, Ms Cullinan, made a complaint to the Society in relation to the appellant (the 2012 Complaint). Ms Lai conducted an investigation and wrote to the appellant in October 2013 informing him that the Society had dismissed the 2012 Complaint. In March 2015, Ms Cullinan made a further complaint (the 2015 Complaint). Ms Lai was appointed as investigator and sent several letters about the complaint to the appellant's DX box. The appellant failed to respond to this correspondence. On 25 May 2015, a notice pursuant to s 660 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (the LPA) was served personally on the appellant, to which he responded simply by indicating that he was not aware that Ms Lai was investigating a complaint. A second notice under s 660 (the July Notice) was served on the appellant. However, the appellant failed to comply with this notice as well. As a result of the appellant's non-compliance, the Society resolved to make a complaint against him pursuant to s 266 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (Uniform Law). Ms Lai wrote to the appellant indicating that it was the Society's view that, subject to any submissions, the appropriate orders to be sought on referral of the complaint to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) were that the appellant be reprimanded, his practising certificate be suspended until he complied with the July Notice and that he pay the Society's costs. The Tribunal found that pursuant to s 676(3) of the LPA, the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct as he had not complied with any part of the July Notice. The Tribunal reprimanded the appellant and ordered that his practising certificate be suspended until such time as he complied with the July Notice. Within hours of the Tribunal making these orders, the appellant complied with the July Notice. Emmett AJA (Beazley ACJ and Meagher JA agreeing): The Court of Appeal found that the appeal must be dismissed and that the appellant should pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. (1) The 2015 Complaint was clearly different from the 2012 Complaint. The subject matter of the 2015 Complaint was the appellant's failure to pay a sum of $78,844.55, while the 2012 Complaint related to a sum of $31,447.21. [59] (2) There was no evidence to suggest that compliance with the July Notice would be oppressive, as demonstrated by the fact that the appellant complied with it within hours of the Tribunal's orders being made. [61] (3) The Society was not required to exercise the discretion under s 511 of the LPA before commencing the investigation. Section 511(2) of the LPA provided that the discretion to dismiss a complaint summarily may be exercised without any investigation or without completing an investigation. [62] (4) The Tribunal took into account, quite properly, the correspondence between the parties and the appellant's persistence in the conduct complained of as indicating a lack of candour on his part. [63] (5) The Society had clearly invited the appellant to make submissions. The failure to inform him of his "right" to make submissions was not a denial of procedural fairness. [64],[65] (6) If the July Notice was invalid, as the appellant alleged, he would not have been required to answer it and, consequently, any non-compliance would not have necessitated a reasonable excuse. [66] (7) No exceptional circumstances were present and, as such, the Tribunal did not err in ordering costs against the appellant. [68] (8) The Society's submissions to the Tribunal had been in error to the extent that they claimed that the LPA applied to the Tribunal proceedings when, in fact, the Uniform Law applied. However, had the proceedings before the Tribunal been heard and determined under the Uniform Law, rather than the LPA, the procedures of the Tribunal would not have differed from the procedures that were, in fact, adopted. So much follows from s 301 of the Uniform Law. The Tribunal was empowered to make a finding of professional misconduct after the completion of its hearing. [70], [74] Judgment 1. BEAZLEY ACJ: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons of Emmett AJA. I agree with his Honour's reasons and proposed orders. 2. MEAGHER JA: I agree with Emmett AJA. 3. EMMETT AJA: The appellant in this appeal, Mr Terrence Sullivan (the Solicitor), is an Australian lawyer. He holds, and at all relevant times has held, a practising certificate as a solicitor issued to him by the Law Society of New South Wales (the Society). On 25 May 2016, the respondent, the Council of the Society (the Council), applied to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales (the Tribunal) for disciplinary findings and orders in relation to the Solicitor, following a complaint that he had failed to comply with a notice served on him under s 660 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (the Legal Profession Act) on 13 July 2015 (the July Notice). On 4 January 2017, for reasons published on that day, the Tribunal made a decision that the Solicitor had been guilty of professional misconduct and ordered that he be reprimanded and that his practising certificate be suspended until such time as he had complied with the Notice. The Tribunal also ordered the Solicitor to pay the Council's costs of the proceedings before the Tribunal. 4. By summons filed in the Administrative Law List of the Common Law Division on 1 February 2017, the Solicitor appealed, under cl 29(2)(b) of Pt 6 of Sch 5 to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the Tribunal Act), from the orders made by the Tribunal. He filed an amended summons on 21 February 2017. On 14 April 2017, pursuant to s 51(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) (the Supreme Court Act), Campbell J ordered that the proceedings be removed into this Court on the basis that, under s 48 of the Supreme Court Act, an appeal from the Tribunal, as it was constituted, is assigned to this Court. It is common ground that the summons should have been filed in this Court in the first place. On 28 June 2017, the Solicitor filed amended grounds of appeal. 5. The Legal Profession Act was repealed by the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) (the Application Act) and was replaced by the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (the Uniform Law). By the Application Act, the Uniform Law was applied in New South Wales, with effect from 1 July 2015. Before dealing with the issues raised in the appeal, it is desirable to say something about the legislative framework that regulated the complaint made against the Solicitor. Legislative Framework 1. Chapter 4 of the Legal Profession Act dealt with "Complaints and Discipline". Part 4.2 of Ch 4, which consisted of ss 503 to 513, dealt with "Complaints about Australian legal practitioners". Sections 503, 504 and 505 relevantly provided that a complaint under Pt 4.2 about an Australian legal practitioner's conduct may be made to the Legal Services Commissioner (the Commissioner) by any person. Such a complaint was required to describe the alleged conduct that was the subject of the complaint. Under cl 26 of Sch 4 to the Uniform Law, a complaint made under Ch 4 of the Legal Profession Act, but not disposed of before 1 July 2015, or an investigation referred to in Ch 4 that had begun but had not been completed before 1 July 2015, was to continue to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Legal Profession Act. 2. Section 508 of the Legal Profession Act provided that, if a complaint was referred by the Commissioner to the Council, the Council was required to ensure that, as soon as practicable after the complaint was made, the Australian legal practitioner about whom the complaint was made was given: * a copy of the complaint; and * a notice in writing informing the practitioner of the practitioner's right to make submissions, unless the Council advised the practitioner that the Council had dismissed or intended to dismiss the complaint. However, the Council was not required to give written notice until the Council had had time to consider the complaint, seek further information about the complaint from the complainant or otherwise undertake preliminary inquiries into the complaint, and properly prepare the notice. 