Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Fantakis v R; Woods v R [2017] NSWSC 1840 Hearing dates: 28 July 2017 Date of orders: 03 August 2017 Decision date: 03 August 2017 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Wilson J Decision: (1) The application for bail by Elefterios Fantakis is refused. (2) The application for bail by Andrew Woods is refused. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – application for bail – charges of murder and accessory after murder – where earlier application refused – s 74 Bail Act 2013 – show cause provision – length of delay in matter proceeding to trial – responsibility for delay – disadvantage in preparing a case from custody – willingness to comply with bail conditions – need for medical treatment Legislation Cited: Bail Act 2013 (NSW) Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Cases Cited: Cain (No 1) (2001) 121 A Crim R 365 Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zaiter [2016] NSWCCA 247 Director of Public Prosecutions v Hourigan [2017] NSWCCA 170 DPP v Tikomaimaleya [2015] NSWCA 83 Filipetti v R (1984) 13 A Crim R 335 Moukhallaletti v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2016] NSWCCA 314 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Elefterios Fantakis (Applicant) Andrew Woods (Applicant) Regina (Respondent Crown) Representation: Counsel: E. Wilkins SC (Respondent Crown) Solicitors: Elefterios Fantakis – litigant in person Havas & Dib Lawyers (Applicant Woods) Solicitor for the Department of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Respondent Crown) File Number(s): 2017/161100 (Woods); 2017/194902 (Fantakis) Publication restriction: 03 August 2017 Restricted to the Parties. Proceedings the subject of a suppression order pursuant to s 8 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010, such that the names of the applicants, the deceased, and witnesses likely to give evidence at trial, and any material which tends to identify these individuals, is suppressed, pending the conclusion of the trial or further order of the Court, whichever comes first. 08 November 2018 Conclusion of trial - Publication restriction removed. Judgment 1. HER HONOUR: On 28 July 2017 the Court heard applications for bail brought by Mr Fantakis and Mr Woods, reserving its decision until today. The applicant Fantakis represented himself, whilst the applicant Woods was represented by his solicitor, Mr Havas. The History of the Matter 1. This is a matter which has a lengthy history and, since the delay in its finalisation is a relevant feature of the applications, it is appropriate to refer to it at the outset. 2. The deceased, Mr Elisha (Sam) Karmas, was last seen on 11 August 2011 and it is the Crown case that he was murdered by the applicant Fantakis on the afternoon of that day, with his body subsequently secreted or otherwise disposed of. The applicant Woods is alleged to have aided Mr Fantakis in the disposal of Mr Karmas' body. 3. The applicant Fantakis was arrested on 3 October 2013, after a lengthy police investigation. The applicant Woods was arrested the same day. Both men have remained in custody since that date, bail having been refused in both the Local and Supreme Courts. 4. The matter remained in the Local Court for a protracted period, before proceeding to committal on 11 April 2016. The delay between arrest and the first listing of the matter for committal, 7 September 2015, was attributable to the time taken for the police and prosecuting authority to finalise the brief of evidence which, by 7 September 2015, amounted to some 16,000 pages, as well as a considerable amount of electronic evidence. 5. Thereafter, the delay between September 2015 and April 2016 appears to have been brought about by the applicants. The first hearing date for committal, and a second date fixed of 18 January 2016, were both adjourned at the request of the applicants. The applicants sought an adjournment of the April 2016 committal date, but the application was refused. 6. The matter first came before this Court for arraignment on 6 May 2016, when a trial date of 20 February 2017 was fixed. On 1 July 2016 that date was vacated on the joint application of the applicants and a fresh date, 24 April 2017, was fixed for trial. 7. Soon after the vacation of the February 2017 date, both accused made an application for bail, which was heard by Garling J on 18 August 2016. The applications were refused by his Honour on 13 September 2016. 8. On 17 February 2017 the applicant Woods made an application to vacate the April 2017 trial date, but the application was refused. Mr Woods also had a bail application listed for that date, which was withdrawn subsequent to the outcome of his application to vacate the trial date. 9. On 31 March 2017 the applicant Fantakis made an application to vacate the April 2017 trial date, with the application granted. A fresh trial date of 15 May 2017 was fixed. On 24 April 2017 Mr Fantakis made a further application to vacate the May 2017 trial date, with his application ultimately joined by the applicant Woods. The trial date was vacated on 5 May 2017. Mr Woods again had a bail application listed, for hearing on 24 April 2017, and adjourned until 5 May 2017. The application was ultimately withdrawn subsequent to the trial date being vacated. 10. Before this Court, the Crown has at all times been ready to proceed to trial. 11. The matter is now listed for trial on 5 February 2018, with a further arraignment date on 4 August 2017. 12. As at the 2018 trial date, and if refused bail, the applicants will have spent a period of 4 years and 4 months on remand. Some 6 years and 6 months will have passed since Mr Karmas' presumed death. The Charges the Subject of the Applications 1. The applicant Fantakis faces four sets of charges, in this Court, the District Court, and the Local Court. 2. In this Court, Mr Fantakis awaits trial for the offence of murder. In the District Court, he is to be tried on 25 June 2018 with respect to charges of Supplying a Prohibited Drug and Possessing a Prohibited Weapon. An earlier trial date of 8 June 2016 was vacated on Mr Fantakis' application, and on his assertion that there was an evidentiary overlap between the District Court matters and the murder trial, such that he would be prejudiced if the less serious charges were heard first. In the Local Court Mr Fantakis faces charges of Intimidating a Police Officer contrary to s 60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), with these offences listed for hearing on 9 October 2017. The last set of charges, four offences under the Crime Commission Act 2012 (NSW), are listed for mention on 18 August 2017 before the Local Court, to fix a hearing date. 3. Whilst Mr Fantakis has had bail with respect to some of these offences for some of the time, he is now bail refused with respect to all offences. 4. The applicant Woods faces two sets of charges, in this Court and in the Local Court. The most serious charge is that of accessory after the fact to murder, for trial next February. The Local Court charges are, in common with Mr Fantakis, offences of Intimidation of a Police Officer. They are listed for joint hearing on 9 October 2017. The applicant seeks bail for all offences. Section 74 of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) 1. As noted above, both applicants have already made application to this Court for bail, with Garling J hearing the matter in August 2016 and making orders refusing bail on 13 September 2016. 