Civil and Administrative Tribunal New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: DKJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2018] NSWCATAD 270 Hearing dates: 13 July 2018, Submissions closed 20 August 2018 Date of orders: 26 November 2018 Decision date: 26 November 2018 Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division Before: J McAteer Senior Member Decision: (1) The decision of the respondent dated 25 January 2018 is set aside. (2) Two recognition payments are provided by way of the giving of support under section 26 (1) (d) as Category D Recognition payments. (3) The applicant is to be provided with total recognition payments in the amount of $3,000.00 less any recognition payment amounts already paid. Catchwords: VICTIMS Support – Administrative law – act of violence – whether series of related acts – whether all acts within application constitute single act of violence or more than one act of violence - sufficiency of evidence - whether applicant primary victim of act of violence causing grievous bodily harm Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 Crimes Act 1900 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (repealed) Cases Cited: BQG v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2015] NSWCATAD 63 CZU v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2017] NSWCATAD 240 DEL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2017] NSWCATAD 376 Texts Cited: Nil Category: Principal judgment Parties: DKJ (Applicant) Commissioner of Victims Rights (Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: Applicant, In person Victims Services Legal (Respondent) File Number(s): 2018/00099546 Publication restriction: S 64 (1) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 applies to the identity of the applicant. Reasons for decision Introduction 1. The applicant asserts that she is a victim of violent crime and has suffered injury as a result. The victims of crime scheme provides that eligible victims may recover financial grants and access to the provision of services under the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (the Act). 2. In order to be eligible to recover under the scheme, a victim must either be a primary victim (the victim of an assault), or a secondary victim or family victim. As will be explained in these reasons, victims of crime must pass through various factual thresholds as set out in the Legislation in order to receive benefits under the scheme. In the current matter, the applicant has established that she was a victim of a violent crime (the statutory term being 'act of violence') in accordance with the Act, and is entitled to a recognition payment. The proceedings concerned whether the level of injury entitles the applicant to a Category D recognition payment, or the more generous Category C recognition payment, as well as determining whether the claim was based on more than one act of violence. Background 1. On 28 March 2018 the applicant filed an application for administrative review with the Tribunal. That application concerned how the respondent had dealt with her initial application and internal review for Victims Support. The application for review set out the following grounds: I would like to seek a review of the claim. I disagree with the internal review decision. Evidence was not taken into consideration – I suffered many acts of violence – lucky to be alive. Feel the assessor didn't understand the situation nor take any of the reports seriously. Awaited over 1 year for appeal to be assessed to have same outcome. After evidence etc. had been submitted. I can explain more. 1. The applicant had been in a relationship with the perpetrator from a period beginning in approximately 2005 and concluding in 2016. The basis of the claim for recognition payments covers a period of late November 2007 until February 2017, a period approaching ten years. 2. The application under s 51 of the Act followed an internal review under s 49 of the Act. That review on 25 January 2018 reached the same decision as the original decision maker had on 3 July 2017. Both decisions found that the applicant was the victim of an act of violence but was only entitled to a Category D recognition payment. 3. The Assessor was not satisfied that the impact of the act of violence had met the criteria for grievous bodily harm. This decision was based primarily on an assessment of the available medical evidence submitted to the Commissioner. The Assessor had deferred the matter and adjourned the final determination on one occasion in late November 2017 to allow the receipt of further medical evidence. The Assessor (in first instance and on review) had grouped the incidents relating to the application as constituting a single act of violence utilising the provisions of s 19 (4) of the Act. This resulted in what were adjudged to be a series of related acts being grouped as one act of violence for the purposes of the claim under the Act. Legislation 1. On 3 June 2013 the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 replaced the former Act – the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (the 1996 Act). Both schemes provided for similar eligibility criteria, with the main difference being the manner in which they provided support and assistance. The current Act replicated the 1996 Act central provisions as to an eligible victim of crime. The relevant current provisions are set out in the following sections of the Act: 5 Meaning of "victim of crime" (1) For the purposes of this Part, a victim of crime is a person who suffers harm as a direct result of an act committed, or apparently committed, by another person in the course of a criminal offence. (2) A person suffers harm if, as a result of such an act: (a) the person suffers actual physical bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm, or (b) the person's property is deliberately taken, destroyed or damaged. (3) If the person dies as a result of the act concerned, a member of the person's immediate family is also a victim of crime for the purposes of this Part. (4) If a person dies as a result of the act concerned and there is more than one member of the person's immediate family, members of the immediate family may nominate a representative for the purposes of the Charter of Victims Rights. …. 