Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: Emily Jade Rose Tapp v Australian Bushmen's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited [2018] NSWSC 208 Hearing dates: 16 February 2018 Date of orders: 28 February 2018 Decision date: 28 February 2018 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Hamill J Decision: (1) Application for transfer of the proceedings to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory is refused. (2) The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the defendant of and incidental to the notice of motion. (3) The trial date of 30 April 2018 is confirmed. (4) The matter is listed before the Registrar on Tuesday 6 March 2018. (5) Recommend that a trial judge be appointed as a matter of urgency to facilitate the case management of the matter and to hear any application for a change of venue, for evidence to be taken on commission or for the use of audio visual facilities Catchwords: CIVIL LAW – cross vesting – application to transfer proceedings to the ACT – where plaintiff resident in Canberra – plaintiff a paraplegic with severe disabilities – plaintiff's injury and disabilities subject of the proceedings make it difficult for her to stay in Sydney – interests of justice – relevant considerations – plaintiff's difficulties part of the interests of justice – cause of action arose in New South Wales – most witnesses resident in New South Wales – matter listed for hearing – hearing date imminent – where previous hearing date vacated – application refused Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5L, 60, 61 Evidence (Audio and Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW) s 5B Evidence on Commission Act 1995 (NSW) s 20 Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 s 5(2) Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 18 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 23 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 12 Cases Cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v ANU (2009) 239 CLR 175; HCA 27. Australian Consolidated Investment Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 5 ACSR 233. Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711. BHP Billiton v Schultz and Ors (2004) 221 CLR 400. Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited [2015] NSWSC 722. Pozniak v Smith (1982) 151 CLR 38; HCA 39. Tapp v Australian Bushman's Camp Drafting Rodeo Association Ltd [2017] NSWSC 979. Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Emily Jade Rose Tapp (Plaintiff) Australian Bushmen's Campdraft & Rodeo Association Limited (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Mr A J Bartley SC with Ms K Oldfield (Plaintiff) Mr G M Watson SC with Mr D A Lloyd (Defendant) Solicitors: Commins Hendricks (Plaintiff) RGSLAW (Defendant) File Number(s): 2012/00241041 Judgment 1. By notice of motion filed 8 December 2017 the plaintiff seeks an order for the transfer of the proceedings to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory pursuant to s 5(2)(iii) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) (the Act). The defendant opposes the application. 2. When she was 19 years old the plaintiff suffered terrible injuries when she fell from a horse in the course of an event organised by the defendant. It appears to be indisputable that she suffered extremely severe physical injuries and psychological sequelae arising out of those injuries and disabilities. There is evidence that the applicant has been in a state of denial as to the extent of her injuries and disabilities. This has resulted in her inability or failure to engage with her lawyers, which in turn has resulted in some defaults in various timetables set by the Court. 3. The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant by statement of claim filed in this Court in August 2012. The statement of claim asserted that the defendant organised an event in January 2011 and was negligent in its management of the event. That negligence is asserted to have caused the plaintiff's fall and the consequent injuries and ongoing disabilities. 4. There was a delay in the filing of the defence and it was ultimately filed on 10 June 2014. The defendant denies that it was negligent and raises a number of statutory defences under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). For example, the defendant relies on the provision of s 5L, asserting that the harm suffered by the plaintiff resulted from an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity in which the plaintiff engaged voluntarily. Further, the defendant relies on the assertion that it was a volunteer and therefore subject to the protection afforded by s 61 of the Civil Liability Act whereby it is asserted that it did not owe the plaintiff a relevant duty of care. The defence also asserts that the plaintiff contributed to her own harm by conducting herself in a negligent manner. 5. The preceding two paragraphs are a simplified and by no means exhaustive summary of the pleadings in the matter but are sufficient for present purposes. 6. The procedural history of the matter is unfortunate but I accept the plaintiff's submission that it is not relevant to, let alone determinative of, the present application. In particular, the extensive psychological and other evidence tendered on the application explains that any delay or default in the conduct of the proceedings by the plaintiff arose from the nature of her psychological disabilities. It is nevertheless appropriate to set out the procedural history in brief terms. 