2. Accordingly, both applicants face an initial hurdle to their present applications. Section 74 of the Bail Act relevantly provides: "74 Multiple release or detention applications to same court not permitted (1) A court that refuses bail for an offence, or that affirms a decision to refuse bail for an offence, after hearing a release application is to refuse to hear another release application made by the accused person for the same offence, unless there are grounds for a further release application. (2) […] (3) For the purposes of this section, the grounds for a further release application are: (a) the person was not legally represented when the previous application was dealt with and the person now has legal representation, or (b) material information relevant to the grant of bail is to be presented in the application that was not presented to the court in the previous application, or (c) circumstances relevant to the grant of bail have changed since the previous application was made, or (d) […]. (4) […] (5) […]" 1. Mr Fantakis relied upon two features of his situation to discharge the s 74 onus. Firstly, he referred to the extent of the delay in the finalisation of his trial, arguing that the delay (whatever the cause) now goes beyond that envisaged by Garling J in refusing bail in September 2016. Secondly, he referred to his recent diagnosis with a delusional disorder, and his consequent transfer to the Long Bay Prison Hospital, to argue that the conditions in custody have materially changed, such that it is even more difficult than was formerly the case for him to prepare his case for trial. 2. Mr Woods also relied upon delay, and additionally that, having appeared unrepresented during the application before Garling J, he is now represented by a solicitor. 3. At the hearing of the matter I indicated that I regarded the s 74 threshold issue as having been met. The change in Mr Fantakis' circumstances satisfies s 74(3)(c), whilst Mr Woods' circumstances fall within that provision and s 74(3)(a). The Applications for Bail The Crown Case 1. The Crown opposes the applications for bail. A volume of material was tendered, from which the following summary of the Crown's case as alleged against the applicants is drawn. 2. Having regard to the objection taken by the applicant Fantakis to the correspondence from the officer in charge of the matter (Ex. A.11), I have had regard to only those parts of the document which contain statements of fact. Expressions of opinion are rejected from the tender. The Alleged Facts of the Murder and Accessory to Murder Charges 1. The background to the murder of Mr Karmas is centred on a Punchbowl property owned by the applicant Fantakis and his late twin brother Nicholas. Mr Karmas was a neighbour and was known to the Fantakis family. 2. From 2009 to April 2011 Nicholas Fantakis had lived with his de facto partner Maria Angeles in the Fantakis property. After the relationship broke down, Nicholas Fantakis moved out of the property, leaving Ms Angeles in possession. About a month later, on 27 May 2011, he committed suicide. 3. Following Nicholas Fantakis' death, there was a dispute between Ms Angeles and the Fantakis family about property, with Ms Angeles contending that she was owed a substantial sum of money by her former partner's estate. She remained in possession of the Punchbowl property pending the discharge of this debt. The situation was volatile, with Ms Angeles feeling sufficiently threatened as to have a bodyguard accompany her to the funeral of Nicholas Fantakis. 4. Mr Karmas came to act as a sort of intermediary between the parties, a role that Mr Fantakis resented. 5. On 8 June 2011 the applicants, and a number of other persons, attended the Punchbowl residence and removed various items of property. Ms Angeles reported the matter to police, and Mr Karmas nominated the applicant Fantakis as having been responsible for the incursion, leading to an exacerbation in the tension. The applicant Fantakis threatened Mr Karmas. 6. The applicant Fantakis came to hold the view that his brother had been murdered by Mr Karmas, acting at the instigation of Ms Angeles. He also believed that Mr Karmas had made attempts on his life. These views came to be shared by the applicant Woods, a close friend of the applicant Fantakis. 7. On 26 June 2011 the applicant Woods sent a text message to the applicant Fantakis that read in part "It's not over yet, but we're gonna get 'em". The reference was to Mr Karmas and Ms Angeles. 8. By early August 2011 Ms Angeles had moved out of the Punchbowl property, and the applicant Fantakis was in possession of it, undertaking work to ready it for lease. 9. On 11 August 2011 the applicant Fantakis was at the Punchbowl property with a labourer, the third co-accused Derek Cheong (charged with accessory after the fact to murder). There was telephone contact between Mr Fantakis and Mr Karmas at 12.03pm that day. Between the time of that call and 1.22pm, there were six telephone calls and two text messages between the applicants, with each using a mobile telephone subscribed in false details. 10. Sometime around 1.30pm Mr Karmas left his house to go to the Fantakis property, intending to help the applicant Fantakis with repair work there. He had some tools and his mobile phone with him, but did not take his wallet or keys, and left his house and car open. 11. Soon after arriving he left the property in company with the applicant Fantakis and Mr Cheong, ostensibly to go to another nearby Fantakis property in Wilga Street, to assist with unloading some furniture from the transit van in which he travelled as a passenger. The blue transit van was owned by the applicant Fantakis. 12. Later, Mr Karmas' spectacles were recovered from the glove box of the blue van. 13. The van arrived in Wilga Street at 1.50pm. That afternoon, a Wilga Street resident heard a loud and aggressive argument between two men speaking in Greek. The applicant Woods attended the property that afternoon. At some stage Mr Karmas was attacked by the applicant Fantakis and killed at Wilga Street. 14. Mr Cheong cleared the driveway of the Wilga Street property to enable the applicant Fantakis to back his blue van into the driveway, preparatory to loading Mr Karmas' body into it. At 3.07pm the blue van left Wilga Street. 15. At 3.19pm a white van consistent with that driven by the applicant Woods also left Wilga Street. 16. Between 3.57 and 5.26pm that day a number of text messages were sent from Mr Karmas' mobile telephone to Ms Angeles, and also to the applicant Fantakis. The Crown contends that the messages sent to Ms Angeles were sent with the intention of luring her to a particular location so that some harm could be done to her. The message to Mr Fantakis' phone was sent as part of an attempt to distance him from the events of 11 August 2011. Cell tower data links the applicant Woods with the transmission of these messages. 17. At 8.40pm the two vans were filmed on CCTV footage travelling west in convoy through the M5 tollgates at Holsworthy. Sometime around then the applicants arrived at the home of Mr Woods' grandmother at Campbelltown, remaining there until about 1am on 12 August 2011. The applicants' two vans were next recorded at 4.46am travelling east through the tollgates at Holsworthy. The Crown alleges that, between 1am and 4.46am the applicants secreted the body of Mr Karmas. 18. Sometime between 4.46 and 6.50am on 12 August 2011 the applicant Fantakis' blue van was left parked and locked in the driveway of Precision Mechanics on Belmore Road. Later that morning Mr Fantakis contacted the proprietor to report various faults with the vehicle. The proprietor found little wrong with it. He did not notice any unusual or strong smells in the vehicle. 