1. Section 511(1) of the Legal Profession Act relevantly provided that the Council could dismiss the complaint if the conduct complained about had been the subject of a previous complaint that had been dismissed. Under s 511(2), a complaint could be dismissed under s 511 without any investigation or without completing an investigation. 2. Part 4.4 of Ch 4 of the Legal Profession Act, which consisted of ss 525 to 536, dealt with "Investigation of Complaints". Under s 525(1), each complaint was required to be investigated under Pt 4.4. However, s 525 did not apply to a complaint that was dismissed or withdrawn under Ch 4, to the extent that it was dismissed or withdrawn. Section 527 provided that the Council had to conduct an investigation into each complaint referred to it by the Commissioner. However, s 527 did not apply to a complaint that was not required to be investigated under Pt 4.4. 3. Under s 531, the Council, when investigating a complaint, was authorised to appoint a suitably qualified person as an investigator to investigate the complaint as agent of the Council. Section 534 provided that such an investigation may extend to any conduct of the legal practitioner that was revealed during the investigation where: * the conduct was related to the subject matter of the complaint and involved the complainant but was not within an allegation contained in the complaint; * the conduct was not related to the subject-matter of the complaint but involved the complainant; * the conduct was related to the subject matter of the complaint but did not involve the complainant; or * the conduct was not related to the subject matter of the complaint and did not involve the complainant. Section 534(2) required that the legal practitioner be informed in writing of any extended investigation as soon as practicable after the investigation was extended. Under s 536, Ch 6 applied to an investigation under Pt 4.4. 1. The primary purpose of Ch 6, which dealt with "Provisions relating to Investigations", was to provide powers that were exercisable in connection with, inter alia, the investigation of complaints under Ch 4 (a complaint investigation). Section 660(1) relevantly provided that, for the purpose of carrying out a complaint investigation in relation to an Australian lawyer, an investigator could, by notice served on the lawyer, require the lawyer to do any one or more of the following: * produce, at a specified time and place, any specified document or a copy of the document; * provide written information on or before a specified date; and * otherwise assist in, or co-operate with, the investigation of the complaint in a specified manner. 1. Under s 660(3), a person who was subject to a requirement under s 660(1) had to comply with the requirement. Under s 660(4), a requirement imposed on a person under s 660 was to be notified in writing to the person and was to specify a reasonable time for compliance. Under s 676, an Australian lawyer who was subject to a requirement under s 660 could not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with the requirement. An Australian lawyer who contravened that provision would be guilty of professional misconduct. Background to the Application to the Tribunal 1. From 19 October 2012, Ms Heather Cullinan, the Solicitor's former wife (the Complainant), pursued a complaint with the Society in relation to certain conduct of the Solicitor. On 12 December 2012, Ms Michelle Lai, an investigator appointed by the Society, wrote to the Solicitor on behalf of the Society requesting his response to three complaints as follows: 1. failing to lodge income tax returns since 2007; 2. failing to pay income tax; and 3. failing to pay child support. 1. Following various exchanges after that letter, Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor on 4 October 2013, saying that she had completed her investigation into the Complainant's complaint and had reported to the Professional Conduct Committee of the Society (the Committee). The letter said that the Complainant had alleged that the Solicitor had failed to lodge his income tax returns since 2007, had failed to pay income tax and had failed to pay child support for their son, of approximately $31,447.21 as at 12 November 2012. The Complainant alleged that a court order had been made against the Solicitor to pay maintenance and that he had ignored the order. Ms Lai said in her letter that the Committee had dismissed the complaint against the Solicitor on the basis that it was satisfied that there was no reasonable likelihood that the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, the predecessor of the Tribunal, would find that the Solicitor had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. 2. The Committee's reasons for dismissing the complaint, which were set out in Ms Lai's letter, were that, based on the material before it, there was insufficient information for the Committee to be satisfied that the Solicitor had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The reasons referred to a letter from the Solicitor in which he said that any outstanding personal tax returns would be lodged shortly and that outstanding income tax would be assessed by the Australian Taxation Office (the ATO) on lodgement of any outstanding tax returns. The reasons recorded that the Solicitor also said that there was an amount of child support outstanding, which had been assessed "on inflated income amounts attributed" to him. He said that, once his correct income was made known, through lodgement of outstanding tax returns, the assessed amount would be disputed and, subject to relevant rules, may or may not be amended. Ms Lai's letter ended by saying that the Society had closed its file and had informed the Complainant of her right to ask the Commissioner to review the Society's treatment of her complaint. 3. On 11 March 2015, the Complainant sent an email to the Commissioner (the March 2015 email), saying that the Commissioner had recently been considering a case that she had put forward about the Solicitor acting unprofessionally. That was apparently intended as a reference to the complaint made in October 2012, which had been the subject of Ms Lai's letter of 4 October 2013. In the March 2015 email, the Complainant said that the Solicitor owed her over $75,000 in unpaid maintenance for his son and "constantly flouts the law to avoid payment, yet continues to practice [sic] family law". 4. The March 2015 email went on to assert that "the case" was being considered "at parliamentary level" and attached a letter dated 4 March 2015 from the Minister for Human Services of the Commonwealth (the Minister) addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who was apparently the Complainant's local member. The March 2015 email said that the Minister's letter might encourage the Commissioner "to look at this case again". 