7. The matter was before the Registrar on many occasions following the filing of the plaintiff's reply on or around 20 February 2015. Eventually, the matter was listed for hearing on 8 May 2017. It had an estimate of ten days. 8. On 28 April 2017, Hoeben CJ at CL vacated the hearing date. In the course of the hearing of the notice of motion leading to that order, his Honour made a number of remarks that may be seen as critical of the plaintiff and her legal representatives. That criticism has no relevance to a proper consideration of the current application. In particular, the evidence before me as to the difficulties confronting the plaintiff and her legal representatives is far more extensive than the evidence before the Chief Judge at Common Law. 9. The Court's records of proceedings show that Hoeben CJ at CL attempted to manage the case until the matter came before Davies J on 12 July 2017. Amongst the voluminous material tendered on the current application is the transcript of proceedings before Davies J. The matter was before his Honour on the defendant's notice of motion to separate the issues or the hearing of the issues of liability and damages. One of the reasons for that application was the asserted delay in the plaintiff filing its evidence relevant to the question of damages. The material before me provides an explanation for any such delay, and, again, it has to do with the psychological impact of the plaintiff's injuries, her pathological state of denial and resistance to engage with her lawyers and instruct them to obtain relevant evidence from those closest to her. 10. In the course of the argument on the defendant's notice of motion for separation of the issues there was an exchange between Davies J and Senior Counsel for the plaintiff in which the Judge contemplated the possibility of changing the venue of the hearing to Queanbeyan. Queanbeyan is a city in New South Wales which is only separated from Canberra and the Australian Capital Territory by a border. Senior Counsel for the plaintiff said: "[T]hat would be an offer which the plaintiff would absolutely jump at if it could be done". 1. As things transpired, the notice of motion was not pressed and was dismissed with the defendant required to pay the plaintiff's costs: Tapp v Australian Bushman's Camp Drafting Rodeo Association Ltd [2017] NSWSC 979. Davies J made orders that the trial be listed with an estimate of 10 days on 30 April 2018. His Honour also made orders for the service of witness statements and other evidence including expert evidence. Relevantly the plaintiff was to file and serve its statements by lay witnesses on damages by 31 July 2017, its expert reports on damages by 31 August 2017 and any expert evidence on damages in reply by 31 March 2018. Those orders were formally made on 17 July 2017. 2. On 19 July 2017 the solicitor for the defendant wrote to the solicitor for the plaintiff inviting the plaintiff "to approach the court to formalise arrangements relating to the location of the trial." This was a reference to the question of whether the trial would be held in Sydney or, rather, in Queanbeyan as was contemplated in the exchange between Davies J and Senior Counsel for the plaintiff a week earlier. No response was received and on 16 August 2017 the defendant's solicitor again wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor, this time in the following terms: "We refer to our letter dated [19] July 2017 to which we have not received a response. Please urgently advise whether the plaintiff has approached the Court to formalise arrangements relating to the location of the trial. We require the location of the hearing to be finalised so that we might advise our witnesses and medical and liability experts to ensure their availability. We look forward to your response prior to Monday, 21 August 2017." 1. On 21 August 2017 the plaintiff's solicitor responded by indicating that it would finalise "arrangements for the venue of the hearing within 14 days." It appears that this was not done. 2. On 14 September 2017 the defendant's solicitor wrote again to the plaintiff's solicitor asking them to "advise as to your client's position regarding the hearing location forthwith." As I understand it, there was no response to this correspondence until the plaintiff filed the present notice of motion seeking orders under the cross vesting legislation for the entire case to be transferred to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. 3. The filing of the application on 8 December 2017 created certain (predictable) listing difficulties due to the December-January Court vacation and the first return date of the notice of motion was Friday 9 February 2018. The matter then came before me on Friday 16 February 2018. 