19. Concerned at his disappearance, members of Mr Karmas' family contacted the applicant Fantakis to ask if he had seen Mr Karmas. Mr Fantakis told Jenny Karmas that he had seen Mr Karmas the previous day when Mr Karmas helped with some repairs. He made no mention of the subsequent attendance at Wilga Street. He claimed that Mr Karmas had left the Punchbowl property on foot. 20. During the course of the day Mr Fantakis and the co-accused Cheong undertook work at the Wilga Street property, including removing a built-in wardrobe, and sanding down walls and painting them. The Crown contends that this work was done to remove forensic evidence of Mr Karmas' murder. 21. On the evening of that day the applicant Woods went to the home of a friend, Christopher Lines. He stayed for a number of hours. On leaving, sometime between 9 and 10pm, Mr Woods said to Mr Lines, "If anyone asks, anyone, I was here last night. Everything that happened tonight happened last night, okay." 1. Mr Woods visited Mr Lines on a number of subsequent occasions to exhort him to stick to that story. On one of those occasions, he was accompanied by the applicant Fantakis. Although Mr Lines initially gave police an account of the events of 11 August 2011 as dictated by Mr Woods, he later confessed the deception, noting that he felt threatened and intimidated by Mr Woods. 2. On 13 August 2011 the applicant Fantakis sought permission from a friend to use his property to wash out the back of his blue van, claiming that a dog had vomited in the vehicle. He subsequently went to his friend's premises, in the company of a person identified as likely to be the applicant Woods, and the two men cleaned the back of the van using bleach. 3. When stopped by police in the van later that day, the applicant Fantakis told officers that a dog had vomited in the van "days ago" and he had just cleaned it, explaining the strong smell of bleach. 4. A later forensic examination of the blue van found what appears to be blood on the rear trim of the driver's door. DNA extracted from the sample was consistent with that of Mr Karmas, and the likely source of the DNA was blood. 5. A quantity of mud and dirt was also found under the wheel arches of the vehicle. This dirt was later forensically examined by a specialist soil scientist. It was concluded that it was likely that the soil material removed from under the wheel arches and on the mud flaps of the blue van had been deposited when the vehicle had driven off bitumen roads and been in contact with two types of soils from the Georges River region. 6. On 17 August 2011 the applicant Woods changed the registration of his white van, claiming that one of his former licence plates was missing. A part of the old plate, which appeared to have been cut up, was later found at a storage unit leased by the applicant Fantakis. 7. In the days following 11 August 2011 the three accused were observed together having a whispered conversation, and opening boxes containing new mobile telephones. 8. On 1 September 2011 the applicant Woods had a telephone conversation with his grandmother, Mrs Robinson. The conversation was intercepted pursuant to a warrant (Ex. B.35, annexure "K" to the affidavit of D/S McGee of 19 April 2017). Mrs Robinson gave Mr Woods an account of what she had said to the police about the attendance at her home of the applicants on the evening of 11 August 2011. Mr Woods remonstrated with her about having told police that the men left at 1am. He said, "Oh Nan. No we said we left at 4 o'clock […] I told you not to talk to [the police]. Oh no. Okay, I've got to sort this out. […] We said we stayed till 4 in the morning; I did go through that with you afterwards as well […] Oh shit, now I've got to explain this to McGodge [Fantakis] and you're gunna have to explain it to him as well. […] Nan. I asked once like! I asked for one story. One. I went through it. One. Like that was it. I said, 'Don't say anything to 'em. Don't talk to 'em. Just say this once. That was it. We went through it beforehand, you said cool. I don't understand. What happened? But now I understand why they're after me. […] You should have said 'I don't know, I was asleep'. That was what the plan was. […] They are going to pick you up for perjury. Okay. Or something like that if you keep goin' on. One more story change and we're gunna be buggered". 1. His next phone call was to Mr Fantakis, during which he said, "Yeah my Nan fucked up with the story again…that's why she's rung….She's fucked us, she's fucked me and she's fucked you…take note, take note, of how to discipline females in your family when we go down there mate." 1. On 26 November 2011 a conversation between the two men was intercepted, in which the two appear to discuss the likelihood of being charged, with the applicant Fantakis stating that he had been "with him all day". 2. The investigation continued, utilising electronic surveillance in 2012 and 2013. 3. Further, a search warrant was executed at the home of the mother of the applicant Fantakis, with a number of items belonging to him seized. These included diary notes written by Mr Fantakis, in which he wrote about his hatred of Mr Karmas, and the violence done to him on 11 August 2011. The notes included the following reference to the events of that day (Ex. B.35, annexure "O" to the affidavit of D/S McGee of 19 April 2017): "B. Sam was coming down the side to gain entry via the back door as the front was closed; C. I left the back door open and he had no choice but to enter. I observed he was holding something in his hand. D. As he passed me I kicked him off his feet. I punched him in the throat to prevent him from breathing & screaming and then grabbed a tazer that he was carrying; E. I used his own weapon to incapacitate him and had him strapped; F. Sam Karmas confessed a number of things including the fact that he had killed my brother his involvement with high ranking police, insurance fraud & Maria's involvement; G. I had torchered [sic] him until he spilled his guts on all that are involved in this machine of killings inc". 1. Another diary note recovered from the blue van had an entry reading, "Wrap in black cotton sheet and tie with black ribbon (shoe lace) tight and through [sic] in the river (Georges River)." 1. A single shoe with no shoelace was also found in the van. 2. A video seized during the search of Mrs Fantakis' home (Ex. B.35, annexure "Q" to the affidavit of D/S McGee of 19 April 2017), which was labelled "Terry's Last Words", depicts the applicant speaking, saying: "Sam killing my brother that, um, he was one sick puppy , mate, he really was and I did catch him out and I did spot him and I basically had to do what I needed to do to protect myself and I didn't plan to do by taking me out to…farm and having me and my mother killed. Now I do have a tape…Not as detailed as this but he basically confesses, um, what he did, how he did it, what he was going to do. And this…Right direction for a while, um, but, um, in some ways, yeah we found…Too, so, mate, I don't mean you any harm." 1. In a letter written by the applicant Fantakis, apparently in the course of civil litigation concerning the disputed Punchbowl property, he wrote: "i. Necessity judge has forced me to inflict the pain and cruel act I video'd of this animal of a man who most would have killed. This confession has been given to an ex-supreme court judge in the event that I am killed. ii. This is why I will probably have to give a statement admitting his alleged death." 