5. The Minister's letter said that the Complainant was, at that time, owed $75,361.10 in child support but that, despite extensive investigations into the Solicitor's finances, the Department of Human Services (the Department) had been unable to locate any avenue for collection from the Solicitor. The Minister's letter referred to a Departure Prohibition Order (DPO) issued against the Solicitor in 2010 when he owed child support arrears of $44,088.30 and said that those arrears had subsequently been paid in full and that the DPO had been removed. However, following further information provided by the Complainant to suggest that the Solicitor was about to travel overseas, the Department had issued a further DPO against him. 6. On 13 March 2015, the Commissioner referred the March 2015 email to the Society for investigation. Following referral of the March 2015 email for investigation, Ms Lai was appointed as investigator. On 23 March 2015, Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor, addressed to his DX box. For reasons that have not been explained, the Solicitor apparently did not receive the letter of 23 March 2015 until much later. 7. By the letter of 23 March 2015, Ms Lai said that the Commissioner had referred to the Society "a further complaint" made by the Complainant on 11 March 2015. A copy of the March 2015 email was enclosed with the letter together with a certificate under s 116(2) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) (the Collection Act) certifying that the sum of $78,844.55 was payable by the Solicitor and remained unpaid as at 11 March 2015. Also enclosed with the letter was a document entitled "CSA Payment History" and a document entitled "Your Child Support Assessment" dated 8 December 2014. 8. The letter of 23 March 2015 said that "the complaint" appeared to raise the following conduct issues: "1. Failing to pay child support." The letter went on to say, in respect of that "complaint": "1. This complaint was previously raised by the complainant on 19 October 2012. 2. You advised that your outstanding personal income taxation returns for the years ended 30 June 2009 to 30 June 2012 would be lodged and you would advise once such returns had been lodged with the Australian Taxation Office. 3. You advised that your attributed income had been 'in excess of actual earnings' which may have impacted on the amounts payable by you for child support. Once your personal income taxation returns had been lodged, you would make aan [sic] application to the Child Support Agency for a (re)assessment of child support payable by you." (Emphasis in original). 1. The letter of 23 March 2015 then requested certain information by 14 April 2015. The letter said that the Solicitor should include copies of any documents that may support his "account", together with any written submissions in response to "the complaint". The letter said that, as part of the complaint investigation, Ms Lai would send a copy of the Solicitor's response to the Complainant for comment. 2. On 16 April 2015 and 4 May 2015, Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor again, in each case addressing the letters to his DX box. In the second letter, the Solicitor's attention was drawn to the proposition that it is important that solicitors respond promptly to the Society when it asks for a reply in response to complaints that have been made. Those documents were also not received by the Solicitor. They requested a response to the letter of 23 March 2015. 3. On 25 May 2015, a notice pursuant to s 660 of the Legal Profession Act dated 21 May 2015 (the May Notice) was served personally on the Solicitor. The May Notice was signed by Ms Lai, as investigator of the Professional Standards Department of the Society, and was expressed to be in exercise of powers given to her by s 660 of the Legal Profession Act. It was served under cover of a letter dated 21 May 2015 from Ms Lai to the Solicitor relevantly saying as follows: "As you will be aware, I am investigating the complaint made with regard to your conduct. Pursuant to section 660 of the Legal Profession Act, 2004, I, as Investigator, can require you by Notice, to provide information, produce documents and otherwise assist in, and co-operate with, the investigation. Enclosed is a Notice under section 660 of the Legal Profession Act, 2004. Please respond in accordance with its requirements and notes." (Emphasis in original). 1. On 15 June 2015, the Solicitor wrote to Ms Lai, referring to her letter of 21 May 2015. After complaining about the manner of service of the letter and the May Notice, the Solicitor said that he was not aware that Ms Lai was investigating a complaint and referred to her letter dated 4 October 2013, in which she advised that the Society "has now closed its file". 2. Ms Lai replied on 19 June 2015, referring to the letters dated 23 March 2015, 16 April 2015 and 4 May 2015. The Solicitor replied on 3 July 2015, asserting that the letter of 21 May 2015 was the first correspondence that he had received from the Society with respect to a complaint by the Complainant since receiving the letter of 4 October 2013 and that he had not received any letters dated 23 March 2015, 16 April 2015 or 4 May 2015. He asserted that he had had "absolutely no knowledge" of a second complaint made against him by the Complainant until he received the letter of 19 June 2015. He requested that the May Notice be withdrawn in circumstances where he said it had been served on him "in the vacuum of no background and/or justifying material". 3. Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor again on 7 July 2015, pointing out that the May Notice stated that on 23 March 2015 the Society had referred to him the complaint by the Complainant. Ms Lai asserted that it was clear on the face of the May Notice that a new complaint had been made. A copy of the letter dated 23 March 2015 (and its enclosures), together with copies of the letters dated 16 April 2015 and 4 May 2015 were enclosed with the letter of 7 July 2015. Also enclosed was a second notice under s 660, the July Notice, dated 7 July 2015. Apart from its date, the July Notice was identical to the May Notice. The letter of 7 July 2015, together with its enclosures, including the July Notice, was served personally on the Solicitor on 13 July 2015. 4. The syntax and structure of the July Notice is less than felicitous. By it, Ms Lai required the Solicitor to provide to her the information set out in Schedule 1, on or before the 21st day after service on him of the July Notice, and to produce to her, on or before the 21st day after service on him of the July Notice, the documents specified in Schedule 2. 5. Schedule 1 began as follows: "On 23 March 2015, the Society referred you [sic] the following complaint made by [the Complainant] against you for your response: 1. Failing to pay child support. In response to the complaint you are required to provide the following information: I note that you have specified in your statutory declaration dated 20 March 2013 (Declaration) that you will owe outstanding amounts to the Australian Taxation Office and the 'amount will be ascertained when assessments are issued by the ATO following lodgement of the outstanding returns.' I also note from the Declaration that you have lodged your personal income taxation returns for the years ended 30 June 2007 and 2008 but have not done so for the remaining years. In relation to each of the financial years ended 30 June 2009 to date:" (Emphasis in original). There then followed 10 items, some of which contained questions and some of which required information. Only the first three could be regarded as having any relationship to a particular financial year referred to in the preamble. For example, items 1 and 2 requested information about the preparation and lodgement of "your personal income taxation returns". Item 3 sought further information "[i]f you or your taxation accountant has not lodged any personal income taxation returns with the [ATO]". 