Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Foster v The Minister Administering the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act [2018] NSWCATAP 42 Hearing dates: 20 September 2017 Date of orders: 09 February 2018 Decision date: 09 February 2018 Jurisdiction: Appeal Panel Before: A P Coleman SC, Senior Member; L Wilson, Senior Member Decision: 1. The appeal is dismissed. 2. The orders of the Tribunal made 15 June 2017 are confirmed. Catchwords: APPEAL: Whether error of law in exercise of discretion Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 Residential Tenancies Act 2010 Cases Cited: House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Stephen Foster The Minister Administering the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act Representation: Stephen Foster, in person Sarena Rowley, agent for the Minister Administering the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act File Number(s): AP17/29131 Publication restriction: Nil Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Jurisdiction: Consumer & Commercial Division Citation: N/A Date of Decision: 15 June 2017 Before: B Shipp, Senior Member File Number(s): RT 17/156 REASONS FOR DECISION Procedural Background 1. This is an internal appeal brought by a former tenant of a residential tenancy property (tenant). The appellant had been party to a residential tenancy agreement with the respondent (landlord). 2. On 13 December 2016 the landlord issued a Notice of Termination relying on various breaches of the residential tenancy agreement by the tenant. 3. On 3 January 2017 the landlord lodged an application with the Tribunal, seeking orders terminating the tenancy and for possession of the property. 4. On 27 March 2017 the landlord's application for termination and possession was heard by the Tribunal. On that occasion, the Tribunal was of the view that the tenancy should not be terminated at that time. The Tribunal did, however, make specific performance orders that the tenant comply with the terms of the residential tenancy agreement. The Tribunal also made an order entitling the landlord to re-list the application at any time before 28 July 2017 to determine whether the tenancy agreement should be terminated. 5. On 9 May 2017 the landlord requested that the termination application be re-listed and it was. 6. On 15 June 2017 the termination application was heard. The Tribunal made orders terminating the tenancy pursuant to s 87 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (the RTA) and ordering possession be given to the landlord on 6 July 2017. Consequential orders with respect to occupation fees were also made. 7. On 29 June 2017 the tenant lodged this appeal, and also made an application to stay the orders made by the Tribunal on 15 June 2017. On 11 July 2017 the appeal and stay application came before the Appeal Panel constituted by Deputy President Westgarth. The Deputy President made direction for the exchange of evidence and for the preparation of the appeal and refused the stay application. However, the Deputy President did vary the date for possession to be 28 July instead of 6 July 2017 as originally ordered. 8. On 15 August 2017 pursuant to the orders made by the Tribunal, varied by the Appeal Panel, the landlord had the sheriff evict the tenant from the property. 9. In a statutory declaration dated 27 July 2017 which the tenant sought to rely on in the appeal, he referred to a desire to appeal the decision of the Appeal Panel to refuse to stay the order for possession. Mentioning a desire to appeal a decision is, however, not the correct way to appeal a decision of the Appeal Panel and no Notice of Appeal has been lodged with respect to that decision and no application was made to amend the Notice of Appeal to include an appeal from that decision. As such, the only appeal before us was the appeal from the decision of the Tribunal of 15 June 2017. Factual Background 1. The tenancy commenced on 19 October 2013. The last written tenancy agreement between the parties commenced on 19 April 2014 and the fixed term expired on 17 October 2014. Thereafter the tenancy had been periodic. 2. From the reasons below, the following findings are relevant. The residential premises were the house at XXX Leumeah. There had been an issue with the tenant subletting the premises for some time. The landlord first issued a warning notice about this in March 2015. The tenant first began occupying the premises in October 2013. There was a shed in the backyard which had been approved but the tenant had been responsible for modifying the shed in the unauthorised way. An inspection of the premises on 2 May 2017 confirmed that the tenant had piped water and power from the house to the back shed to enable it to be used as a dwelling. The Member found that as at 15 June 2017, the tenant remained residing in the back shed. The Member noted that Campbelltown City Council, which is the council responsible for the residential premises (the Council) had by then clearly deemed this to be illegal. The tenant did not dispute that he continued, as at the 15 June hearing, to live in the modified shed/garage. 3. The tenant did not challenge these factual findings in this appeal. 4. However, in his statutory declaration of 27 July 2017, the tenant declared that, as at that date, he had "now moved into the house of the property and have had the electricity and water disconnected in the shed". 