1. The Crown relies on a number of intercepted conversations between the applicants, including one at 18:21 on 25 November 2011, in which the following conversation concerning the police officer in charge of the murder investigation, D/S Roxanne McGee, is recorded (Ex. B.35, annexure "C" to the affidavit of D/S McGee of 19 April 2017): "Woods: I don't even wanna punch her in the face okay…I want to blind her…I want to know where she lives…I want to know where she lives…I wanna know where she fuckin lives. I'm gonna start chasing her. Fantakis: - Woods: Fuckin…I'm gonna start chasing her okay. […] Woods: start doin' it…hey" […] Woods: She would have been gone…made sure…fuckin…Officer in charge of Flaggy dead. Fantakis: That won't be a problem man haha Woods: gun…fuck this get a gun, we've gotta get a gun […] Fantakis: oi…it's the only fucken way… Woods: what do you mean it's the only fucken way […] Fantakis: What are you talking about the only way Woods: that's how you deal with it like that I'm just asking because…if you can't help me I'll do it myself. […] Woods: listen I need you…listen…shit like that ok…they got nothing." 1. (This conversation forms the basis of the first charge of intimidate police officer.) 2. On 30 July 2012 the applicant Fantakis was recorded saying to the applicant Woods, in an apparent reference to Ms Angeles and the civil litigation involving her, "I need her destroyed. She put me through this for one whole year." 1. During a court appearance relevant to the civil proceedings the applicant Fantakis approached Ms Angeles and said, "I will get you". 2. On 1 August 2012 the Crown contends that the applicant Fantakis made a threat directed at the Crown Prosecutor: "They always think they have the upper hand. Well they're getting killed now. Doesn't cost you nothing to get the fucking Crown Prosecutor, fuck you ya fucken' cunts." 1. In February 2013 the applicants took action in this Court relating to the investigation. Mr Fantakis confronted D/S McGee outside the Court room on the day of the hearing and asked her if she intended to arrest him. Later, he sent a text message to the applicant Woods which was lawfully intercepted. It read: "I got pooned by another corrupt judge. On the basis that I was incoherent. I think he must have received a blow job from the toad as well as a bonus. Medusa was outside and I asked her if she would arrest me. but she lost her tongue. obviously still stuck on the judges dick. Anyway privy [pity] it is as these mother fuckers obviously have to be educated on the crime of treason I could not believe the boldly cock sucker. I guess they all need to be reunited with reality it will help in the name of public interest.. You fucking toad gov. u permitted the murder of my brother and that will be the fall of your reign you evil slut. I will have my way and u know it's only a matter of time before u are exposed for the vermin that u are. your not even worth spitting on but I cannot wait until people start throwing stones at u. I will spend my last breaths in my attempt to expose u. u will not escape the loss you have caused and I will have justice regardless of who you pay. Inc. the dirty commissioners u appoint. U evil toad I will watch u fry in the name of public interest. Eat shit and die. I always have a plan, no matter how difficult things become. I do know that u are worrying I can smell your fear u toad cunt." 1. In an conversation of 19 March 2014 Mr Fantakis was recorded telling a male person in a telephone call: "You know what, fuck 'em. They want to push it so far that I go to gaol. Yeah, no worries. I'll go to gaol but it's gonna be for something fucking good. I can tell you that much mate." 1. Other recorded discussions between the applicants are said to refer to their access to "RP data", being a real estate information data base. 2. On or about 5 April 2013 the applicant Fantakis was recorded saying: "Cunts, I know where everybody lives now. Yeah youse all thought it was such a good fucking idea didn't you. Yeah not anymore. I can get you dog cunts. Every one of you motherfuckers." 1. On 7 June 2013 police searched the applicant Fantakis' house at Croydon Park. Amongst the items found were copies of the statements of witnesses taken by police as part of the investigation into the murder (T112:40 of 18 August 2016). The Alleged Facts of the Intimidate Police Offences 1. The Crown relies on much of the evidence already noted above to establish these charges. Specifically, the intercepted conversation of 25 November 2011 (set out at [62] above, and relevant to sequence 1), and conversations that occurred between 25 July 2012 and 31 August 2012 (relevant to sequence 2, some of which have been set out above). 2. As and from 7 July 2012 the applicants were both aware that telephone and other conversations had been intercepted and recorded by police. 3. On 25 July 2012 the applicant Woods was recorded referring to D/S McGee as "the fucken' toad McGee". He said, amongst other things, "I'm gonna get that fucken' toad", and "[..] it is only a matter of time before I catch you out. Ya fucken' toad". 4. The vehicle used by the applicant Woods was marked with the words "toad finder" during August 2012. 5. On 1 August 2012 the applicant Fantakis was recorded apparently making further threats to D/S McGee (and charged as sequence 3 against Mr Fantakis alone). He said: "Fantakis: They're not going to come to my fucken home kick my doors in while they're questioning me right, under voluntary fucken, they didn't arrest me, fucken…voluntary…yeah nah fuck that man I've had enough of that shit mate…the only way you stop em is when you fucken stop em. Woods: Yeah nah they don't have it themselves. Fantakis: Nah man…wiggle they giggle mate, that's it. Seven years mate, all this…seven years that's it. Fucken cunts. Man I want her to choke on that fucken…fucken cunt." 1. In other conversations reference was made to having access to real estate data and "knowing where everybody lives". 2. Police were sufficiently concerned at the increasing vehemence of the threats as to undertake formal processes to assess the risk to D/S McGee and take steps to ensure her safety. 3. All of the evidence relevant to these charges is capable of being used relevant to the murder and accessory after murder charges, as going to consciousness of guilt. The Alleged Facts of the Supply Charge Against Fantakis 1. On 13 August 2011 the applicant's blue van was searched. An extendable baton was located (it being a prohibited weapon) together with a USB stick containing information about the cultivation of cannabis. 2. The supply offence is alleged to have occurred on 14 August 2011 at Punchbowl. In the early hours of that day police executed a search warrant at the Wilga Street address. No person was in occupation at that time although the applicant Fantakis arrived soon after the police forced entry to the premises, that entry having triggered an alarm. 3. A garbage bag full of cannabis leaf was found in the lounge room of the premises. The applicant claimed that the bag had probably belonged to his late brother. He said he had brought a number of items of his brother's property from the premises at Warwick Street Punchbowl to Wilga Street. An identical bag, also containing cannabis, was found in the bedroom of the property, which showed signs of having been sanded and painted. The applicant claimed to have seen the bag for the first time when it was located by police, and suggested it was a bag of his brother's property. 