1. Items 4 and 5 sought information concerning current outstanding income tax liabilities to the ATO. It is quite unclear whether that information was sought only in respect of financial years ended 30 June 2009 to date. 2. Item 6 began by referring to the annexure, being the certificate under s 116(2) of the Collection Act, showing a liability of $78,844.55, and asked the Solicitor whether he agreed that that sum was payable by him. Item 7 required the Solicitor to specify, if the answer to this question was "no", why he did not owe that sum in child support. 3. Item 8 referred to the Solicitor's letter of 31 May 2013, in which, the July Notice asserted, he had said that he would be making an application with respect to the assessments made by the Child Support Agency and asked whether the Solicitor had contacted the Child Support Agency for a re-assessment. Items 9 and 10 sought the reasons if the answer to the question at item 8 was "no" and the result if the answer was "yes". 4. Schedule 2 of the July Notice called for copies of all notices, demands and/or correspondence from the ATO concerning the lodgement of any of the Solicitor's personal income taxation returns and the payment of any taxation liability arising from such returns. Schedule 2 also called for copies of all correspondence with the Child Support Agency concerning the Solicitor's application for re-assessment and documents evidencing amounts paid by the Solicitor for child support. 5. The Solicitor did not comply with the July Notice. Rather, on 3 August 2015, he wrote to Ms Lai referring to the letter of 7 July 2015 and saying that it was not clear to him how the "new complaint" that Ms Lai was "investigating" was any different from the original complaint. He complained further that Ms Lai had still not forwarded to him a copy of the Complainant's complaint to the Commissioner of 11 March 2015. He referred to the March 2015 email and asserted that there was no complaint in that email. 6. The Solicitor asserted, in his letter of 3 August 2015, that it was a matter of "basic procedural fairness" that he be provided with all relevant material with respect to the matter, being the "new complaint" made by the Complainant, so that he could, first, consider and address the question of whether or not it was different from the "previously closed complaint" and, secondly, in the event that it was different, so that he could make the submissions that Ms Lai invited him to make in relation to it. He requested that the whole of the relevant material and, in particular, a copy of the Complainant's "new complaint", be provided to him. 7. Ms Lai replied to the Solicitor on 3 August 2015, saying that the Commissioner had referred to the Society for investigation the "new complaint" made by the Complainant. Ms Lai said that the new complaint arose from the material that was included in the Society's letter to the Solicitor of 23 March 2015, being the March 2015 email and its attachment. Ms Lai also said that the material forwarded by the Complainant to the Commissioner had been determined by the Commissioner to amount to a complaint and that the complaint was identified and confirmed by the Complainant as "failing to pay child support". Ms Lai ended by saying that the Solicitor's response to the July Notice was required by 4 August 2015. 8. The Solicitor did not comply with the July Notice by 4 August 2015. Rather, he wrote to Ms Lai again, by letter of 4 August 2015, in which he asserted that the material enclosed with the original letter of 23 March 2015 was of no assistance in identifying a "new complaint". He said that the Minister's letter of 4 March 2015 did not assist in that regard but, rather, was indicative of a continuation of the Complainant's original complaint, which had been considered by the Society and had been closed. The Solicitor said that the issue he had, and which the Society should also have, was whether the March 2015 email amounted to a "new complaint" or whether it was a mere continuation of previous and apparent ongoing correspondence between the Complainant and the Commissioner. The Solicitor asserted that the material that had been provided to him was not relevant to a "new complaint" and in no way identified a "new complaint" and that the July Notice sought, in part, material and information that was not relevant to the "new complaint" but was, instead, relevant to complaints that had already been finalised, "as advised" in the letter of 4 October 2013. The Solicitor complained that he did not have an understanding of what Ms Lai was "investigating" or of her grounds for doing so. 9. On 21 August 2015, Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor again, saying that the Society had resolved to make a complaint against him under s 266 of the Uniform Law. She said that the complaint arose from the July Notice and that the text of the complaint was as follows: "The solicitor has failed to comply with a notice pursuant to section 660 of the Legal Profession Act, 2004." It is unfortunate that the letter of 21 August 2015 incorrectly referred to the July Notice as having been served with the letter of 21 May 2015. It was in fact the May Notice that was served with that letter. The July Notice was served with the letter dated 7 July 2015. Nevertheless, the letter of 21 August 2015 expressly referred to a notice served on 13 July 2015. The letter of 21 August 2015 then said: "To enable the Professional Conduct Committee to fairly consider the complaint, you must provide me with your written submissions to the complaint by 15 September 2015. You should include copies of any document that may support your account." (Emphasis in original). 1. On 15 September 2015, the Solicitor wrote to "committee members" of the Committee. He said that his first knowledge of "the present complaint" was the letter from the Society dated 21 May 2015, which was hand-delivered to him on 25 May 2015 together with the May Notice. The Solicitor referred to the incorrect reference in the letter of 21 August 2015, which stated that the July Notice was served by the Society's letter of 21 May 2015, observing that the mistake reflected "the standard of consideration given to this matter". The Solicitor then went on to say that the May Notice and the July Notice were in identical terms and that they sought information and documents "of a very personal nature". He asserted that the "complaint" had no connection whatsoever with the conduct of his legal practice, being a complaint from his ex-wife, "whose agenda is personal and who has made continued efforts over a period of eleven years to discredit me with whomever and wherever possible". The Solicitor then referred to the three complaints made to the Commissioner in 2012 and asserted that the third complaint, "failing to pay child support", was in exactly the same terms as "the present complaint", as set out in the Society's letter of 23 March 2015. He referred again to the Society's letter of 4 October 2013 informing him that the complaints had been "dismissed" and that the Society had "closed its file". 