5. The warning notice referred to by the Member below was in evidence before the Appeal Panel. It is dated 30 March 2015 and includes the following: "It has come to our attention that there are more than the agreed occupants residing in the property. Your lease currently states that you are the only occupant to live at the property at any time". 6. Also in evidence before the Appeal Panel, were letters to the landlord from the Council. In the letter dated 10 May 2017 from the Council to the landlord, notice was given under s.121B of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 that the shed/garage stop being used as a secondary dwelling and for reinstatement of the rear detached shed/garage to its original state, and for that purpose to demolish and remove the unlawfully constructed secondary dwelling which was the rear detached shed/garage. 7. Clause 1 of the agreement provided that, "The residential premises include the additional things (if any) noted under 'Premises'". "N/A" was noted under Premises in the agreement. Note 1 on page 10 of the agreement contained the Definitions applicable to terms used in the agreement. One of the defined terms was "residential premises". This was defined to mean "any premises or part of premises (including any land occupied with the premises) used or intended to be used as a place of residence". The shed/garage is not lawfully able to be used as a place of residence and was therefore not part of the residential premises. As such, the residential premises was the house, and not the shed/garage which had unlawfully been used as a dwelling by the tenant. 8. The maximum number of occupants allowed at the residential premises, pursuant to page 2 of the agreement under the hearing "IMPORTANT INFORMATION" was four. Special condition 11 of the agreement stated: "The tenant acknowledges that the persons named in this agreement are those who will occupy the premises during the term of the agreement, and that any change in those occupying the premises must be immediately reported to the landlord; for permission to be sought." This special condition was signed by the tenant, witnessed by the agent and dated 3 April 2014. The only person named on the agreement was the tenant. 9. The tenancy agreement included cl.32 which was: "The landlord and tenant agree that: 32.1 the tenant may, with the landlord's written permission, transfer the tenant's tenancy under this agreement or sub-let the residential premises; and 32.2 the landlord may refuse permission (whether or not it is reasonable to do so) to the transfer of the whole of the tenancy or sub-letting the whole of the residential premises; and 32.3 the landlord must not unreasonably refuse permission to a transfer of part of a tenancy or a sub-letting of part of the residential premises, and 32.4 without limiting clause 32.3, the landlord may refuse permission to a transfer of part of the tenancy or to sub-letting part of the residential premises if the number of occupants would be more than is permitted under this agreement or any proposed tenant or sub-tenant is listed on a residential tenancy database or it would result in overcrowding of the residential premises." 1. As noted above, on 27 March 2017 the Tribunal made specific performance orders and provided the landlord with the opportunity to re-list its application at any time in the following four months, should the tenant continue to breach the lease. In paragraph [18] of the 27 March decision, the Tribunal found that the tenant had breached special conditions 4 and 11, and clauses 15.4, 16.1 and 23 of the agreement. There has been no appeal from the 27 March decision. 2. The first order made by the Member on 27 March was "On or before 10 April 2017, the [tenant] shall advise the [landlord] of the names of any person living at the Premises other than himself and seek the [landlord's] permission for those persons to live there. Such permission shall not be unreasonably refused." 3. The tenant did not provide a copy of any notification or advice in compliance with Order 1 made on 27 March 2017. However, the Appeal Panel accepts that an application of some description was made, or advice was given, by the tenant to the landlord, as the landlord's email to Tribunal sent 9 May 2017 stated "We would like to re-list the matter for a further hearing as: 1. The tenant has not attempted to clean up the junk yard 2. Is still subletting the house despite the applications for tenancy being declined 3. Is still living in the shed out the back – a non-habitable dwelling." 4. On 3 January 2017 the landlord's agent sent the tenant a message through an online program called "MessagePort". These messages were in evidence before the Appeal Panel and are accepted as true copies of the correspondence between the parties on the times and dates set out below: 1. 3 January 2017 at 1:07pm landlord to tenant: We will be applying to tribunal today for vacant possession as you have not vacated as per the termination notice. Thank you Harcourts. 2. 1:17pm tenant to landlord: New girl in house now moved in over Xmas. 3. 1:21pm landlord to tenant: …that is subletting which is not permitted as per your tenancy agreement but thank you for the written confirmation that you are sub-letting. 4. 