19 Meaning of "act of violence" (1) In this Act, act of violence means an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons: (a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and (b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and (c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons. (2) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to an offence in subsection (1) (a) extends to conduct of a person that would constitute an offence were it not for the fact that the person cannot, or might not, be held to be criminally responsible for the conduct because of the person's age or mental illness or impairment. (3) For the purposes of this section, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence. (4) Except as provided by subsections (5) and (6), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because: (a) they were committed against the same person, and (b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner: (i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or (ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or (iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other. (5) An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated as related acts. (6) An act is not related to any earlier act in respect of which support is given under this Act if it occurs after the support is given. (7) For the purposes of this Act, a series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons, constitutes a single act of violence. 20 Meaning of "primary victim" (1) A primary victim of an act of violence is a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of that act. (2) A primary victim of an act of violence extends to a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of: (a) trying to prevent another person from committing that act, or (b) trying to help or rescue another person against whom that act is being committed or has just been committed, or (c) trying to arrest another person who is committing, or who has just committed, that act. …. 1. The pathways under the Act which lead to a recognition payment are a necessary threshold precondition to access benefits of the victims of crime scheme. Once an eligible victim (of an act of violence) has passed through the initial threshold, an assessment of the circumstances of the incident(s) and level of injury is carried out to determine the appropriate recognition payment. In both the initial decision and the internal review, the delegate of the administrator (the Commissioner of Victims Rights) found that the applicant was the victim of an act of violence. Subject to a similar finding on act of violence, the main issue of this administrative review concerns an assessment of whether the applicant is entitled to a Category D recognition payments or some other category of payment. Jurisdiction 1. There is no dispute that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Section 51 of the Act provides for administrative review by the Tribunal. 51 Application to Tribunal for administrative review of decision concerning recognition payment (1) An applicant for a recognition payment who is aggrieved by the decision of a decision maker in respect of the application may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a decision made by the Commissioner following an internal review under section 49 of the decision maker's decision with respect to the recognition payment. (2) An applicant for a recognition payment who is aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner in respect of the application may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a decision made by the Commissioner. 1. At the commencement of the hearing the Tribunal noted that the application for administrative review had been lodged outside of the 28 day period provided for by the operation of the s 55 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, (the ADR Act) and cl 23 and 24 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014. 2. When the matter was initially returnable for directions on 11 May 2018 neither party appeared to have been aware of this issue as there was no evidence that it was raised with the Tribunal at that time. The application was lodged approximately six days beyond the relevant 28 days period. 3. Section 41 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (the NCAT Act) provides for the Tribunal to extend the time for an applicant to make an application to the Tribunal. It provides: 41 Extensions of time (1) The Tribunal may, of its own motion or on application by any person, extend the period of time for the doing of anything under any legislation in respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction despite anything to the contrary under that legislation. (2) Such an application may be made even though the relevant period of time has expired. 1. As s 57 of the ADR Act has been repealed the Tribunal is not required to determine whether an out of time application has been supported by a reasonable explanation for the delay in making the application. Section 41 of the NCAT Act does not import the same language as the former s-57. However the authorities indicate that there must be some explanation for the delay when the Tribunal is called upon to exercise its discretion. 2. Noting that the delay was not pressed, that there was no prejudice attaching to the respondent and that by completing the application on 1 March 2018 the applicant intended to lodge it promptly, I made an order during the preliminary hearing extending time to lodge the review (to the extent necessary) to 5:00pm 28 March 2018 pursuant to s 41 of the NCAT Act. 3. The Tribunal's powers in relation to an application for administrative review are governed by s 63 of the ADR Act, which provides: (1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following: (a) any relevant factual material, (b) any applicable written or unwritten law. (2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision. (3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide: (a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or (b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or (c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or (d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. Hearing 1. At the hearing the applicant appeared in person and the respondent was represented by an employee Solicitor. The procedure of the Tribunal was explained to the applicant and at the conclusion of the hearing directions were made for the filing and serving of written submissions. I am satisfied that the provisions of s 38 (5) of the NCAT Act have been satisfactorily discharged especially in respect of the applicant's need to provide evidence and submissions to support her case. Only the applicant's evidence was adduced in the hearing. 