2. The Solicitor's letter of 15 September 2015 also referred to the statement in Ms Lai's letter of 7 July 2015 that the new complaint was in different terms and distinguishable from "the previously closed compliant [sic]". The Solicitor said that he could not detect the "different terms" and the "distinguishable" features asserted by Ms Lai. He asserted that at no time had Ms Lai advised him of any basis for those assertions and had not provided objective material to support them. He said that, in order "to give proper regard to the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness", Ms Lai ought to have ventilated properly what the "new complaint" was and how it was "in different terms" and "distinguishable" from "the previously dismissed complaint". 3. The Solicitor also complained in his letter that s 511(1)(d) of the Legal Profession Act was not referred to by Ms Lai and asserted that Ms Lai should have considered that provision and its possible application to the present complaint. He said that, had Ms Lai referred to that provision in correspondence, he would have addressed it by pointing out that the complaint was not only "the subject of a previous complaint" but was in exactly the same terms as the previous complaint. The Solicitor then asserted that the May Notice and the July Notice sought documentation and information relevant to the first and second complaints made by the Complainant in 2012 as well as the third complaint "which ha[d] been duplicated in 2015". He asserted that some of the material sought from him was relevant only to the first two complaints of 2012 and that the content of the two notices was "indicative of the lack of attention that ha[d] been given to this matter and of the lack of proper assessment that ha[d] been made of it". 4. The Solicitor then said that he had failed to comply with both the May Notice and the July Notice, not because he had ignored them but, rather, because the Society had failed to advise him of the proper grounds on which the notices had been issued. He submitted that he had provided a "reasonable excuse" as contemplated by s 676 of the Legal Profession Act for non-compliance with the notices and that the complaint for failing to comply with the July Notice should be dismissed. He also submitted that the "complaint" by the Complainant should be dismissed. 5. On 16 September 2015, Ms Anne-Marie Foord, the Manager, Professional Standards, of the Society, wrote to the Solicitor in response to his letter of 15 September 2015. Ms Foord said that the complaint that was the subject of the Society's current consideration was that he had failed to comply with the July Notice. Ms Foord asked for any further submissions by 30 September 2015, saying that her understanding of his response to the complaint was that he had a reasonable excuse, namely, that the substantive complaint had no merit. 6. On 20 November 2015, Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor informing him that the Committee had resolved at its meeting on 19 November 2015 that he be informed of certain matters as follows: (1) the issues of professional misconduct that, in the opinion of the Committee, were involved in the complaint and in respect of which the Committee invited submissions; (2) the Committee's opinion that, subject to any submissions, it should resolve to initiate and prosecute proceedings in the Tribunal; (3) the Committee's opinion that, subject to any submissions, certain orders were appropriate; and (4) consideration of the complaint would be placed on the agenda for a meeting of the Committee as soon as practicable after 11 December 2015. The professional misconduct was identified in the letter as follows: "The solicitor has failed to comply with a notice pursuant to section 660 of the Legal Profession Act, 2004". The letter said that it was the Committee's opinion that, subject to any submissions, the appropriate orders to be sought on a referral of the complaint to the Tribunal were as follows: * The Solicitor be reprimanded; * The Solicitor's practising certificate be suspended until such time as he had complied with the July Notice; * The Solicitor pay the Society's costs as agreed or assessed. The letter told the Solicitor that if he wished to make any further submissions of fact or law, or as to the orders to be sought, they must be received by Ms Lai no later than 11 December 2015. 1. On 4 March 2016, Ms Lai wrote to the Solicitor again saying that the matter had been considered by the Committee at its meeting on 3 March 2016, when the Committee resolved that it was of the opinion that the alleged conduct of the Solicitor may amount to professional misconduct and that proceedings be initiated and prosecuted in the Tribunal. The professional misconduct and the orders sought, as stated in the letter of 4 March 2016, were in the same terms as in the letter of 20 November 2015. Proceedings in the Tribunal 1. As I have said, the Council filed its application to the Tribunal on 25 May 2016. The grounds stated in the application were that the Solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct, in that he failed to comply with the July Notice. The Solicitor's reply raised nine matters, which may be summarised as follows: (1) At the time of issuing the July Notice, the Council had not established a complaint investigation and had failed to give notice to the Solicitor in writing of his right to make submissions. It had also failed to specify the period within which submissions had to be made. (2) By not complying strictly with the requirements of s 508 of the Legal Profession Act, the Council had not established a complaint investigation with the Solicitor at the time that the July Notice was issued and consequently could not lawfully proceed with a complaint investigation. (3) By failing to comply with s 508, there was no complaint investigation that the Council could lawfully undertake. (4) The conduct complained about, and for which the purported complaint investigation was being conducted by the Council, namely, failing to pay child support, was clearly the subject of a previous complaint that had been dismissed. (5) It was incumbent upon the Council to consider the provisions of s 511 of the Legal Profession Act and to exercise its discretion provided by that section when determining whether or not to conduct a complaint investigation. The Council did not consider that section and consequently did not exercise any discretion. (6) By the July Notice, the Council sought information from the Solicitor that, in part, was not relevant to the conduct complained about, namely, failing to pay child support, but was relevant to two previous complaints, namely, failing to lodge income tax returns and failing to pay income tax. (7) The Council was bound to exercise its discretion when determining whether or not to issue the July Notice and when formulating the terms of the July Notice but failed to do so, reasonably or at all, as it did not consider what was relevant to the complaint investigation but, rather, was informed from a previous file that had been closed in 2013. (8) The Council did not act reasonably and impartially when considering the conduct complained about, namely, failing to pay child support, and in purporting to carry out a complaint investigation of the conduct complained about. (9) The Committee did not consider the conduct complained about, namely, failing to pay child support, and the purported establishment by the Council of the complaint investigation, but only considered the Solicitor's failure to comply with the July Notice in isolation, without considering the background to the issuing of the July Notice or the right to issue the July Notice and, in those circumstances, the Committee did not properly exercise its discretion. 