1:26pm tenant to landlord: Just helping a friend it's hard for young mums I must just be a fool. 5. 8:15pm tenant to landlord: I just help for 1 or 2 mounth (sic) and they move on wall (sic) they are here I eat and be happy how is that sub-letting I live here not every day it is a home base for me and my dog just thort (sic) it whould (sic) be a wast (sic) of time putting them on the lease I ust (sic) to do that at head office every 2mounths (sic) check my past with the department pull back that's how you stop [sic] 1. The final paragraph of the 27 March decision included the following: "… in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is of a view that the tenancy should not be terminated at this time and specific orders made for the Respondent [tenant] to comply with the Agreement. Lest the Respondent believe that, without consequence, he can fall into arrears again, the Tribunal draws to his attention that now that orders have been made against him, this is a matter which would be taken into consideration if a relist is sought by the Applicant." The Appeal 1. The tenant seeks to challenge all the orders made by the Tribunal on 15 June 2017. He seeks orders that the Appeal Panel set aside all the orders made at first instance and remit the application for termination to the Tribunal for rehearing. 2. The tenant's two grounds of appeal were: 1. The Tribunal made an error of law in the exercise of the discretion to terminate the tenancy. The Tribunal member erred in the application of the law, allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to affect him; made mistakes as to the facts; and did not take into account material considerations. 2. The Tribunal erred in law in applying the wrong test in finding that the tenant had breached special condition 11. Material Relied Upon on Appeal 1. The appellant relied on the documents which he provided to the Tribunal on 6 July and 27 July 2017. The first bundle of documents provided to the Tribunal included an application form for documents under the Government information (Public Access) Act 2009. The application form appears to be incomplete. It was signed by the appellant on 29 June 2017. Documents provided to the appellant pursuant to that GIPA application were not part of the first bundle. Also in the first bundle was an email from the landlord's agent to the Tribunal sent on 9 May 2017 seeking to relist their application, a medical document dated 27 February 2017, two statutory declarations by the appellant both dated 1 March 2017, a residential lease between the parties for a different residential property for the period 23 January 1989 to 23 July 1989 and a residential tenancy agreement between the parties, plus two other tenants, for the 1989 residential premises for the period 22 March 1993 to 19 September 1993. 2. The appellant did not provide any written submissions in support of his appeal. 3. The appellant's second bundle of documents, provided to the Tribunal on 27 July 2017, included a further statutory declaration by him, dated 27 July 2017, a copy of the orders and directions made by the Appeal Panel on 11 July with annotations including an asterix for "edvance" and a T "for time". On the second page of the Appeal Panel orders were some hand written notes by the appellant. Finally, there were two invoices from Total Alcott Plumbing dated 26 July 2017 for disconnecting the hot water, capping off sewer and cold water service to rear shed and "disconnecting power and lights to extension of shed to allow for demolishing". 4. The respondent landlord relied on two bundles of documents it provided to the Tribunal on 11 July and 30 August 2017. The first bundle commenced with a Reply to Appeal document. There was a great deal of overlap in the two bundles. Included in both bundles were the residential tenancy agreement, ingoing, routine and outgoing inspection reports, submissions, letters from the Council making orders about the illegal shed that the tenant had been occupying, and ordering its demolition, and multiple letters to the tenant from 2015 to 2017 inclusive setting out numerous breaches of the residential tenancy agreement. The termination notice and a large number of photographs of the rental premises were also in the bundles. 5. The Appeal Panel has taken into account all of the material submitted on the appeal, and the oral and written submissions of the parties. Applicable legal principles and statutory provisions 1. Sections 80 and 81 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 are as follows: 80 Making of internal appeals (1) An appeal against an internally appealable decision may be made to an Appeal Panel by a party to the proceedings in which the decision is made. (2) Any internal appeal may be made: (a) in the case of an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal at first instance—with the leave of the Appeal Panel, and (b) in the case of any other kind of decision (including an ancillary decision) of the Tribunal at first instance—as of right on any question of law, or with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds. (3) The Appeal Panel may: (a) decide to deal with the internal appeal by way of a new hearing if it considers that the grounds for the appeal warrant a new hearing, and (b) permit such fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received by the Tribunal