2. The applicant filed written material in support of her application in the nature of evidence and submissions. 3. The respondent also filed and served s-58 documents and written submissions dated 25 June 2018 and 1 August 2018. The administrator's decisions 1. These are summarised at paragraphs [5] and [6] above. Both decisions quickly established that the applicant was an eligible victim in that she was the victim of an act of violence and had suffered an injury giving rise to a recognition payment. There were no adverse matters identified under s- 44 of the Act reducing or disentitling the applicant to a payment because of contributory or other contrary or adverse matters. In respect of the issue of whether the application gave rise to one or more claims the Assessor in first instance dealt with the matter in the following brief terms. 19. Based on the evidence, I find that sections 19 (1) (a) and 19 (1) (b) of the Act are satisfied on the balance of probabilities as the act apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence and involved violent conduct. … 23. In addition, I find that as the acts were committed against the applicant by the same person over a period of time, the acts are a series of related acts pursuant to section 19 (4) of the Act and, pursuant to section 19 (7) of the Act, constitute a single act of violence. 1. The Assessor went on to find that the applicant's injuries constituted: psychological trauma as a result of the act of violence. In respect of the recognition payment Category the Assessor found the following: 37. Based on the available evidence, I am of the view that the applicant is eligible for a category D recognition payment for an assault (not resulting in grievous bodily harm) (section 35 (4) (d) ). 1. That decision resulted in a recognition payment of $1,500.00 to the applicant. On internal review the applicant provided further evidence including evidence of additional incidents. The matter was deferred so that the applicant could provide evidence concerning the details of these additional incidents and also advise whether they were reported to police. The Act provides that incidents must be in effect verified by a police, government or health provider record establishing that the incident was reported or came to attention. Section 39 (2) provides: 39 Documentary evidence (1) An application for victims support is to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as may be required by the approved form. (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the documentary evidence to be required: (a) for an application for financial assistance for immediate needs under section 26—is documentary evidence (such as a medical or police report) sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence, and (b) for an application for financial assistance for economic loss under section 26 or 27 or for a recognition payment—is a police report or report of a Government agency and a medical, dental or counselling report verifying that the applicant or child who is the primary victim concerned has actually been injured as a result of an act of violence. (Emphasis added) 1. The internal review request raised the further incidents as well as evidence of more significant medical injuries or long term psychological consequences for the applicant. The Senior Assessor deals with the act of violence issues in the following manner: 13. I have considered the medical evidence that has been submitted and I note that (DKJ) has sustained both physical and psychological injuries as result of domestic violence. 14. Having had regard to the evidence, I am satisfied that (DKJ) was the primary victim of an act of violence that occurred during the period 1 October 2008 to 6 February 2017, consisting of a series of related acts. In addition, I find that as the acts were committed against the applicant by the same person over a period of time, the acts are a series of related acts pursuant to section 19 (4) of the Act, and pursuant to section 19 (7) of the Act, constitute a single act of violence. 1. The Senior Assessor went on to find that the applicant's injuries constituted: psychological trauma as a result of the act of violence. In respect of the recognition payment Category the Assessor found the following: 19. The appropriate category of recognition payment is determined by the nature of the offence or offences committed against the applicant during the act of violence and the degree of injury caused. 20. (DKJ) has submitted that the incidents of domestic violence included, among other things, being doused with fuel and knocked unconscious. (DKJ) states this incident took place in January or February 2015 and she is sure that police attended. 21. I have carefully reviewed all the police Event reports on file and unfortunately I do not find a record of this incident in the police reports. 1. Near the end of the decision the Senior Assessor notes that the allegation of being 'doused' with petrol by her former partner is recorded in the Counselling notes provided by the local hospital. The remainder of the decision addresses matters concerning whether the combined effects of the assaults constitutes an injury in the nature of grievous bodily harm or merely actual bodily harm. The decision also focuses on the physical injury of the dousing with fuel, and refers to there being: 25. …. no medical evidence regarding any burns or other injuries the applicant may have sustained as a result of being doused with fuel. 1. In conclusion paragraph [25] of the internal review states: Based on the medical evidence that is before me, although (DKJ) was clearly the victim of domestic violence I do not consider (DKJ's) physical and psychological injuries as recorded in the medical records, reach the high level of 'grievous' or 'really serious' bodily harm that is required for a category C recognition payment to be awards. I am therefore of the view that the applicant is eligible for an assault (not resulting in grievous bodily harm) (section 35 (4) (d) ). Applicant's arguments / evidence 1. At hearing the applicant gave evidence that she had been employed full time from 2007 to 2010 in hospitality and full time from 2010 to August 2016 in the community sector. The applicant's evidence being that the impact of the acts of violence prevented her from being able to remain employed in the manner that she had previously. 