4. A quantity of items consistent with hydroponic cultivation were also found, with the applicant again asserting the items had come from his late brother's home. A set of digital scales were located. A shed on the property smelled strongly of cannabis and appeared to be set up for cultivation. Further cannabis leaf was located in the shed, in which the applicant said he had been working all day. 5. A Nokia mobile phone falsely subscribed to Sever Popovic and used by the applicant was found in the kitchen. It contained an incoming text message from Mr Woods which related to the drying process of a quantity of cannabis leaf. 6. A storage facility leased by the applicant was searched by police on 2 May 2011. Equipment typically used for hydroponic cultivation of cannabis was located, together with a small quantity of cannabis. The applicant's fingerprints were found on a transformer that was seized. 7. A former colleague of the applicant's has provided a statement to police detailing a conversation she had with the applicant in which he acknowledged cultivating cannabis with a "partner". The Crime Commission Allegations Relevant to Fantakis 1. Mr Fantakis is charged under the Crime Commission Act with refusing as a witness to take an oath or make an affirmation, refusing as a witness to answer questions, knowingly giving false evidence to the Commission, and hindering the Commission. All of the offences are alleged to have been committed on 16 September 2013. 2. The applicant was summonsed to appear before the Crime Commission on that day. He attended the hearing, which was conducted as part of an inquiry into the death of Mr Karmas, but refused to be sworn or affirmed, refused to answer questions, gave false evidence, and finally told the presiding officer to "go and get fucked". He then walked out of the Commission. Information Relevant to Fantakis 1. The applicant has no criminal convictions. 2. On 9 April 2013 the applicant failed to answer a summons to attend the NSW Crime Commission and a warrant issued for his arrest. He was arrested on 11 April 2013 and taken before the Crime Commission but refused to give evidence. 3. When summonsed again in September 2013, as noted above, he refused to co-operate with the Commission, in breach of the Crime Commission Act. 4. In the past the applicant has been at liberty subject to bail conditions with respect to the drug and intimidation offences. His criminal history indicates that he breached bail on a number of occasions, on each occasion by contacting Mr Woods, contrary to a specific condition of bail. On 17 June 2013 the applicant was taken before Burwood Local Court for breaching bail. He was allowed bail. Despite that experience, he was again in breach of bail and taken before the Local Court on 24 June 2013. A third breach led to the applicant being remanded in custody, until bail was again allowed in August 2013. 5. A failure to report to police on 14 September 2013 in breach of the August bail resulted in a formal warning from police. Information Relevant to Woods 1. Mr Woods has a (relatively minor) criminal record. He has a driving offence from October 2008, and convictions for drug offences, including supply prohibited drug, from March 2013. Those offences were all dealt with by way of a bond pursuant to s 9 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 2. Whilst at liberty for the drug offences the applicant breached bail on 21 August 2012 by failing to report as directed to police. He was placed before Bankstown Local Court and bail was redetermined. 3. According to questions asked by the applicant in evidence given before Garling J on 18 August 2016 Mr Woods planned to leave NSW in January 2012 (T104:14 of 18 August 2016), at a time when the investigation into Mr Karmas' death was underway, with him as a suspect. He in fact left the state in May or June 2012. 4. When in the Australian Capital Territory the applicant was able to obtain a driver's licence by falsely declaring he was not a suspended driver, and to obtain a rental property by producing false documents demonstrating a good history as a tenant. 5. On 26 June 2013 the applicant was arrested in the Australian Capital Territory pursuant to an interstate arrest warrant, although there are no details of the issue of the warrant or its execution in the material tendered to the Court. 6. In September 2013 the applicant was dealt with for an offence of driving under the influence. 7. The applicant has demonstrated the capacity to obtain a mobile phone using false subscriber details, having obtained and used some 16 telephones in such a way during the course of the police investigation. At around the time of Mr Karmas' disappearance the applicant had utility accounts held in false names, including Andrew Williams, Andrew Townsend, Andrew Walker, and Andrew Baker. 8. In a recorded conversation of 26 November 2011 the applicant stated an intention to "get off shore". He referred to the prospect of travelling to England (where he has antecedents). The Case for Fantakis 1. Mr Fantakis called evidence from a family friend, Milka Buttita, and from his mother, Antonia Fantakis. 2. Mrs Buttita is a neighbour of Mrs Fantakis, living in the same apartment complex, and friend to the Fantakis family. She deposed that she is willing to assist the applicant, were he to be at liberty, by driving him to court appearances or other commitments, and returning him to his home. She told the Court that the applicant is very close to his mother, and his incarceration has had an adverse effect on Mrs Fantakis' health. Mrs Fantakis has had some recent admissions to hospital. 3. Mrs Fantakis confirmed that the applicant can live with her at her Croydon Park home, where she will supervise him. She is also able to drive him to any commitment he may have. She confirmed her ill health and told the Court she would benefit by having the applicant live with her. In cross-examination she agreed that the applicant, together with his sister, owns some land in Greece. Mrs Fantakis' daughter lives in Greece and the applicant could visit her there. 4. The applicant also tendered and relied upon three character references, from a priest of the Greek Orthodox Church; a friend, Mr Premetis; and another friend, Mr Palmer. There was also an affidavit before the Court from Mr Premetis, who is willing to act as a surety on bail for the applicant, and deposit security in the sum of $20,000. 5. The applicant himself told the Court (in the course of submissions) that he is presently being held in the Long Bay Prison Hospital, and expects to be there for the foreseeable future. He is being medically treated there, and a Community Treatment Order has issued relevant to him, an order with which he would comply were he to be admitted to bail. He also referred to the difficulties in preparing his case from custody, with problems in getting access to the brief of evidence, problems with being able to listen to the electronically recorded evidence, and even problems in securing paper and pens to make notes. The Case for Woods 1. Mr Woods called evidence from his mother, who lives on the South Coast of NSW. Mrs Woods is willing to have the applicant reside with her, and she would do all in her power to assist him when at liberty, and to ensure that he complied with bail conditions. She would be able to drive him to any court appearance or other commitment and return him to the family home. She said that, if she became aware of any breach of bail, she would report her son to police without hesitation. Mrs Woods is prepared to act as a surety, with a security deposit in the sum of $20,000. The Legal Framework 1. This application is governed by the Bail Act 2013. Applications fall to be determined in accordance with Part 3 of the Act, with the Court able to take into account any information which appears credible or trustworthy: s 31. The relevant standard of proof for any matter to be decided by the Court is the balance of probabilities: s 32. 