R v Walter [2018] NSWDC 75

District Court New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Walter [2018] NSWDC 75 Hearing dates: 2 February 2018 Date of orders: 16 February 2018 Decision date: 16 February 2018 Jurisdiction: Criminal Before: Blackmore SC DCJ Decision: Charge dismissed Catchwords: CRIME - procedure - autrefois acquit - interests of justice - abuse of process - incontrovertibility - back up charge - section 166 certificate - verdict of acquittal - finality in judicial proceedings - further prosecution of an accused person Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Cases Cited: Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254 PJE v The Queen (1996) 15 Leg Rep C2 Regina v Carroll [2002] 213 CLR 635 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: New South Wales Director of Public Prosecutions Andrew Jason Walter Representation: Counsel: Peter K Lynch - Crown Sheridan Goodwin - Offender

Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions - Crown Steven Young Lawyers - Offender File Number(s): 2016/00110464

Judgment 1. The accused Andrew Walter faced trial by jury on a charge of break and enter and commit serious indictable offence, namely assault occasioning actual bodily harm, in circumstances of aggravation, namely that the accused used corporeal violence on the complainant. 1. After his trial the accused was found not guilty by the jury. 1. As is common with jury trials it is not possible to know the reason or reasons for such a verdict. 1. The Crown however had filed, prior to committal, a section 166 certificate (see Criminal Procedure Act, 1986 section 165 and following). That certificate included, as back up charges, two offences including one of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The other offence was one of contravene an apprehended domestic violence order. 1. It is now submitted by the accused that he should not face a summary hearing in relation to the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm as that charge formed one of the elements of the offences for which he was found guilty by the jury. It is argued, as I understand it, that the principle of autrefois acquit applies in these circumstances, or that it would be oppressive for the accused to face the same charge twice and therefore the charge should be permanently stayed as an abuse of process.