2. The applicant gave evidence that the perpetrator had been jailed or otherwise placed in custody three times following the breach of Apprehended Violence Orders issued to protect her. The applicant stated that her various diagnoses included a psychosis, post traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and depression. The impact of the perpetrators actions cause her to abandon her employment and there was evidence that he had contacted her through her work. 3. Evidence of injuries also included a broken collar bone following an assault in the home by the perpetrator, where the applicant fell. One incident involved the applicant's body being slammed in to the floor while being dragged out of the home. Another incident involved the perpetrator 'throwing' the applicant up a flight a stairs, where she was treated by a doctor in the A.C.T. Respondent's submissions 1. In initial written submissions the respondent stated that as s 51 limits the ground of review to matters concerning a recognition payment (as opposed to financial assistance under s-26 (1) (b) and (c)), the issue for consideration is whether a more beneficial payment can be approved. This would in effect limit the options on a successful review to a Category C, or Category B payment, with Category C (c) (an assault resulting in grievous bodily harm) being the only option available on the evidence as the claim is not based on either sexual assault or an assault on a child. 2. Various submissions extended to establishing that the applicant had not reported various instances to police or had failed to disclose the domestic violence context of the injuries. The applicant had submitted that she was unable to link these matters to the applicant as he was present at the time and was intimidated and otherwise unable to make a full report of the cause of many of her presentations in the period of the relationship. 3. The respondent relied on the Tribunal's analysis of the meaning of grievous bodily harm in the decisions of: BQG v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2015] NSWCATAD 63, CZU v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2017] NSWCATAD 240, and DEL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2017] NSWCATAD 376. 4. The respondent submitted that consistent with these decisions the applicant's evidence did not establish any injury arising from the act of violence that could be considered as grievous bodily harm. In addition some aspects of the applicant's psychological functions were submitted to be pre-existing further complicating the claim and reducing any argument that if such a level of harm existed then it was attributable to the act of violence. 5. However following matters raised by the Tribunal at hearing the respondent prepared further written submissions. These submissions addressed the possibility that the assessors had failed to properly consider all of the available evidence in determining that the claim was one act of violence being a series of related acts, rather that examine the evidence that even though the claim was based on many instances of violent conduct, there might be more than one suite of related acts constituting separate acts of violence. 6. The respondent conceded that the Tribunal has discretion at s-19 (5) to determine that acts of violence are not related. Section 19 is set out at [7] above. Section 19 (5) states: (5) An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated as related acts. 1. The respondent helpfully set out a chronology of incidents (totalling 12) ranging from 20 December 2007 to 8 February 2017. The issue for the Tribunal is to determine whether 'having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought to be treated as related acts'. Consideration 1. I note that it is highly unlikely that there would be any evident physical injuries arising from the applicant being doused with fuel. I make this point because the assessors have specifically noted this issue in the context where there was no evidence of the fuel being ignited. Notwithstanding that observation the incident would have been traumatic and potentially having a psychological impact for the applicant. 2. However, having considered all of the medical material on file, and noting the additional evidence given by the applicant at hearing, in my view consistent with the cases outlined at [31] above, the totality of the injuries of the applicant do not amount to an injury which would be described as grievous bodily harm. Even accepting the broken collar bone submission the medical evidence is insufficient to allow that matter to be verified as an injury with the long term consequences and of the nature as referred to in those cases at [31]. 3. The same finding applies to the other physical injuries concerning left forearm, hand pain, and ulnar. The psychological injury whilst long term and to some extent disabling, does not on my assessment of the evidence amount to being severely disabling, and therefore consistent with those cases equating to grievous bodily harm. 4. However the incidents all involve violent conduct, and it appears that some of them have a clear character which separates then from the others. Whilst all involve the same parties and involve violent conduct, the incidents on 21 January 2014, 20 February 2014, 28 December 2014, 29 April 2015 and 8 February 2017 are in my view distinct from the other seven incidents. 