at first instance, to be given in the new hearing as it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 81 Determination of internal appeals (1) In determining an internal appeal, the Appeal Panel may make such orders as it considers appropriate in light of its decision on the appeal, including (but not limited to) orders that provide for any one or more of the following: (a) the appeal to be allowed or dismissed, (b) the decision under appeal to be confirmed, affirmed or varied, (c) the decision under appeal to be quashed or set aside, (d) the decision under appeal to be quashed or set aside and for another decision to be substituted for it, (e) the whole or any part of the case to be reconsidered by the Tribunal, either with or without further evidence, in accordance with the directions of the Appeal Panel. (2) The Appeal Panel may exercise all the functions that are conferred or imposed by this Act or other legislation on the Tribunal at first instance when confirming, affirming or varying, or making a decision in substitution for, the decision under appeal and may exercise such functions on grounds other than those relied upon at first instance. 1. Clause 12 of Schedule 4 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 is as follows: Limitations on internal appeals against Division decisions (1) An Appeal Panel may grant leave under section 80 (2) (b) of this Act for an internal appeal against a Division decision only if the Appeal Panel is satisfied the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because: (a) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable, or (b) the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence, or (c) significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with). (2) Despite section 80 (2) (b) of this Act, an internal appeal against a Division decision may only be made on a question of law (as of right) and not on any other grounds (even with leave) if: … (b) the appeal is an appeal against an order of the Tribunal for the termination of a tenancy under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 and a warrant of possession has been executed in relation to that order. 1. Section 75 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 is as follows: Consent to transfer of tenancy or sub-letting (1) No requirement for reasonable refusal for whole transfer or sub-letting The landlord may withhold consent to a transfer or sub-letting relating to the whole tenancy or residential premises whether or not it is reasonable to do so. (2) Consent must not be unreasonably withheld for partial transfer or sub-letting The landlord must not unreasonably withhold consent to a transfer of a tenancy or sub-letting of premises if the transfer results only in one or more tenants in addition to an original tenant under the residential tenancy agreement or the partial sub-letting of the residential premises occupied by the tenant. (3) Without limiting subsection (2), the landlord is entitled to withhold consent if: (a) the number of proposed occupants is more than the number permitted by the residential tenancy agreement or any applicable consent or approval under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, or (b) the proposed tenant or sub-tenant is listed on a residential tenancy database in accordance with this Act, or (c) the landlord is reasonably of the opinion that the transfer or sub-letting would result in the residential premises being overcrowded. (4) Subsections (1)–(3) are terms of every residential tenancy agreement. Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply if the landlord is a social housing provider. (5) Remedy if landlord refuses consent The Tribunal may, on application by a tenant, order that the tenant may transfer a tenancy or sub-let residential premises as referred to in subsection (2) if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the landlord's failure to consent is unreasonable . Leave is not required 1. As this is an appeal against an order of the Tribunal for the termination of a tenancy under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 and a warrant of possession has been executed in relation to that order, the tenant's appeal may only be on a question of law as of right, or otherwise with leave: s.80(2)(b) and cl.12(2) of Sch 4 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. 2. Ground 1 alleges errors which would, if established constitute errors of law such that the Member would have made a House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499 type error. No leave is therefore required for ground 1. 3. Ground 2 also raises a question of law and leave to appeal is not required for that ground. Consideration of Ground 1(a) and 2 1. It is convenient to deal with these two grounds together. 2. Ground one has three components, as set out on the Notice of Appeal. 3. The first component in Ground 1 was described by the tenant as follows: "The Tribunal member erred in law in finding that he could not take into account the concerns of the occupants who had not been formally recognised as tenants or sub-tenants. i. The respondent's refusal to approve the occupants was unreasonable (see ground 2) ii. The consideration of the circumstances of the case extends to consideration of all the occupants". 