R v Ambrosius (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 1847

Supreme Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Ambrosius (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 1847 Hearing dates: 6-10, 13-17, 20-24 November 2017 Date of orders: 24 November 2017 Decision date: 24 November 2017 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Campbell J Decision: I am satisfied that the statutory conditions precedent to giving the jury a majority verdict direction under s 55F Jury Act 1977 are satisfied. Catchwords: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – majority verdicts – whether majority verdict direction can be given Legislation Cited: Jury Act 1977 (NSW) Category: Procedural rulings Parties: Regina (Crown) Mr Rodney Rees Ambrosius (Accused) Representation: Counsel: P Rosser QC (Crown Prosecutor) P Young SC (Public Defender)

Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid (Accused) File Number(s): 2016/0075590 Publication restriction: Publication restriction lifted

EX TEMPORE Judgment (REVISED) 1. The conditions that must be satisfied before a Court is legally entitled to give a majority verdict direction are to be found in the provisions of s 55F Jury Act 1977 (NSW). They are: (a) a unanimous verdict has not been reached after the jurors have deliberated for a period of time (being not less than 8 hours) that the court considers reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity of the criminal proceedings, and (b) the court is satisfied, after examination on oath of one or more of the jurors, that it is unlikely that the jurors will reach a unanimous verdict after further deliberation. 1. There cannot be any serious question about the satisfaction of the first statutory condition; the jury have been out now for something like 25 hours, making an allowance for some early adjournments and for breaks that they may have had during the days of deliberations, and discounting the usual lunch hour which has been spent in the jury room. 2. It must be said, at least for experienced lawyers, the issues in the trial are not complex, although I accept for a jury of lay people some degree of difficulty arises when one bears in mind the intersection in this case of the law of murder and manslaughter and, in particular, in regard to the latter, the three different pathways by which that matter arises. But allowing for that, and bearing in mind the number of requests that the jury have made for further clarification of the directions of law, I am well satisfied that the jury have deliberated for a reasonable time having regard to the nature and complexity of the proceedings. 3. I have also earlier today examined on affirmation three jurors, being the foreperson and two other members of the jury. Although the foreperson gave evidence of an optimistic nature, that given "sufficient time" the jury would reach a unanimous verdict, and expressed the view that, since I received the note on Wednesday which prompted my Black direction, real progress had been made, the two other jurors were not so sanguine. 4. One juror, although perhaps a little reluctant to come out and express a plain view, really expressed, in substance, the view that that juror thought that wasn't achievable. And another juror was far plainer in that juror's answer to my questions, and made it quite clear from her point of view that she saw no prospect of the jury reaching a unanimous verdict. 5. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the statutory conditions precedent to giving the jury a majority verdict direction are well satisfied, and I propose to ask the jury to return to Court for that purpose.