4. The plaintiff relied on an extensive body of affidavit evidence including affidavits sworn by the plaintiff, by members of her family and by two of her solicitors. There was no objection to this material and no cross-examination of any of the deponents. The affidavits included (or annexed) a substantial body of medical, psychological and other evidence establishing the reasons the plaintiff will have difficulties in attending a two-week hearing in Sydney. The material is compelling and establishes, amongst other things, that the plaintiff would have trouble obtaining accommodation in Sydney that would cater for her extensive medical and personal needs. A deal of the material is of a highly sensitive and personal nature and I do not propose to repeat it in the course of this judgment which will be published. However, the evidence establishes that the plaintiff would be far more comfortable and safe if she is able to live in her present accommodation in Canberra rather than attempting to find suitable accommodation in Sydney. I accept that an ordinary hotel room, or even a room with facilities for a person with the plaintiff's disabilities, would not be suitable. At the very least, she will need a serviced apartment with convenient clothes washing facilities and appropriate facilities to accommodate her disabilities. 5. The evidence also shows that the plaintiff has an extensive support network in Canberra. This includes the services of a psychologist with whom the plaintiff has established a trusting and important relationship. If the case is heard in Canberra, the psychologist will be able to assist the plaintiff to deal with the anxiety that giving evidence and attending the hearing is likely to cause. The psychologist would be able to attend court at times if the case is heard in Canberra and will be available to the plaintiff outside of court times. Maintaining the therapeutic relationship during the period of a hearing in Sydney would be problematic and certainly the plaintiff would not receive the same support she would if the case is heard in the ACT. 6. The plaintiff, in spite of her extensive injuries and disabilities, is obviously an extremely courageous young woman. Over the years since her accident she has become involved in "para-sports". In fact, she has become an elite para-athlete, only missing out on participation in the Rio de Janeiro Olympics because she suffered a burn to a leg three weeks before the event for which she was selected in the Australian team. The Plaintiff has been selected as part of the Australian Commonwealth Games team and will be competing in those Games on the Gold Coast in the month before the hearing of the current proceedings. While the travel she undertakes to participate in such events may seem to run contrary to the suggestion that there are insurmountable difficulties in her travelling to Sydney and staying here for a period of two weeks for the hearing, I accept that when travelling for events such as the Commonwealth Games, there would be a substantial support network specialised in dealing with the kinds of injuries and disabilities suffered by the plaintiff. 7. There is also unchallenged evidence that the plaintiff has had a number of unfortunate and distressing experiences in Sydney. 8. As I have said, and without going into a great amount of detail, the case presented by the plaintiff is a compelling one in terms of the difficulties she will face if she is required to come to Sydney for the trial. These physical and psychological challenges must be considered in the light of her pathological state of denial. It is the accumulation of these factors, and other matters, that lie at the heart of the plaintiff's submission that it is in the interests of justice that the case be heard in Canberra (and therefore transferred to the ACT Supreme Court). 9. As I said in argument, it is a shame that the offer made by Davies J to change the venue of the hearing to Queanbeyan was not accepted by the plaintiff (or her lawyers) with the alacrity implicit in the comment made by Senior Counsel that the plaintiff would "absolutely jump at" the case being heard in Queanbeyan. The evidence, and my Associate's enquiries with the listing authorities, suggests that the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory has now booked the Queanbeyan Court for the period commencing 30 April 2018. Inquiries made since judgment was reserved suggest that there are no longer hearing rooms available at the Queanbeyan Court House. However, my Associate's enquiries also showed that there is a court with facilities for disabled people available at Goulburn. Goulburn is about one hour's drive north of Canberra. 10. Another possibility canvassed in argument was for this Court to attempt to conduct the hearing in a courtroom within the Australian Capital Territory. However, the jurisdiction of this Court to conduct a hearing outside of New South Wales is, at least, controversial: see, s 23 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW); s 12 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW); cf s 18 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT); and see also the observations of the High Court in Schultz at [90]-[93] (Gummow J), [151] (Kirby J), [178]-[179] (Hayne J) and [191]-[200] (Callinan J). 11. There is no application for a change of venue before the Court. Nor is there any application to take the plaintiff's evidence on commission in Canberra or an application that audio-visual facilities be employed. The only application before me is the application to transfer the case in its entirety to the Australian Capital Territory. That application requires me to consider the "interests of justice", including the interests of the plaintiff, her legitimate desire to be present at the hearing and the significant concern that she may be disadvantaged in giving evidence if the case is heard in Sydney. There are a number of relevant considerations. 