1. Ground 2 has four components: "The Tribunal erred in law in applying the wrong test in finding that the tenant had breached special condition 11. S75 Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) states that a landlord must not reasonably [sic] withhold consent for partial subletting. The appellant, in accordance with Member Marzilli's directions, applied for consent for partial subletting. The landlord refused consent because the applicants had no tenancy record (para 26). The Tribunal member found that he did not have to consider whether the refusal of consent was reasonable as the tenant had done what was required of him, namely to seek consent. The Tribunal member then went onto find that the tenant was now in breach of special condition 11. Special condition 11 specified that the only persons to occupy the premises are those named in the RTA and any change must be immediately reported and permission sought. The Tribunal member failed to consider whether special condition 11 was valid. Special condition 11 is inconsistent with sections 74, 75 and 79 of the RTA and is void to the extent of this inconsistency (RTA s21)." 1. As already explained, the residential premises is only constituted by the house, and not the shed/garage which had unlawfully been used as a dwelling by the tenant. Therefore what the tenant must have applied for, between 27 March and 9 May 2017, was to sub-let the whole residential premises (that is the dwelling house). The shed/ garage was not part of the residential premises. It could not lawfully be tenanted or used as a dwelling. The tenant must have sought consent of the landlord to allow the other occupants to sub-let the whole residential premises, and, pursuant to s.75(1) of the RTA, the landlord is entitled to withhold consent whether or not it is reasonable to do so. 2. The Appeal Panel rejects the appellant's submission that the tenant's application had been to partially sub-let the residential premises. The tenant did not provide any evidence to the Appeal Panel which proved that he had applied for the landlord's permission to sub-let the premises, however the Appeal Panel can infer from the landlord's email to the Tribunal on 9 May 2017 and the submissions of the parties, and the first instance decision, that the tenant made some sort of application to sub-let the house which the landlord rejected because the proposed sub-tenants had no tenancy history. 3. The Tribunal made no error of law in finding that the tenant had breached special condition 11. Firstly, special condition 11 was valid; it is in no way inconsistent with ss.74, 75 or 79 of RTA. Both ss.74 and 75 require the tenant to obtain written consent of the landlord to transfer some or all of the tenancy to another person or sub-let the premises. Special condition 11 is consistent with those sections. Section 79 has no relevance to these proceedings. 4. Secondly, the proposed sub-letting by the tenant was for the whole residential premises, not partial subletting. Therefore, the landlord was entitled to withhold consent for this even if it were unreasonable to do so. The Member therefore was correct to find that he did not have to consider whether the refusal of consent was reasonable. 5. Thirdly, the question before the Tribunal on 15 June 2017 was whether to make the orders sought by the landlord as set out in its application lodged 3 January 2017. That application sought orders for termination and possession for breach of the agreement. The question was not whether the tenant had done what was required of him by the orders made on 27 March 2017. Whether the tenant complied with the 27 March orders could be relevant for the Tribunal to consider in deciding whether the breaches of the agreement (found by the Members on 27 March and 15 June) were sufficient to justify termination of the agreement and any steps taken by the tenant to remedy the breach: s.87(4)(b) and (5)(c) RTA. The hearing on 15 June 2017 was the hearing of the landlord's application for termination and possession; the appellant's submission that "the relist was limited to considering whether those conditions had been complied with" is wrong. 6. Fourthly, the tenant has not demonstrated that there was any error in paragraph [26] of the decision of 15 June which was as follows: "The managing agents confirm that approval had been sought for Ms Sutton and her family to become tenants or sub-tenants, and that this was refused because they had no tenancy record. It is unnecessary for me to consider whether this application was unreasonably refused. The tenant's obligation is to seek approval. He has now done this, and is therefore no longer in breach of Clause 32. However, as the Landlord has not given consent to anyone else occupying the premises, he is now in breach of Special Condition 11." 1. The breaches the Member was considering were those committed by the tenant, not breaches by the landlord. The only application before the Tribunal was the landlord's application for termination for breaches of the agreement by the tenant. Not any alleged breaches by the landlord for example an alleged breach of cl.32.3 or s.75(2) of the RTA. The Member did not fall into error by failing to consider whether the refusal of consent was reasonable. 