1. In its reasons of 4 January 2017, after referring briefly to the background and the legislative framework, the Tribunal observed that the Solicitor did not dispute that he had failed to comply with the July Notice but claimed that the July notice was invalid. The Tribunal summarised the Solicitor's grounds for that contention as follows: (1) The Council had failed to comply with s 508 of the Legal Profession Act in that the letter of 23 March 2015 did not inform the Solicitor of his right to make submissions or state a period in which his submissions were required. (2) The Council had failed to consider the complaint under s 511 and determine whether or not to dismiss it on the grounds that the conduct in the complaint had been the subject of a previous complaint. (3) The July Notice was issued in reliance on a complaint that was the same as the previous complaint that had been dismissed. (4) The July Notice sought information that was irrelevant to the complaint. (5) The Committee did not consider the Solicitor's submissions dated 15 September 2016 and he had, therefore, been denied procedural fairness. (6) The Council acted with a lack of impartiality. 1. The Tribunal then observed that the parties had agreed that, in light of the above issues, the question of whether or not the Solicitor had a "reasonable excuse" within the meaning of s 676(3)(b) of the Legal Profession Act did not arise. The Tribunal said that no excuse was put forward by the Solicitor at the hearing and that, at the request of the parties, the Tribunal determined to deal with the issue of validity in making its decision on the allegation of professional misconduct. The Tribunal then proceeded to deal with the six grounds. 2. The Tribunal observed that both ground (1) and ground (2) appeared to be based on the proposition that the power in s 660 was not enlivened unless the Society had first complied with certain provisions of the Legal Profession Act dealing with the receipt, notification and consideration of complaints. The Tribunal concluded that the Solicitor was, in effect, told in the letter of 23 March 2015 that he should provide submissions by 14 April 2015. The Tribunal did not consider that anything turned upon the failure to mention a "right" to make submissions and that if, as the Solicitor alleged, he did not receive the letter of 23 March 2015 at the time when it was sent, he was not disadvantaged. The Tribunal considered there was no relevant lack of compliance with s 508. 3. In relation to ground (2), the Tribunal concluded that s 511 did not impose an obligation upon the Council to consider whether there were any grounds on which to dismiss a complaint before commencing an investigation or at any particular stage during an investigation. The Tribunal referred to s 511(2), which provided that a complaint may be dismissed without any investigation or without completing an investigation. The Tribunal considered that the legislature clearly wished the Council to have the choice of exercising the power either before, during or after an investigation had commenced. 4. In relation to ground (3), the Tribunal was not persuaded that the complaint contained in the March 2015 email was the same as the complaint that had been dismissed in 2013. The Tribunal observed that, while it might relate to the same kind of conduct, it was not the same actual conduct as was previously complained of, as it covered a different period, related to a different sum of money and took into account acts or omissions since the dismissal of the earlier complaint. 5. In relation to ground (4), the Tribunal considered that the requests for information concerning the Solicitor's taxation returns were made relevant to the investigation of the complaint by his previous advice to the Society that he would lodge outstanding returns and seek a reassessment of his child support obligations. The Tribunal considered that, even if some of the material sought was not relevant, the Solicitor had not complied with any part of the July Notice and, therefore, ground (4) could not succeed. 6. In relation to ground (5), the Tribunal found that the Solicitor had not established that the Committee did not consider his submissions and that the evidence supported a finding that they did, in fact, consider them. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Committee's words "subject to any submissions" referred to the submissions they were inviting the Solicitor to provide and were not an indication that they did not have any submissions from him before them. The Tribunal observed that the Solicitor had a further opportunity to make submissions, which was communicated to him by Ms Lai on 20 November 2015. In addition, the Tribunal observed, the Solicitor had an opportunity to ventilate his concerns before the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that there was no failure to consider the submissions and no denial of procedural fairness. 7. In relation to the contention in ground (6), that the Society had demonstrated bias against the Solicitor by sending a letter concerning the complaint to him at his office by public facsimile, thereby breaching privacy and confidentiality, the Tribunal observed that Ms Foord, who swore an affidavit in support of the complaint to the Tribunal, accepted that correspondence with solicitors on complaint matters should be dealt with sensitively. Ms Foord said that there may have been a reason why the letter was sent by facsimile in the present case. The Tribunal observed that there was no evidence that actual bias was the reason why the letter was sent by facsimile and that the mere fact that Ms Lai sent the letter, which could have been seen by others in the Solicitor's office, would not cause a fair-minded and informed observer to draw the conclusion that the Committee or the Council would not act impartially. 8. In dealing with the penalty, having noted that the Solicitor did not dispute that he had failed to comply with the July Notice and that, as at the date of the hearing, had still not complied, the Tribunal found the conduct proven and observed that s 676(3) provided that an Australian lawyer who failed to comply with a requirement under s 660, without reasonable excuse, was guilty of professional misconduct. The Tribunal referred to the Solicitor's submission that he treated the July Notice seriously and did not simply fail to comply but engaged in frequent requests for clarification. It also referred to his contention that it was appropriate for him to raise issues that he saw as relevant to his obligations and that he should not be penalised for failing to give evidence. He pointed out that he had been in practice since 1987 and that he had not previously appeared in a disciplinary matter. He said that a reprimand would damage his reputation and that suspension was a very serious penalty for a sole practitioner with employed staff. 9. The Tribunal concluded that, by virtue of s 676(3) of the Legal Profession Act, the Solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct. The Tribunal found that the Solicitor's arguments about the validity of the July Notice were without merit and that, as a result of his conduct, the investigation of the Complainant's complaint had been delayed for more than 18 months. The Tribunal considered that the Solicitor had not complied with any part of the July Notice and had not shown any contrition. The Tribunal considered that the Solicitor's conduct and the tone of his correspondence with the Council did not give cause for confidence that he would comply fully with the July Notice without some motivation to do so. The Tribunal found that the Solicitor had been guilty of professional misconduct, reprimanded him and ordered that his practising certificate be suspended until such time as he complied with the July Notice. 