5. The five incidents referred to in [39] all occurred in circumstances where an enforceable Apprehended Violence Order was in place protecting the applicant. On two of these the perpetrator was convicted of breach AVO offences, and in respect of the 30 September 2013 incident he was convicted of a stalk / intimidate intend physical harm type offence. Further on 10 May 2016 another Order was applied for in response to the perpetrators actions on that day. The 9 February 2017 incident resulted in breach AVO matters also being before the Court. 6. Contrary to the submissions of the respondent, these instances involve different particular circumstances when contrasted with the other incidents. The particular circumstances being that these matters occurred in circumstances where there was an Order in force and as a result constitute a prima facie breach of that Order and its ensuing conditions. 7. The 12 or more instances over ten years all involve violent conduct perpetrated against the applicant by her boyfriend who later is described as being her ex-boyfriend as his actions continued beyond the initial relationship. As indicated above the parties are the same and it is conceivable as to why the matters were originally assessed and on review affirmed as being a series of related acts. The same perpetrator attacked the same victim 'one on one' in circumstances which would meet the broad definition as being domestic violence related. 8. The Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 removed or transferred a number of provisions from the Crimes Act 1900 into a separate piece of legislation. The legislature was mindful of the need to treat domestic and personal violence matters separate from ordinary offending behaviour and recognise the particular significance and impact of these behaviours on victims. The legislation contains an objects provision at s-9 which states: 9 Objects of Act in relation to domestic violence (1) The objects of this Act in relation to domestic violence are: (a) to ensure the safety and protection of all persons, including children, who experience or witness domestic violence, and (b) to reduce and prevent violence by a person against another person where a domestic relationship exists between those persons, and (c) to enact provisions that are consistent with certain principles underlying the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and (d) to enact provisions that are consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. (2) This Act aims to achieve those objects by: (a) empowering courts to make apprehended domestic violence orders to protect people from domestic violence, intimidation (including harassment) and stalking, and (b) ensuring that access to courts is as safe, speedy, inexpensive and simple as is consistent with justice. (3) In enacting this Act, Parliament recognises: (a) that domestic violence, in all its forms, is unacceptable behaviour, and (b) that domestic violence is predominantly perpetrated by men against women and children, and (c) that domestic violence occurs in all sectors of the community, and (d) that domestic violence extends beyond physical violence and may involve the exploitation of power imbalances and patterns of abuse over many years, and (e) that domestic violence occurs in traditional and non-traditional settings, and (f) the particularly vulnerable position of children who are exposed to domestic violence as victims or witnesses, and the impact that such exposure can have on their current and future physical, psychological and emotional well-being, and (f1) the particular impact of domestic violence on Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders, persons from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, persons from gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities, older persons and persons with disabilities, and (g) that domestic violence is best addressed through a co-ordinated legal and social response of assistance and prevention of violence and, in certain cases, may be the subject of appropriate intervention by the court. (4) A court that, or person who, exercises any power conferred by or under this Act in relation to domestic violence must be guided in the exercise of that power by the objects referred to in this section. 1. The following section deals with personal violence. In my view the offences committed against the applicant are all in the nature of domestic violence offences as defined by the domestic violence legislation but also the victims legislation (the Act) at s-19 (8). 2. The respondent submitted that: 22. Having regard to the particular circumstances of each incident described in the police reports, the respondent submits that there is no particular incident which ought to be considered a separate and distinct act of violence, as is allowable under section 19 (5). Given the nature of the incidents described the respondent submits that it would be an arbitrary exercise of the discretion contained in section 19 to sever any particular incident from the current application in order to treat it as a separate act of violence. 1. I have had particular regard to s-9 ss-(1) (a) and (b), ss-(2) (a) and ss (3) (a) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 in determining whether s-19 (5) of the Act is applicable to the matter before the Tribunal. I note that the Tribunal in conducting a review is determining the matter afresh. 2. Having regard to the matters under s-19 (5) and the totality of the evidence and material before me, and noting the analysis at [39] – [44], and [46] above, I find that the incidents occurring on 21 January 2014, 20 February 2014, 28 December 2014, 29 April 2015 and 8 February 2017 are a series of related acts for the purposes of s-19 (4) of the Act. However those acts are a distinctly different act of violence than the other seven instances occurring on 20 December 2017, 7 February 2008, 9 November 2010, 17 May 2013, 30 June 2013, 30 September 2013 and 10 May 2016. 3. In my view the group of seven instances referred to near the end of [47] should constitute the first claim based recognition payment act of violence (as a series of related acts), and the other five (dealing with the AVO contraventions and listed earlier in [47]) become an extra claim based on a series of related acts constituting a (separate) single act of violence. 