2. The offences of murder and accessory after the fact to murder are offences punishable by imprisonment for life, and 25 years imprisonment respectively. They fall within the provisions of s 16B(1)(a) (murder) and s 16B(1)(k) (accessory to murder). That triggers the operation of s 16A, which relevantly provides: "16A Accused person to show cause for certain serious offences (1) A bail authority making a bail decision for a show cause offence must refuse bail unless the accused person shows cause why his or her detention is not justified. (2) If the accused person does show cause why his or her detention is not justified, the bail authority must make a bail decision in accordance with Division 2 (Unacceptable risk test—all offences). (3) […]." 1. Accordingly, it is for the applicants to show cause why their respective detention is not justified. In Moukhallaletti v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2016] NSWCCA 314 the Court of Criminal Appeal outlined the principles applicable to a determination of whether an applicant has shown cause (at [51] – [56]). They are: "First, the question is separate from the question of whether there would be unacceptable risks of certain things occurring if the applicant were granted bail: see Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Tikomaimaleya [2015] NSWCA 83 at [25]. Secondly, as was remarked upon in that judgment of this Court, Parliament has not enumerated the facts that may show cause, in contrast to the enumeration by Parliament of the factors relevant to the assessment of unacceptable risks: see ss 16A and 18 of the Bail Act. Thirdly, there will nevertheless often be a substantial overlap between the factors that may go to whether cause has been shown and the factors that inform whether an unacceptable risk exists: see Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Tikomaimaleya at [24], R v Marcus [2016] NSWCCA 237 at [31] and [35], and McAndrew v R [2016] NSWCCA 58 at [9]. Fourthly, cause may be shown by a single powerful factor, or a powerful combination of factors: see R v S [2016] NSWCCA 189 at [63]. Fifthly, one should refrain from placing a gloss on the words of the Bail Act: see the judgment of Beech-Jones J (Gleeson JA and Adams J agreeing) in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Mawad [2015] NSWCCA 227 at [42]. In particular, it is not incumbent upon an applicant to show special or exceptional circumstances in order to show cause; Parliament has reserved that different requirement to different circumstances: see s 22 of the Bail Act. Sixthly, one can find countless examples whereby a single judge of the Supreme Court has found that an applicant has shown cause, or failed to do so. However, as RA Hulme J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Wilson J agreeing) explained recently in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zaiter [2016] NSWCCA 247 at [30] to [33], unless they contain a discussion of legal principles, those decisions have little or no precedential value. That is because many bail decisions are evaluative judgments about the interplay of a multitude of factors, not determinations of legal questions." 1. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Hourigan [2017] NSWCCA 170 the Court of Criminal Appeal referred with approval to that list of relevant principles, and went on to say: "The show cause requirement is a matter to be determined by consideration of all of the evidence or information the bail authority considers credible or trustworthy in the circumstances and not just by a consideration of those matters exhaustively listed in s 18 required for the unacceptable risk assessment: R v McCormack [2015] NSWCCA 221. However, it may well be that matters that are relevant to the unacceptable risk test will also be relevant to the show cause test: Director of Public Prosecutions v Tony Mawad [2015] NSWCCA 227 at [12]. Time spent in custody pending trial may be a relevant factor in considering whether an applicant has shown cause why his or her detention is not justified: R v BNS [2016] NSWSC 350 per Garling J at [62]; A1 v R, A2 v R [2016] NSWSC 1288 per Garling J at [102]. Significant delay however is not, of itself, sufficient to show cause." 1. Only if the applicants are able to point to factors which, alone or in combination, support a conclusion that their continuing detention is not justified can the Court go on to consider those matters in Division 2 of Part 3 of the Act: DPP v Tikomaimaleya [2015] NSWCA 83 at [20], [25]. 2. Whether cause has been shown falls to be assessed in the context of the whole of the material before the Court, including the nature of the charges, the strength of the Crown case, the likelihood of a custodial sentence should a conviction be recorded, and the question of any danger to the community attaching to a grant of bail. The Show Cause Issue 1. In each case the applicants refer to the very lengthy delay between the date on which each was charged, and the date on which the matter is expected to come on for trial. 2. Each refers to the difficulties of preparing their respective cases in relation to very serious charges from prison, with the problems associated with having necessary access to the brief of evidence, and the means to listen to recorded conversations, highlighted. 3. Each attacks the strength of the Crown case, contending that recordings of purported conversations may have been interfered with, and cell tower evidence is flawed. 4. Each contends that he is able to comply with strict conditions of bail, including house arrest. Each asserts that he does not pose a threat to any witness or other person. 5. Mr Fantakis additionally referred to his mental health and the diagnosis made by Dr Elliott in May 2017, noting that he is now in receipt of treatment considered necessary for his condition, and is willing to continue with treatment better provided in the community, pursuant to a community treatment order. Although it was in a different context (that of delay) he referred to himself as not being the same man he was four years ago. Consideration 1. The starting point for the determination of the present application is an assessment of the strength of the Crown case, since that is also relevant to the likelihood and extent of any sentence that might also be imposed, and to risks such as flight, or the possibility that witnesses or evidence may be interfered with. That assessment can only be conducted in a limited way, since the evidence placed before the Court is largely from secondary sources, and there is no real opportunity for the applicants to test the evidence, in a way that can be done at trial. 2. As the applicants point out, the Crown case in relation to the presumed murder of Mr Karmas is entirely circumstantial. Mr Karmas' body has never been recovered and the fact of his death is to be inferred from the circumstance that, after leaving his own home to assist the applicant Fantakis with repair works at the Punchbowl property, he was never seen again. In the period of six years since his disappearance he has not contacted any family member, and nor has he accessed bank accounts and the like. 3. The evidence for his murder by the applicant Fantakis, with the applicant Woods aiding Mr Fantakis subsequently, is also to be inferred from a series of circumstances. 4. However, a circumstantial case is not necessarily a weak case. On the contrary, cases dependent upon the accumulation of pieces of circumstantial evidence can be very compelling. 