2. Fifthly, there was no error in the Member finding that the tenant was in breach of Special Condition 11. There were two parts to that special condition. The first was that the tenant acknowledged that the persons named in this agreement were all those who will occupy the premises during the term of the agreement. As at 15 June, the tenant was in breach of Special Condition 11. The only person named in the agreement was the tenant himself. 3. The second part of Special Condition 11 was that any change in those occupying the premises had to be immediately reported to the landlord for permission to be sought. That was clearly not done by the tenant either, until the Tribunal ordered that he do so on 27 March. However, permission for those others to occupy the premises was denied, and thus the tenant remained in breach of Special Condition 11 as at 15 June. There was no error in the Member's finding about the breach. The Appeal Panel does not accept that the Member applied the wrong test in coming to that correct conclusion. Ground 2 fails. 4. In considering whether the tenant was in breach of the agreement and whether to make a termination order, the Member had no obligation to take into account the concerns of the occupants who had not been formally recognised as tenants or sub-tenants. The Member correctly found that the Tribunal did not need to consider whether the landlord's refusal was unreasonable, as explained above. The Appeal Panel does not accept the appellant's submission that the Member did not take into account material considerations being the consideration of all the occupants. The occupants, who appear to be a Ms Sutton, her partner and her daughter, were not lawfully residing in the residential premises as at the hearing on 15 June. There was no obligation for the Tribunal to consider the concerns of persons unlawfully occupying rental premises, when deciding whether to terminate a tenancy between a landlord and tenant. The Member correctly set out the position in paragraph [31]: "I am not satisfied I can properly take into account the concerns of occupants who have not been formally recognised as tenants or sub-tenants." Ground 1(a) fails. 5. It should be noted that the Member on 27 March also found that the tenant was in breach of Special Condition 11 (at [13]) and there has been no appeal against the decision of 27 March 2017. Consideration and disposition of Ground 1(b) 1. The appellant also argued that the Tribunal made three mistakes as to the facts. The first alleged mistake was that the tenancy was nearly four years in length whereas the appellant argued the parties had been in continuous residential tenancy agreements since 1968. This may be so, but has not been proved on the balance of probabilities, and further the tenancies since 1968 are different from the current tenancy. For example the 1989 lease was for a property in South Campbelltown: attachment 3 – 4 of the tenant's July bundle. The 1993 lease was for the same property in South Campbelltown but was between the landlord and three tenants, including the appellant. The current tenancy before the Tribunal was for the property in Leumeah and was only between the two parties to this appeal. Tenancy is defined in the agreement in Note 1, on page 10 of the agreement as "the right to occupy residential premises under this agreement". "This agreement" was the one signed by the tenant on 3 April 2014. The Appeal Panel agrees with the Member's finding of fact that the length of the tenancy was nearly four years. The other tenancies were irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunal. 2. The Appeal Panel does not consider the alleged findings of fact set out in Ground of Appeal at 1(b)(ii) and (iii) to be material to the issues on appeal. Further, there is no evidence before the Appeal Panel which could allow the Appeal Panel to come to a contrary finding of fact than the Member did, in those regards. 3. Ground 1(b) fails. Consideration and disposition of Ground 1(c) 1. This Ground is misconceived. On 27 March the Tribunal had not dealt with the landlord's application to finality. So much is plain in the decision of 27 March. No issue of Anshun estoppel arises. The re-listing of the application was available to the landlord to seek to have its application for termination and possession determined to finality by the Tribunal. All that occurred on 27 March was that the Tribunal considered the alleged breaches, found the tenant had breached the agreement, but gave the tenant a chance to comply with the Agreement, with a clear warning that his non-compliance with those orders is a matter which would be taken into consideration if the relist was sought by the landlord. The relist was not limited only to whether the tenant had requested the landlord's consent to sub-let. 2. The Appeal Panel rejects the appellant's submission that he complied with the orders made on 27 March. There is no evidence before the Appeal Panel to support the appellant's submission in this regard. In fact the evidence before the Tribunal, provided by the landlord, satisfied the Appeal Panel on the balance of probabilities that the tenant had largely not complied with the orders of the Tribunal made 27 March. 3. Ground 1(c) also fails. Orders 1. All Grounds of appeal have failed. 2. The orders we therefore make are: 1. The Appeal is dismissed; 2. The orders of the Tribunal made 15 June 2017 are confirmed. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 09 February 2018