12. In addition to the plaintiff's difficulties in travelling to Sydney, finding suitable accommodation, dealing with her history of bad experiences in this city and the lack of support network in Sydney, the plaintiff also submitted that there were a large number of witnesses resident in Canberra who would be giving evidence in the hearing. It was also submitted that many of the other lay witnesses are not residents of Sydney (although they are residents of New South Wales), and that there would be no greater inconvenience in requiring those witnesses to travel to Canberra (rather than Sydney) to give evidence. 13. As to the Canberra witnesses, the affidavit of one of the plaintiff's solicitors asserts that there are some 15 witnesses based at the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) in Canberra where the plaintiff resides. However, Senior Counsel for the defendant submitted that no statement had been served from any of those witnesses. Senior Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that this was so. This seems to constitute a significant breach of the directions and orders made by Davies J in July last year. I assume the evidence of the 15 AIS witnesses goes to the question of damages. The orders made by Davies J required such statements to be served by 31 July 2017 (or if they are expert witnesses, which I was told they are not, by 31 August 2017. Presumably, Davies J was told (or assumed from what he was told) that the plaintiff could comply with such an order. Presumably, such assurances were relevant to the defendant's decision not to press its application to separate the issue of liability from the issue of damages. 14. While the breach of the orders is not directly relevant to the present application, it is relevant in a less direct way. It is difficult to know, in the absence of the service of their statements, whether the evidence of those witnesses is relevant, important, controversial or disputed. It may be that the evidence of those witnesses is not in dispute and could be taken by the tender of statements or the reading of their affidavits. It may also be that their evidence is not admissible. While I am prepared to act on the possibility that there are a number of witnesses resident in Canberra, I cannot give that matter very much weight in these circumstances. 15. The defendant relied on a single affidavit of its solicitor. That affidavit sets out the history of the matter and presents an analysis of the witnesses to be called by both parties and where they reside. The affidavit also recounts the procedural history to which I have fleetingly referred and annexes the transcripts of the proceedings before the Chief Judge at Common Law and Davies J and the correspondence relating to the possible change of venue to which I earlier referred. 16. The nature of the decision I am called upon to make, and the operation of the cross-vesting legislation, has being considered in a number of cases: see, for example BHP Billiton v Schultz and Ors (2004) 221 CLR 400; [2004] HCA 61 ("Shultz"), Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711, Australian Consolidated Investment Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation (1991) 5 ACSR 233, Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited [2015] NSWSC 722. That is a small sample of the many cases in which judges at first instance, and appellate courts, have been called upon to consider the deceptively simple terms of s 5(2) of the Act which provides: "5 Transfer of proceedings (2) Where: (a) a proceeding (in this subsection referred to as the relevant proceeding) is pending in the Supreme Court of a State or Territory (in this subsection referred to as the first court); and (b) it appears to the first court that: (i) the relevant proceeding arises out of, or is related to, another proceeding pending in the Supreme Court of another State or Territory and it is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding be determined by that other Supreme Court; (ii) having regard to: (A) whether, in the opinion of the first court, apart from this Act and any law of a State relating to cross-vesting of jurisdiction, the relevant proceeding or a substantial part of the relevant proceeding would have been incapable of being instituted in the first court and capable of being instituted in the Supreme Court of another State or Territory; (B) the extent to which, in the opinion of the first court, the matters for determination in the relevant proceeding are matters arising under or involving questions as to the application, interpretation or validity of a law of the State or Territory referred to in sub-subparagraph (A) and not within the jurisdiction of the first court apart from this Act and any law of a State relating to cross-vesting of jurisdiction; and (C) the interests of justice; it is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding be determined by that other Supreme Court; or (iii) it is otherwise in the interests of justice that the relevant proceeding be determined by the Supreme Court of another State or Territory; the first court shall transfer the relevant proceeding to that other Supreme Court." 