10. Although there was no evidence before this Court, the Court was informed by counsel for the Solicitor and counsel for the Council that, within a period of some hours after the orders of the Tribunal were made, the Solicitor complied with the July Notice. That may have some relevance in that it indicates that the Solicitor had no difficulty in complying with the July Notice. The Appeal 1. While the amended grounds of appeal filed on 28 June 2017 identified 18 separate grounds, the Solicitor's submissions grouped the 18 grounds into eight categories. Counsel for the Council formulated the following issues arising from the Solicitor's submissions: (1) Whether the Tribunal erred in its characterisation of the complaint against the Solicitor made by the March 2015 email as a new complaint (Grounds 1, 2 and 3). (2) Whether the July Notice was valid (Grounds 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11). (3) Whether the Tribunal erred in finding that the Society was not required to exercise the discretion under s 511 (Ground 7). (4) Whether the Tribunal erred in finding, or otherwise taking into account, that the Solicitor was unwilling to comply and showed no contrition following his failure to comply with the July Notice (Grounds 9 and 18). (5) Whether the Solicitor was denied procedural fairness by the Society or the Tribunal (Grounds 12 and 13). (6) Whether the Tribunal erred in failing to find that the Solicitor had a reasonable excuse for not complying with the July Notice (Ground 14). (7) Whether the Tribunal erred in terms of the costs order made against the Solicitor (Ground15). (8) Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter (Grounds 16 and 17). I shall deal separately with each of those issues. Characterisation of the 2015 Complaint 1. Grounds 1, 2 and 3 involve a contention that the complaint made by the March 2015 email (the 2015 Complaint) was the complaint that had been dismissed in 2013. While the correspondence from 23 March 2015 and following, in the circumstances in which it was provided to the Solicitor, may have been infelicitous in its wording, it is clear enough that the subject matter of the March 2015 email and the Minister's letter was failure by the Solicitor to pay a sum of $78,844.55, whereas the complaint dismissed in 2013 related to a sum of $31,447.21. Whether or not the former sum included the whole or part of the latter sum, it must have been obvious to the Solicitor that the 2015 Complaint related to different money, or at least additional money, alleged to have been owing in respect of child support. The 2015 Complaint was clearly different from the complaint that had been dismissed in 2013. The Tribunal did not err in so concluding (see [51] above). Validity of the July Notice 1. Grounds 4, 5, 6, 8 and 11 refer to the May Notice. However, the May Notice was not the subject of the proceedings before the Tribunal. The only question in issue was the Solicitor's failure to comply with the July Notice. The Solicitor's contention is that the July Notice was not issued for the purpose of carrying out a complaint investigation, that it was an abuse of process and oppressive and that it was not issued for proper purposes, namely, for the purposes of complaint investigation. 2. There was no evidence to suggest that compliance with the July Notice would be oppressive. Indeed, as noted earlier, it was common ground before this Court that, within hours of the orders being made by the Tribunal, the July Notice was complied with. It is clear that the Society was under an obligation to conduct an investigation following the referral of the 2015 Complaint by the Commissioner. There is no basis for concluding that the July Notice was not issued for the purposes of conducting a complaint investigation in relation to the 2015 Complaint. Accordingly, these grounds are not made out. Discretion under s 511 1. The Solicitor contends that the Tribunal should have found that the Society failed to take into account a relevant consideration, namely, that the conduct complained of in the 2015 Complaint was the same conduct as had been the subject of the complaint dismissed in 2013. Section 511 of the Legal Profession Act permitted the Society to dismiss a complaint summarily, relevantly, if the conduct complained about had been the subject of a previous complaint that had been dismissed. However, s 511(2) provided that the discretion may be exercised without any investigation or without completing an investigation. There is nothing in s 511 that required the Society to exercise the discretion under that section before commencing the investigation. In any event, for the reasons indicated above, the 2015 Complaint was not a complaint in respect of the same conduct that had been the subject of the complaint that had been dismissed in 2013. There is nothing in this ground. Contrition 1. The Solicitor contended that the Tribunal accepted his submission that he treated the July Notice seriously and that he did not simply fail to comply with it. Therefore, he contended, it should not have found that he was unwilling to comply with the July Notice and that he showed no contrition. The Tribunal's reasons, however, are consistent only with the Tribunal having rejected the Solicitor's submissions that he treated the July Notice seriously and that he did not simply fail to comply. The Tribunal found the Solicitor's arguments concerning the validity of the July Notice to be without merit and that his conduct and the tone of his correspondence did not give cause for confidence that he would comply fully with the July Notice. More than 12 months had elapsed since the July Notice had been given. It is clear that the Tribunal took into account, quite properly, the correspondence between the parties and the Solicitor's persistence in the conduct as indicating a degree of lack of candour on his part in the course of the hearing. These grounds must fail. Procedural fairness 1. The Solicitor contends, by ground 12, that he was not afforded procedural fairness by the Council because the Council did not notify him in writing as soon as practicable of his "right" to make submissions, and did not provide him with a copy of the 2015 Complaint, together with sufficient particulars of the conduct that was the subject of that complaint, to enable him to determine that it was different from the complaint dismissed in 2013. There is no substance in this ground. It is clear enough that the letter of 23 March 2015 invited him to make submissions. The failure to inform him of his "right" was not a denial of procedural fairness. Indeed, the 2015 Complaint has not yet been resolved, since no decision has yet been made by the Council in relation to that complaint. There is nothing to suggest that the Solicitor will not be afforded an appropriate opportunity to make submissions in relation to the 2015 Complaint at an appropriate time. 2. By ground 13, the Solicitor complains that the Tribunal failed to afford him procedural fairness, in that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to answer particulars of conduct that should have been provided as the subject of the 2015 Complaint. The ground is difficult to understand. Submissions filed with the Tribunal on behalf of the Council directly addressed the differences contended for by the Council between the complaint dismissed in 2013 and the 2015 Complaint. There is no basis for concluding that the Solicitor was unable to deal with the differences between the conduct that was the subject of the complaint dismissed in 2013 and the conduct that was the subject of the 2015 Complaint. The Solicitor made no submission to the Tribunal that he was not in a position to deal with the matter. He did not seek an adjournment or make any complaint to the Tribunal. There is no substance in this ground. Reasonable excuse 1. In his written submissions, the Solicitor asserted that he had a reasonable excuse, as articulated in the correspondence that passed between him and Ms Lai. However, he adduced no evidence before the Tribunal directed to establishing a reasonable excuse. Further, the Council submitted to the Tribunal that for the Solicitor to rely upon a defence of reasonable excuse, he must accept that the July Notice was valid. If the July Notice was invalid, there could be no requirement for him to answer it and, consequently, any non-compliance would not require a reasonable excuse. That was accepted by the Solicitor, who confirmed that the primary question for determination was the validity or otherwise of the July Notice. 