4. An issue to determine is whether it is possible for the second identified act of violence / claim as set out at [48] to be considered in the one application to the Commissioner. The Act in my view provides minimal guidance on this issue. References appear throughout the Act to the term 'act of violence' rather than acts of violence. (Emphasis added). Section s -38 (1) (a) and s-43 (3) (a) and both refer to the matter in the singular. Section 38 deals with the making of an application for victims support and s-43 deals with the determination of applications. The term victims support is defined in s-18 of the Act. victims support means support in the form of approved counselling services, financial support or a recognition payment under the Scheme. 1. Section 38 concerns the making of applications for victims support. The section provides: 38 Applications for victims support (1) An application for victims support may be made by the following: (a) a victim of an act of violence, (b) a parent, step-parent or guardian of a primary victim who is a child, (c) any other person, on behalf of a victim, who has a genuine interest in the welfare of that victim. (2) The application is to be made to the Commissioner in the approved form, which is to be supplied by the Commissioner free of charge. 1. Section 38 (2) refers to the approved form for the making of an application. The application form utilised in the current matter was filed as pages 1-5 inclusive in the s-58 documents filed by the respondent. That form does not particularise any issues arising from the language of s-19 concerning how an act of violence is assessed or qualified as a single act, a series of related acts or a separate or unrelated act as contemplated by s-19 (5) of the Act. 2. The only issue of relevance appears at Part 4 of the form which is headed 'Part 4: Details of the act of violence.' Reference is made as to whether the act occurred over a specific period of time with an option to elect a date of commencement to date of completion or cessation of the violence. I cannot glean any further administrative details concerning the form which would resolve the issue of whether a single application can be made (administratively) for more than one act of violence, if such a situation arises from the decision maker's assessment of the evidence under s- 19 (5) of the Act. Likewise there is nothing relevant in any Regulation or Rule that I was aware of or brought to my attention. 3. The issue of whether a single administrative application for victims support can be made for multiple (unrelated) acts of violence was not addressed by the parties in written submissions. However I note that this was a live issue identified from the evidence considered at hearing and the fact that the Tribunal might find that there were unrelated acts contained within the application material was clearly a potential outcome of the hearing. In this regard I believe that both parties were on notice of this issue. The respondent's submissions cover the s-19 issues but do not address the administrative matters arising. Nothing has therefore been submitted as to the appropriate approach to manage the outcome of this review in any particular manner administratively or procedurally. 4. In my view the 'approved form' as provided in the current matter whilst referring to act of violence in the singular, does not state anywhere that a separate application needs to be made for a matter identified under s-19 (5) of the Act. 5. It would seem that the appropriate course of action is to make an order that the applicant receive an additional category D Recognition payment for the series of related acts (constituting a separate act of violence) as particularised at [39] of these reasons. 6. In the absence of any provision that the respondent has identified or alerted the Tribunal to, it seems that whilst the application form and the legislation refer to acts of violence in the singular, the preferred approach because of my finding under s-19 (5) would be for the second act of violence to be dealt with administratively under the single application. Such a course would appear to be consistent with the guiding principle governing the Tribunal under s-36 of the NCAT Act. 7. This would also be preferable to the Tribunal remitting the matter consistent with s-65 of the ADR Act, and or requiring the lodgement of a second application. That approach could invoke issues with the limitation period having expired on any fresh application, even if such an application has arisen from a finding in a matter already before the Tribunal. Findings 1. In accordance with s-19 (5) of the Act I find that the seven instances occurring on: 20 December 2007, 7 February 2008, 9 November 2010, 17 May 2013, 30 June 2013, 30 September 2013 and 10 May 2016, as a series of related acts constitute a single act of violence under the Act. 2. In accordance with s-19 (5) of the Act I find that the five instances occurring on: 21 January 2014, 20 February 2014, 28 December 2014, 29 April 2015 and 8 February 2017, as a series of related acts constitute a single act of violence under the Act. 3. Having regard to the totality of their evidence before me concerning injury and the impact of these two acts of violence on the applicant, I assess each matter as warranting a recognition payment in the nature of a Category D payment. Conclusion 1. For the reasons outlined above, and the decision of the respondent will be set aside. The import of this decision is that the respondent is to grant the applicant two recognition payments in the nature of Category D in the sum of $1,500.00 each. 2. If the applicant has already received one or part Category D recognition payment then the balance will be payable. Orders 1. The decision of the respondent dated 25 January 2018 is set aside. 2. Two recognition payments are provided by way of the giving of support under section 26 (1) (d) as Category D Recognition payments. 3. The applicant is to be provided with total recognition payments in the amount of $3,000.00 less any recognition payment amounts already paid. ********** I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Registrar I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 26 November 2018