1. The question here is whether "it is otherwise in the interest of justice that the relevant proceedings be determined by the Supreme Court of another state or territory": s 5(2)(b)(iii). Neither party bears the onus and, as Senior Counsel for the plaintiff submitted, the question does not involve a discretionary judgment or the exercise of judicial discretion. Rather the Court is called upon to determine where the interests of justice lie. The "interests of justice" is a phrase of very wide import and the weight to be afforded to various considerations will vary from case to case: cf BHP Billiton v Schultz and Ors (2004) 221 CLR 400; [2004] HCA 61 at [15]; Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711 at 714 and 727. If the Court comes to the conclusion that it is in the interest of justice that the matter be dealt with by the ACT Supreme Court, the Act mandates that the proceedings "shall" be transferred to that Court. 2. It has been held that the choice of the venue originally made by the plaintiff is a neutral consideration. However all of the cases in which such statements have been made – the most authoritative being Schultz in the High Court – were cases where the defendant sought to move the proceedings from the jurisdiction of the court chosen by the plaintiff. Neither counsel in the present case was able to point to a case in which a plaintiff commenced proceedings in a particular jurisdiction and subsequently sought to avail themselves of the cross vesting legislation. Even so, I accept that the fact that the case is presently before the Supreme Court of New South Wales is not a relevant consideration guiding the determination under s 5(2)(b)(iii). 3. However, the fact that the case has been in this Court for more than 5 years, has previously been listed for a 10 day hearing, and is currently listed for hearing on 30 April 2018 is a relevant consideration. In the course of argument I invited the parties to make enquiries as to when the case might first be heard if an order was made transferring the proceedings to the Australian Capital Territory. Assuming all went well, it seems the first possible hearing date would be in or towards the end of October 2018. That is to say, there would be a further delay of at least 6 months before the case could be heard. Even that would be predicated on both Courts and the parties acting expeditiously and obtaining a hearing date soon. The further delay of already protracted proceedings is a matter militating against a transfer of the proceedings given that all parties seem to be proceeding on the basis that the case is ready to proceed now, or at least will be by 30 April 2018. The defendant points to the fact that the memory of the witnesses will fade with time and that some of the defence witnesses involved in organising the event have also been adversely affected by the experience and want the proceedings to come to an end. Davies J mentioned this matter in his judgment in July last year, noting at [14]: "the members of the Defendant who are keen to have liability issues resolved. There is furthermore the issue of recollections when already the accident happened some six and a half years ago and the need to wait until the damages case is ready for a hearing will likely extend that time considerably." 1. Another related matter relied on by Senior Counsel for the defendant is that the previous hearing date, with an estimate of 10 days, was vacated. If the matter is transferred to the Australian Capital Territory at this late stage, a further 10 hearing days will be lost. This not only adversely affects the parties to these proceedings but is also a matter of concern to the many thousands of other litigants who have cases before this Court. These are the kinds of matters to which the plurality referred at [15] in Schultz when their Honours spoke of "interests wider than those of either party": see also, in a different context, Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 at [5] (French CJ). 2. The cause of action in the present case arose in New South Wales. The law to be applied in determining the dispute between the parties is the law of New South Wales. Some of the relevant statutory provisions have no counterpart under the law of the Australian Capital Territory. While not a determinative matter, and understanding that the judges of any state or territory are capable of interpreting and applying legislation specific to the law of another state, there are benefits and advantages in such legislative provisions being interpreted and applied by the court of the state where such laws apply: see for example Pozniak v Smith (1982) 151 CLR 38; HCA 39, Brydon v Australian Rail Track Corporation Limited [2015] NSWSC 722 and Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711 at 728 and 729. 3. As I have already indicated, there is no onus on either side in a dispute under s 5(2). It is simply for the Court to determine where the interests of justice lie and, having made that judgment, comply with the mandatory terms of the statute. The defendant raised a submission based on the words of the plurality in Schultz that "the interests of justice are not the same as the interests of one party". Whilst that is unquestionably true (not to mention binding on this Court), the plaintiff will be the most significant witness in the case, at least in terms of damages. Her ability to acquit herself well in giving evidence is a matter which is relevant to the more general interests of justice and not merely relevant to her own interests. Accordingly, I approach the matter on the basis that the plaintiff's difficulties in conducting the litigation in Sydney is a matter that is relevant to the interests of justice generally and not merely a matter relevant to the plaintiff's own interests. 