5. Having considered the evidence placed before the Court for the purposes of this application, I have concluded that this is such a case. 6. There is clear evidence of deeply felt antipathy from both applicants towards Mr Karmas. That evidence is found in diary notes written by Mr Fantakis, and in various exchanges between the two applicants which were intercepted by police. That hostility has its origins in the belief each man held that Mr Karmas (and Ms Angeles) were responsible for the death of Nicholas Fantakis. Evidence of a strong motive to kill is available to the Crown. 7. There is also evidence of opportunity, since the deceased left his own home on 11 August 2011 to go to the neighbouring Fantakis property to assist Mr Fantakis with some work to be undertaken there. The applicant Woods can be placed at the property at the same time. It is significant that the applicant Fantakis was, on the evidence, the last person to see Mr Karmas alive, with the applicant Woods at the property at about the relevant time or soon after. 8. It is well open to any tribunal of fact to conclude that Mr Karmas was violently murdered after accompanying the applicant Fantakis to the Wilga Street property. In the handwritten notes (Annexure "O" to the affidavit of D/S McGee of 19 April 2017, Ex. B.35) Mr Fantakis recorded the attendance of Mr Karmas at Wilga Street, and then "As he passed me I kicked him off his feet. I punched him in the throat to prevent him from breathing and screaming and then grabbed a tazer that he was carrying. I used his own weapon to incapacitate him and had him strapped. […] I had torchered [sic] him until he spilled his guts on all that are involved in this machine of killing inc." 1. A similar admission is contained in the notes annexed as "P" to the same affidavit, Ex. B.35. 2. In the recording "Terry's Last Words", Annexure "Q" to D/S McGee's affidavit, Ex. B.35, the applicant Fantakis records his hostility to Mr Karmas, his belief that Mr Karmas posed a threat to him and his family, and his actions in doing "what I needed to do to protect myself". 3. This evidence is capable of establishing that it was the applicant Fantakis who murdered Mr Karmas. 4. The movements of the two applicants in the hours subsequent to Mr Karmas' attendance at Wilga Street support the conclusion that his body was removed by them from Wilga Street in the blue transit van, and disposed of. The note written by the applicant Fantakis about wrapping the body, tying it with a shoelace, and throwing it in the Georges River (annexure "R" to the affidavit, Ex. B.35); together with the expert evidence as to the likely origins of the soil removed from the wheel arches of the applicant's vehicle, is compelling evidence that Mr Karmas' body was secreted in the vicinity of the Georges River. 5. The attempts of the applicant Woods to have his grandmother provide a false account of his and Mr Fantakis' movements that night, and to secure a false alibi for himself for 11 August 2011 through Mr Lines, is clear evidence of consciousness of guilt. 6. The Crown case against both applicants is a strong one. 7. Were the applicants to be convicted of the offence with which each stands charged, it is inevitable that a lengthy custodial sentence would be imposed, noting that the maximum penalties are respectively imprisonment for life, and 25 years imprisonment. Although Mr Woods contended in submissions that any sentence imposed upon him is likely to be exceeded by the period spent in custody on remand, I am unable to accept that submission. The nature and degree of assistance alleged to have been provided by Mr Woods to the principal is such that the objective seriousness of the offence is likely to be regarded as very high, resulting in the imposition of a significant sentence. The Judicial Commission Statistics relied upon by Mr Woods do not persuade me to the contrary, particularly bearing in mind what the Court of Criminal Appeal has repeatedly said about the lack of utility of bare statistics. 8. The case against the applicants for the offences of Intimidate Police seems similarly strong, in that it is based upon recorded conversations and other exchanges between the applicants. This offence carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment when prosecuted on indictment, and 2 years when heard summarily. 9. The Crown case against the applicant Fantakis for the drug offences is also a strong one. Although there is a Filipetti v R (1984) 13 A Crim R 335 issue raised by the applicant's assertions to police that the bags in which the cannabis was located had belonged to his late brother, that claim is belied by the information in the applicant's possession concerning cannabis cultivation, the discovery of his fingerprints on a transformer that was with a quantity of equipment typically used for hydroponic cultivation of cannabis, and the text message he received concerning the process of drying cannabis. 10. The supply offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. 11. Where the Crown has a strong case for serious criminality likely to attract a substantial custodial sentence, the Court must have regard to attendant risks, such as flight, and interference with witnesses or evidence. 12. Here there is clear evidence of threats made to witnesses, and acts undertaken in an attempt to interfere with witnesses. The intercepted telephone communications reveal the hostility of both applicants to Ms Angeles, and their belief that she played a role in the death of Nicholas Fantakis. The applicant Fantakis threatened her verbally. There is a risk to her safety if the applicants are at liberty. 13. There is similarly a risk to D/S McGee who has been the subject of threats made by both applicants to kill her. Having regard to the vehemence with which the threats were expressed, and the apparent attempts of the applicants when at liberty to discover her residential address, the death threats must be taken very seriously. There is, in my view, a risk to the safety of the officer if the applicants are in the community on bail. 14. It is also a matter of grave concern that the applicant Woods took active and repeated steps to interfere with the evidence that could be given by both his grandmother and Mr Lines, attempting to induce each to give false testimony. 15. That then is the background against which the question of whether the applicants have shown cause as to why their detention is not justified falls to be assessed. 16. The principal argument advanced by each applicant is the delay in bringing this matter to trial. 17. There is no question that the delay is extraordinary. There was considerable, and unacceptable, delay in the service of the brief of evidence when the matter was in the Local Court. Thereafter, there have been repeated applications by the applicants for adjournments, which further delayed committal, and have caused significant delay in this Court. 18. The applicants have referred the Court to the oft cited comment of Sperling J in Cain (No 1) (2001) 121 A Crim R 365 at [9]: "As to the interests of the applicant, he has a legitimate claim to be at liberty to go about a lawful life and to be with his family pending trial. He has been in custody for over a year. I am told by the Crown that the present charges might not come to trial but [ [sic] ] a further year. The prospect that a private citizen who has not been convicted of any offence might be imprisoned for as long as two years pending trial is, absent exceptional circumstances, not consistent with modern concepts of civil rights." 