2. It would have been open to the Solicitor, if he wished, to take steps to challenge the validity of the July Notice. He did not do so. He took his chances in corresponding with Ms Lai and, at the same time, made no effort to comply with the July Notice or to seek an extension of time for compliance until the question of its validity had been established. There is no substance in the ground. Costs 1. By Ground 15, the Solicitor contended that the Tribunal erred in ordering him to pay the Council's costs because s 566(1) of the Legal Profession Act had been repealed and was not available as a provision under which a costs order could be made. However, the Council's submissions to the Tribunal referred to cl 23(1) of Pt 4 of Sch 5 of the Tribunal Act. Clause 23 requires the Tribunal to make orders requiring an Australian legal practitioner, whom it has found to have engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, to pay costs unless the Tribunal is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist. That is the contention that was advanced in writing. No exceptional circumstances were alleged by the Solicitor and certainly none were proved. There is no substance in the ground. Jurisdiction 1. Any contention that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction should have been raised before the Tribunal as a preliminary matter for determination. However, the Solicitor did not challenge the Tribunal's jurisdiction at first instance. During the hearing, the Tribunal raised the question of whether it had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the July Notice or whether that question should be referred to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor did not seek to be heard on that question and did not raise any other basis for challenging the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 2. The Council accepted before this Court that its submissions to the Tribunal were erroneous, insofar as they asserted that the Legal Profession Act applied to the proceedings before the Tribunal. As indicated above, the Legal Profession Act was repealed by the Application Act with effect from 1 July 2015 and, under the Application Act, the Uniform Law applied as from 1 July 2015. The July Notice had been issued under s 660 of the Legal Profession Act in relation to the investigation of the 2015 Complaint, which had been made under the Legal Profession Act. The complaint before the Tribunal was made under the Uniform Law, in that it alleged a failure, after 30 June 2015, to comply with the July Notice. 3. The 2015 Complaint was made prior to the repeal of the Legal Profession Act and had not been disposed of as at 1 July 2015. While the Legal Profession Act would have applied to the investigation and any proceedings in respect of a complaint made in relation to non-compliance with the May Notice, the Uniform Law applied to the investigation and any proceedings in respect of a complaint made in relation to non-compliance with the July Notice. 4. The July Notice was correctly issued pursuant to s 660 of the Legal Profession Act in the course of the investigation of the 2015 Complaint. The complaint in relation to the failure to comply with the July Notice was made on 10 August 2015 under s 266 of the Uniform Law, because it concerned conduct that occurred after the commencement of the Uniform Law, notwithstanding that the conduct occurred in the context of the investigation under the Legal Profession Act. 5. The resolution to commence proceedings was made on 3 March 2016 under s 300 of the Uniform Law and conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear and determine the complaint that had been made on 10 August 2015. Nevertheless, ss 660 and 676 of the Legal Profession Act remained relevant, as delineating the conduct alleged to constitute professional misconduct. 6. Had the proceedings before the Tribunal been heard and determined under the Uniform Law, rather than the Legal Profession Act, as the Council submitted, the procedures of the Tribunal would not have differed from the procedures that were in fact adopted by the Tribunal. So much follows from s 301 of the Uniform Law. The Tribunal was empowered to make a finding of professional misconduct after the completion of its hearing. The orders sought and made by the Tribunal are permitted under the Uniform Law. 7. At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal before this Court, the Council was granted leave to file a notice of contention. The grant of leave was not opposed. The contention was that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the application under the Uniform Law since it concerned a complaint made after 1 July 2015 under the Uniform Law regarding conduct that occurred after 1 July 2015. 8. Ground 16 was that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the application, as no decision was made by the Council to commence proceedings in the Tribunal as required by ss 551 and 552 of the Legal Profession Act. Ground 17 was that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the application as it was brought more than six months after the Council had decided that proceedings be commenced with respect to the complaint, contrary to s 552 of the Legal Profession Act. 9. Under s 137 of the Application Act, a disciplinary application may be made to the Tribunal at any time within six months after the Society decides to initiate proceedings in the Tribunal. As indicated above, the decision to commence proceedings pursuant to s 300 of the Uniform Law conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal. The Solicitor contended that the relevant decision was comprised by the resolution of 19 November 2015 set out in the Society's letter of 20 November 2015. 10. However, it is clear that the resolution of 19 November 2015 was not a resolution that triggered the commencement of time. It was not a decision to commence proceedings but a decision that the Solicitor be informed of certain matters before a decision would be made. The decision was actually made by resolution of the Committee on 3 March 2016, when the Committee resolved that it was of the opinion that the alleged conduct of the Solicitor may amount to professional misconduct and that proceedings be initiated and prosecuted in the Tribunal. That resolution was notified to the Solicitor on 4 March 2016. The proceedings in the Tribunal were commenced on 25 May 2016, within six months of the resolution of 3 March 2016. This ground must also fail. Conclusion 1. It follows from the above that the appeal must be dismissed. The Solicitor should be ordered to pay the Council's costs of the appeal. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 26 September 2017