4. Even so, the considerations militating in favour of the case being determined by the Supreme Court of New South Wales are overwhelming. In summary they include: 1. This Court is the natural forum for resolution of the dispute between the parties. 2. The cause of action arose in New South Wales. 3. The law of New South Wales, including a number of specific legislative provisions, will govern and guide the judgment of the Court which hears the case. 4. Most of the witnesses who are known to be giving evidence are residents of New South Wales. This includes a number of expert witnesses as well as most of the lay witnesses relevant to the question of liability. 5. The matter is already listed for hearing in this Court and the hearing date is imminent. The High Court in Schultz confirmed that "the capacity of the tribunal to deal expeditiously with cases has always, and rightly, been regarded as relevant to the interests of justice". 6. The only real connection between these proceedings and the Australian Capital Territory are the plaintiff's residence, the possibility of a number of Canberra based witness and the plaintiff's understandable preference. The High Court in Schultz held that the determination of the more appropriate forum should be made "without any specific emphasis in favour of the choice of forum made by the plaintiff". 7. There are, potentially, a number of alternative remedies that could mitigate to some degree the difficulties confronting the plaintiff. These include changing the venue to Goulburn (or if a courtroom became available, Queanbeyan), taking part of the evidence on commission in the ACT, and using audio-video facilities so that the Canberra witnesses, including the plaintiff, could give evidence remotely. 1. For those reasons I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that the Supreme Court of New South Wales determines the proceedings. Accordingly the application to transfer the case to the Australian Capital Territory will be refused. 2. I should say, if it is not already clear from what I have written to this point, that I have considerable sympathy for the plaintiff's situation. If I were able to, I would make an order that the venue be transferred to Queanbeyan. Both parties seemed to accept that that would be an appropriate resolution although Mr Bartley's enthusiasm seemed to have diminished somewhat between July 2017 (when the offer was made by Davies J) and February 2018 (when the matter was raised here, see transcript p 34). However, the facilities in Queanbeyan seem no longer to be available. As I have suggested at [36](7), there may be other practical solutions. For example, it might be that the plaintiff could give evidence on commission from Canberra if an application was made under s 20 of the Evidence On Commission Act 1995 (NSW). There is also the possibility of taking evidence by an audio visual link under s 5B Evidence (Audio and Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW). It is no doubt possible to arrange for the plaintiff to be "present" at the hearing by means of some form of audio visual link from Canberra. There could also be an application for a change of venue and, in this regard, the most recent enquiries by my Associate indicate that there is a courtroom available at Goulburn Court House and that the complex has appropriate facilities for disabled litigants. There may also be the possibility of the case being heard in Yass although at this stage my Associate has been unable to confirm either the availability of a courtroom or the accessibility to the courthouse for people with disabilities. 3. There are many options available to the plaintiff and I propose to make directions or recommendations that the matter be allocated to a trial judge as soon as possible so that any such applications can be dealt with expeditiously. In view of the question of whether the plaintiff has complied with the directions made by Davies J, the appointment of a trial judge at this stage will also enable the case to be managed up until the hearing date on 30 April 2018. 4. I make the following orders: 1. The application for transfer of the proceedings to the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory is refused. 2. The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the defendant of and incidental to the notice of motion. 3. The trial date of 30 April 2018 is confirmed. 4. The matter is listed before the Registrar on Tuesday 6 March 2018. 5. Recommend that a trial judge be appointed as a matter of urgency to facilitate the case management of the matter and to hear any application for a change of venue, for evidence to be taken on commission, for the use of audio visual facilities or any other matter raised by the parties. ********** Amendments 28 February 2018 - Typographical error DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 February 2018