1. Those observations must, however, be considered in light of a number of features. Firstly, Cain (No 1) was decided many years ago, under a different legislative scheme, and in a very different environment. In 2001 a delay between arrest and trial of in excess of 2 years was an extraordinary one; regrettably, that is not the case in 2017, where such a delay is the norm. Secondly, it is important to bear in mind the observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zaiter [2016] NSWCCA 247 about the precedential value of decisions of a single judge of this Court: At [30] – [33] RA Hulme J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and I agreed) said: "I pause to observe that in this case, and as seems to often occur, the parties have cited judgments of single judges of the Supreme Court presiding in the Common Law Division Bails List. It is important to recognise that such judgments do not often lay down anything of precedential value for "bail authorities" (as defined in the Bail Act). Many such judgments are delivered ex tempore. Some judges are more inclined as a matter of individual practice to publish judgments on the Caselaw website whereas others are not. Bail decisions involve a discretionary evaluative judgment on a variety of factors about which, and within limits, reasonable minds may differ. It does not follow that simply because a judgment is published it is more authoritative than others that are not. What I am saying should not be taken as any criticism of judges who do publish their judgments in the public domain. But it must be recognised that most of these judgments are very specifically directed to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. It is useful for "bail authorities" to have examples of how particular factual circumstances have been considered by Supreme Court judges. But every bail application presents its own unique factual matrix. It should be kept very firmly in mind that the doctrine of precedent is concerned with decisions on points of law: see, for example, Fleming v White; Gamble v Hiles [1981] 2 NSWLR 719 at 725-6 (Street CJ); and R v XY [2013] NSWCCA 121; 84 NSWLR 363 at [30] (Basten JA). A decision by a single judge of the Supreme Court regarding, for example, delay as a decisive factor in determining whether cause has been shown under s 16A of the Bail Act is no more than the view taken by that particular judge in the circumstances of the particular case at hand." 1. The delay here must be assessed in the circumstances of this case, and not as against other cases, a number of which were provided to the Court, or referred to by both applicants. 2. The delay has been exceptional, in circumstances where the applicants have been convicted of no crime, and have the benefit of the presumption of innocence. However, delay must be considered not simply as a bland number of years, but against the history of the proceedings. Whilst there was initial delay in the Crown being ready to proceed to committal, in the absence of the brief being fully served, the delay since 7 September 2015 is entirely attributable to the forensic choices made by the applicants. 3. This Court was able to offer a trial date of 20 February 2017. Had it not been for the various applications to vacate that and other trial dates, this matter would by now have been finalised. The applicants must, to some extent, bear the consequences of the forensic choices each has made. Whilst the applicant Fantakis argues that he cannot be held responsible for the most recent vacation of a trial date, it has been open to him and his legal advisors to investigate the availability of a mental illness defence since the brief was served, particularly since there is material in the brief that clearly points to that as a potentially live issue. 4. Had the delay been entirely attributable to the Crown, or to the Court's inability to offer a timely trial date, the fact of delay would hold more persuasive significance. That is not the situation. 5. Delay then is a consideration, but it is by no means determinative in the circumstances of this case. 6. The applicants rely upon the difficulties of preparing a case from custody and I accept that it is much more difficult for an accused person held on remand to prepare for trial than for an accused who has been admitted to bail. That is axiomatic. It is also, however, a consideration that applies to all remand prisoners awaiting trial. 7. That the applicants have to date managed to prepare their cases with remarkable care and thoroughness is evidenced by the many applications brought by both from time to time over the currency of these proceedings, and often argued by both personally, with reference to evidence and case law. Both applicants demonstrate a capacity to have significant intelligent input into the preparation of their respective defences, even from prison. Their positions can only be enhanced now that each has the benefit of legal representation. 8. The applicants further rely upon features which ordinarily are of relevance to the assessment of bail concerns, but which may be considered in connection with the show cause requirement. Each has community ties, family or friends to provide support and supervision, the availability of a substantial surety of $20,000, and an asserted willingness to comply with stringent bail conditions including home detention. Both point to the fact that no harm was done to witnesses during the period when each was at liberty to submit they there is no real risk to the community in their liberty. 9. I have had regard to all of those features, but do not consider them to be persuasive, either singly or in combination, when considered in light of the strong Crown case, the danger to witnesses, and the information as to earlier breaches of bail. 10. Finally, the applicant Fantakis points to his recent diagnosis, the difficulties for him in preparing his case whilst in hospital, and his need, and willingness, to engage in treatment in the community. The report of Dr Elliott is before the Court and I note the doctor's opinion and the likely diagnosis. What is significant however, is that the applicant has only accepted psychiatric treatment when in custody. Although some of the evidence before the Court, including Dr Elliott's report, points to the likelihood that the applicant was ill when in the community, the applicant took no steps to seek medical assistance, or to accept treatment. 11. Further, there is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the applicant cannot be adequately treated in the custodial system; indeed, that is the only environment in which he has been diagnosed and treated to date. 12. This feature adds little to the application. 13. I have taken into account all of the matters raised by the applicants in oral and written submissions, and considered all of the evidence placed before the Court. Ultimately, I am not persuaded that in the circumstances of this case the applicants have shown cause as to why their detention is not justified. Accordingly, s 16A(2) of the Act requires that bail is refused. orders: 1. The application for bail by Elefterios Fantakis is refused. 2. The application for bail by Andrew Woods is refused. ********** Amendments 27 November 2018 - Publication Restriction Amended and Removed 03 August 2017 Restricted to the Parties. Proceedings the subject of a suppression order pursuant to s 8 of the Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010, such that the names of the applicants, the deceased, and witnesses likely to give evidence at trial, and any material which tends to identify these individuals, is suppressed, pending the conclusion of the trial or further order of the Court, whichever comes first. 08 November 2018 Conclusion of trial - Publication restriction removed. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 27 November 2018